McArtor v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1985
Citation profile
34 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 34 later decisions — most recently June 2010 · most notably Parker Land & Cattle Co. v. Wyoming Game & Fish Commission (1993), Campbell v. State (1985)
34 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Rose v. Locke · Sorenson v. State · Sanchez v. State · Nehring v. Russell · Civic Ass'n of Wyoming v. Railway Motor Fuels, Inc.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 34 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(d) Appellant contends that the provisions of § 6-2-301, W.S.1977 (§ 6-63.5, W.S.1957) should control over § 11-3-105, W.S.1977 (§ 11-28, W.S.1957) because it is the more specific of the two and they both cover the same subject. We have often stated that a special statute will govern where a general statute is inconsistent with a special statute pertaining to the same subject matter. City of Rock Springs v. Police Protection Association, Wyo., 610 P.2d 975 (1980); Department of Revenue and Taxation v. Irvine, Wyo., 589 P.2d 1295 (1979); Thomas v. State, Wyo., 562 P.2d 1287 (1977). However, appellant has not furnished us with any authority reflecting support for application of such rule to this instance. And it must be remembered that such is a rule of construction to which resort is had, as with all other rules of construction, only for the purpose of ascertaining legislative intent. Wyoming State Department of Education v. Barber, Wyo., 649 P.2d 681 (1982); Houghton Brothers v. Yocum, 40 Wyo. 57 , 274 P. 10 (1929). In this instance, the legislative intent to continue the operative functions of § 14-3-105 (§ 14 — 28) was manifested as noted supra. The propriety of applying any rule of construction to further ascertain legislative intent would seem to be futile. Beyond that, it is not immediately discernible as to which of the two statutes is the more specific. Sexual intrusion or penetration is an element of § 6-2-304 (§ 6-63.5) but is not a necessary element of § 14-3-105 (§”
3 later decisions quote this exact passagee.g. DeSpain v. State · Pierson v. State“Any person knowingly taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with any child or knowingly causing or encouraging any child to cause or encourage another child to commit with him any immoral or indecent act is guilty of a felony, and upon conviction shall be fined not less than one hundred dollars ($100.00) nor more than one thousand dollars ($1,000.00) or imprisoned in the penitentiary not more than ten (10) years, or both.”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage“§ 6-2-3022. Sexual Assault in the first degree. (a) Any actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits a sexual assault in the first degree if; (i) The actor causes submission of the victim through the actual application, reasonably calculated to cause submission of the victim, of physical force or forcible confinement; (i) The actor causes submission of the victim by threat of death, serious bodily injury, extreme physical pain or kidnapping to be inflicted on anyone and the victim reasonably believes that the actor has the present ability to execute these threats; (@i) The victim is physically helpless, and the actor knows or reasonably should know that the victim is physically helpless and that the victim has not consented; or (iv) The actor knows or reasonably should know that the victim through a mental illness, mental deficiency or developmental disability is incapable of appraising the nature of the victim's conduct. § 6-2-3038. Sexual Assault in the second degree. (a) Any actor who inflicts sexual intrusion on a victim commits sexual assault in the second degree if, under cireumstances not constituting sexual assault in the first degree: (1) The actor causes submission of the victim by threatening to retaliate in the future against the victim or the victim's spouse, parents, brothers, sisters or children, and the victim reasonably believes the actor will execute this threat. "To retaliate" includes threats of kidnapping, death, serious bodily injury or extrem”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissente.g. Misenheimer v. State
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.