New v. Pyle

¶1 said that he had a distinct impression that it had already been decided, several years since, and in which it was held in a ease similar to this, that the goods were not subject to distress after the expiration of the term, and their removal from the demised premises. Houston, J., remarked that it seemed to be controlled by the words of the statute which provides in the first place, that the distress may be made “ during the demise, or afterward, while the tenant, or any person coming into possession by, or under him, shall continue to hold the demised premisesbut in the *11 second place, when it comes to provide for following and distraining the goods after their removal from the demised premises, either during the term or after its expiration, within forty days, it speaks only of the tenant, and not as before, of “any person coming into possession by, or under him.” It would appear, therefore, to have been the design of the statute to render the goods of such persons liable only to distress so long as they remained on the demised premises. The Court considered that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, and gave judgment accordingly.