State v. Planco’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

11 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 11 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Article 1, § 20 of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, prohibits "cruel, excessive, or unusual punishment." A sentence which falls within the statutory limits may nevertheless be excessive under the circumstances. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762 (La.1979); State v. Naquin, 527 So.2d 601 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1988). To constitute an excessive sentence this court must find that the penalty is so grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime as to shock our sense of justice or that the sentence makes no measurable contribution to acceptable penal goals and, therefore, is nothing more than needless imposition of pain and suffering. State v. Campbell, 404 So.2d 1205 (La.1981); State v. Everett, 530 So.2d 615 (La.App. 3 Cir. 1988), writ denied, 536 So.2d 1233 (La. 1989). The trial judge is given wide discretion in imposing a sentence, and a sentence imposed within the statutory limits will not be deemed excessive in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Howard, 414 So.2d 1210, 1217 (La.1982).”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 866 So. 2d 1040 - State v. Todd · 827 So. 2d 569 - State v. Suire

2. “A plea bargain is a contract between the state and one accused of a crime. State v. Nall, 379 So.2d 731 (La.1980); State v. Waguespack, 589 So.2d 1079 (La.App. 1st Cir.1991), writ denied, 596 So.2d 209 (La.1992). In viewing a plea bargain as a contract, the Louisiana Supreme Court has evaluated guilty plea agreements under general Civil Code rules of obligations. See, e.g., State v. Lewis, 539 So.2d 1199 (La.1989). An obligation or contract cannot exist without a lawful cause. LSA-C.C. Art. 1966. Cause is the reason why a party obligates himself. LSA-C.C. Art. 1967. In the instant case, it is obvious that one of the reasons why the defendant entered the plea bargain was that he would have the right to appeal any sentence the court imposed. The cause of an obligation is unlawful when the enforcement of the obligation would produce a result prohibited by law or against public policy. LSA-C.C. Art. 1968. A contract is absolutely null when it violates a rule of public order. LSA-C.C. Art. 2030. Because the plea agreement, if enforced, would produce a result prohibited by law and violate a rule of public order, it is absolutely null. Stated differently, the legislature has indicated that in cases where the defendant has agreed to a sentence cap or to a specific sentence, no appeal should lie. If we were to review the sentence and thereby implicitly countenance this bargain which allowed an appeal after an agreed-to sentence, we would circumvent the legislative will. Obviously, the”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 754 So. 2d 1068 - State v. Shipp

3. “Finding that a review of defendant's sentence for constitutional excessiveness is "prohibited by law" and "violate[s] a rule of public order" is wrong. The constitution mandates the review and public order is best served by a decision rather than a repeat of the journey down the road already traveled. The contract agreed to by the defendant included his right to appeal any sentence as excessive. Everyone but this court is ready to fulfill that agreement. This case is analogous to State v. Crosby, 338 So.2d 584 (La.1976), and its progeny, which allows defendants to enter qualified guilty pleas while reserving the right to appellate review of pre-plea errors.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 754 So. 2d 1068 - State v. Shipp