¶1By the Court. —
¶2delivering the opinion.
¶3
¶4Such being the intention, the next inquiry is, does it conflict with any established rule of law? We think that it does not, but that the intention and the legal construction of the deed harmonize. Two rules for the government of Courts in the construction of this marriage settlement, are to be noted and ob*544served. The first is, if possible, to give to it such legal construction as will effectuate the intention. The second is, not to make, a remainder contingent, which can be made to vest. The extent of the latter rule goes,-perhaps, not beyond this, to-wit: The law does not favor contingent remainders. Courts will not become astute, in order to declare a remainder contingent, but will construe the limitations liberally, with a view to declare it vested. Nor does the former rule go so far as to authorize a Court to carry into effect the intention, when it is clearly contrary to law; for declared and indubitable intentions must be defeated, if they are manifestly in conflict with the necessary legal construction. The conflict, however, must be manifest and decided; such conflict will not be vaguely inferred; it must be so palpable as to leave to the Court no alternative.
¶5For the purposes of this discussion, remainders may be said to be vested or executed and contingent. “ Vested remainders, (or remainders executed, whereby a present interest passes to the party, though to be enjoyed in future,) are where the estate is invariably fixed, to remain to a determinate person, after the particular estate is spent.” 2 Black. Com. 108, ’9. “ Contingent or executory remainders, (whereby no present interest passes,) are where the estate in remainder is limited to take effect, either to a dubious or uncertain person, or upon a dubious and uncertain event, so that the particular estate may chance to be determined, and the remainder never take effect.” Ib.
¶6A familiar illustration of the former is this : If an estate be left to A for life, with remainder in fee to B, it is a vested remainder. The estate in remainder takes effect simultaneously with the life estate, a present interest passes to B, and the enjoyment of the estate is postponed until the death of A. There is no uncertainty as to the person, for he is named; nor as to the event, for that is fixed, to-witthe death of A, the tenant for life.
¶7This settlement, to my mind, creates just such an estate; that is, a vested remainder. To prove it, I shall consider two clauses, to-wit: that which creates the life estate in Tuffts and the children, and that which gives the estate to the children. In construing this deed, I am not to be held down to one clause; I may consider all. Nor am I to look to the words used in any one or more clauses or limitations; but I am to consider the whole deed, and thus ascertain the legal intendment. The two which make *545this a vested remainder, are the limitations which dispose of the estate, after Mrs. Garrett’s death ; in fact, she died before Tuffts. With these limitations, therefore, we start, because then it is necessary to determine what became of the estate. If the legal construction of these dispose of the estate, it will be conceded that it will not be necessary to look beyond them, to the final limitation clause. Now, the event which Mrs. Garrett contemplated as possible, to-wit: her death before the death of her husband, Tuffts, having taken place; and also, another event which she deemed possible, to-wit: there being issue or children of the marriage, in life, at her death, what does she do with the estate ? That is the question. She makes two provisions in relation to it. First, she declares, (there being children, note,) that it shall be held to the proper use, benefit and behoof of Tuffts, during his natural life, jointly with the children. That is, beyond all cavil, the creation of a life estate in the property in Tuffts and the children, dependant for its termination, on the death of Tuffts, for it is during his natural life. What farther does she declare concerning the property, (there being children, note,) this, to-wit: from and after the death of Tuffts, that it is to be holden to the proper use, benefit and behoof of the children forever. Put then, these two limitations together, and what do they make ? Why, to the eye of common sense and right reason, as well as to the eye professional, an estate for life in Tuffts, and the children for Tuffts’ life, with remainder in fee to the children. No ingenuity, it seems to me, can make anything else of them. The interest which the children have in the life-estate, cannot .affect the construction. An estate to them, for life, with remainder to them, in fee, would no doubt be an absolute estate in them. But it is no less a life estate in Tuffts, because they are interested in the life estate. To him — to both him and the children, if you please— there is given a life-estate, and the fee is cast upon them. .. What, then, is the estate thus created? It is a vested remainder. The person, to-wit: the children, are certain and determined, and the event, to-wit: the death of Tuffts, is certain and determinate. The form of language used by the settler, is immaterial. Here are all the elements of a vested remainder. The law, in considering these elements, can give no name or attribute to the dispositions, but that which we now give. If it be a vested remainder, the children took the fee eo-instanti, in which the life estate vested; *546upon their death, it Went, by the law of descent, to their heirs, and the plaintiffs in this suit are not entitled to it. Here is an absolute disposition of the estate. What use then, or necessity, to look farther 1 If, however, we do look farther, we shall find, that even by the last limitation in the deed, the estate is a vested remainder. By that limitation it is declared : “ And from and after the death of the said Francis Tuffts, there being no issue or children, and no appointment, then, to the proper use and behoof of the right heirs of the said Charity Garrett.” I repeat here, what I have before said, that issue or children in this clause, means the same that we hold it to mean elsewhere in this deed, to-wit: issue of the marriage, at any time, born and surviving the settler, Mrs. Garrett; and that the contingency contemplated is not the issue or children surviving Tuffts; but the contingency here as elsewhere contemplated, was, there being issue of the marriage; if issue, they, as I have attempted t(5“ show, take the property; if none, then it goes, by this limitation, to the right heirs of Charity Garrett. But there was issue of the marriage; the contingency did happen; and therefore, the right heirs of Charity Garrett cannot take, under this clause in the deed.
