Volume 7 — Court of Claims Reports

<p> On the claimants’ Appeal. </p> <p>The Amended Court of Claims act, (12 Stat. Z.,p.765,) provides for appeals from ■the Court of Claims to the Supreme Court, (sec. 5,) hut contains a provision, (sec. 14,) since repealed, Act 17tli March, 1866, (14 Stat. L., p. 9,) forbidding the payment of claims “passed iipon by the Court of Claims till after an appropriation therefor shall be estimated for by the Secretary of the Treasury.” While this provision remains in force the claimants below appeal, and the case eomes to a hearing in the Supreme Court.</p> <p>The Amended Court of Claims act, (12 Stat. L., p. 765, sec. 14,) wherein it provides that “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury for any claims passed upon by the Court of Claims till after an appropriation therefor shall be estimated for by the Secretary of the Treasury,” by necessary implication, ( gives to the head of an Executive Department authority to revise the decisions of that court, and thereby denies to it the judicial power from the exercise of which, only under the Constitution, appeals can be taken to the Supreme Court.†</p>

There were three transactions, so to speak, that preceded the award which formed the basis of the appellant’s action: 1. Congress passed the Joint Resolution 3cZ March, 1857, (10 Stat.

<p>On the claimants’ Motions.</p> <p>The Amended Courtof Claims Act provides that “either piarty may appeal under such regulations as the Supreme Court may direct, within ninety days after the rendition of the judgment.” The regulations of the Supreme Court prescribe that “ an order of allowance of appeal by the Court of Claims or the Chief Justice thereof in vacation, is essential.” The rules of the Court of Claims require that if “ an application for an appeal he made in vacation, the same shall be filed with the clerk, and such filing shall be deemed the date of the application.” The appellants file their applications loith the clerk of the Court of Claims within ninety days during a temporary recess of the court. At the next sitting of the court the appeal is allowed; but the ninety days have then elapsed. The appellees, Adams and Johnson, now move to dismiss the appeal as not allowed in time; and also because the findings of the Court of Claims contain evidence, and not ultimate fads, as required by the regulations of the Supreme Court. The appellant, Clark, moves for a certiorari to require the court below to make an extended statement of the evidence on which it found “ that the allegation of fraud or mistake in the concoction of the written agreement is not sustained by the evidence in the case.”</p> <p>I. The appeal to the Supreme Court given by the Amended Court of Claims Act (12 Stat. L., 765-85, 1) is a matter of right, not depending upon judicial discretion, of which the Court of Claims cannot deprive a party, either by neglecting to grant an allowance or by returning imperfect findings of fact. The appeal is taken within the meaning of the statute when application is made for its allowance; ánd the allowance is merely an authority to the clerk to transmit the record.</p> <p>II. Where the findings of fact returned by the Court of Claims contain affiJavits and letters from officers of the Government, the Supreme Court willnotstop to inquire whatfacts they were intended to establish.* It is the duty of the Court of Claims to draw the inferences and conclusions which the documents are supposed to establish, or to decide that they do not establish them. And where the findings of fact set forth evidence instead of ultimate facts, the record will be remanded for correction.</p> <p>III. Where the Court of Claims has returned as an ultimate fact that the appellant’s “ allegation of fraud or mistalee in the concoction of the written agreement is not sustained by the evidence,” a certiorari will not be awarded to require a more extended statement of the evidence. The finding is precisely of the character required by the regulations of the Supreme Court.</p>

<p> On the defendants’ Appeal. </p> <p>The appellees here being defendants in a suil brought by the Government in the United States Circuit Court for the southern district of New Torio, plead a set-ojf and have a balance in their favor certified by the jury in the manner provided by the laivs of that State. They then bring their action in the Court of Claims and rest their case upon the verdict and judgment, without other evidence. The court sustains the action, holding that the matters m controversy in the former suit in which the Government toas a voluntary party, cannot be re-examined, and that the verdict and judgment against it are final and conclusive.</p> <p>I. The judiciary act does not authorize a suit against the Government in any of the Federal courts. Parties dissatisfied with the course pursued toward them hy the executive officers charged with the fulfilment of contracts, have no other remedy than hy petition to Congress, except in the limited class of cases cognizable in the Court of Claims.</p> <p>IX. Jurisdiction cannot he exercised hy a circuit court of the United States unless it he conferred hy an act of Congress.</p> <p>III. Eight of set-off dicl not exist at common law, and is everywhere founded upon statutory regulations.</p> <p>IV. Under the Act 3cl March, 1797, (1 Stat. L., p. 515,) persons indebted to the Government are subject to suit, and the requirement is that the court, on motion, shall grant j ndgmcnt at the return term unless the defendant shall, in open court, make oath that he is equitably entitled to credits previously submitted to tho accounting- officers of tho Treasury. No other claim for a credit can be admitted in a suit against an individual unless it appears that the defendant, at the time of trial, is in I>ossession of vouchers not before in his power to ju-ocure, and that he was prevented from exhibiting the claim for such credit to the proper officers by absence from the United States, or some unavoidable accident.</p> <p>V. The extent of the authority conferred by the Act 3d March, 1797, (1 Stat. L., p. 515,) is that the defendant, sued by the Government, may exhibit his claims for credit, but that they cannot be admitted as demands for judgment. They may, if sufficient, discharge the entire claim of tho Government, but the provision confers no jurisdiction on tho court to render j udgment for any excess.</p> <p>VI. In suits of the Government against individuals where a counter claim is set up and a cross judgment is sought to be recovered, State laws do not constitute the rule of decision. The question arises exclusively under the acts of Congress, and no local law or usage can have any influence in its determination.</p>

<p> On the claimant’s Appeal. </p> <p>The elaimant agrees “ to furnish all the material and make 221,000 cubic yards of embankment ” in the Memphis navy-yard. The contract contemplates frequent payments, hut is silent as to the time and manner of measurement, As the work proceeds the defendants insist that the measurements nmsl he from a fixed hose, and that the claimant must hear the loss of shrinkage, settling, waste, tfc. The Court of Claims holds that “ in the silence of a contract for building an embankment as to the manner of making the measurements, the law will conclude that they are to be made in the ordinary way, and that “ measuring from a fixodbase may bo the ordinary and proper method of estimating an embankmentand that it rests with the claimant to shots that ilesas not. Also that “ where the commandant of a navy-yard interferes with a contractor and delays his work,” the latter “ cannot recover for tho interference if ho be in defarrlt respecting the completion of the contract.”</p> <p>I. Where a contract declares no penalty for not completing a work by the day specified, nor authorizes the Government to forfeit or terminate it, the utmost that can be claimed by tho Government is such damages as it may have sustained. The officers of the Government have no right to interfere with the contractor within a public navy-yard by compelling him to take circuitous routes, &e., though he be in default as to the time of completing his work.</p> <p>II. Where a contractor agrees to build an embankment at so much a cubic yard, and there is a settling of the batture on which the embankment is built, the measurements of tho work should not be from a fixed base, but should include the quantity required by the sottling of the batture.</p> <p>III. Where a contractor agrees to build an entire enbankment on dry land the natural waste and shrinkage must be borne by him; but where the specific place is to be selected, according to the contract, by the engineers of the other party and they needlessly compel him to dump loose earth in running water, the quantity of earth placed there should be ascertained by some other mode than measuring what remains after the embankment is completed.</p>

<p> On the appellants' Motion. </p> <p>The defendants l> elow appeal from a judgment of the Court of Claims. The record does not show that “ tlie amount in controversy exceeds ¡$3,000,” nor that “tlie judgment or decree will affect a class of cases or furnish a precedent for the future action of an Executive Department.” The Supreme Court dismisses the appeal. The appellants move at the same term to reinstate the case on the doehet, and remand it hack to the Court of Claims for amendment to the record.</p> <p>Where, in an appeal taken "by the Government from the Court of Claims to the Supreme Court, it neither appears on the record that the amount in controversy exceeds $3,000, nor- that the decree will affect a class of cases, the appeal will be dismissed or the record remanded that the fact may be certified, as provided by the Amended Court of Claims Act, (12 Stat. L., p. 765, § 5.)</p>

<p> On the defendants'1 Appeal. </p> <p>The Commissioner of Pensions and the Secretary of the Interior deny the claimant a land-warrant. He brings his action in the Court of Claims, “ to estahlish his right to a warrant.” The court holds that it has “original jurisdiction of a case founded upon an application for a land-warrant,” and renders a decree directing that a “military bounty land-warrant he made, issued, and delivered to the said Julian Alire hy the proper officer;” and also directs that the decree he certified hy the clerh and remitted to the Secretary of the Interior.</p> <p>The only judgments which the Court of Claims is authorized to render against the Government., or over which the Supreme Court has jurisdiction on appeal, are judgments for money. Neither court possesses authority to decree the recovery of a land-warrant. Under the Amended Court of Claims Act (12 Stat. L., p. 765) the limited power given to render judgment necessarily restrains the general terms and confines the jurisdiction to moneyed demands.</p>

<p> On the claimants Appeal. </p> <p>Contractors execuie a formal contract in the belief that it is for the sale of 9,000 bushels of potatoes deliverable as required, when in fact it is for “such quantities (not exceeding 3,000 bushels per week) as may be required.” There has been previous correspondence between them and a commissary which misled them into this belief; but they have the contract in their possession two weeks before executing it. It follows the terms, of the Government’s advertisement instead of the terms of the contractors’ bid, and in this differs from the correspondence between the parties. The Court of Claims decides that fraud or mistake cannot be imputed where the formal contract remains two iveelcs in the parties’ possession before execution, merely because it does not follow the terms of his offer, and differs from correspondence previously passing between him and the other party.</p> <p>The question of fraud or mistake as to the execution of a formal written contract, differing in terms from the contractor’s proposals, and from correspondence previously passing between the parties, is a question of fact and not of law. Upon it the finding of the Court of Claims is conclusivo, and cannot bo reviewed in the Supreme Court.</p>

<p> On the claimant’s Appeal. </p> <p> The Western Cherokees employ the appellants to prosecute an important claim against the Government. Saving no other means of compensating them, they give to them a portion of the claim itself. The appellants prosecute the claim, and secure it hy a treaty. When the treaty leaves the hands of the commissioners there is in it a provision securing to the appellants their portion. This the Senate strikes out, and provides, hy an amendment, that the funds shall not he assigned, and shall he paid to the Indians per capita. The amendment is ratified, hut the Indians still recognize their obligation, and direct the Secretary of War to pay the appellants out of any moneys which may he found due to them under the treaty or otherwise. Congress disregards the agreement, and appropriates money to pay the Indians directly. The appellants endeavor to collect the money from the Indians individually, hut fail. The tribe subsequently is united with others, and all possibility of collecting the money lost. The appellants bring their action in the Court of Claims, where the judgment is for the appellees. </p> <p>Where a claim is of no fixed amount, nor time, nor mode 'of payment, and has never received the assent of the person against whom it is asserted, hut remains to he settled hy negotiation or suit, it cannot he so assigned as to give the assignee an equitable right which will prevent the original parties from compromising it. And where an Indian tribe employ agents to prosecute a claim against Government for a percentage on what may he obtained, and it is afterward provided hy treaty that the funds shall be paid to the Indians per capita, an action will not lie “ against the Government in favor of the agent, even though the Indians, after the treaty, direct the Secretary of War to pay the agent out of any moneys coming to them under the treaty or otherwise.</p>

<p> On the claimants’ Appeal. </p> <p>The appellants, between 1847 and, 1851, import goods into the United States on which a collector of customs assesses an illegal amount of duties. The appellants pay the duties without giving the written protest required by the Act 26th February, 1845. The collector pays them into the Treasury. The appellants: bring their action against the Government in the Court of Claims to recover back the excess of duties as money had and received to their use. The Government demurs to the jurisdiction, and upon the merits. The Court of Claims decides-that it has jurisdiction of a claim under the revenue laws, as based upon an implied promise to repay money erroneously exacted, although there may be another remedy by action against the collector; but that where no protest is made by the party at the time, as required by the Act 26tli Feliruary, 1845, (5 Stat. L.,p. 727,) the duties are not illegally exacted and the payment is a voluntary one under a mutual mistake of law which cannot be recovered back.</p> <p>The Court of Claims lias not jurisdiction to hoar and determine oases arising rrnder the revenue laws; that is to say, where the action is brought to recover hack taxes on imports which have heen paid into the Treasury; for the revenue laws of the United States constitute a system which provides not only for the manner of collection, but also the only remedy by which errors of collection can he corrected.</p>

<p> On the claimant’s Appeal. </p> <p>A large amount of distilled spirits, and the distillery and appurtenances where the same ivas manufactured, are seized in April, 1865, at the instance of, and upon information furnished by, officers of the internal revenue service. Judicial proceedings are instituted to have the spirits declared forfeited. During the pendency of these suits, and before condemnation, the Commissioner of Internal Sevenue, with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, compromises fheease, the owners of the property paying ¡$195,102 as taxes due on the spirits, and $25,000 as penalties. The Secretary of the Treasm-y divides the$25,000 with the revenue officers, but retains the whole of the amount paid as taxes. The officers bring their action to recover one-half of the proceeds received by the Government under the judicial proceedings against the property. The Government demurs. The Court of Claims decides that as the Act 30th Juno, 1864, (13 Stat. L., p. 239, § 44,) authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to “ compromiso” all suits “relating to internal revenue,” he may malee the payment of taxes due upon property against which proceedings in rem. have been instituted a part of the compromise, and that the officers were not entitled to participate therein.</p> <p>I. In the case of United States v. Morris, (10 Wheat. R., p. 246,) it was held that the Secretary of the Treasury may remit a forfeiture, even after judgment, until the money is actually paid over to the collector, and that such remission extends to the share to which the revenue officers were entitled, although, they had an inchoate interest in the seizure,- for the reason that their interest is conditional and subject to the power of remission, and is not a vested right. It is now held on “ these well settled ' principles” that after seizure, and while a suit in rem is pending, the Secretary of the Treasury may release the property and acceirt payment of the tax, and the money thus received as tax, notwithstanding that it may he the fruit of the suit, founded on the seizing officers’ information, ■belongs exclusively to the Government.* (The Chief Justice and Nelsosr, J.; dissenting.)</p> <p>II. The power intrusted by the revenue laws to the Secretary of the Treasury to remit penalties and forfeitures is not a judicial power but one of mercy to mitigate the severity of the law. It admits of no apiieal to any court, being the exercise of his discretion in the matter intrusted to him alone.</p>

