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← 692 SW2D 78 - Cisneros v. State

Cisneros v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1985

Citation profile

70
cited by 70 later decisions
1
states following
April 2012
most recently cited

70 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 70 later decisions — most recently April 2012 · most notably Montoya v. State (1987), Camacho v. State (1993)

70 state decisions

3501985199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Miranda v. State of Arizona Vignera · Doyle v. Ohio · Jenkins v. Anderson · Brown v. United States · Anderson v. Charles

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 70 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “In the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in the Miranda warnings, a state does not violate due process of law by permitting cross-examination as to post-arrest silence when a defendant chooses to take the stand. A state is entitled, in such situations, to leave to the judge and jury under its own rules of evidence the resolution of the extent to which post-arrest silence may be deemed to impeach a criminal defendant’s own testimony.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “While the Fifth Amendment prevents the prosecution from commenting on the silence of a defendant who asserts the right to remain silent during his criminal trial, it is not violated when a defendant, who testifies in his own defense, is impeached with his prior silence.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. ““It is well established that a defendant who takes the stand as a witness on the trial on the merits may be cross-examined and impeached in the same manner as any other witnesses. McCormick and Ray, Texas Law of Evidence, Vol. I, Chapter 8, § 643, p. 487; 1 Branch’s Ann. P.C., 2nd Ed., § 168, p. 170, and cases there cited; 62 Tex.Jur.2d, Witnesses, § 205, p. 130; Shelton v. State, 397 S.W. 2d 850 (Tex.Cr.App.1965); Cerda v. State, 33 Tex.Cr.R. 458 , 26 S.W. 992 (1894). See also Davis v. State, 478 S.W.2d 958 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Dunlap v. State, 440 S.W.2d 672 (Tex.Cr.App.1969). Thus such a defendant may be contradicted, impeached, discredited, attacked, sustained, bolstered up, made to give evidence against himself, cross-examined as to new matter and treated in every respect as any other witness except when there are overriding constitutional and statutory provisions. Taylor v. State, 612 S.W.2d 566 (Tex.Cr.App.1981); Williams v. State, 607 S.W.2d 577 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Myre v. State, 545 S.W.2d 820 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); Sensabaugh v. State, 426 S.W.2d 224 (Tex.Cr.App.1968). See also Valerio v. State, 494 S.W.2d 892 (Tex.Cr.App.1973); Black v. State, 440 S.W.2d 668 (Tex.Cr.App.1968); Gonzales v. State, 160 Tex.Cr.R. 548 , 272 S.W.2d 524 (1954). “Once the defendant testifies ‘[t]he interests of the other party and regard for the function of the courts of justice to ascertain the truth become relevant, and prevail in the balance of considerations determining the scope and limits o”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.