¶8I come now to meet, and I trust to answer, the view of this clause, taken by the learned counsel for the plaintiff in error. He claims that it creates a contingent remainder in favor of the children, and that the event upon which it depends, is their surviving Tuffts; and that the event not happening, the property passes over to the right heirs of Charity Garrett. If the right of the children to take depends upon this limitation, and conceding that they did not survive Tuffts, yet, we think the remainder vested in them; that it was executed in them at the death of their mother, and that the property, therefore, does not go over to her right heirs. It is claimed that this must be a contingent remainder, because the event upon which it depends, to-wit: the children surviving Tuffts, is uncertain. At first view, it would seem that this must needs be so, and that the counsel is right. But a well settled distinction, when applied to this case, puts upon it a new face; that is, a distinction between that kind of uncertainty which really makes a remainder contingent, and one which is often confounded with it, to-wit: the uncertainty of a remainder ever taking effect in possession. The taking effect of a remainder in possession may be uncertain, and yet be a vested *547remainder. This distinction, says Fearne, is not always attended to, “ but is absolutely requisite to complete an accurate notion of what is in Law considered as a contingent remainder.” 1 Fearne on Remainders, 216. The definitions which I have before given of vested and contingent remainders, from Blackstone, do not develope this distinction. More fufíy and more accurately are they defined by Mr. Fearne : “ "Wherever,” says this able writer, “ the preceding estate is limited so as to determine on an event which certainly must happen; and the remainder is so limited to a person in esse, and ascertained that the preceding estate may, by any means, determine before the exjfiration of the estate limited in remainder, such remainder is vested.” This is his definition of a vested remainder, and he proceeds to define what is a contingent remainder. ■ “ On the contrary, wherever the preceding estate is limited, so as to determine only on an event which is uncertain, and may never happen, or wherever the remainder is limited to a person not in esse or not ascertained, or wherever it is limited so as to require the concurrence of some dubious, uncertain event, independent of the determination of the preceding estate and duration of the estate limited in remainder, to give it a capacity of taking effect, then, the remainder is contingent.” 1 Fearne on Remainders, 217.
¶9The application of Mr. Fearne's definition of a vested remainder will prove that this is a vested remainder. The preceding estate must be limited, so as to determine on an event which certainly must happen. That is the case here. The preceding estate is the life estate of Tuffts and the children, and that is limited to determine on an event which must happen, to-wit: the death of Tuffts ; for “ it is appointed unto men once to die.”
¶10Again, the remainder must be limited to a person in esse and ascertained. That is the case here; for the persons tó take the remainder are the 'children; there is no uncertainty about the persons; they are.in esse and are ascertained. And farther, the remainder must be so limited to them, that the preceding estate may, by any means, determine before the expiration of the estate limited in remainder. Well, in this case the estate is so limited in remainder, that the preceding estate may, by some means, determinebefore the expiration of the estate in remainder, because the estate limited in remainder to the children, is a fee; it is an unqualified estate; it is to them and their heirs forever; and because *548the preceding estate, to-wit: the life estate of Tuffts might, in more ways than one, have terminated, not only before the expiration of the estate limited in remainder, hut during the life of the remainder-men themselves. For example, the preceding estate, to-wit: the life estate, might have determined by the death of Tuffts during the life of the children, or he might have relinquished his life-estate to them. The touchstone of this question is this: Was there a capacity in this estate limited in remainder, to take effect during the life of the children in possession, if during their life, the possession of the life estate had become vacant 1 Would the children have taken the estate had Tuffts died before them! Suppose Tuffts had died first, can there be a doubt that they would have taken 1 Not the shadow of a doubt. If they had the capacity to take in that contingency, the remainder was a vested remainder. The question, whether it is a vested remainder, does not depend upon the fact of their outliving Tuffts, but upon their capacity to have taken, in the language of Fearne, by any means which might have determined the life estate. “ The present capacity, (says Mr. Fearne,) of taking effect in possession, if the possession were to become vacant, and not the certainty that the possession will become vacant, before the estate limited in remainder determines, universally distinguishes a vested remainder from one that is contingent.” 1 Fearne Remainders, 215 to 222. Duncomb vs. Duncomb, 3 Lev. 437. Smith, dem. Dorimer vs. Parkhurst, Vin. vol. 18, fol. 413. 2 Cruise’s Dig. 270. 2 Vesey, Jr. 357. Chitty, note 10. 2 Black. 169.
¶11Let the judgment below be affirmed.