<p> On the claimants’ Appeal. </p> <p>Congress pass a private aet in 1848, (9 Stat. L,, p. 712,) requiring the Second Auditor to adjust a party’s claim for property destroyed by United States troops in the Florida war, “on principles of equity and justice;” hut nothing to he allowed for property destroyed by the Indians. Also a supplemental act, in 1854, (10 Stat. L., p. 835,) directing the Auditor to re-examvne the case on depositions ivhich were previously “rejected for the want of autlientiñcation.” Also a joint resolution in 1858, (11 Stat. L., p. 553,) devolving this duly upon the Secretary of War. Also another joint resolution m 1860, requiring the Secretary to revise his execution of the supplemental act, to restate the account, and to malee such further allowances as, in his opinion, justice to the claimant may require. Under these private acts there is allowed to the v claimant, first, ¡¡¡8,873; then $100 for an error of calculation in the first “.award;” then $8,997.94, for interest; then $10,004.89 for more interest; then $39,217.50for property previously found not to have been destroyed by United States troops, and finally, $66,519.85 on a “revision” of the previous awards. Before the last allowance is paid, Congress pass the Joint Resolution 2d March, 1861, (12 Sfcat. L., p. 895,) rescinding fho previous resolution of June 1, 1860, and pronouncing the same and all proceedings under it null and void. The claimant brings his action on the last allowance as a vested right, and insists that, by the publishing of the “ award,” the joint resolution of 1860 was executed, and could not be repealed. The Court of Claims holds that a direction by Congress to an accounting officer to restate an account is no submission to his arbitrament. Judgment for the defendants. The claimant appeals.</p> <p>I. To clothe a person with the authority of an arbitrator the parties must mutually agree to be bound by his determination of the matter in controversy. A private act which authorizes an Auditor or Secretary of War to restate and resettle an account, and to make corrections in former statements and settlements, and such further allowances as in his opinion justice to the claimant may require, does not confer judicial power; the Secretary acts ministerially, and the resolution does not authorize him to make a final adjustment of the matter which will bind both parties.</p> <p>II. Where a private act, authorizing the Secretary of War to adjust a party’s accounts, and make him further allowances, is designed as an instruction to the officer, and is not intended to be a submission to his arbitrament, his report is not final and conclusive against the Government. Therefore, his allowance is not an award, and confers no vested rights, and Congress may repeal the private act, and pronounce it, and all proceedings under it, null and void, and no action can be maintained upon it.</p>

<p> On the claimant's Appeal. </p> <p>The claimant proposes to the Secretary of War to deliver all the army supplies that may he needed at certain posts in Arizona from the9th March, 1860, teethe 26lh March, 1862, which proposal the Secretary accepts. The order of acceptance does not require an inspection, hut the claimant delays shipping his goods for several months in order that they may he inspected in Boston, so that, if rejected, he may he spared the cost of shipment. By reason of this delay the goods are captured, in transitu, hy the public enemy. The claimant also loses his teams employed in. transporting the goods. A new Secretary of War, in April, 1861, rescinds the order of 9th March, 1860. The claimant brings his action, hut does not prove that supplies were needed at the posts. The Court of Claims gives judgment for the defendants.</p> <p>I. If by the terms of a contract army supplies arc to he delivered hy the contractor in Arizona, the property does not vest in the Government until delivery, notwithstanding an inspection and approval in New York before shipment. The inspection does not work a change of title in the property, and its being before shipment instead of after delivery is to the advantage of the contractor.</p> <p>II. When a contract for the delivery of army supplies in Arizona is silent as to inspection, the Secretary of War cannot by a subsequent order compel inspection iuNew York.*</p> <p>III. Where property is destroyed by accident in transitu, the party in whom the property is must bear the loss; and the Government is not bound to indemnify a contractor where the property is destroyed in transitu by the public enemy.</p> <p>IV. Though the Government be in default in not inspecting' army supplies promptly whereby, while in the hands of the contractor, they are captured by the public enemy, yet the default cannot be deemod the proximate cause of the loss, nor the Government be held responsible for the goods.</p> <p>V. Where a contract entitles the contractor to furnish at certain military posts', for a certain time, all the supplies that may be needed, to enable him to recover for a breach he must prove that supplies wore needed and his damages. It is not sufficient to sustain the action that the Secretary of War rescinded the contract before it expired.</p>

<p> On the elaimanfs Appeal. </p> <p>Congress authorize the Secretara of the Treasury to settle with all the parties interested in a contract for furnishing .bride for the Washington Aqueduct, provided that they first surrender to the United States the brick made, the machinery, <fo., Joint Resolution March 3, 1857, (11 Stat. L., p. 256.) The claimant is not a party to the contract, but the agent of the sureties thei-eto. Reunites with the parties representing the original contractors in such surrender. The Secretary makes an award and pays the amou/nt thereof to the representatives of the original contractors, they being the sureties thei'eof. The claimant raises nor objection, and recovers through these parties a portion of the award, which he accepts under protest. Se brings his action, claiming that he was the owner of the brick-yard; that the award toas not according to the submission, and that he is entitled to recover the damages, losses, cf-c., sustained. The Court of Claims decides that an award is an entire thing, which cannot be affirmed in part and disaffirmed in part; and that where one accepts a benefit under an award, he is estopped from denying its validity, and it is immaterial whether the award was made according to the submission or not.</p> <p>I. Where a contract by its terms cannot he “ sublet or assigned,” one who has agreed with the sureties, on default of their principals, to carry out the contract, receive the consideration and allow to the sureties a percentage thereof, is not a party “interested therein,” hut merely the “agent, attorney in fact, or employe” of the sureties.</p> <p>II. Where a private act authorizes the Secretary of the Treasury to settle “ with all the parties respectively interested” in a certain contract for their loss incurred “on account of their contract,” on condition that they shall first surrender all the brick made, with all the machinery, &c., prepared for executing the contract; and the Secretary makes an award in favor of the contractors, or their legal representatives, hut refuses to apportion any part of the award in favor of a person who has heen employed to carryout the contract, his award is in strict accordance with the private act; and the agent has no redress against the Government, though ho was to receive the consideration of the contract for his services, and though he united in the surrender of hriek, machinery, &c., in his possession, to the Government, according to the berms of the private act.</p>

<p> On the defendants’ Appeal. </p> <p>In September, 1861, the claimant enters inlo an express contract with ihe quartermaster of the “ Department of the West ” for building cei'tain mortar-boats for military purposes on Ihe western nvers, and the price to be paid therefor is specified in the contract. In October the Secretary of War suspends the payment of all contracts in ihe Department, because of alleged frauds. On the 25th October he appoints ihe “Davis-Holt-Campbell commission” to examine and report %ipon all unsettled claims against the Department. In December ihe claimant presents to the commission his claims and vouchers. The co’mmission deducts from the expressed price of the contract $112,748.76, and requires the claimant to sign an-achnowledgment, not under seal, and expressing no consideration, that the amount allowed “ when paid will be in full of all demands against the United States.” The claimant at first refuses to sign ihe aclcnoutledgment, but the commission withholds from him his vouchers until he does. He protests against this, and signs under protest. Congress pass ihe “ Joint Resolution 11th March, 1862, (12 Stai. L., p. 615,) directing “ that all sums allowed to he due from tlie United States to individuals,” &c., “ by the commission,” “ shall be deemed to be due andpayable and shall be paid by the disbursing officers,” &o., “upon the presentation of the voucher with the commissioners’certificate.thereon.” The claimant presents his vouchers to the disbursing officer and receives the amount allowed by the commission. Se brings his action for the amount withheld. The Court of Claims finds the validity of his express contract, and decides that the commission teas not authoriged to exact releases from claimants, nor to adjudicate between them and the Government; that a release not under seal and without consideration, exacted by an ex-parte commission, cannot be upheld by the doctrine of arbitrament and award, nor as the release of an existing indebtedness, nor as the compromise of a doubtful claim. '</p> <p>,1. An ex-parte commission appointed by the Secretary of War to. examine and report upon claims in a certain military department where frauds and irregularities are believed to exist, has no authority to compel a hearing and adjustment of the claims, and is possessed of no judicial power.</p> <p>II. An action for the expressed consideration of a valid contract is barred hy the voluntary submission of the claim to an ex-parte commission appointed by the head of an Executive Department to examine and report upon similar claims; the hearing and final decision thereon; the receipt of the vouchers containing the amount found due; and the acceptance of the payment of that amount under an act of Congress providing therefor ; and it is thus barred, notwithstanding that the party was coerced into the receipt of the vouchers by the commission withholding from him his papers and original evidences of indebtedness; that he protested at the time against the action of the commission ; and that he had then (the transaction being before the reorganization of the Court of Claims) no means of legal redress.</p> <p>III. The Government has the “power ” and the “ right ” through the heads of the Executive Departments to refuse the payment of contracts suspected of being fraudulent, and summarily to interfere and arrest the frauds and irregularities committed against it. But the creditors-of the Government are free to look for redress to the only legal tribunals provided in such oases.</p>

<p> On the claimants'’ appeal. </p> <p>Floyd, as Secretary of War, accepts drafts drawn on Mm by Russell, Mayors 4" ■ Waddell, army contractors, to the amownt of $5,000,000. The acceptances are given to aid the contractors to carry out transportation contracts and upon an understanding that they should receive payment of their contracts when they became due and use the money to talee up the drafts. Some of the contracts provide for payment only when performed ; others as the services are rendered. The claimants buy the acceptances as commercial paper before maturity for a valuable consideration. The Court of Claims decides that the Secretary of War has no general power to bind the Government by accepting negotiable paper;.that the acceptances given before money became due on the contracts were advances prohibited by certain statutes; that any usage to the contrary was merely an illegalpracticebypublic officers.</p> <p>I. It is settled, that ■when the United States become a party to commercial paper, (i. e., paper transferable by indorsement or delivery exempt in the hands of innocent holders from inquiry into the circumstances amid which it was put in circulation,) they are bound in any court to whose jurisdiction they submit by the same principles that would govern individuals.</p> <p>II. The protection which commercial usage throws around negotiable paper cánnot be used to establish the authority of an agent who issued it. Thence whenever negotiable paper is found in the market upon which the Government apparently is a party, the purchaser must, at his peril, see that the officer who indorsed or accepted it had authority to bind the Government.</p> <p>III. The use of bills of exchange by officers of the Government in cases authorized by law cannot establish a usage for eases not authorized by law; and no authority in a public officer to bind the Government by accepting drafts can be inferred from the frequent exercise of a j>ower unauthorized by law.</p> <p>IV. The Federal statute-hooks are filled -with acts authorizing contracts with the Govern merit; hut in every instance the person entering into such a contract must look to the statute under which it is made and see thathis contract comes within thei terms of the law. In the case of hills of exchange as to which there is no authority expressly given hy statute, it can he implied only as an incident to some other power ex. qi\ Where an officer is authorized to pay money at a distant point, he may transmit it by drafts.</p> <p>V. The Secretary of War has no legal authority to lend the name and credit of the Government to army contractors hy accepting their drafts, even though the purpose he, to furnish necessary subsistence, clothing, and shelter for the army in the field; and his official acceptance of such paper is absolutely void. (Nelson, Grier, and Clifford, J. J., dissenting.)</p> <p>VI. Drafts drawn by army contractors upon the Secretary of War iu terms “ on account of owr contract for supplies for the army in Utah," or “on account of our transportation contract of the 12th April, 1860,” hut with an understanding that the contracts should be p>aid in the mean time and the drafts he taken up by the contractors at maturity, do not, in the hands of innocent holders, become a charge upon moneys due to the .contractors, and are absolutely void. (Nelson, Grier, and Clifford, J. J., dissenting.)</p>

<p> On the Claimant's Appeal. </p> <p>Major General Butler is authorized, lnj the Secretary of War “ to uniform and equip a volunteer force” “ in such manner as lie may judge expedient,” “ provided tlie cost of such recruitment, armament, and equipment does not exceed in the aggregate that of like troops” raised for the service of the United States. He agrees with the claimant for Liege rifles at $27 “or such less sum as the Ordnance Department may have paid for guns like in qualitjr and description, or contracted to pay for, to said Garrison.” Subsequently it is agreed that the Government shall accept Enfield rifles instead of Liege “ upon the value conditions as herein specified.” This subsequent agreement is indorsed on the original by General Butler, and is signed by Mm but not by the claimant, who delivers Enfields and demands $27 for them. Lt appears that the Ordnance Department has not contracted with him for other Enfields, but had then for Liege rifles for $27. Also that it has bought Enfields of other persons at $23. The Court of Claims decides that the price under the supplemental agreement should be limited by the amount which the Ordnance Department has agreed to pay for Enfield rifles to the claimant, and if there has been no contract with Mm for Enfields then the only standard of value is the price paid to other persons. Judgment for the defendants. The claimant appeals.</p> <p>I. Where a supplementary agreement, indorsed upon the original, is signed hy an officer of the Government hut not hy the contractor, its doubtful expressions should he construed most strongly against the Government, in accordance with the rule that doubtful expressions should be construed against the party who uses the language.</p> <p>II. Where a supplemental change to a contract for the sale of arms is made at the request of the ordnance officer of the Government, it is to he construed as made for the accommodation of the Government.</p> <p>III. Where a contemporary construction is given to a supplemental alteration of a contract by the officer of the Government at whose suggestion the change was made, that construction should be maintained against the Government if the terms of the alteration are doubtful.</p> <p>IY. Whore a contract is for the sale of Liege rifles at $27 “ or such less sum as the Ordnance Department may have paid for guns Hice in quality or description, or contracted to pay for, to said Garrison,” and a subsequent alteration is indorsed to substitute Enfield rifles “upon the value conditions as herein specified,” and it appears that at the time a contract did exist between the Ordnance Department and G. for Liege rifles, but none for Enfielcls, the contractor should recover the price specified for Liege rifles, notwithstanding that the Ordnance Department has purchased Enfields of other jiersons at $23.</p> <p>Y. An order of the War Department authorizing a General of volunteers to raise and equip troops with a proviso that the cost “ does notexeeed in the aggregate that of litce troops now or hereafter raised for the service,” is merely directory, and loaves to the discretion of the General the price to he paid for each article needed.</p>

