Sudds v. Maggio’s Empirical Analysis
696 F.2d 415 · 1983
Citation profile
7 federal appellate · 1 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 20 later decisions — most recently August 2015
7 federal appellate · 1 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Rideout v. United States · Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. · Ohio State Board of Education v. Reed · United States v. Sealy, Inc. · Brooks v. Tennessee
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 20 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““We come now to Sudds’ contention that the same prior conviction cannot be used to enhance two subsequent convictions. Sudds cites no case for this proposition, nor can we find any to support it. Since double jeopardy principles are not offended by the use of a prior felony conviction to enhance punishment, Woodard [v. Beto, 447 F.2d 103 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 957 , 92 S.Ct. 325 , 30 L.Ed.2d 275 (1971)]; Price v. Allgood, 369 F.2d 376 (5th Cir.1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 998 , 87 S.Ct. 1321 , 18 L.Ed.2d 349 (1967) (upholding Louisiana statute), we see no logical reason why it should be impermissible to use the same prior conviction to enhance sentences on more than one subsequent conviction. Another circuit has reached the same conclusion. Montgomery v. Bordenkircher, 620 F.2d 127 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 857 , 101 S.Ct. 155 , 66 L.Ed.2d 71 (1980). Such a restriction would greatly reduce the utility of tiered habitual offender statutes (where the sentence is enhanced to one degree for the second conviction, to another degree for the third, and so on), since a criminal who was convicted as a second offender could not then be convicted as a third offender until he had committed two more crimes.””
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“is within the discretion of the trial court, and it does not provide a basis for habeas corpus relief unless the disqualifying fact was so prejudicial that the refusal deprived the petitioner of a fundamentally fair trial.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Bridge v. Lynaugh
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.