Volume 7 — Hawaii Reports

<p>On appeals from the Police and District Courts, the fees for witnesses cannot be allowed, unless taxed and allowed in the lower Court.</p> <p>Where a trial on appeal occupied one day only, and no affidavit was filed as to the reason for the attendance of witnesses for more than that day, fees for one day’s attendance will be allowed.</p>

<p>Question of Costs submitted by Consent.</p>

<p>A party introducing a deed cannot, in rebuttal, introduce testimony to resist inferences of law or fact flowing therefrom.</p> <p>The only assignments of property by an insolvent which the law will sustain are those upon good consideration to a bona fide purchaser, having no reasonable cause to believe the party insolvent.</p> <p>When the whole mortgage was shown to be fraudulent by evidence of the party producing it, the Court should not submit to the jury a particular clause which might not be fraudulent standing alone.</p>

<p>A lease in the Hawaiian language had a clause in it to the purport that the lessor shall not without cause take away the land to lease it anew or sell it to another during the term; but if the lessor without cause take away the land before the lease has expired, the lessee can remain on the land without paying rent ; but if the lessor wishes to sell the land, he must sell it to the lessee. The lessor conveyed the land to his wife through a third party, and they mortgaged it, and the land was sold to the plaintiff upon foreclosure. The lessee (defendant) remained in possession and was sued for rent.</p> <p>Held, that the covenant was repugnant to itself, as the lessee could not remain on and enjoy the premises if he had been dispossessed by the lessor; but the latter part of the covenant is to the effect that the lessee is to be preferred as a purchaser, and so long as he remains in possession, he must pay rent.</p>

<p>Exceptions from Second Circuit.</p>

<p>On the night of the 29th June, 1886, the steamer J. I. Dowsett had left Kuau, a port near Kahului, on the Island of Maui, and was proceeding under sail and steam down the Molokai Channel for Honolulu. The wind was the usual trade-wind, blowing at the rate of about thirty miles an hour in the direction of E.N.E. The J. I. Dowsett had all sail set and her course was "W-S-W. The breeze being a fair wind to her, her sails were “ wing-a-wing,” her foresail being over on her starboard side and her mainsail on the port side. She was going at the rate of from nine to ten knots per hour. The Moiwahine. a schooner, was running close to the wind on the port tack, with all her sails set, and going from seven to eight knots per hour, steering S.E. by E. The night was moonless, but the sky was clear and the stars were shining. Shortly before eleven o’clock the bright mast-head light of the J. I. Dow-sett was seen to windward by the lookouts of the Moiwahine, reported to the mate whose watch it was, and to the captain, who, hearing his men talking about a light, came on deck. The vessels were about midway in the channel between Molokai, Lanai and Maul, at a point estimated to be somewhat eastward of the port of Kaunakakai on Molokai. There was plenty of sea room for both vessels, and there are no reefs or obstructions to navigation near the place of collision. The Captain of the Moiwahine saw first the mast-head light of the J. I. Dowsett, then her red light on the Moiwahine’s port bow, and judged her to be three-quarters to one mile off; about a minute after he saw her green light and after that her red and green lights. The captain could not tell within two or three points the course, the J. I. Dowsett was coming down on; but she appeared to yaw from side to side. When about one hundred or one hundred and fifty feet off, the captain called out to the steamer to “port your helm,” and when about seventy-five or one hundred feet off, the helmsman on the J. I. Dowsett gave his wheel a turn to port, and the collision being imminent, the Captain of the Moiwahine ordered his own wheel to port, and his main sheet slacked off, which put the Moiwahine’s head off and increased her speed, and brought her stem slightly towards the J. I. Dowsett. The J. I. Dowsett’s stem struck the Moiwahine about six feet from the taffrail on the port quarter a violent blow, but did not fasten.</p> <p>Held, affirming the decree of the Chief Justice, that the navigation of the Moiwahine was proper under the circumstances, and did not contribute to the collision, which had become inevitable, and that by the J. I. Dowsett neglecting to keep a proper lookout, she was solely to blame.</p>

The plain effect of the article is to prejudice the minds of the public unfavorably to the petitioner and his case now pending. The publication is therefore punishable as a contempt.