<p> On the claimant’s Appeal. </p> <p>A cleric in the Department of the Interior, is, in 1851, appointed agent of the Government to attend the Industrial Mxhibition in Lmidon. He is promised J>y the terms of his appointment compensation for this additional service, a/nd the reimbursement of his expenses. He continues at the same time to hold his clerkship in the Department, and to draio his pay. The Court of Claims decides that under the Act 23 August, 1842, (5 Stat. L.,p. 525, § 12,) one whose salary is fixed by law can hold no other office, and can 1'eceiveno additional compensation. Judgment for the defendants. The claimant appeals.</p> <p>I. A clerk in an Executive Department drawing a fixed salary is debarred by tbe Act 23d August, 1842, (5 Stat. L., p. 510, § 2,) from receiving additional compensation for distinct additional service, notwithstanding that the Secretary of the Department agrees in writing that he shall be so paid, and the service rendered is without the ordinary duties of the Department.</p> <p>II. The Act 23d August, 1842, (5 Stat. L., p. 510, § 2,) which prohibits any “ officer in any branch of the public service, or any other person, whose salary, pay, or emoluments is or are fixed by law,” from receiving any additional pay, applies to clerks in the Executive Departments, notwithstanding that the subsequent Act 26th August, 1842, (ib., p. 525, § 12,) relates to ■clerks, prohibiting additional compensation for “ the discharge of duties which belong to any other cleric,” or tor “ extra services.”</p>

<p> On the claimant’s Appeal. </p> <p>A mail contractor is engaged in carrying_ the mail in several of the insurgent Slates at the breaking out of the rebellion. He continues to do so till stopped by an order of the Post-Office Department suspending the postal service there. His contracts have thirteen months to run, but provide that the Government may annul them by a month’s notice. He reguests the Postmaster-General to annul them. The Postmaster-General refuses, and informs him that he will be reguired to renew the service if hostilities admit of it. It is never renewed. The defendants refuse to pay him after the time that the service ivas suspended. The claimant proves that he was ready to perform, and seeks to recover the consideration of the contracts for the period yettorun. On these facts the Court of Claims, being equally divided as to the extent of the contractor’s rights, render judgment pro forma in favor of the defendants. The claimant appeals.</p> <p>I. Where a contract for mail transportation provides that the Postmaster-General may at any time discontinue the service on allowing the contractor one month’s pay, his suspension of the service on account of the rebellion, though coupled with a refusal to discontinue it, and notice-that the contractor must renew it whenever the Postmaster-General' deems it safe to do so, will not entitle the contractor to recover the compensation named in the contract during its continuance. But the notice-to suspend will be construed to be a notice of discontinuance, and the contractor entitled to one month’s pay.</p> <p>II. The Act 28th February, 1861, (12 Stat. L., p. 177,) authorizing the Postmaster-General to discontinue the postal service when it cannot be safely continued, has no effect upon the legal import of mail transportation contracts.</p>

<p> On ihe defendants' Appeal. </p> <p>A commissary during therebellion, acting with the knowledge of the Commissary-General and of the Seareta/ry of War, agrees with the claimant that he shall slaughter and pack 50,000 hogs, at 92£ cents per 100pounds of meat. Ihe defendants furnish only 16,177 hogs. Ihe contract is subject to the approval of the Commissary-General, but contains no provision allowing him to terminate it at any time. It is not made by advertisement, as prescribed by the Act 2 March, 1861, {12 Stat., L., p. 220,) and no “ public exigency” is shown to exist which will take the case out of the statute. Ihe approval of the Commissary-General is shown circumstantially. The Court of Claims holds that the contract bound ihe defendants to furnish 50,000 hogs, and that the claimant should recover the profit that he might have made, which profit ivas the difference bekveen the amount that it would have cost him to do the work and the price which he was to receive for doing it, less ihe worth of the time, risk, an&responsibility, from which he was relieved by the rescission of the contract. Judgment for the claimant. The defendants appeal.</p> <p>I. The Commissary Department has power to make contracts for slaughtering hogs and packing the pork for the use of the Army.</p> <p>II. A contract made by a commissary for slaughtering a certain number of hogs for the use of the Army is valid, though it contains no provision for terminating it at the discretion of the Commissary-General.</p> <p>III. A contract made by a commissary for a certain amount of supplies or a specific job of work requiring skilled labor is not subject to the Commissary-General’s discretionary power of terminating contracts for the regular and continuous supply of subsistence stores.</p> <p>IV. Although the Act 2d March, 1861, (12 Stat. L., p. 220,) requires that “ all purchases and contracts for supplies or services in any of the Departments” “shall be made by advertising” “forproposals,” it still invests the officer charged with the duty of procuring them with discretion to dispense with advertising if the exigencies of the public service require immediate delivery or performance; and where the discretion is exercised, the validity of a contract does not depend on the wisdom of the officer.</p> <p>V. Where a contract provides that it shall be subject to the ax>proval of the Commissary-General, but does not prescribe any mode by which the approval shall be evidence, there being no rule of law which prescribes any, it may be proved circumstantially.</p> <p>VI. Where a contract requires from the contractor a large expenditure in preparation and continuous readiness to perform a specific service, it implies a duty in the Government to do whatever may he necessary on its part to enable the contractor to perform all that he has covenanted to do. As where the contractor is hound to slaughter and pack 50,000 hogs, at so much per 100 pounds, the Government is hound to furnish 50,000.</p> <p>VII. The measure of damages where the Government has violated its contract hy preventing performance is the difference between the cost and the price, making reasonable deduction for the less time the contractor-would he engaged, and for his release from the care, trouble, risk, and responsibility attending a full execution of the contract.</p>

<p> On the defendants’ Appeal. </p> <p>On fhe20th December, 1864, the claimant, resident within the loyal States, enters into an agreement with a Treasury agent to bring owl cotton from the insurrectionary States, which the Government agrees to purchase on arrival at Norfolk. The contract is supposed to be authorized by the Acts 13th July, 1861, and 2d July, 1864, (12 Slat. L., p. 255; 13 id., p. 377,) notwithstanding that the claimant resides in a loyal State. He receives apermit to pass through the lines, and does so, andproeures the cotton. On the voyage to Norfolk his vesselis stopped by naval officers. Before the cargo is released the toar ends, and the price of cotton falls. The vessel is libelled by the Government in a court of admiralty, but, on the final hearing, the libel is dismissed with costs, and the vessel with her papers ordered to be delivered to the owner. (This decree is not before the Supreme Court on the hearing of the appeal, but merely a finding of the fact by the court below.) The claimant brings his action on the ground that his services were equivalent to full performance, and that the defendants’ acts constituted a breach of their agreement. He also insists that the deirse of the court of admiralty dismissing the libel stops the Government from contesting the legality of the voyage. The Court of Claims sustains the action. Judgment for the claimant. The defendants appeal.</p> <p>I. Neither the acts of Congress nor the Treasury regulations thereunder authorized commercial intercourse during the rebellion, across the military-lines ; anda contract between aTreasury agent onbehalf of the Government and a person residing in a loyal State, that the latter should bring out cotton from an insurrectionary State for the joint benefit of the Government and himself was illegal and void. The traffic authorized by the Act 2d July, 1864, (13 Stat. L., p. 375, 5 8,) was traffic between the Government and one within the insurrectionary States, who at the time owned or controlled products there.</p> <p>H. How far a decree against the Government in a court of admiralty concludes it in another suit in another court, cannot be determined unless the record of the court of admiralty be before the Supreme Court on the appeal.</p>

<p> On the claimants Appeal. </p> <p>faring the rebellion the claimant agrees with a quartermaster to deliver 200,000 bushels of oats within thirty days. Within the prescribed time he tenders a part, which the defendants, without just cause, refuse to receive. The claimant .notifies them that his obligations under the contract are at an end. After the thirty days have expired the market value of oats has advanced beyond the contract price. Thereupon the quartermaster requires the claimant to deliver the balance of the 200,000 bushels by threatening to buy them in open ■market, and withhold the difference inprioe from moneys then due to the claimant from the defendants. Under these threats, and also fearing that he might be jxrrested by military authority, the claimant delivers the balance. He then brings his action on the ground that the contact was at an end, and he should recover the market value at the time of delivery. The Court of Claims holds that the claimant was not bound to deliver the oats after the period specified, he having tendered a part within the proper time ; but that if he did deliver, it must be deemed a delivery under the contract. The claimant appeals.</p> <p>I. Where but one contract was ever made between the Government and a contractor, and he is absolved from its obligations by the refusal of a quartermaster to accept his grain when properly tendered, his subsequent delivery of it must he deemed a voluntary delivery under the contract, notwithstanding that he may have been coerced into it by the fear of arrest and threats of the quartermaster that he would buy grain in the-market and withhold the cost out of moneys due to the contractor.</p> <p>II. Under the guise of an implied contract the Government cannot be made liable for the unauthorized acts of its officers, they being in the nature of torts, even though it derive a benefit thereby. •</p> <p>III. Wrongs done to individuals by officers of the Government, though they may have been committed while serving that Government, and in the belief that they were for its interest, cannot be righted by the decisions of the United States courts. Con gress have wisely reserved such matters for their own determination.</p>

<p> On the defendants' Appeal. </p> <p>The pay of officers’ servants is fixed by laxo at the rate of a private soldier, then, $11 a month, Act July 6,1812, (2 Stat. L., p. 785.) A second act is passed which increases the pay to $13 a month, Act 6th August, 1861, (12 id., p. 326;) a third which-provides that the second shall not extend thereafter to officers’ servants, Act 17th July, 1862, (12 id., pi. 594;) a fourth xohieh repeals the second and increases the pay of a private soldier to $16 a month, Act 20th June, 1864, (13 id., p. 144;) a fifth lohiah declares that the pay of officers’ servants “ is the pay of a private soldier as fixed "by law at the time,” Act 3d March, 1865, (13 id., p. 487.) The War Department pays a colonel for his sei'vants from May, 1864, to March, 1865, only $11 a month. Be seelcs to recover $16. The Court of Claims holds that the fourth statute of 20th June, 1864, which repealed the second and raised the pay of private soldiers to $16, is not subject to the limitation of the third, of 17th July, 1862, which provided that the increase of the second should not apply to officers’ servants; also that the fifth act is a declaratory statute fixing the eonstruction of former acts imperatively. Judgment for the claimant. The defendants appeal.</p> <p>I. The pay of officers’servants is not increased hy the Act 20th June, 1864, (13 Stat. L., p. 144,) which increases the pay of privates; notwithstanding that the Act 6th July, 1812, (2 Stat. L., p. 785,) provides that officers shall he allowed for servants the pay of privates, and that it has heen the settled practice since then to allow to officers whatever increase is allowed to privates.</p> <p>II. No effect can he givenhy the judiciary to an act of Congress which seeks to declare retroactively the legal effect to he given to other statutes</p>

<p> On the claimants’ Appeal. </p> <p>Congress direct the Secretary of the Navy to contract with either the claimants or certain other parties for the building of a balance-dock according to apian submitted previously by them and on file, Act 3d August, 1848, (9 Stat. L., p. 265, § 3,) provided that it can be done within a certain limited price. The Secretary substitutes in the contract, copper sheathing for that specified in the plan. The claimants object, but sign the contract. They furnish the copper sheathing andbring their action for its additional value. The Court of Claims holds that the act of Congress ivas not the contract; that the Secretary made the contract and might vary the details. Judgment for the defendants. The claimants appeal.</p> <p>An act of Congress which directs the head of an Executive Department to enter into a contract with one of two parties, leaving it optional with him as to which, with a discretion as to the price, is not of itself an acceptance of certain prior proposals of the party, though referred to in the act, and does not constitute a contract, hut leaves the Secretary free to make the "best terms he can, and the terms agreed upon are the contract.</p>

<p> On the claimants’ Appeal. </p> <p>The medical purveyor al Louisville, in November, 1863, advertises for hospital iee. The claimants send in proposals and the contract is awarded to them. A written agreement is then executed by the purveyor and the claimants. It provides for the delivery of iee at several places on the Mississipipi, specified m a schedule annexed; but is m terms subject to the approval of the Swgeon-General. He approves it, but before delivery to the parties he recalls it mid substitutes another. Thq second differs from the first in form but not in substance. But before it is executed by the parlies, the Secretary of War orders that the item of ice for New Orleans be stricleen out of the schedule annexed. The claimants object to the annulment of the first contract, but nevertheless execute the last. They allege that they in fact procured the iee for New Orleans on the faith of the aivard of the contract to them. The Court of Claims decides that when parties deliberately execute a second agreement which omits an item contained in the first, they must be deemed to have substituted the one for the other and cannot perform under the latter and recover damages upon the former. Judgment for the defendants. The claimants appeal.</p> <p>When a contractor knowingly executes a written contract with a medical purveyor from which the Surgeon-General has stricken out a part of the subject-matter, covered by the contractor’s accepted proposals, the contract as executed supersedes any previous legal agreements; and the contractor has no cause of action, though he proceeded on the faith of his proposals being accepted to make needful preparations at great expense, and protested at the time he exocuted the reduced contract against the erasure.</p>

<p> On the claimants' Appeal. </p> <p>•On the 21st May, 1861, Tift, a citizen of Florida, appoints Ms brother Ms attorney, with poxoer to sell real estate, and goes xoithin the Confederate lines to aid the rebellion. The agent sells the property at Key West, in December, 1861, to the claimants, residents at Key West. They give their notes for the purchase-money, which, are held by the agent until the end of the war. On the lZth January, 1862, the commanding officer at Key West orders that the property “ be taken possession of for tbe use of tbe Quartermaster Department.” On the2ilh Janxiary the claimants enter into an agreement to lease the property to the guax'termastw. The eommaxidmg officer approves this lease and “ cancels” .his previous order. The Government remains in possession for five years. No rent is ever paid, nor does the Qnax'termaster-General ever approve the lease. The action is brought to recover the agreed rent. The Court of Claims decides that the deed from the agent to the claimants was between enemies and void, axid that the defendants’ officers had xio authority to bind the Government upon a lease of realty, where the title to the property xvas xmlaxvfully acquired, in violation of the law of nations and thepxibliapolicy of the United States. Judgment for the defendants. The claimants appeal.</p> <p>X No lease of premises for tbe use of tbe Quartermaster Department is binding upon the Government until approved by tbe Quartermaster-General.</p> <p>II. Tbe premises of a loyal citizen within an insurrectionary State must be deemed to have been " appropx-iated” by tbe army engaged in tbe suppression of tbe rebellion, and not to have been acquired by contract, where tbe lease was executed by a quartermaster, with tbe approval of tbe commanding officer of tbe post, but without tbe approval of tbe Quartermaster-General. In such a case tbe lessor is without judicial redress, even though tbe Government retained possession under tbe lease for five years before tbe Quartermaster-General disapproved of it.</p> <p>■III. Tbe term “appx’opriation” in tbe Act ith July, 1864, (13 Stat. D.,p. 381,) is of tbe broadest import, including all taking and use of property by tbe Army and Navy, permanent or temporary, with or against tbe consent of tbe owner, resulting in destruction or mere injury, and extending to all cases where tbe right to tbe property is not obtained by valid contract.</p>

