State v. Edmondson’s Empirical Analysis
1997
Citation profile
3
cited by 3 later decisions
1
states following
February 2003
most recently cited
3 state decisions
Relationships
Relies on Kastigar v. United States · Murphy v. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor · Shotwell Manufacturing Company v. United States · State v. Wilson · Cape v. Francis
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 3 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[W]e hold the constitutional rule to be that a state witness may not be compelled to give testimony which may be incriminating under federal law unless the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any manner by |5federal officials in connection with a criminal prosecution against him. We conclude, moreover, that in order to implement this constitutional rule and accommodate the interests of the State and Federal Governments in investigating and prosecuting crime, the Federal Government must be prohibited from making any such use of compelled testimony and its fruits. This exclusionary rule, while permitting the States to secure information necessary for effective law enforcement, leaves the witness and the Federal Government in substantially the same position as if the witness had claimed his privilege in the absence of a state grant of immunity. [Footnote omitted.] Murphy, 378 U.S. at 79 , 84 S.Ct. at 1609-1610 . The holding in Murphy was cited with approval in State v. Wallace, 321 So.2d 349, 357 (La.1975) (on rehearing), wherein the Louisiana Supreme Court stated: But the prosecution may compel a witness to testify against himself only if it guarantees that his testimony will not be used against him in any judicial proceedings, except for perjury in giving such testimony; an immunity statute is constitutional only if its scope is coextensive with the privilege against self-incrimination. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 , 92 S.Ct. 1653 , 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“In our view, since transactional immunity would prevent any prosecution for the charged offense, a motion to quash would be the correct procedural vehicle to challenge an indictment which allegedly violated a grant of transactional immunity. On the other hand, if only use plus derivative use immunity was granted, we find that the correct procedure by which to challenge an indictment allegedly returned in violation of a grant of use plus derivative use immunity would be a motion to suppress any evidence obtained as a result of the grant of immunity, or any evidence derived directly or indirectly therefrom.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“This agreement prohibits any prosecution related to the transaction, irrespective of whether there is an independent source for the evidence.... It is understood that the testimony given under this agreement will be non-voluntary and compelled. The witness, Sarah Havely Edmondson, will continue to assert his/her Fifth Amendment Rights and State Constitutional rights against compulsory self-incrimination. (emphasis added).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.