Thomason v. Schweiker’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

17 federal appellate · 3 district ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 29 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Evaluating a request for approval of a fee. (1) When we evaluate a representative’s request for approval of a fee, we consider the purpose of the supplemental security income program, which is to assure a minimum level of income for the beneficiaries of the program, together with— (i) The extent and type of services the representative performed; (ii) The complexity of the case; (iii) The level of skill and competence required of the representative in giving the services; (iv) The amount of time the representative spent on the case; (v) The results the representative achieved; (vi) The level of review to which the claim was taken and the level of the review at which the representative became your representative; and (vii) The amount of fee the representative requests for his or her services, including any amount authorized or requested before, but not including the amount of any expenses he or she incurred. (2) Although we consider the amount of benefits, if any, that are payable, we do not base the amount of fee we authorize on the amount of the benefit alone, but on a consideration of all the factors listed in this section. The benefits payable in any claim are determined by specific pro visions of law and are unrelated to the efforts of the representative. We may authorize a fee even if no benefits are payable.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 656 F. Supp. 648 - Smith v. Bowen

2. “That the Secretary, through the decision of the ALJ, has the sole authority to set the fee, however, does not mean that he is free to set fees arbitrarily. As we mentioned in Garcia v. Neagle, 660 F.2d 983 (4th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1153 , 102 S.Ct. 1023 , 71 L.Ed.2d 309 (1982), ‘even where action is committed to absolute agency discretion by law, courts have assumed the power to review allegations that an agency exceeded its legal authority, acted unconstitutionally, or failed to follow its own regulations.’ Id. at 988. The appellant does not colorably claim that the fee award itself was improper on constitutional, statutory, or regulatory grounds. His challenge to the reasonableness of the fee, therefore, must fail.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Family Housing & Law Clinic of Franklin Pierce Law Center v. Heckler

3. “The appellant’s fifth amendment argument is predicated upon the appellant’s property interest in the contractual fee arrangement between the attorney and client. The contract is conditioned, however, on the statutory requirement that the fee be reasonable. Also implicit in the contract is the fact that the Secretary determines the reasonableness of the fee. The private interest of the attorney, therefore, is not in the twenty-five percent fee to which the claimant agreed, but to a reasonable fee set by the AU which is not to exceed twenty-five percent of back benefits. Id. at 336 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Siler v. Heckler