<p> On the defendants’ Appeal. </p> <p>A free man of color residing in Charleston early in the rebellion purchases cotton. It is seized by the military authorities on the capture of Charleston, sold, and the proceeds paid into the Treasury. At the trial the claimant proves his own loyalty, but not that of the vendors, who reside in an insurrectionary State. They testify as witnesses for the claimant to prove his title. The suit is not brought until the 5th June, 1868.</p> <p>I. Where one residing during the rebellion in an insurrectionary State purchases property in good faith, for value, and with no purpose to defraud the Government, or any one else, he acquires agood title to it within the intent of the Abandoned or captured property aet, notwithstanding that he bought of disloyal owners; and such a purchase is not void under the Confiscation act. The two acts cannot he construed in pari materia; the one is penal, the other remedial; the one claims a right, the other concedes a privilege.</p> <p>II. The Act 25th 'June, 1868, (15 Stat. L., p. 75, § 4,) prohibits three classes of persons from testifying against the Government in the Court of Claims— claimants, persons who, after a claim accrued to them, transferred it to the claimant, and persons interested in the event of the suit. But the vendor of property which is captured after sale may testify for the vendee. Such a vendor never had a claim against the Government, and such a claim only attached to the vendee when the proceeds reached the Treasury.</p> <p>III. The limitation in the Abandoned or captured property act, (12 Stat. L., p. 820, § 3,) which requires suits to be brought “ at any time within two years after the suppression of the rebellion,” did not take effect till the 20th August, 1868. Congress has determined by the Aet 2d March, 1867, (14 Stat. L., p. 421,) that the rebellion ended on the date of the President’s Proclamation, 20th August, 1866, and its declaration should be received as settling the question whenever private rights are affected by it.</p> <p>IV. The Court of Claims is authorized in cases under the Abandoned or captured property aet to render judgment for a specific amount; and not merely to determine whether the claimant is entitled to receive the proceeds of his property, leaving it to the Treasury to fix the amount. Such a construction of the act would reduce that court to a mere commission. The Supreme Court will not attribute such a purpose to Congress in the absence of an express declaration to that effect.</p>

<p>On the defendants’ Appeal.</p> <p>A creditor residing in the District of Columbia during the rebellion, directs Ms debtor, residing in Georgia, to invest the debt in cotton and keep it for him till the rebellion shall be suppressed. The debtor makes the purchase in good faith, turns the cotton over to another to be held for the creditor, and after the war settles his account with the creditor and receives back his notes canceled. The third person holds the cotton until the capture of Savannah, and then reports it as the property of the creditor. The creditor brings, his action under the Abandoned or captured property act. In the Court of Claims the point now considered is not pressed. Judgment for the claimant. The defendants appeal.</p> <p>I. Where a creditor, residing in the Distrietof Columbiaduringtherebellion, sends across the lines to his debtor in Georgia directions to invest the debt in cotton and hold it till the close of the war, the transaction is unlawful, and no title is acquired and no property passes; nor can the creditor maintain an action under the Abandoned or captured property act to recover the proceeds of the cotton.</p> <p>II. A resident in the territory of one of two belligerents may have an agent, in the territory of the other to whom his debtor can pay his debt in money, or deliver property in discharge of it; but the agency must have been created before the war began. It is unlawful to appoint an agent after hostilities have been commenced; and it is not necessary, to make the act unlawful, that the principal communicate personally with the. agent; business intercourse through a middle-man, which results in establishing the agency, is equally unlawful.</p> <p>III. Where commercial intercourse during the rebellion was unlawful between a creditor in a loyal and a debtor in an insurrectionary State, the transaction growing out of such intercourse cannot be made better by ratification after the war, but must be held illegal and void.</p>

<p> On the claimant’s Appeal. </p> <p>Virginia, in her cession of territory to the United States, reserves a tract for the benefit of her quota of the Continental tfoops. The western boundary of the reservation is not fixed by the terms of the grant; Virginia neglects to fix it, but the United States do so by the Act 11th April, 1818, (3 Stat. L., p. 424, § 3.) The claimant enters his Virginia land-warrant beyond this boundary. The Government grants the land to another person, who enters upon and possesses the same, and refuses to issue a patent to the claimant. The claimant insists that the true boundary will leave the land within the reservation, and he brings his action against the Government to enforce the trust. > The Court of Claims decides the case upon the merits in favor of the defendants. The claimant appeals.</p> <p>Tlie Court of Claims lias jurisdiction of actions to enforce legal rights and obligations, hut not of suits involving mere equities between a citizen and tlie Government. Therefore, in the absence of legislation by Congress, the holder of a Yirginia military bounty-land warrant who has no legal cause of action against the Government for compensation, cannot rest his case on the allegation that the Government has wrongfully appropriated to othor uses the lands ceded by Yirginia to the United States for his benefit. Snell a liability wonld arise, if at all, out of the breach of an accepted trust, and that liability cannot be enforced at law.</p>

<p> On the claimant’s petition for mandamus. </p> <p>The relator "brings his action in the Court of Claims uniter the Abandoned or captured property act. That court decides against him on the merits and renders final judgment in favor of the defendants, dismissing his petition. Within the proper time he presents Ms application and prays the allowance of an appeal to the Supreme Court. The Court of Claims decides that eases under the Abandoned or captured property act are not the subject of appeal, and refuses the allowance. The relator presents his petition in the Supreme Court for a mandamus to compel the Court of Claims to alloio the appeal. The single question now presented is whether or not a claimant is entitled to appeal from the final judgment of that court in that class of cases.</p> <p>Tbe Court of Claims amendment act, (12 Stat. L., p. 763,) which confers general jurisdiction, contains this provision: “ JCither party may appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States from any final judgment or decree tohieh may hereafter be rendered in any case.” It extends to subsequent subjects of jurisdiction, and among others to the Abandoned or captured property cases.</p>

<p> On the defendants’ Appeal. </p> <p>The President, "by Proclamation. 3d May, 1861, calls out a volunteer force for the suppression of the rebellion. The Proclamation states that the enrollment and organization will be made Mown through the War Department. The orders of the War Department declare that every such volunteer “shall be paid, -when honorably discharged, the sum of $100.” On the 12th July, 1861, a soldier enlists under this call. On the 22d July, 1861, Congress enact that the bounty of $100 shall be paid only token “the individual shall have served for a period of two years.” On the 6th August, 1861, Congress enact that “All acts, proclamations, and orders of the President” “respecting- the Army or Navy, and calling- out or relating to the militia or volunteers from the States, are hereby approved, and in all respects legalized.” The soldier is “honorably discharged” before he has served two years. The Court of Claims decides that a volunteer “honorably discharged” is entitled to the bounty o/$100 under the President’s Proclamation 3d May, 1861, (12 Stat., p. 1260,) the order of the War Department, (General Orders No. 15, 1861,) the Acts 22d July, 1861, (12Stat. L.,p. 268,) and 6th August, 1861, (12 Id., p. 326, § 3,) notwithstanding that he has not “ served for aperiod of two years,” as prescribed by the former act. Judgment for the claimant. The defendants appeal.</p> <p>Where a soldier enlisted under the President’s Proclamation 3c7 May, 1861, and the orders of the War Department, which x>rovide that every private shall be paid, “when honorably discharged,” $100, he is entitled to the bounty on his honorable discharge for disability, notwithstanding that he did not serve two years. The Aet 6th May, which “ approved and in all respeets legalized” the proclamation and orders, gives the same validity to such a claim as if the soldier had entered the service under an antecedent statute, notwithstanding that the Aet 22d July, 1861, (12 Stat. L., p. 268,) provides that the bounty shall be paid only when “ the individual shall have served for aperiod of two years.”</p>

<p> On the defendants’ Appeal. </p> <p>A suit is drought under the Abandoned or captured property act. The Court of Claims finds that the claimant never gave “ voluntary aid or comfort to the late rebellion;” but does not find, as required by the Act 25 June, 1868, (15 Stat. L., p. 75, § 3,) that he did not give aid or comfort “ to persons engaged in said rebellion.” It also finds that he gave involuntary aid under compulsion, and that he voluntarily executed as surety official bonds of commissaries and quartermasters in the Confederate serviee from motives of personal friendship to the principals. Also that afleo' the capture of Savannah, but before the actual seizure therein of the claimant!s cotton, he did, in dm form of lato, lalce and subscribe the oath of amnesty and allegiance to the United States prescribed by the President’s Proclamation 8 December, 1863. Judgment for the claimant. The defendants appeal.</p> <p>I. The Act 25 June, 1868, (15 Stat. L., p. 75, § 3,) does not change essentially the nature of the proof of loyalty required by the Abandoned or captured property act.</p> <p>II. The aid or comfort to the rebellion referred to in the Abandoned or eaptu/red property act is voluntary. The act does not intend to deprive persons of the benefits it gives, because of aid or comfort not voluntarily given.</p> <p>III. To execute as surety the official bonds of quartermasters or commissaries in the Confederate service, though from motives merely of pDersonal friendship to the principals, is to give aid and comfort to the rehellion within the moaning of the Abandoned or captured property act.</p> <p>TV. Private property cannot be deemed to have been captured, within the meaning of the Abandoned or captured property aei, by the captui’e of the city or place wherein it was, but only by its actual seizure or some declaration of the commanding officer to regard a particular desorption of property as not entitled to tho usual immunity.</p> <p>T. Where one takes the amnesty oath prescribed by the President’s Proclamation, 8 'December, 1863, immediately after the capture of the town, in which he lives, but bgfore the seizure of his property by the military, his right to the property remains perfect, notwithstanding the seizure; and by the oath he is purged of whatever offense he may have committed, and relieved from any penalty which he may have incurred. Therefore, on proof of his taking the oath, and that he was not within its exceptions, and that he has since complied with all of its requirements, he should recover in a suit under the Abandoned or captured property act, notwithstanding that it appears that he voluntarily aided the rebellion, while the act declares that he must prove that he “ has never given any aid or comfort to the present rebellion.’’</p>

<p> On the appellee's Motion. </p> <p>The Court of Claims renders judgment in favor of the claimant, and the defendants appeal. In framing Us finding of facts for the hearing on the appeal, it states that the claimant presented his claims to the Davis-Holt-Camphell Commission, when in fact it was transmitted to the commission by the Quartermaster-General. The claimant and his counsel are aware of the mistake, hut, deeming it immaterial, proceed to the hearing without moving to have the error corrected. The Supreme Court decides that the submission of the claim to the commission, its award, and the acceptance thereof, constitute a bar to this action, K and, reversing the judgment of the court below in favor of the claimant, directs that his petition be dismissed. He now moves on affidavit to stay the mandate so as to procure a correction of the record beloio, and a rehearing of. the appeal.</p> <p>Where the court helow fell into a mistako when framing the findings of fact for an appeal, hut the mistake was known to the party and his counsel in season to have had it corrected before hearing, and they, relying on its supposed immateriality, took no step to correct it, it is ’too late to move for relief after the decision of the Supreme Court has been announced.</p>

<p> On the appellees Motion. </p> <p>The Court of Claims renders judgment for the elaimant. The Government appeals. While the ease is still pending on appeal in the Supreme Court, the Government moves in the Court of Claims for a new trial, on newly discovered evidence wilder the Act 25 June, 1868, (15 Stat. L.; p. 75, $ 2.) The claimant then moves in the Supreme Court to dismiss the appeal. The motion is denied. Subsequently the Court of Claims grants a new trial. The elaimant again moves in the Supreme Court to dismiss the appeal. The Government opposes and aslcs that the record be remitted to the eouri below for further proceedings • there, reserving all questions that may arise on the judgment brought up by the appeal now sought to be dismissed.</p> <p>I. The Act 25 June, 1868, (15 Stat. L., p. 75, § 2,) which grants an exclusive right to the Government to move in the Court of Claims for a new trial “ at any time while any suit or claim is pending before or on appeal from said court” is new and anomalous, giving to one party an advantage over the other; hut the power of Congress to give it cannot he doubted.</p> <p>II. An appeal taken hy the Government from a judgment of the Court of Claims will not he dismissed because the Government has elected to move in the court below for a new trial on newly discovered evidence under the Act 25 June, 1868, (15 Stat. L., p. 75, § 2.) But it will he dismissed if the Court of Claims grant a new trial.</p> <p>III. The order of the Court of Claims granting a new trial in favor of the> Government, under the Aot 25 June, 1868, (15 Stat. L., p. 75, $ 2,) while the case is pending on appeal in the Supreme Court, has the effect of vacating the judgment appealed from, rendering it null and void, and leaving the parties in the same situation as if no trial had ever taken place.</p>

<p>On the defendants’ Appeal.</p> <p>An officer in the Regular Army is commissioned, in 1861, as colonel of the Second Missouri Volunteer Cavalry. Be remains in the volunteer service till December, 1865, when he is honorably discharged, and resumes Ids position in the Regular Army. Be brings his action for the “ three mouths’ pay proper ” given to officers of volunteers on their muster-out by the Act 3 March, 1865. The Court of Claims decides in his favor pro forma, the Government only having the right of appeal in this case. Judgment for the claimant. The defendants appeal.</p> <p>The intent of the Acts 3 March, 1865, and 13 July, 1866, (13 Stat. L., p. 497, § 4, 14 id., p. 24,) which provides that “ all officers of volunteers now in commissioti below the rank’of brigadier-general, who shall continue in the military service until the close of the tear, shall be entitled to receive, upon being mustered out of said service, threemonths’pay proper,” was to provide for the loss of volunteer officers before they could resume the avocations of civil life. They do not extend to an officer of the Regular Army who has been serving in the volunteers, and, on muster-out, returns to his former military position.</p>

<p> On the appellants’ Motion. </p> <p>The appellants move for a certiorari to complete the findings of the Court of Claims. They desire to show that the claimants voluntarily submitted their demands to the Davis-Holt-Camphell Commission, so as to bring this case •within the decision of the Supreme Court in Adams, (ante.) They propound certain interrogatories of fact, and further ash that the Court of Claims be directed, inmalcing up its fundings of fact, to use and regard the deposition. . of one of the claimants as an admission of the appellees. The deposition referred to toas excluded from the case by the Court of Claims at the trial on the appellants’ own motion.†</p> <p>I. An appellant in the Supreme Court is entitled to have the findings of fact of the court helow made complete, either affirmatively or negatively, on a material point.</p> <p>II. The findings of fact by a court, being conclusions deduced from evidence,, certiorari (a writ used to bring up to the court of error out-branches of the record, documents, or writings) is not the remedy for obtaining them. The party should move for an order of the Supreme Court directed to the court below, requiring that court to make return as to the existence or non-existence of the facts. But the Supreme Court cannot give the court below directions as to what finding it shall make, nor how it shall proceed on the points in question.</p> <p>III. If the Court of Claims should refuse with the proper evidence before it to find a material fact desired by either party, the proper remedy is to make a request that such finding be made, and to except in case of refusal.*</p>

Findings of the Court of Claims: 1. On the 22d February, 1819, and for a number of years prior thereto, Richard W. Meade, the claimant’s decedent, an American citizen, was resident in Spain and engaged therein in business as a merchant.

