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← 692 So. 2d 1127 - Deumite v. State

692 So. 2d 1127 - Deumite v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1997

Citation profile

8
cited by 8 later decisions
1
states following
July 2018
most recently cited

8 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 8 later decisions — most recently July 2018

8 state decisions

50199720002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on 549 So. 2d 840 - Rosell v. Esco · 617 So. 2d 880 - Stobart v. State Through DOTD · 579 So. 2d 931 - Socorro v. City of New Orleans · 395 So. 2d 727 - Shipp v. City of Alexandria · Voisin's Oyster House, Inc. v. Jesse J. Guidry, Louisiana Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, and Louisiana Wildlife and Fisheries Commission

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “; (3) the injury-causing instrumentality must be of the type normally encountered in the”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “The Recreational Use Statutes are in derogation of common or natural right and, therefore, are to be strictly interpreted, and must not be extended beyond their obvious meaning. The rule that statutes in derogation of natural or common right are to be strictly interpreted is now generally recognized as being a corollary of the rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be interpreted strictly. This rule is so well settled that it must be presumed that the legislature acted with full knowledge of the strict interpretation of statutes of this nature. The great majority of courts in other states interpreting recreational use statutes have held that because the statutes are in derogation of the common law and because they limit the duties of landowners in the face of a general expansion of premises liability principles, they must be strictly construed. For the purpose of this rule, "common law" should be understood to carry its broadest meaning, i.e., the existing body of law rather than the narrower definition of an ancient body of Anglo-American judge-made principles. Accordingly, where there is any doubt about the intent or meaning of laws in derogation of common law or common right, such as the Recreational Use Statutes, the statutes are given the effect which makes the least rather than the most change in the existing body of law. Furthermore, the Recreational Use Statutes constitute grants of immunities or advantages to a special class of landowners against t”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  3. “we must decide whether the State can be immune from liability for damages incurred because of the action or inaction of one of its executive department agencies and, at the same time, be not immune from liability for the same damages because the action or inaction of another executive department agency was also involved. To paraphrase an old saying, the State cannot be a little bit immune.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.