¶1The question is whether an assault with one’s fists may be considered an assault with a dangerous instrument so as to constitute assault in the first degree. K.R.S. 508.010.
¶2Appellant was sentenced to imprisonment for 20 years upon his conviction of first-degree assault under an instruction which permitted a finding of guilt if the jury believed that he intended to cause serious physical injury to the victim by *864beating her with his fists and feet and also believed that his fists and feet were dangerous instruments.
¶3A jury could reasonably conclude from the evidence that appellant had severely beaten the victim. At the time of trial, she had not regained consciousness.
¶4K.R.S. 508.010 provides that a person is guilty of first-degree assault when he intentionally causes serious physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon or a dangerous instrument.
¶5K.R.S. 500.080(3) defines “dangerous instrument” to mean any instrument, article or substance which, under the circumstances in which it is used, attempted to be used, or threatened to be used, is readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury.
¶6There is no question but that appellant’s fists, under the circumstances in which they were used, were readily capable of, and did in fact, cause a serious physical injury. The question is whether his fists constituted an instrument, an article, or a substance within the meaning of K.R.S. 508.010.
¶7We have not been cited any Kentucky case which is dispositive of the issue. Cases, in this state and elsewhere, have held that shoes worn on the feet can be used in such a manner as to render them dangerous instruments. Jones v. Commonwealth, Ky., 256 S.W.2d 520 (1953); Grass v. People, 172 Colo. 223, 471 P.2d 602 (1970).
¶8A shoe, of course, is something apart from the body, and thus is more susceptible of classification as an instrument or an article than is a fist.
¶9In common usage, hands and feet are not described as substances nor are they regarded as articles. Whether they might be considered as instruments depends upon the sense in which that word is used. In one sense, an instrument is anything by means of which something is accomplished. War, for example, is an instrument of destruction. In another sense, the word instrument refers to a tool or to an implement.
¶10The question is not whether the word instrument can be construed to include a person’s fists or feet, but whether the general assembly intended them to be so included. A literal reading of the statute is as readily adaptable to one meaning as the other. The statute is ambiguous to this extent.
¶11There is no real evidence as to the legislative intent. The fact that the statute contains three words, “instrument, article or substance” all of which are commonly used to refer to something other than a part of the human body, may be said to indicate that each of the three words was used to refer to a specific object other than a part of the human body.
¶12The fact that a serious physical injury inflicted by the fists would clearly constitute assault in the second degree might be takpn as an indication of a legislative intent that assault in the first degree by means of a dangerous instrument contemplated something more than striking with fists.
¶13In truth, however, it is simply not clear whether the general assembly intended that fists be considered to be a dangerous instrument as that term is used in K.R.S. 508.010. In such cases, we follow the rule of lenity which is to give to the appellant the benefit of the doubt. Haymon v. Commonwealth, Ky., 657 S.W.2d 239 (1983).
¶14Accordingly, we hold that the instruction which authorized conviction if the jury believed appellant’s fists and feet were dangerous instruments was erroneous.
¶15The judgment is reversed, and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.