Doe v. Boland’s Empirical Analysis
698 F.3d 877 · 2012
Citation profile
4 federal appellate · 4 district · 5 state decisions
Relationships
Applies 11 U.S.C. § 363 · 16 U.S.C. § 2613 · 18 U.S.C. § 2252A (§ 101 of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996) · 18 U.S.C. § 2255 · 18 U.S.C. § 2256 · 18 U.S.C. § 2259 (§ 40113 of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994) · 7 U.S.C. § 13B
Relies on Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife · New York v. Ferber · Ashcroft Attorney General v. Free Speech Coalition · United States v. Stevens · Osborne v. Ohio
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 19 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Any person who, while a minor, was a victim of a violation of section ... 2251 [among others] ... and who suffers personal injury as a result of such violation ... may sue in any appropriate United States District Court and shall recover the actual damages such person sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee. Any person as described in the preceding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less than $150,000 in value.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“Like a defamatory statement, pornography injures a child's reputation and emotional well-being, and violates the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. Morphed images are of a piece, offering a difference in degree of injury but not in kind. Boland created lasting images of Doe and Roe, two identifiable children, purporting to engage in sexually explicit activity. If the point of Boland's exercise was to demonstrate that the naked eye cannot distinguish morphed images of child pornography from real child pornography, as he claims it was, that goes a long way toward confirming that morphed images may create many of the same reputational, emotional and privacy injuries as actual pornography. And like defamation, those harms are "personal injuries." * * * In this instance, the plaintiffs became victims of Boland's conduct at the same time that they suffered injuries, namely the moment Boland created the morphed images with their likenesses.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“Even if Doe and Roe never see the images, the specter of pornographic images will cause them "continuing harm by haunting [them] in years to come." As a result, it is immaterial that Boland never displayed these images outside of a courtroom and never transmitted them electronically. The creation and initial publication of the images itself harmed Jane Doe and Jane Roe, and that is enough to remove Boland's actions from the protections of the First Amendment.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.