¶1 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
¶2 Troy Lamont Burrell seeks to appeal the district court’s orders dismissing with- • out prejudice his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) action for failure to adequately comply with the magistrate judge’s order directing Burrell to particularize the complaint, and denying Burrell’s motion to alter or amend the judgment. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (20Í2), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2012); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-47, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). Because the deficiencies identified by the district court may be remedied by the filing of an amended complaint, we conclude that the orders Burrell seeks to appeal are neither final orders nor appeal-able interlocutory or collateral orders. Goode v. Cent. Va. Legal Aid Soc’y, Inc., 807 F.3d 619, 623-24 (4th Cir. 2015); Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392, 10 F.3d 1064, 1066-67 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Bridges v. Dep’t of Md. State Police, 441 F.3d 197, 207 (4th Cir. 2006) (“The denial of reconsideration of a nonappealable order is not a final order”). Accordingly, we deny Burrell leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. * We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
¶3 DISMISSED
¶4 We do not remand this matter to the district court, because the court previously afforded Burrell the opportunity to amend his complaint. Cf. Goode, 807 F.3d at 629-30.