<p>The Mittimus, by which the prisoner was held, set forth that he had been convicted of the offense of having Opium unlawfully in his possession, contrary to Section 4 of the Session Laws of 1886, approved October 15, 1886 (Chap.' LXXIII.) Section 4 makes punishable the possession of opium “ contrary to the provisions of Section 3.” Section 3 only devolves certain duties upoii the licensed vendor. Held, that the statute does not define the possession of opium as a punishable offense.</p>

<p>Appeal from Decision of McCully, J.</p>

<p>The defendant was convicted in the Police Court, Honolulu, of having opium unlawfully in his possession.</p> <p>Held, that since the passage of the Act of 1886, “ To regulate the importation and sale of opium in this Kingdom,” the mere possession of opium is not punishable by any law in force.</p> <p>Held also, that the Court will not listen to an objection to the constitutionality of an Act by a party whose rights it does not affect.</p>

<p>Rule in Appeals from Police and District Courts.</p>

<p>The plaintiff made a return of its property liable to taxation, on the second day of August, 1886. The tax assessor had made the assessment of all those persons who had returned their property according to law on the 31st of July, and had entered the same on his books by the first day of September, but had not made and completed two copies of his tax-list until the first day of November. The assessor raised the amount of the plaintiff’s assessment above the return.</p> <p>Held, that such assessment was valid, and that plaintiff eonid not recover the amount of taxes paid on such increased assessment.</p>

<p>The plaintiff in an action of ejectment claimed title under W., who claimed under an unrecorded deed from K., executed in 1851 or 1852.</p> <p>Evidence was given that W. had received rent from P. until his death in 1883, when he leased the land to P.’s widow for life. She died in 1884, and her son (the defendant) entered and claimed title through her. The defendant moved for a non-suit, but the Circuit Court gave judgment for plaintiff.</p> <p>Held, that there was evidence to support the judgment, and the exceptions therefore overruled.</p>

<p>One who is served with process as a garnishee, at his peril neglects to appear and discharge himself in the mode prescribed by statute.</p> <p>The reasons offered setting aside default in this case were insufficient.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Police Court of Honolulu.</p>

<p>A. and B. were defendants in a replevin suit brought before the defendant K., who was Police Justice at W.: K. ordered the plaintiffs to give a bond conditioned for the production of the horse, ("the subject of the suit), and in default of their so doing, he inflicted a fine upon A. and B. of $25 for contempt and issued warrants for their arrest. The warrant was executed by the defendant E., the Sheriff of Maui, and they were detained in custody for about 15 minutes until the fine was paid.</p> <p>The Jury acquitted E. but found a verdict against K. for $200.</p> <p>K. moved for a new trial on the ground of excessive damages.</p> <p>Held, sustaining the Chief Justice who refused the motion: That the order was beyond the authority and in excess of the jurisdiction of K., and therefore void, and that the damages, although rather large, were not excessive.</p>

<p>Appeal from Decision of Preston, J.</p>

<p>The defendants agreed with the plaintiff to bore an artesian well for the plaintiff for the sum of $1650, and were paid that amount. The well was left in an unfinished condition and leaked. The plaintiff employed other persons to complete the well and stop the leak, and such persons agreed that if they could not stop the leak, they were not to receive anything, but if they stopped the leak they were to be paid $1000. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff for $400.</p> <p>Held, on motion for new trial by plaintiff, affirming decision of Judd, C.J., that plaintiff could only recover what the work was reasonably worth, and that the evidence supported the verdict.</p>

<p>The case is reported in 5 Hawn., 634, and the defendant having elected' in terms of the decree not to insist upon specific performance, a reference was had to a master to ascertain the amount which the market value of the estate was enhanced by the permanent improvements put thereon by the defendant. The master reported a balance due to the defendant of $4670.20.</p> <p>On appeal, the Chief Justice reduced the amount to $3670.20.</p> <p>Both parties having appealed,</p> <p>Held, that from the reduction of $1000, the sum of $250 should have been allowed for depreciation, but the sum of $100 allowed to the plaintiff, for the removal of a stone wall by the defendant, should be increased to $400, and that the total amount payable to defendant was $3620.20.</p>

Questions Reserved by Judd, C.J. On behalf of the prisoner, it was contended that the judgment which restrained the petitioner’s liberty, as alleged, is absolutely void. First, it omits an essential statutory term (spirituous) of description necessary to constitute the real qature of the subject matter required by the statute; second, it punishes a man for an act which is not a crime.

<p>Bill of Exceptions to Rulings of Judd, C.J. at January Term.</p>

<p>Publications tending to affect, hinder or obstruct the administration of justice, while it is in process of administration, are punishable as contempts. The publication of the contents of a bill in equity, held contempt, as calculated to prejudice the public concerning the merits of the case then pending.</p>

<p>Motion to Strike Case from Calendar.</p>

<p>J. H. P. and S. P. sold to G. W. W. a sugar cane planting enterprise for $40,000. It was agreed that G. W. W. should give to the vendors a mortgage over the property conveyed, together with twenty-six shares of stock in a corporation then held by another firm as security for W.’s note for $1000. The mortgage was executed but contained no reference to the shares.</p> <p>Subsequently W. surrendered the mortgaged property and his equity of redemption therein to P. and P. J. H. P. had in the meantime taken up W.’s note and the shares were transferred to him.</p> <p>W. filed his bill to redeem the shares.</p> <p>Held, that there was a valid charge in favor of P. and P. upon the shares, but that the effect of the deed from W. to P. and P. was to release such charge.</p> <p>Decree appealed from sustained with a variation as to time of payment.</p>