<p> On the claim antfs Appeal. </p> <p>The claimant is appointed consul at Algiers in 1854, after it had become a dependency of France. Se transacts private commereial business and receives from Government the “ expenses” of Ms office and malees no return of fees as consuls receiving a salary are required to do. After holding the office Jive years he resigns. Se brings his action for the salary allowed by law before Algiers became a French province, Act 1st May, 1810, (2 Stat. L.,p. 608, § 7.) It appears that Congress ceased to appropriate for a salary when Algiers passed to France, but the act 1810, giving a salary to “ the consul who shall be appointed to reside at Algiers,” has never been repealed. The Court of Claims decides that though the statute was not repealed, yet Us subject-matter expired when Algiers ceased to be a semi-barbarous Mohammedan power and became a French province; and that the duties, powers, and compensation of the consul then became regulated by our treaties xoith France and laws relating to consuls in Christian countries. Judgment for the defendants. The claimant appeals.</p> <p>A person appointed consul at Algiers after it became a French province is not entitled to the salary fixed bj' law when Algiers was one of the Barbary States, notwithstanding that the act fixing the salary has never been repealed. The conquest of Algiers changed it from a Mohammedan to a Christian state; and a distinction has always been made between consuls to those different powers; the one class being clothed. with diplomatic and judicial functions, and prohibited from entering into commercial transactions; the other being little more than commercial agents, generally allowed to engage in private business.</p>

<p> On the claimant's Appeal. </p> <p>The Continental Congress resolve to borrow $5,000,000 on “Loan-Office Certificates.” The certificates are to be countersigned by the commissioners of the loan-office to be established in each hítate. The claimant brings his action on certain certificates singed by the Continental Treasurer; indorsed “ countersigned by order of J. A. Treut.lin, governor of Georgia, E. Davies, jr.” The authority of E. D., jr., to countersign is not directly shown. It appears that Government once paid four years’ interest on some of these bonds ; that Hamilton, when Secretary of the Treasury, reported to Congress that there was then no evidence of the appointment of E. D.,jr., as commissioner, nor that he teas ever Icnown or reported to have acted as such ; and that the payment of interest was made by mistake of a Treasurer. The claimant fails to show that he took the bonds for value on the faith of Government’s payment of interest. The Court of Claims decides that the indorsement raises no presumption that the certificates were legally countersigned. Judgment for the defendants. The claimant appeals.</p> <p>I. The $5,000,000 loan-office certificates authorized by the Continental Congress 3d October, 1776, are not obligatory upon the Government unless they were executed as required by the legislature authorizing- them, and regularly issued and negotiated on account of the Confederacy. Therefore a party relying upon them must show that they were countersigned by a commissioner for the State in which they were issued; and it is not enough to produce ancient copies countersigned by one E. D., jr., by order of the governor of the State.</p> <p>Field, J., dissenting.</p> <p>II. The payment of interest for four years, through the mistake of a Treasurer, upon loan-office certificates of the Continental Congress, does not estop the Government from contesting the regularity of their issue and asserting- that the person countersigning them was not a commissioner for that purpose nor authorized to do so.</p>

<p> On the defendants' Appeal. </p> <p>The claimant brings his action under the Abandoned or captured property act. The defendants plead, under the Act 27tb. July 1863, (15 Stat. L.,p. 243, J 2,) that, he is an alien, anil not entitled to maintain his action in the Court of Claims. The claimant replies that the British government accords to citizens of the United Slates the right to prosecute claims against it in its own courts, by means of the Petition of right given by the common law of England and regulated by the Act 3d July, 1880, (2Mand‘¿üh Viet.) The Court of Claims decides that by the remedy known as the Petition of right, American citizens are accorded the right to prosecute the government of Great Britain, and that it is equivalent to the right of prosecuting the Government of the United States in the Court of Claims. Judgment for the claimant. Vie defendants appeal.</p> <p>The Edition of right is a judicial proceeding-; and though theoretically the permission of tho Crown is necessary and permission is sometimes refused in extraordinary oases, yet nevertheless the remedy is not less practical and efficient than a suit in tho Court of Claims. Therefore a British subject may maintain his action in the Court of Claims notwithstanding- the Act 27th July, 1868, (15 Stat. L., p. 243, § 2,) restricts that privilege to aliens whose governments accord a similar right to American citizens.</p>

<p> On the Appeals of doth parties. </p> <p>The owners of a steamboat in Saint Louis are applied to in June, 1865, b¡¡ a quartermaster to talce a cargo of military supplies to Fort Berlhold, on the Missouri. Refusing, they are informed that the boat will be impressed. They protest, but get their steamer in readiness, receive the cargo and discharge it al the place of destination. The steamer on her ret urn voyage is driven aground in a gale. The crew leave her in charge of an engineer, a mate and three watchmen, in July. In September these abandon her. The following spring she is destroyed by ice. The owners make their protest to cover insurance. On chartering the steamer the quartermaster fixes the compensation al $272 a day. It is paid up to the time that information is received of her grounding. So thenpaysJ$Wl a day for the time the engineer and men remain aboard. Be next issues vouchers at $80 a day for a portion of the time between the abandonment and the final destnelion of the steamer, but they are not paid. The owners, at the request of the (quartermaster, send a party to save the boat and expend $2,500 in po doing. Under the Act 3d Mareli, 1849, (9 Slat. L., p. 414,) the Third Auditor alloivs $30,000t/or the loss of the steamer, which is] paid to the owners. They bring their action for $80 a day up to the time of her destruction. The Court of Claims desides that the Government is not liable for the per diem of the steamer after the abandonment by the owners; but that under the Act 3d March, 1849, if stands in the relation of insurer of a vessel used for military purposes; and that mqney expended in efforts to save such a vessel, al the request of the officer who chartered her, may be recovered back from the Government. Judgment for the claimants in pari. Both parties appeal.</p> <p>I. Where the owner retains the possession, command, and navigation of his vessel and contracts for a specified voyage, the arrangement in contemplation of law is a mere affreightment, not a demise of the vessel, and the charterer is not clothed with the character or responsibility of ownership.</p> <p>II. When rthe Government charters a vessel to carry a cargo to a certain port, tho compensation being fixed at a per diem going and returning, tho vessel being possessed and navigated by tho owners, and she is grounded on the return voyage, and some months later totally lost, the Government is not liable beyond the agreed per cliem from the beginning of the voyage until it is broten up, including so many days in addition as would have been spent if no disaster had occurred.</p> <p>III. When a vessel enrployod by a quartermaster to carry military supplies is in danger of being lost, and the quartermaster requests tho owners to send assistance for the purpose of protecting the interests of the Government as well as of the owners, no liability on the part of the Government arises for money so expended. Tho Government has no interest in the steamer and the quartermaster no authority to bind the Government by any such arrangement.</p>

<p> On the appellant!? Motion. </p> <p>The case is pending in the Supreme Court on appeal. Shortly before it is reached on the doelcet, the appellants move a continuance, on the ground that they have moved in the Court of Claims for a neto trial, on the ground of newly discovered evidence under the Act 25 June, 1868, (15 Stat. L.,p. 75, § 2.) The appellee opposes, on the ground that more than two years had elapsed after judgment was given before the new trial was asked for ; andón the ground of interminable delay.</p> <p>Final hearing on an appeal will be postponed at the instance of the Government, where it, being appellant, has moved in the Court of Claims for a new trial on newly-discovered evidence under the Act 25 June, 1868, (15 Stat. L.,p. 75, $ 2.)*</p>

<p> On the defendants' Appeal. </p> <p>Congress grants pensions to the widows of soldiers of the Revolution if married before the lsf January, 1800, “ to commence oil the 4th day of March, 1848,” Act 29th July, 1848. Congress next enacts that the widows of all officers and soldiers of the Revolution who were married subsequent to the 1st January, 1800, “shall he entitled to a pension in the same manner as those who were married before that date,” Act 3d February, 1853. The Commissioner of Tensions construes the last act to grant the pensions only from the date of its enactment and decides'that they should not “commence on the 4th day of March, 1848.” The claimant’s intestate was the widow of a soldier of the Revolution. She was married subsequent to the 1st January, 1800, and received her pension subsequent to the 3d February, 1853. Me seelcs to recover the arrears from 1848 to 1853. The Court of Claims decides that the intent of the second act ivas to give to all widows of soldiers of the Revolution the same pension from the same time. Judgment for the claimant. The defendants appeal.</p> <p>I. Where the Commissioner of Pensions has construed an act to mean that certain widows of soldiers of tlic Revolution shall receive pensions from the time of the enactment and not from the time fixed by a previous statute to wliiob the latter act refers, and such construction has ever since been given to it by the Pension Bureau, and subsequent legislation indicates that Congress has acquiesced iu that construction, the true construction which should he given to the act is not an open question,, and the Supreme Court is not at liberty to interpret the act differently from .the Pension Bureau.</p> <p>II. The Jet 29th July, 1848, (9 Stat, b., p. 265,) gives pensions to those widows of soldiers of the Revolution who wore married before the 1st January, 1800, “to commence on the Ath day of March, 1848.” The Act 3d February, 1853, (10 Stat. L., p. 154,) provides that all married subsequent to the 1st January, 1800, “shall he entitled to a pension-in the same manner as those who were married before that date.” But the latter act is not to be construed as an amendment of the former; nor is a widow to whom it extends entitled to a jjension “ to commence on the 4th day of March, 1848,” but only to commence at the date of the last enactment.</p>

Findings of fact in the Gotirt of Claims : 1. During the months of August and September, and before the 14th October, 1861, the city of Saint Louis, being the military center and headquarters of a large military department known as the Department of the West, Major McKinstry, the chief quartermaster of the department, and his assistant quartermasters, under the express orders and with the approval of Major-General Frémont, commanding the department, purchased of the…

<p> On the defendants’ Appeal. </p> <p>An officer in the army, being the patentee of the Sibley tent, contraéis with the Secretary of War for the use of the patent-right on the payment of a royalty. The contract authorizes the Government to malee as many tents as it may require, and is to continue until notice is given by the patentee. He subsequently transfers to the claimant, another officer in the army, “ the one-half interest in all the benefits and net profits arising from and belonging to the invention ” from a time anterior to the contract with the Government. The patentee joins in the rebellion, whereupon the Government pays the half of the stipulated royalty to the claimant. Subsequently the Secretary of War orders no further payments to be made to the claimant; but the Government continues to use the invention after the suspension of payments. There is cm Army Regulation, No. 1002, which provides: “ No officer or agent in the military service shall purchase from any other person in the military service, or mate any contract with any such person to furnish supplies or services, or mate any puchase or contract in which such person shall be ad mitted to any share or part or to any benefit to arise therefrom.” The Court of Claims decides that the Secretary of War is a civil officer and not within the Army Regulation. Also, that the Government could only terminate the contract by discontinuing the use of the invention. Also, that the loyal partner might maintain his action for his moiety. Judgment for the claimant. The defendants appeal.</p> <p>I. The Secretary of War is a civil and not a military officer. Therefore an Army Regulation (No. 1002) which provides that “noofficeror agentinthe military service shall purchase from any other person in the military service or malee any contract with any such person,” <f-e., does not apply to contracts on behalf of the Government which require for their validity the approval of the Secretary.</p> <p>II. An officer in the military service not specially employed to make experiments may devise new and useful improvements in arms, tents, and war material, and will be entitled to the benefit of his inventions and to let-tors-patent therefor equally with any other citizen; and the Government cannot, after the patent be issued, make use of the improvement without license of the patentee, or making compensation to him.</p> <p>III. Where the Government is manufacturing patented tents under a license from the patentee and upon the payment of a royalty for each tent manufactured, it can determine its liability by ceasing to make the tents; but an order of the Secretary of War forbidding further payments of the royalty will not be construed as a repudiation of the liability of the Government, but only as an intent to leave the rights of the parties (involved in peculiar complications) to be determined by judicial proceedings.’</p> <p>IV. An assignment by a patentee of “ the one-half interest in all the benefits and net profits arising from and belonging to the invention” from a time anterior to a license from him to the Government, passes a half interest in the license and a right to a moiety of the royalty stipulated thereby.</p> <p>Y. Where the Government is indebted to two persons for the royalty of a . patented tent manufactured by it under a contract with the patentee entered into before the rebellion and one of the parties j oins the Confederates, and the Secretary of War recognizes the half interest of the other and directs the payment of a moiety to him, he thereby severs the claim nnder the contract, and the loyal party may maintain his several action for his half interest.</p> <p>'YI. The rights of one person to whom with another jointly the Government is indebted for its license to uso a piatented article, can neither be forfeited nor impaired by the disloyalty of his associate. Under the Amended Court of Claims Act, (12 Stat. L., p. 765, § 12,) he may maintain his action while his disloyal associate is barred. Therefore the act severs the original joint claim, and allows the interest of the loyal joint owner to be prosecuted severally.</p> <p>VII. The Court of Claims is not bound by any special rules of pleading.</p>

<p> On the claimants’ Appeal. </p> <p>The claimant (Mrs. Perrin) seeks to recover for properly destroyed, in the bombardment of Qreytoivn by the United States ship of war Cyane, the 13th of July, 1854. At the time of the bombardment, she teas a French subject, but has since become a naturalized citizen of the United States. The defendants demur. The Court of Claims decides: 1st, that her claim must be against the government of the country where she chose to reside; 2d, that it is political, to be settled by the Fxeautive with Nicaragua. Judgment for the defendants. The claimants appeal.</p> <p>A claim for property destroyed in. the bombardment of G-reytown by the United States ship of war Cyane is not a claim “founded upon any lani ■ of Congress, or upon any regulation of an Executive Department or upon any contract, express or implied, with the Government,” and cannot be maintained in the Court of Claims under the Court of Claims Act, (10 Stat. L. p. 612, § 1.)</p>

<p> On the claimant’s Appeal. </p> <p>The claimant agrees with a quartermaster to furnish all the river transportation the Government may require from Little Boclc to Fort Smith, and to and from all points between. Me insists that he is to carry all the freight passing wp the river ; hut Government ships freight from Saint Louis direct to Fort Smith and refuses to re-ship by the claimant’s boats at Little Boclc. Me brings his action for the profits he might have made. The Court of Claims decides that the contract must be construed to include only supplies passing 'exclusively on the claimant’s route. Judgment for the defendants. The claimant appeals.</p> <p>Where an Army transportation contract is for “all transportation the United Stales may require”from a specified military depot to a specified military post “and to and from all points ’botween,” the contractor has not a monopoly of all Government transportation passing over the water-way where his contract is to he performed; i. <?., Government is not hound when it ships freight from a point without the contractor’s route to a point within, to stop on reaching his route and reship hy his boats. Such an inconvenience could not have been within the intent of the parties when they made the contract.</p>

Findings of the Court of Claims. ■ III. The bark Annie Kimball arrived at Port Royal with the freight .specified in the bill of lading on the 4fch May, 1865, and immediately tendered the freight to the consignee, the defendants’ quartermaster.

