Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

7 Ala. App. 180

Jones v. State

Alabama Court of Appeals

Decided May 1, 1913

Alabama Court of Appeals · decided 1913-05-01

Failure to Work the Road. Appeal, from Baldwin Circuit Court. Heard before Hon. A. E. Gamble. Walter Jones was convicted of failing to work on the public roads after notice, and lie appeals. It appears from the evidence that, at tbe time Jones was warned to work tlie road, be ivas over 18 years old. It was further attempted to be shown by defendant that Walter Jones’ father forbade him to go and work upon the road after the warning, and for that reason he declined to do so.

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently May 1916

1 state decisions

Relies on McManus v. State · Williams v. State · Harrison v. State

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Affirmed · Decided 1913-05-01

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

WALKER, P. J.

¶1To constitute the statutory offense with which the appellant was charged, his failure to work the public roads must have been willful, and without a sufficient excuse. — Code, § 7737; Ward v. State, 88 Ala. 202, 7 South. 298. The evidence was ■without conflict to the effect that at the time he failed and refused to work the public road, when duly notified or warned to do so, he was a minor over 18 years of age, and that his only excuse for such failure or refusal was that his father would not let him go, or permit him to work the public road. It is not claimed that the appellant’s excuse was a sufficient one; but the claim is that, under the evidence, it was a question for the jury whether his failure or refusal was “willful,” within the meaning of the statute, and that the court erred in giving the written charge requested by the state and in refusing those requested by the appellant.

¶2It was a necessary inference from the evidence that the appellant intentionally and deliberately elected to obey his father rather than to heed the notice or warning given him. More than this was not required to make his conduct “willful” within the meaning of the statute. The word “willful,” when employed in penal enactments, has not always the same meaning. — Harrison v. State, 37 Ala. 154. Sometimes it means no more than that the act shall be intentionally done without lawful excuse or necessity. Williams v. State, 83 Ala. 68, *1833 South. 743; D. P. Robinson v. State, Infra, 62 South. 303. Sometimes it includes the idea of obstinaney or perverseness, or an act intentionally done with a bad motive or purpose. Johnson v. State, 61 Ala. 9; McManus v. State, 36 Ala. 285; 40 Cyc. 944. The statute here under consideration does not make any specific wrongful purpose or intent an essential ingredient of the offense Avhich it creates. Certainly no other motive or purpose is required than one not to do what the law commands, without a suffiicient excuse. We are of opinion that it may properly be said that one’s failure or refusal to work the public roads is “willful,” within the meaning of the statute, when it is a result of a deliberate choice to recognize and obey an authority other than the law. The conclusion follows that the court was not in error in the rulings complained of.

¶3No error is found in the record.

¶4Affirmed.

/7/alaapp/180 · .json · Public domain