Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

696 So. 2d 386

Docket No. 96-1446.

Waters v. Williams

Kenneth WATERS and Guy Skipper, Appellants, v. Nettie WILLIAMS, Appellee.

District Court of Appeal of Florida

Decided May 22, 1997.

Rehearing Denied July 3, 1997.

District Court of Appeal of Florida · decided 1997-05-22

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently September 2002

3 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“The presumption provides a prima facie case which shifts to the defendant the burden to go forward with the evidence to contradict or rebut the fact presumed. When the defendant produces evidence which fairly and reasonably tends to show that the real fact is not as presumed, the impact of "the presumption is dissipated." Whether the ultimate fact has been established must then be decided by the jury from all of the evidence before it without the aid of the presumption. At this point the entire matter should be deposited with the trier of facts to reconcile the conflicts and evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Murray v. Schreiner

“sufficient for the jury to properly infer a lack of negligence.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including Murray v. Schreiner

Relies on 174 So. 2d 26 - Gulle v. Boggs · Pensacola Transit Co. v. Denton

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1997-05-22

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1*387 Christopher R. Johnson and Belinda B. De Koan of Fuller, Johnson & Farrell, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellants.

¶2James F. McKenzie and Michael S. Burtt of McKenzie & Soloway, P.A., Pensacola, for Appellee.

¶3PER CURIAM.

¶4This appeal arises from an order of the trial court granting Appellee's motion for new trial as to damages following a directed verdict ruling on liability. Appellants make two arguments on appeal: (1) that the trial court erred in granting a new trial on damages, and (2) that the trial court erred in granting Appellee's motion for directed verdict on liability. We hold that the trial court erred in directing a verdict on liability. We do not, therefore, need to address the first issue raised. We reverse and remand for a new trial as to both liability and damages.

¶5The law is well established that where a defendant runs into the rear of a plaintiff's automobile while plaintiff is stopped for a traffic light, there is a presumption of negligence of the defendant on which the plaintiff would be entitled to recover in the absence of explanation by the defendant. Pensacola Transit Co. v. Denton,119 So.2d 296, 297 (Fla. 1st DCA 1960). When the defendant introduces evidence which fairly and reasonably tends to show that the real fact is not as presumed, then the impact of the presumption is dissipated and the issue of negligence becomes a jury question. Gulle v. Boggs,174 So.2d 26 (Fla.1965).

¶6Here, the law raised a presumption that Appellant was negligent when he drove into the rear of Appellee's car. Appellant, however, effectively rebutted this presumption by presenting evidence that he experienced brake failure as he attempted to stop. Such evidence was sufficient for the jury to properly infer a lack of negligence on Appellant's part. See, e.g., Gulle,174 So.2d at 27 (defendant's evidence that his brakes failed and that he had no alternate course of action but to collide with plaintiff rebutted the presumption of negligence and required the issue to be presented to the jury); Pensacola Transit Co.,119 So.2d at 297 (defendant's testimony that his brakes "didn't take" and did not function was sufficient to rebut the presumption of negligence and send the issue to the jury). Thus, the trial court erred in removing the negligence question from the jury.

¶7Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND the case for a new trial on the issues of Appellants' liability and damages.

¶8BOOTH, WOLF and VAN NORTWICK, JJ., concur.

/696/so2d/386 · .json · Public domain