<p> On the defendants' Appeal. </p> <p>Wilson resides within the insurrectionary district, and is guilty of giving aid and omfori to the rebellion. On the capture of Yicksburgh his cotton is seized. Subsequent to seizure Tie takes the oath under the President's Proclamation, 8th December, 1883, (12 Stat. L., p. 737.) Sis administrator brings this action under the Adandoned or Captured Property Act, and recovers judgment in the Court of Claims. The defendants’ appeal. Congress pass the proviso to the General Appropriation Act, 1870, (16 Stat. Z., p. 235,) declaring no pardon or amnesty admissible in evidence in the Court of Claims, cj-c.*</p> <p>I.Except as to property used in actual hostilities, no titles wore divested by captures in the insurgent States, nor by any means except a judgment of confiscation, after duo legal proceedings. As regards the abandoned or captured property, whereof the proceeds are in the Treasury, the property of the original owner is in no case absolutely divested, whether ho was loyal or disloyal. As regards the proceeds in the Treasury, the case stands thus : There has been no confiscation; possession is in the Government ; the property remains in the original owner ; restoration is pledged only to those who have adhered continually to the Government; as to others it must bo determined by consideration of public policy. Miller, J., dissenting.</p> <p>II.The pardon or amnesty of the President, with the promise of restoration of all rights of property, restores to the disloyal owner of captured property the right to the proceeds in the Treasury, aud the right to maintain an action therefor in the Court of Claims, although he did not avail himself of the pardon by taking the prescribed oath until after the seizure of his property.</p> <p>III. The Court of Claims exercises all the functions of a court, and is one of those inferior courts which Congress authorize having jurisdiction of contracts between the Government and the citizen, from which appeal lies to the Supreme Court. The Legislature has complete control of its organization and existence, and may confer or withhold the right of appeal from its decisions, but cannot prescribe to it a rule of decision for cases which it is to decide.</p> <p>IV. The proviso to the General Appropriation Act, 1870, (16 Stat. L., p. 235,) because it prescribes rules of decision to the judicial department of the Government in cases pending before it, and because its great and controlling purpose is to' deny to pardons granted by the President the effect which the judiciary has adjudged them to have, and because it impairs the effect of a pardon, and thus infringes the constitutional power of the Executive, is unconstitutional and void. It is the intention of the Constitution that the legislative, executive, and judicial departments shall be each, in its sphere, independent of the others. The distinction between this and the Wheeling Bridge Case, (18 How. R., p. 429,) stated.</p>

<p> On the claimant's Appeal. </p> <p>The owner of certain. cotton in Arkansas dies in 1863, ’before Us capture. In an action for the proceeds brought bij his administratrix, his disloyalty is fully shown, and that the estate is insolvent. The claimant offers evidence of her own loyalty. The Court of Claims rejects the evidence, and decides that wider 17ie Abandoned or Cap tured Property Act,»?; administratrix slandsin thestead of the decedent; representing his rights, entitled to his equities, and subject to his disabilities; and that the rights of the real parties in interest can neither be aided nor destroyed by her loyally or disloyalty. Judgment for the defendants. The claimant appeals.</p> <p>In an action by an administratrix brought under the Abandoned or Captured Property Act, (12 Stat. L.; p. 820,) to recover the proceeds of property which was captured after administration, it is the loyalty of the administratrix, and not the loyalty of the decedent, nor of the distributees, that must be established.</p>

Findings of the Court of Claims. 1. On tbe 26th clay of February, 1864, at the city of Washington, the claimant entered into a written agreement in due form of law with the defendants through Lieutenant-Colonel James A. Ekin, the chief quartermaster of the Cavalry Bureau, a bureau established by the War Department, aud having charge exclusively of the purchase, care, and custody of cavalry horses; whereby it was agreed— u First.

Findings of the Goiirt of Claims. 1. On bio vein ber 16, 1862, and during tbe emergency caused by tbe removal of tbe army of the Potomac to Falmouth, tbe Tallacca, a steam-vessel owned by tbe claimant, was chartered by Captain C. B. Ferguson; an officer in tbe Quartermaster’s Department, acting, at Alexandria;, Virginia, under tbe instructions of General Fucker, the chief, quartermaster at Washington.

Tlie claimant moved on bis own affidavit, which among other ■things stated: This affiant farther states that on the 21st and 22d of… Held: that inasmuch as the motion for a new trial had been argued before, and submitted to four of the judges, and inasmuch as the said judges were equally divided, the said motion for a new trial should be overruled; and that on the 19th day of December, 1871, the said motion for a new trial was ordered to be placed on the law-docket for…

<p> On the defendants’ Appeal. </p> <p>The claimant traces 73 hales of captured cotton to the quartermaster in Atlanta charged with the care and custody of captured property. He shoios that the quartermaster shipped 130,605 pounds to the officer in charge ofmilitojry transportation at Nashville, which officer turned over to the Treasury agent, there, 1,382 hales of cotton coming from Atlanta. The cotton received hy the agent is forwarded to the general supervising agent at Cincinnati, and, hy him sold. The proceeds of the sale go into the Treasury. But the claimant does not show that his cotton was included in the quartermaster’s shipments. The Court of Claims decides that where capiiured property is traced to the possession of' the Government, it is hound to account for it. Judgment for the claimant. The defendants appeal.</p> <p>I. The presumption, is that officers of tlie Government perforin their duty, and the presumption is strengthened in a certain case hy the fact that heavy statutory penalties will he incurred hy neglect.</p> <p>II. 'Where captured cotton is traced hy the owner to the possession of a quartermaster'charged with its care and custody, and it is shown that lie transmitted a large quantity to another officer, who turned over a largo quantity to a Treasury agent, which was sold, and the proceeds paid into the Treasury, the owner is not-bound to trace his own cotton more specifically, nor to show positively that it was included in the quartermaster’s shipments. The presumption is that the officers transmitted it, and the evidence to repel the iiresunxption being the books of the Treasury, the burden is on the G o vernment to do so. Davis, Swayxe, and Mrrj.Eii, JJ., dissenting.</p>

<p> On the defendants’ Appeal- </p>

<p> On the claimant’s Appeal. </p> <p>The claimant brings her action under the Abandoned or Captured Property Act, hut fails to establish that she never gave aid or comfo.rt to the rebellion as required by Che statute. Neither does she show the talcing of any amnesty oath as did the claimants in Padelford and Klein’s cases, (ante.) The Court of Claims decides that her disloyalty was fatal. Judgment for the defendants. The claimant appeals.</p> <p>The President’s Proclamation, 25th December, 1808, (15 Sfcat. L., p. 711,) declaring universal amnesty for participation in the rebellion, and granting pardon unconditionally and without reservation, relieves a party from all proof of loyalty or of compliance with tho conditions of preceding proclamations or of a special pardon.</p>

<p> On the claimants Motion. </p> <p> ■On the trial the claimant requests the court heloie to find that the title to certain captured property was in her. The court, on the contrary, finds that shewas not 1he oivner. She now moves for an order to have all the evidence which, was before the court below returned to the Supreme Court, to the end that the disputed question of foot may be brought up for review. </p> <p>'The purpose of the rules regulating appeals from the Court of Claims is to bring up nothing for review save questions of law, leaving the Court below to exercise the functions of a jury by finding facts equivalent to a special verdict. . The purpose of Hule V, which authorizes a party to request the court below to find a fact deemed essential, and directs that if refused the prayer and refusal must be made a part of the record, is to pnable the Supreme Court to determine whether the question is necessary to the decision of the case.</p>

<p> On the claimant's Appeal. </p> <p>The petitioner alleges possession of his plantation in Louisiana until, in October, 1862, “ tlie United States illegally, violently, and forcibly took possession of said plantation against tlie consent of said petitioner, whom they dispossessed ; and continued to hold possession thereof until January, 1866, on ■ the false and illegal pretext that the property was abandoned by the owner.” Also, that there was on the plantation certain personal property which “ was destroyed or taken and carried away by the United States and those agents who were put in charge of the plantation, so that the petitioner has been deprived of it,” and “ the United States have become liable in law to pay him the value thereof,” $-c. Also, “that during the time the plantation aforesaid was in the possession of the United States,” <fc., “it was rented out by the United States to persons who made largo crops” ¿Jr., “worth” $3Q,000, which “the United States are justly and legally liable bo pay him for.” The defendants move to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. The Court of Claims decides that where a petitioner does not in terms profess to seek relief under the “ Abandoned or Captured property Act,” (12 Stat. L.,p. 820; 13 ib.,p. 375,) and where he does not show a talcing of private properly for publie use, nor that the defendants received rent to the use of the claimant for his plantation leased by them to third persons, but simply contains the elements of a declaration in trespass quare clasum frogit, viz, piossession by the claimant — an entry illegal, violent, forcible, by the defendants — the Court of Claims has not jurisdiction of the action. Judgment for the defendants. The claimant appeals.</p> <p>Where a petition alleges that the Government took and destroyed property during the rebellion, in one of the insurrectionary States, the presumption is that it was done by the army, and hence that the Court of Claims is restricted from jurisdiction by the Act 4th July, 1864, (13 Stat: L., p. 381.) Neither will an allegation that the Government leased the claimant’s plantation save the jurisdiction, under the Act 2d July, 1864, (ib., p. 375,) if the leasing is alleged merely as an incident of unlawful appropriation.</p>

<p> On the defendants’ Appeal. </p> <p> More Chan six years elapse after the claimant’s service is performed before the bringing of the action; but less than six years from a payment made by the Quartermaster Department for the service. The defendants plead the statute of limitations. The claimant proves his case, and insists that the payment made talces the case out of the statute. The Court of Claims, with doubt, so decides, f udgmentfor the claimant. The defendants appeal. </p> <p>I. A claim against tiro Government is not taken out of tlio statute of limitations, (12 Stitt. L., p. 763, § 10,) by a payment made within six years.</p> <p>II. The Supreme Court lias never adopted as a rule of decision respecting statutes of limitation the judicial requirements which in some courts have prevailed; hut has hold that they are entitled to tho same respiect as other statutes and should not he explained away.</p>

<p> On the claimant1 s Appeal. </p> <p>A disloyal citizen of Louisiana "brings his action under the Abandoned or captured property act. He pleads a special pardon from the President in the ■stead of the statutory allegation that “ he has never given any aid or com'■forfc to the present rebellion.” The Court of Claims construes the statute as ■one passed midway in the rebellion Jn the nature of a compact, and holds ■that the icords “aid or comfort to the rebellion ” relate to the fact and not to the crime, and that pardon and amnesty which obliterate crime do not create a jurisdictional fact. Judgment for-the defendants. The claimant appeals.</p> <p>'The decision of the Supreme Court in Mrs. Armstrong's Case {ante) covers the case of one who pleads in a suit under the Abandoned or captured property act, a special pardon, instead of the requirement of the statute that “he has never given aid or comfort to the present rebellion."</p>

<p> On the defendants’ Appeals. </p> <p>/lotions are brought to recover the “20 per cent .’’given to certain persons in the civil service at Washington bg the Joint Resolution 28th. February, 1867, (14 Stat. L., p. 569.) Among them are cases of a gate-lceeper of the Capitol, of the leeeper of the crypt, of a laborer on the public grounds, of a watchman on the grounds of the Capitol, of a watchman in the stables of the Commissioner of Public Buildings, of a watchman on the dome of the Capitol, of the captain of the Capitol police.* The Court of Claims decides that such. employes are within the terms of the resolution. Judgment for the respective claimants. The defendants appeal.</p> <p>I. The “ Twenty per cent, resolution” 1867, (14 Stat. L., p. 369,) extends to a keeper of the gate of the Capitol, a keeper of tho crypt, a laborer on the public grounds, a watchman on the grounds of the Capitol, a watchman at tho stables of the Commissioner of Public Buildings, a watchman on the dome of the Capitol, and to the Capitol police. The term “ employésin the office of” does not restrict the i-esolution to clerks, messeng-ers, and the like. Neither is a commission, nor a warrant of appointment, jiecessary to entitle an eruployiS to the benefit of the resolution; nor is it limited to employments designated in appropriation acts.</p> <p>II. Civil officers are usually divided into three classes, political, judicial, ministerial. But persons actually and properly employed in the Executive Mansion or in the Executive Departments or in bureaus or divisions thereof, if employed by an officer charged with that duty and authorized by law to fix their compensation, are persons in tho civil service.</p>

<p> On the defendants’ Appeal. </p> <p>The aclion is ’brought io recover the “20 per ceut.” given to certain persons in the civil service of Washington, by the Joint Resolution 28tli Eetouary, 1867, (14 Slat. L.,p. 569.) The case is that of one of the guards of the jail in the District of Columbia. The Court of Claims decides that such an employe is within the terms of the resolution. Judgment for the claimant. The defendants appeal.</p> <p>The “ Twenty percent. Resolution,” 1867,. (14 Stat. L., p. 569,) extends to the guards of the jail in the District of Columbia, they being selected by the warden, but their number and compensation being fixed by the 'Secretary of the Interior. They are employes of tho warden, and the office of warden is a bureau or division of the Interior Department,</p>

This is a petition to recover of the defendants the sum of $45,712.33 alleged to be due for a balance on account of beef furnished to the Army of the United States, in West Yirginia, in 18C2. It is averred that said beef was furnished under orders issued by the proper authorities in the field, and to-supply emergencies then existing, all of which is sufficiently evidenced in the telegrams issued by Captain KcKenzie, commissary in the army under General Frémont.

