695 So. 2d 1293 - Taylor v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 7 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"`It is rudimentary, and should require no citation of authority, that the one essential element which distinguishes first-degree murder from second-degree murder is premeditation. The term "design" as mentioned in each of the two degrees, means the specific intent to kill, and in second-degree murder such specific intent may, or may not, be present. The difference is, that in second-degree murder, if it is present, it is not premeditated. Thus, premeditation is the ever-present distinguishing factor; and no doubt should be left in the minds of the jury as to its complete and full legal import. No door should be left open for confusion as to what it means. Without the full and complete definition of premeditation, the jury would have neither an understanding of what they were looking for to determine it, nor what to exclude to reject it.' [Citation omitted.] "Failure to define `premeditation' in a first degree murder charge is reversible error, even where no objection was made by the defendant. [Citation omitted.]" 276 So. 2d at 18-19 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 33 Kan. App. 2d 391 - State v. Patton

2. “It is well established that an attorney may not concede guilt for any crimes to which the defendant has pled `not guilty' unless the court finds that the defendant understands the consequences of the concession, because it is the functional equivalent of a guilty plea.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 857 So. 2d 172 - Nixon v. State

3. “While counsel may believe it tactically wise to stipulate to a particular element of a charge or to issues of proof, an attorney may not stipulate to facts which amount to the `functional equivalent' of a guilty plea without [the defendant's] consent.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 857 So. 2d 172 - Nixon v. State