¶1specially concurring.
¶2I specially concur.
¶3Although I agree with the result reached by the majority, in my view, this case does not require that we make a choice between Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 85 S.Ct. 824, 13 L.Ed.2d 759 (1965) and People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748 (1978). See also Commonwealth v. Soares, 377 Mass. 461, 387 N.E.2d 499 (1979). Even if this court were to adopt the more liberal rule of Wheeler, here, as in People v. Smith, 622 P.2d 90 (Colo.App.1980), the defendant has been denied no right.
¶4The record shows that there were four persons with Spanish surnames who were peremptorily challenged by the parties. One was excused by the defendant, and three were excused by the People. One of the three prospective jurors excused by the People stated on voir dire that when he had been discharged from employment, he felt like killing someone and could understand how someone in that situation might want to shoot somebody. The second prospective juror excused by the People had a good friend who had recently been charged with murder in Denver, the case was concluded, and the juror expressed disbelief that his friend was guilty of the offense. It is difficult to believe that any prosecutor would permit two such jurors to serve on the panel in a case such as this.
¶5Although the People’s reasons for excluding the third prospective juror are not clear, it is my view that the peremptory challenge of one juror does not equate with a “systematic” exclusion of minority group members. I am not ready either to “embrace” or to reject the reasoning in Swain v. Alabama, supra,on a record which does not compel us to address the issue. I adhere to the views expressed in People v. Smith, supra.