<p> On Motion. </p> <p> The claimant sues for the consideration of certain United States bonds held illegally, it alleges, by third persons. It now moves for a citation requiring these persons to come in and assert their rights. The motion is founded on the analogy of English chancery practice. </p> <p>Where an action directly relates to certain evidences of debt in the possession of third persons in which they profess to have a legal interest, the claimant may'take a citation requiring them to appear, so as to formally notify them of the pendency of the suit and have the notification appear of record, to the end that he shall not he hindered in the prosecution of the suit by their unseasonable interposition.</p>

<p> On motion for New Trial. </p> <p>A business firm m Cumberland, Maryland, composed of loyal citizens, at the breaking out of the rebellion, has a branch m Martinsburgh, Virginia, conducted by one of the firm. When Martinsburgh passes within the Confederate lines, he sells out the stock of the firm, and gives $4,000 to one M. to invest in cotton. The agent invests it; the cotton is captured; the firm brings its action for the proceeds in the Treasury ; but the court decides that the resident partner could' not appoint an agent for the firm, and that no valid title to the cotton wan acquired. (6 C. Cls. B., x>. 333.) T.he claimants now move for a new trial on alleged error of law.</p> <p>War, where members of a partnership are belligerents, dissolves tlio partnership as to future joint dealings, but not as to winding up tlio affairs of the firm. The property remains the property of the firm, and liable for its debts exactly as the property of a x>erson deceased belongs to his estate, and is liable for his debts. Each partner as such remains the agent of the firm, and can use the authority of the firm in relation to its property, but he can do nothing that the firm itself could not do. Therefore a partner resident in belligerent territory cannot appoint an agent and give him partnership funds to purchase cotton for the firm, and no valid title is acquired by the firm to the cotton so purchased.</p>

<p> On Motion for.-New- Trial. </p> <p>The defendants move.for a new trial under i7te-Acb 25th June, 1868, (15 Stat. L., p. 75, § 2,) on newly-discovered evidence. The motion is founded on the affidavit of one of their present law-officers. Tlie affidavit does not show that the evidence was unknown to the former law-officers who tiled the ease, nor that they exercised diligence to discover it.</p> <p>I. Tlie Government when a party litigant, like other suitors, is bound to use duo diligence. The officers of the Government on whom the obligation of diligence falls, are those whotii the láw makes officially cognizant of the suit, or those who are charged in law'or in fact with its prosecution or defense. They must he .deemed to stand in the stead of the ordinary party, so far as mere legal proceedings are involved, and be subject to his obligations of care and diligence. Therefore a new trial founded on newly-discovered evidence should not be allowed where the evidence might have been known to the 'former law-officers charged with the defence of the action.</p> <p>II. The official cognizance of certain officers of the Government is established, so far as suits against the Government in the Court of Claims are concerned, by the Act 25th June, 1868, (15 Stat. L., p. 75, § 6.)</p> <p>III. A new trial will not t>e allowed in favor of the Government whore tlie newly-discovered evidence is irrelevant and immaterial; nor where the only effect of it, if admitted, will be to contradict former witnesses of the claimant; nor where it will merely negative a finding now spread on the record of the appeal under the order of the appellate court.</p> <p>IY. A new trial in a suit under the Abandoned or captured property aot will not he granted on the Government’s motion because a subsequent Treasury report indicates that the proceeds of the captured property are not in the Treasury.</p>

The claimant was appointed a clerk in class four by the Congressional? Printer, and was so employed from the date of his appointment to the present time, as follows: From the 15th day of May, 18C9, and has received a salary from that date at the rate of $1,800 per annum, the salary of clerks of that class having been fixed by law at that rate prior to the act of July 28, 1866. (See act of March 3,1853, par. 3, 10 Stat.

This suit is brought against the United States under the third section of the act of March 12,1863, for the recovery of the net proceeds of fifty-nine bales of cotton, seized by the military authorities of the United States, in the month of June, 1805, in Newton County, Mississippi, and turned over to the United States Treasury agent and sold, and the proceeds paid into the United States Treasury. This claim is founded on the following facts : First.

On tbe 4th day of December, 1867, tlie Secretary of the Treasury, by virtue of the power in him vested by the concluding proviso of section 25 of the internal revenue act, passed June 30, 1884, (13 Stat.

This is a claim for unliquidated damages arising out of the violation of a contract by defendants, and it has not been presented for settlement in any Department. The contract was entered into between claimant and defendants on March 27, 1865, and will be found in the record of tbe case.

By this suit claimant seeks to obtain the sum of $350 from the United States, which, he claims to he due to him as commissions on amounts of internal-revenue stamps purchased by him in pursuance of act of June 30, 1864, sec. 161. There is, in this case, a preliminary question of jurisdiction to be considered.

This is an action brought to recover the proceeds of the salo of thirty-seven bales of cotton, the property of the claimant, which were taken and carried away from his plantation, situated in the parish of Tensas, State of Louisiana, by the United States Mississippi marine brigade, then under the command of Brigadier General Ellett, on or about February 1,1864, and which cotton was afterward delivered to the agents of the Treasury of the United States at Yicksburgh,…

<p> On Motion. </p> <p>On the trial the court found the claimant to have leen the owner of certain captured property, and that the proceeds thereof are in the Treasury, hut that his proof of loyalty tvas defective. The court dismissed the petition. Subsequently the decision of the Supreme Court was rendered in Klein’s Case. The claimant now moves for a new trial, and to comet the judgment for error of law.</p> <p>I. The proviso to the Appropriation act 1870, (16 Stat. L., p. 235,) contains hut a single provision which distinctively appertains to the Supreme Court.. Throughout its entire scope it relates to 'the administration of justice in the judicial department of the Government, and its provisions relate to, affect, and in part nullify, the official acts of the Executive. Therefore it was within the properjudicial province of the Supreme Court to hold in Klein’s Case that 'the entire act was unconstitutional, because it interferes with the constitutional functions of the judiciary, and infringes upon the constitutional power of the Executive.</p> <p>II. The Proalamation25th December, 1868, (15 Stat. L., p. 711,) relieves a citizen coming within its terms from mating proof of loyalty.*</p>

<p> On 2ioiion. </p> <p>An action is brought under the Abandoned or captured x>roperty act, in the name of the assignee. After the right of the assignor to bring an action in his own name has become barred by the statute of limitations, but before trial, it is discovered that the right of action is not legally in the assignee. To save it from being barred by the statute of limitations the claimant moves to substitute his assignor as party claimant.</p> <p>To save a right of action from being barred by the statute of limitations courts will allow an assignor to be substituted for the assignee as party-plaintiff, and such a substitution will be allowed in a suit under the Abmdoned or captured property act, although the claim of the assignor is already barred by the statute. (And see Green’s Case, post.)-</p>

<p> On Motion. </p> <p>The petition alleges that certain moneys belonging to the claimants were seieed by the army engaged in the suppression of the rebellion, but afterward came to the possession of the Government. The defendants move to dismiss the petition ■upon the ground that the moneys were appropriated by the army, and jurisdisdiction of the action was talcen away by the Act 4th July, 1864.</p> <p>I. Where the defendants’ objection toapetition goes to the right of a claimant to maintain his action, it should be presented by demurrer or plea, aud where it goes to the. jurisdiction it should be taken by plea to the jurisdiction.</p> <p>II. Where property seized by the army engaged in the suppression of the rebellion came to the possession of the Government, it was not “ appropriated” by the army, within the intent of the Act ith July, 1864, (13 Stat. L., p. 381,) and the Court of Claims may entertain jurisdiction of such an action.</p>

This action was brought by Simon Queyrouze, a subject of France, who during the late rebellion was domiciled in the city of New Orleans, under the statute known as the “ Captured and abandoned property act,” to recover the net proceeds of one hundred and two bales of upland cotton, of which he was the owner, and which were seized in the parish of Saint Landry, Louisiana, in the spring of 1863, by the Federal military authorities.

Claim is made for the net proceeds of one hundred and fifty-three bales of cotton, taken by the army of General Banks in the Opelousas expedition, May, 18C3. The taking of the cotton is proved by numerous witnesses, and by the original receipt now produced. That it was taken by proper authority appears as well from the receipt referred to and from the testimony of Colonel Chickering, who gave it.

This action is brought by the claimants, wbo are citizens oí the State of New York, under the act known as the “Abandoned and captured property act,” to recover the net proceeds of ten bales of upland cotton seized at Charleston, South Carolina, by the United States Treasury agents, in October, 1865, and which were subsequently shipped to New York, and there sold by the Government, and the proceeds of which have been paid into the National Treasury.

1. By tbe contract of charter-party tbe defendants acquired tbe right of tbe use of tbe claimant’s vessel, her tackle and apparel, officers and men, at a fixed price per month, for an indefinite period. 2. Tbe law implies that tbe vessel should be required to perform reasonable services, not to incur any extraordinary or hazardous risks, but to be navigated according to the received, rules of experience of g'ood seamanship in tbe service of the defendants. 3.

Tlie foundation of this suit rests upon an INDEBTEDNESS of the United States to the plaintiff'. It is not a claim against the United States, in the common or ordinary acceptation of the term claim. The plaintiff seeks the recovery of a portion of the “ public debt,” or “ funded debt,” as it is generally termed, due and owing to him.

This cause is founded upon the act of Congress of May 9, 1866, (14 Stat.

This is an action brought by original petition to recover compensation for 18,000 bushels of corn sold and delivered to the Government. It appears that the corn was all shipped from Manteno to Cairo between the 22d and the 29th of April. The corn was then in excellent condition. The time ordinarily required to transport freight from Manteno to Cairo, was two and a half days.

<p> On the Proofs. </p> <p> The claimant offers in evidence a pardon from the President, which, by its terms, is declared to he of no effect until he shall take the oath prescribed by a certain proclamation. Annexed to it is an oath taken before the pardon ivas granted. He contends that this is a substantial compliance with the condition imposed. </p> <p>He who claims the benefit of a pardon must be held to strict compliance with its conditions. Therefore where there is a provision in a pardon that it shall “ be of no effect until the said EC. 3. shall take the oath pre~ scribed” in a certain proclamation, it is not sufficient to produce such an oath taken before the pardon was granted, and the pardon cannot be given in evidence.</p>

<p> On the Proofs. </p> <p>The claimant reties on an oaih taken under a ‘proclamation of amnesty. The proclamation prescribes the form. The oath talcen varies in two particulars ; first, in the clause “ I will henceforth, faithfully support, protect, and defend the Constitution,” the ivord “ protect” is omitted ; second, in the clause “ during the late rebellion” the word “ existing” is substituted for “late.”</p> <p>An oath taken under the Amnesty Proclamation 29th May, 1865, is sufficient, though it omits the word “protect,” and substitutes for the term “ late rebellion ” the term “ existing rebellion.”</p>

<p> On the Proofs. </p> <p>The quartermaster's reports of cotton captured at Savannah credit the claimantwith less than Ms evidence indicates. To rebut the reports he brings into court the original shipping^books of the quartermaster. In .them the claimant’s name appears to have stood originally at the head of a page, bnt to have been overwritten with the words, “ Claimant unknown.” The books have been in the posses-sion of the War Department. The quantity credited to the claimant in the shipping-books agrees almost precisely with that shown by his evidence.</p> <p>The burden rests on the Government to explain, establish, and justify erasures and alterations in its original shipping-books of captured property, if it would avail itself of the altered entries. And where the original entries receive strong' confirmation ■ from certain circumstances, and the alterations are not explained by the Government, the former will be taken in favor of the claimant.</p>

<p> On the Proofs. </p> <p> The suit is brought by the husband in his own name, to recover the proceeds of cotton-captured, in, Georgia, where he and the wife reside. It is alleged as against his title that the cotton was either owned bylhexoife before marriage or purchased with her money after marriage. Blit it toas in his possession when seized. </p> <p>Tlie lmsbaud may maintain a suit in his oivn name under the Abandoned and' eaptured property act, where the property was captured, in his possession in Georgia, in which State ho and the wife reside ; notwithstanding that the property belonged to the wife before marriage or was bought with her inouey after marriage. (And see Green’s Case, post.)</p>

Tiiis action is brought under tlie Captured and abandoned property act to recover the net proceeds of thirty-two bales of ■ cotton owned by claimant, and taken by the Federal authorities in May, 1863.

I. The claimants, by their original petition in this court, seek to recover damages for the non-performance of a contract by the United States, entered into by the claimants with Joseph S. Wilson, Commissioner of the General Land-Oihee, dated September 18, A. I). 1806. The claimants, by reason of the non-performance of the said contract by the United States, claim as damages the sum of thirty-two thousand seven hundred and sixty-eight dollars. IT.

This is a suit brought for the breach of two contracts, made by the Government with the petitioners, for the delivery of six hundred, thousand bushels of coru and oats.

This claim, is for the proceeds of one hundred and two (102) bales of upland cotton, seized at the time of the occupation of Savannah by General Sherman, and, shipped to Mr. Simeon Draper, at New York, and sold.

This suit is brought on a quartermaster’s voucher, delivered to the claimant by Captain Turnley, dated October 15, 1805, for the sum of $4,116.20. The consideration of the voucher was the delivery of thirty-seven thousand four hundred and thirty pounds of corn at Camp Fillmore, at eleven cents per pound, about the 1st of October, 1865, in fulfillment of a contract made in July, 1864, between Captain Mullin, assistant quartermaster, and the claimant.

