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← 697 F.2d 38 - United States v. Cobb

United States v. Cobb’s Empirical Analysis

697 F.2d 38 · 1982

Citation profile

98
cited by 98 later decisions
4
cited 4 times by the Supreme Court
1
states following
May 2017
most recently cited

78 federal appellate · 3 district · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 98 later decisions (4 by the Supreme Court) — most recently May 2017 · most notably Henderson v. United States (1986), United States v. Janik (1983)

78 federal appellate · 3 district · 1 state decisions

8201982199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (§ 101 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974) · 18 U.S.C. § 3501 · 18 U.S.C. § 922 (Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act)

Relies on United States v. Brim · United States v. Bufalino · United States v. Cobb

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 98 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “(1) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the defendant, including but not limited to ... (F) delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion of the hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such' motion ... (J) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty days, during which any proceeding concerning the defendant is actually under advisement by the court ...”
    9 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “In using the words 'prompt disposition', the committee intends to make it clear that, in excluding time between filing and disposition on the papers, the Committee does not intend to permit circumvention of the 30-days, 'under advisement' provision contained in Subsection (h)(1)(J). Indeed, if motions are so simple or routine that they do not require a hearing, necessary advisement time should be considerably less than 30 days.”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[o]n a pretrial motion Congress intended to exclude under (F) only such time as was reasonably necessary for the fair processing of the motion. We conclude that the period of allowable excludable delay applicable to a pretrial motion begins automatically with the making of the motion and runs for a period of time that is “reasonably necessary ” to conclude a hearing or to complete the submission of the matter to the court for decision. Under this view, long postponements of hearing dates, unless reasonably necessary, would not qualify as excludable time, nor would unnecessarily long extensions of time for the submission of papers.”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.