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← 7 F.2d 594 - Kaplan v. United States

Kaplan v. United States’s Empirical Analysis

7 F.2d 594 · 1925

Citation profile

32
cited by 32 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
November 1978
most recently cited

26 federal appellate ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 32 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently November 1978 · most notably Gebardi v. United States (1932), United States v. Pugliese (1945)

26 federal appellate ·

130192519301940195019601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Hyde v. United States · United States v. William Rabinowich · Hyde v. United States · Brown v. C. T. Elliott · Samara v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““to obtain supplies, make quick sales, collect the proceeds, and then allow the company to fall into bankruptcy, making off with such loot as might meanwhile have been gathered.” Kap-lan v. United States, 7 F.2d 594 , 595 (2d Cir. 1925).”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““Not being themselves bankrupts, they were not protected by section 7(9) of the act . . and their admissions were competent against them upon the trial of an indictment, as in a civil cause. Had they wished to remain mute, no doubt they might have done so; but, having once consented to speak, any privilege was at an end.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““The next question is the directed verdict in favor of Smythe. This was the act of the judge at trial sua sponte, on the ground that Smythe had testified before the grand jury. This was clear error, not, as the defendants seem ‘ to suppose, because Smythe had in fact ‘waived immunity/' but because there is not the slightest warrant of law for saying that in the absence of statute any one may be quit of his-crimes by testifying either before a grand jury or anywhere else. How such a notion should have got its apparent currency it is impossible to see. A man has, of course, the right to stand mute, if he will;' but, if he speaks, he does not by that purge himself of his crime. He may be indicted, tried, and convicted, quite as though he had stood on his privilege. The contrary notion is a thorough perversion of the whole principle of self-incrimination, perhaps arising from a misunderstanding of those statutes which, in order to compel persons to testify at all, give them plenary absolution.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.