698 So. 2d 1160 - Robinson v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 5 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"`"`(1) The test for voluntariness involves a consideration of the totality of the circumstances. (2) "The admissibility of confessions is for the court, their credibility is for the jury." (3) Where the voluntariness inquiry presents conflicting evidence and the trial judge finds that the confession was voluntarily made, great weight must be given his judgment. "(W)here there is a genuine conflict of evidence great reliance must be placed upon the finder of fact." (4) This finding will not be disturbed on appeal unless the appellate court is convinced that the conclusion is palpably contrary to the great weight of the evidence and manifestly wrong. (5) Even where there is credible testimony to the contrary, if the evidence is fairly capable of supporting the inference that the rules of freedom and voluntariness were observed, the ruling of the trial court need only be supported by substantial evidence and not to a moral certainty. "Review of the court's action is limited to determining whether its finding was clearly erroneous."'"'"”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Pressley v. State · 728 So. 2d 691 - Farrior v. State

2. “"The general rule is that for a confession to be admissible the state must show that the defendant was advised of his rights, as required by Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), and its progeny, and that the defendant gave the statement after making a voluntary and knowing waiver of those rights. Bush v. State , 523 So.2d 538 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988); Magwood v. State , 494 So.2d 124 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985), aff'd, 494 So.2d 154 (Ala. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 995 , 107 S.Ct. 599 , 93 L.Ed.2d 599 (1986)."”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Pressley v. State · 728 So. 2d 691 - Farrior v. State

3. ““The facts show that during the first interrogation of [Robinson], which occurred on November 5, 1992, he made a request for counsel. Specifically, [Robinson] told Detective Mike Wallace that he did not want to answer any more questions until he had an attorney present. This statement was sufficient to be considered a clear and unequivocal request for counsel. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 , 114 S.Ct. 2350 , 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994); [Arizona v.] Roberson, [ 486 U.S. 675 , 108 S.Ct. 2093 , 100 L.Ed.2d 704 (1988) ]. The investigating officer honored this request and immediately terminated questioning. However, on November 6, 1992, [Robinson] made a confession, in which he admitted to participating in the bank robbery. No attorney was present when [Robinson] made this confession. “Because [Robinson] had requested counsel and because his confession was given after this request, the prosecution had the burden of proving that [Robinson] initiated the further contact and that he voluntarily and knowingly waived his previously asserted right to be represented by counsel. The only testimony that supports the contention that [Robinson] initiated further contact was given by Detective Fisher, who stated that he ‘didn’t go and talk to [Robinson] because someone told me that [Robinson] — someone in the jail, and I’m not really sure, honestly, I’m not — that [Robinson] requested to talk to me.’ According to Fisher, this incident happened while he was questioning [a code-fendant].”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Ex Parte Williams