This action was commenced originally by Estelle G. P. Green. Subsequently, by an order of this court, William H. Green, the husband of Estelle, was' made a party claimant, and the suit is now prosecuted in the joint names of husband and wife, who are residents of Charleston. The cotton was purchased in one lot of N. II. Guyton, and was paid for by Mrs. Greene, with her own money.

<p> On Motion. </p> <p> The claimant before suit executes a power of attorney to one Vr., irrevocable in terms, and coupled with an in terest, authorizing him to collect and prosecute the claim. TF. employs the attorneys of record, and makes large advances. After suit brought, the claimant executes a power of attorney to one IT., revoking the former power, and authorizing him to prosecute the suit as sole attorney. JI. moves for an order of substitution. </p> <p>iL Tho relations "between counsel ami client ave oí so delicate and confidential a nature that a party cannot be tied up and prevented from changing his counsel by any previous arrangement subsisting'hotwoon them, though he may he liable for the breach of tiro contract.</p> <p>-II. A claimant in whose name a suit is prosecuted, and who has an interest in the cause of action, though not the entire interest, is tho responsible claimant, and tho only party known to the court. He has the right to change Ins attorney, and substitute, another, notwithstanding that before suit he executed a power irrevocable in terms, and coupled with an interest on the faith of which his attorney in fact has employed counsel, and made large advances. But all of tho disbursements incurred by tlie attorney in fact and tlie attorneys of record must lie iirst repaid, and tlie latter will liare a lien to tlie amount of any contingent fees and costs that were agreed upon.</p>

<p> On the Proofs. </p> <p>The claimant relien to establish his loyalty upon a pardon which helios duly aucipted in writing. But the pardon• provides that it shall lalce effect from the day on which he shall take the oath prescribed by a certain proclamation. The claimant offers no evidence to show that he tool: the prescribed oath.</p> <p>I. Where a pardon “ is to begin and talee effect ” from the day on which a prescribed oath is taken by the party, it does not take effect until the oath be taken. The formal acceptance of the pardon does not supersede the necessity of taking the oath.</p> <p>II. Where a pardon is ottered in evidence by the party in whose favor it was granted, which ill terms “ is to begin and take effect” from the day on which ho takes a prescribed oath, the burden of proof is on the party to show affirmatively that he complied with its condition by taking the oath.</p> <p>III. The Amnesty Proclamation 'Toth December, 18G8, relieves all x>ersons guilty of disloyal acts during the rebellion from their disability to prosecute suits in the Court of Claims, and extends to those who have been pardoned upon conditions with which they have not complied.</p>

<p> On the Proofs. </p> <p>The wife, residing in Georgia, purchases cotton in her own name, in. the absence of her husband, with means derived from his estate, but greatly increased by her sole management and shill. She claims it as her men at the time of capture. He brings his suit under the Abamloned or captured proiierty act to recover the proceeds in the Treasury.</p> <p>The Code of Georgia substantially recognizes-the rule of the common law respecting personal property acquired by the wife during coverture. Therefore, where a wife in Georgia purchases cotton during the absence of her husband with means derived from his estate, but greatly increased by her sole management and skill, ho may maintain an action in his own name under the Abandoned or cayluredproperly act for the proceeds in the Treasury, although at the time of capture the wife claimed the cotton as her own.</p>

This claim is founded on the following facts: I. That the claimant’s testator was the rightful owner of thirteen bales of cotton at the date of the alleged seizure by a 'Government agent. II.

<p> On the Proofs. </p> <p> The claimant and one C. in Charleston buy colton during the rebellion, to benefit undivided mi til the end of the war, the claimant to have the control. ITe escapes from rebel territory, leaving the cotton under the control of C. It being threatened with confiscation, C. gives twenty bales to one 11., a Confederate officer, to prevent confiscation, which JS. does. The claimant returns after the war, and disavows the transaction. The twenty bales being captured, he brings his suit for the proceeds, on the ground that the title is still in himself. </p> <p>I. Where one of two joint owners of personal property during the rebellion escapes from the iusurreotionary States, leaving to the other the control of the property, the latter has the legal right to incur expense to save the property from confiscation or destruction by the rebel authorities. To that end ho may give a part of the cotton, and the transfer will be valid, divesting the title out of both joint owners, so that an action cannot he maintained by either under the Abandoned or captured property act.</p> <p>II. A joint owner of personal property in tbe insurrectionary States during the rebellion may use a part of the property to bribe Confederate officers for the purpose of saviug the remainder from confiscation or destruction. Such a transaction was not illegal under the laws of the United States, and such a contract will not be declared invalid because againstthe laws, civil or military, of the rebel confederacy.</p>

<p> On the -Proofs. </p> <p>An officer in the Engineer Corps having charge of the work for the improvement of the mouth of the Mississippi, has the control of money appropriated for that purpose. He (tratos his check on the United Stales Treasurer in Hew Orleans for $2,119 to pay the crew of a steamer one hundred and ten miles distant. The money is placed in the office safe, provided by the Government, to be kept there over night. .Is the officer who is to pay the crew is compelled to leave flew Orleans at 7 a. m., it is a necessity that the money he drawn the day before. During the night the chief cleric, who has a Icey and access to the safe, the hoolcs and papers of the office being Icept therein, steals the money, and absconds. The chief cleric was employed in the office before the officer assumed its duties, acid for three years there has borne the character of a trustworthy man. Due diligence is shown on the part of the officer to recover the money.</p> <p>The Disbursing officers act, (14 Stat.L., p. 44,) extends to the case of an officer of engineers whose chief clerk, having a key and access to the office safe, steals money therefrom, and absconds; it at the same time being shown that the officer found the chief clerk in the position when he assumed the duties of the office; and that the clerk has borne a good character; and that the officer exercised prudence in the care of the money and diligence to recover it.</p>

<p> On the Proofs. </p> <p> After the dissolution of a partnership, and while its affairs are in process of liquidation, the managing partner hugs cotton in the name of the firm, hut with Ms own funds. The cotton is captured. After capture the partnership affairs are wound ■up and adjusted as between the partners. No elaim for the cotton is made by the retired partner; the other brings suit for Us proceeds in his own name. </p> <p>Where property is "bought -after the dissolution of a firm, and while its affairs are in process of liquidation by the managing' partner in the name of tlie firm, but with his own funds, he is the owner within the meaning of the Abandoned or captured property aet and may bring a suit for the proceeds in his individual name.</p>

This is an. action brought for eleven bales of sea-island cotton, captured in Savannah, Georgia, in December, 1864. The claimantis a foreigner by birth, and a citizen of Belgium. It is proved that he was Belgian consul, and did all that he could to keep Belgian citizens out of the confederate service; he was a Union man in sentiment.

This is a claim for unliquidated damages, arising out of a violation of a contract for twelve hundred cords of wood, and has not been presented for settlement in any Department. E. I). Wheeler made the contract on behalf of the claimant, and of this the defendants had knowledge when the contract was made.

<p> On the JProofs. </p> <p>Tin claimant ierres in ike Interior Department as assistant messenger, bul is not paid as suit). Congress snbscipienlly appropriates $2,180 “ for additional I>ay heretofore withhold from W. S. to equalize liis compensation with that of an assistant messenger.’’ The amount so appropriated is withheld from him, av<l he brings his action to recover ii.</p> <p>An appropriation made by act of Congress to equalize the pay of one who has served in an Executive Department as assistant messenger, but has not been paid as such, is as authoritative as any other statute which makes tin; law of the land. (</p>

This cause arises on contract. This was a charter-party, by which defendants employed the plaintiff’s vessel, at a stipulated sum per month. A charter-party need not necessarily be in writing.

<p> On- the Proofs. </p> <p>The Jinn oj' 11. f IT. is engaged in business in Savannah before ihe, rebellion. During Ihe war TV. resides in Connecticut; It. continues to reside in Savannah. In ■ 18G3, It. bugs coiton in his own name, which, on the capture of Savannah, he reports as the property of IV. In February, 1865, after capture,he executes an assignment to IF. of all his interest in the cotton. J suit for the proceeds is brought in ihe name of both parties, setting up a joint title and common ownership. The petition is verified by IF.</p> <p>Where a suit is "brought under the Abandoned or captured properly act in the name of two parties, setting up a joint title and common ownership, and the evidence indicates that only one of tlie parties is entitled to the proceeds, yet if he verified the petition presenting the joint title, judgment will be rendered accordingly, and not for him individually.</p>

This action is brought to obtain the balance of an award made by the joint commission of the United States-and Peru, in pursuance of the treaty of July 6, 1809.

This action was commenced by the claimant, a British subject, under the Act March 1 ‘2th, 1803, to recover the net proceeds of one hundred and eighteen bales of upland cotton, of which he was the owner, which were seized by the Union military authorities after the capture of Savannah, in December, 18(34, and which were subsequently sold in New York, and the proceeds paid into the National Treasury. The cotton was purchased in one lot of one Orrin Ilowes.

Thus is a.claim for unliquidated damages, arising but of violation of a contract by defendants, and has not been presented for settlement in any Department. The contract violated consists in the original agreement in writing, made March 21, 1865, and notices in writing served upon the claimant by defendants’ agents.

<p> On the Proofs. </p> <p>The defendants object to the admissibility in evidence of an oath taken by the claimant under one of the amnesty proclamations: 1st, as excluded by the p?'oviso to the General Appropriation act 1870; 2c?, as not sufficiently proven. It appears that the nanne, residence, and occupation of the claimant are identical with those of the person described in the oath.</p> <p>I. Tlie decision of this court in TVillcoioski’s Case (ante) re-affirmed.</p> <p>II. Where the name, residence, and occupation of the claimant are identical ■with those of the person described in an oath taken under an amnesty proclamation, it is a sufficient identification, and the oath may he admitted in evidence without further proof that the claimant was tho person hy whom it was made.</p>

The petitioners imported from Marseilles a quantity of duti-. able merchandise in April, 1861. The ship arrived in the collection district of New Orleans on the 23d April, 1864, when the manifest of the cargo ivas exhibited to the custom-house officer, and certified by him. The merchandise was entered at the custom-house in New Orleans on the 2d May, 1864, when petitioners paid $4,995.39, in gold, to cover duties, amount subject to be ascertained by future calculations.

<p> On the Proofs. </p> <p>The regulations of the Treasury Department provide that, when an employé’s absence from duty is caused by siékness, a certificate of the attending physician must be furnished. A cleric is absent and furnishes Ms physician’s certificate in conformity tviih the regulation ; but the Secretary directs the absence to be deducted from the cleric’s pay.</p> <p>"Where the regulations of the Treasury Department provide that, when an employó’s absence is caused by sickness, a certificate of the attending physician must be furnished, and a clerk complies with the regulation, the Secretary has no power to deduct the time lost from his pay.</p>

The ownership in the plaintiff of the cotton claimed in this .suit has been abundantly proved. The seizure of his cotton. and its hauling to Kingston and Adairsville, Georgia, were also proved from the mouths of many witnesses.

Tiie claimant, at North Vernon, Indiana, delivered on board the cars of the Madison and Indianapolis Kailroad, being the place of delivery specified in the written contract, dated July, 1854, dimension stone, 2,307 cubic yards, under the contract, and inspected by Thomas Yost and Fall, the persons designated by the commanding officer, Captain Whitmore, as provided by the contract.

The fourth section of the Act July ith, 1864, (13 Stat. L., 396,) provides “ that when an emergency shall exist requiring- the immediate procurement of supplies for the necessary movements of any army or detachment, and when such supplies can-hot be procured from any established depot of the Quartermaster’s Department, or from the head of the division charged with the duty of furnishing such supplies within the required time, then it shall be lawful for the commanding…

The claimant was, in her fiduciary capacity, the owner of three hundred and eighty-nine bales of cotton, the production of the plantation of her deceased husband, and taken by the Treasury agents in the spring of 1864, sold, and the proceeds paid into the Treasury, amounting to $112,140.21. Claimant’s decedent died in the fall of 1863, never having taken any part in the late rebellion, but having remained loyal to his Government.

<p> On the Proofs. </p> <p>Melclrlm <f Doyle are ihe equal joint owners of cotton in Savannah. It is captured. Doyle dies before suit is brought and before the General Amnesty Proclamation 25tli December, 1868. Suit is brought jointly by Meldrim and the administratrix of Doyle. But she is unable to prove her intestates loyalty.</p> <p>I. Where one guilty of giving' aid or comfort to the rebellion dies without pardon and before the General Amnesty Proclamation 25th December, 1868, the proclamation does not obliterate the offense; and his administratrix cannot maintain an action for the proceeds of his captured property in the Treasury,</p> <p>II. Where the joint owners of captured property bring a joint suit for the proceeds, and the one establishes his loyalty and the other fails to do so, judgment will be rendered in favor of the one to the extent of his joint interest in the fund, and the petition of the other will be dismissed.</p>

This is an action brought to recover the proceeds of fifty-two bales of upland cotton, seized at Atlanta, Georgia, in the month of September, 1864. The claimant is a citizen of' the United States, and residing at Atlanta.

<p> On Motion. </p> <p>The claimant moves for leave to amend his petition in a suit wider the Abandoned or captured property act. Some of his amendments seek to introduce new causes of action into the petition. When the motion is made, more than two years have elapsed since the close of the rebellion, and a new suit on these would be barred by the limitation of the statute.</p> <p>Iu a suit under the Abandoned or captured property act, new causes of action cannot bo introduced into tlio petition by amendment when a now suit would be barred by the limitation of the statute.</p>

<p> On the Proofs. </p> <p> After capture a portion of the claimant’s cotton is burned before sale. The fact appears in a Treasury return, which does not show the circumstances amid xohich the fire occurred, nor the quantity consumed. </p> <p>Where it appears by a Treasury return that a portion of the claimant’s cotton was burned after capture and before sale, but the record is silent as to the circumstances amid which the fire occurred, and as to the quantity consumed, the ease will be remanded for evidence to show the quantity or proportion lost.</p>

In the case of Julia A. Nutt, executrix, Messrs. Brent and Crittenden, of record, and Mr. R. T. Merrielc, of counsel. In the case of Mary Ann Wells, executrix, and others, children of J. K. Elgee, Messrs. Sullivan, Billings and Hughes, of New Orleans, and Messrs. Simons and Nutt, of New Orleans, attorneys of record, and Messrs. Carlisle and McPherson, of Washington, of counsel.