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← 692 So. 2d 462 - State v. Giovengo

692 So. 2d 462 - State v. Giovengo’s Empirical Analysis

1997

Citation profile

3
cited by 3 later decisions
2
states following
January 2016
most recently cited

1 federal appellate · 2 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on 640 So. 2d 561 - State v. Moore · State v. Moore · 395 So. 2d 319 - State v. McCoy · 549 So. 2d 884 - State v. Cohen · Schum v. Marion T. Fannaly, Inc.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 3 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Contrary to the defendant's argument, La.R.S. 32:81(A) has already been held to be constitutionally specific. In State v. Cohen, 549 So.2d 884 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1989), writ denied, 559 So.2d 135 (La. 1990), a state trooper pulled over the defendant for following too closely behind another car. In the course of events, a search was conducted on the defendant's car; this search yielded 180 pounds of marijuana compressed in suitcases in the trunk. On appeal, one of the defendant's arguments was that the language of the statute was unconstitutionally vague. Citing State v. McCoy, 395 So.2d 319 (La.1980), the court discussed the test on the constitutionality of a statute when the defendant is arguing a vagueness problem: Words used in statutes need not have the same precision as mathematical symbols. Due process requires only that the language of a statute have generally accepted meaning so that a person of ordinary and reasonable intelligence is capable of discerning its proscriptions and is given fair notice of the conduct which is forbidden by its terms. (citations omitted.) Cohen, 549 So.2d at 886 . Thus, in applying the aforementioned standard to La.R.S. 32:81(A), the court held that the statute was constitutionally specific: Here, the language of the statute, given a generally accepted meaning and read in pari materia, would indicate that a following car should leave enough room in case the car in front stopped suddenly. Id. In this case, the officer did not believe that the d”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage
  2. “A. The driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such vehicle and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.