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← 698 F.3d 910 - Waldman v. Stone

Waldman v. Stone’s Empirical Analysis

698 F.3d 910 · 2012

Citation profile

68
cited by 68 later decisions
3
cited 3 times by the Supreme Court
1
states following
December 2020
most recently cited

11 federal appellate · 4 district · 1 state decisions

Relationships

Applies 11 U.S.C. § 502 · 11 U.S.C. § 506 · 11 U.S.C. § 547 · 28 U.S.C. § 1334 · 28 U.S.C. § 157

Relies on Anderson v. City of Bessemer City · Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. · Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg · Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor · Celotex Corporation v. Edwards

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 68 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “Stem’s limited holding stated the following: When a claim is “a state law action independent of the federal bankruptcy law and not necessarily resolvable by a ruling on the creditor’s proof of claim in bankruptcy,” the bankruptcy court cannot enter final judgment. Id. at 2611. In those cases, the bankruptcy court may only enter proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Ibid.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “Following the genesis of the modern bankruptcy system, the Supreme Court clarified that “Article III, § l’s guarantee of an independent and impartial adjudication by the federal judiciary of matters within the judicial power of the United States ... serves to protect primarily personal, rather than structural, interests.” Stem further made clear that § 157 “does not implicate questions of subject matter jurisdiction.” Accordingly, “as a personal right, Article Ill’s guarantee of an impartial and independent federal adjudication is subject to waiver.” And in fact, § 157(c)(2) expressly provides that bankruptcy courts may enter final judgments in non-core proceedings “with the consent of all the parties to the proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 157 (c)(2). If consent permits a non-Article III judge to decide finally a non-core proceeding, then it surely permits the same judge to decide a core proceeding in which he would, absent consent, be dis-entitled to enter final judgment. The only question, then, is whether EBIA did in fact consent to the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “A claim is “related to” a bankruptcy case if the “outcome of that [claim] could conceivably have any effect on the estate being administered in bankruptcy.” Lindsey v. O’Brien, Tanski, Tanzer and Young Health Care Providers of Conn. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 86 F.3d 482, 489 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d Cir. 1984)). Each of Stone’s claims will have an effect on his estate here. His disal-lowance claims challenge the validity of debts that Waldman has sought to enforce in bankruptcy. And a damages award on Stone’s affirmative claims would provide assets for his other creditors. See Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300 , 307 n.5, 115 S.Ct. 1493 , 131 L.Ed.2d 403 (1995) (“related to” jurisdiction includes causes of action owned by the debtor that become property of the estate). Thus, the federal courts have jurisdiction over all of Stone’s claims notwithstanding their state-law basis.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.