<p>On a bill for specific performance of a contract for the sale of land, the Court, not being satisfied that a good title was offered to the purchaser, declined to enforce the contract.</p>

<p>Appeal from Decision of Preston, J.</p>

<p>Appeal from Decree of Preston, J.</p>

<p>On Exceptions to Master’s Report.</p>

<p>A plea in bar, which makes a mere general reference to records of cases on which it is based, is faulty: there should be a specific reference to what is relied on in each case.</p> <p>There being an adjudication that an award to “A. for B.” was a grant to B., the plaintiff, claiming through A., is barred from recovery against the heirs or assigns of B.</p> <p>An adjudication in an action of ejectment against a different defendant for another parcel comprised within the same grant, bars this action, there being an identity of subject matter.</p> <p>A claim of adverse possession having been adjudicated adversely in a previous case, bars another claim through the same tenant.</p> <p>An award to A. for B. having been adjudicated to be merged in a Royal Patent to B. and heirs, an action based on the award is thereby barred.</p>

<p>Action of Replevin for a Diamond Ring.</p> <p>One McL. came to plaintiff’s shop and told plaintiff that he had a customer for plaintiff, and could sell the ring in question for $300.</p> <p>Plaintiff gave the ring to McL. and told him to bring the plaintiff $300. In a few days McL. called, said the ring was sold, and he would get the money in a few days; he said on several occasions that the money was all right. He was to return the ring in a few days; had he brought the plaintiffs the $300, no inquiry would have been made.</p> <p>The defendant, a watchmaker and jeweller, purchased the ring from McL. in good faith and exposed it for sale in his window.</p> <p>Held, that although a person intrusted simply with the possession of property, with no power to sell or pass title, cannot give title to the property even to a bona-fide purchaser for value: yet McL. had the right to sell the ring in question.</p>

<p>Appeal prom Decision op Judd, C.J., sitting as a Court op Admiralty.</p>

<p>Exceptions to Rulings op MoCully, J.</p>

Exceptions from Third Judicial Circuit. This case was heard by the Chief Justice and Circuit Judge Lyman, at the last May Term of Circuit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit, the jury being waived. The following is the decision of the Court, which contains a statement of the case and the facts found : “ This is an action to recover the contract price of certain hogs.

<p>Appeal from Bickerton, J.</p>

<p>Upon a charge of selling intoxicating liquors without a license to M.. and L. the evidence showed two sales — one to M, and one to L.</p> <p>Held, the conviction was right.</p>

<p>Appeal pbom decision op Preston, J., on Question op a Rehearing.</p>

<p>In Admiralty. On Appeal from Chief Justice Judd.</p>

<p>In Equity. On Appeal from Mr. Justice Bickerton.</p>

<p>Where the landlord cannot put the lessee in possession of all the demised estate, the lessee is under no obligation to accept the residue; but if he prefers to occupy such part as he can get possession of, he is liable for the use and occupation of the part he does occupy. In such cases an action for rent reserved will not lie, nor can the rent be apportioned.</p>

<p>Appeal prom Decree op Preston, J.</p>

<p>H. loaned to the bankrupt $1500 for which he received a note endorsed by O. and A. (who afterwards became insolvent), and a mortgage over four shares in a rice plantation. A., a partner of the bankrupt, died and S. was appointed administrator, and also receiver of the partnership estate. The bankrupt gave to H. an order upon S. for the amount which would become due to the bankrupt vrhen the partnership was settled. S. paid such share into Court and that was by an order of the Court paid to defendants.</p> <p>Held, that the Court upon making such order should have been informed of these facts, and that H. was entitled to the amount less costs of the submission. Held also, that the assignees were not entitled to commissions or to deduct the costs of the bankruptcy.</p>

<p>The Collector-General filed a libel for the forfeiture of the goods in question on the ground that they were not included in the manifest of the vessel importing them. (Section 547, Civil Code.)</p> <p>The claimant was prosecuted and convicted in the Police Court under Section 8, Chapter VII. of the Session Laws of 1886.</p> <p>The Court (Preston, J.) dismissed the libel on the ground that such conviction precluded the Government from claiming the forfeiture.</p> <p>Held, reversing such order, that the goods became liable to forfeiture upon the delivery of the manifest, and that no action of an officer of the Government could purge such forfeiture.</p>

<p>Appeal from Decree of the Chancellor.</p>

<p>The plaintiff sued the defendant in the Police Court, Honolulu, for work and labor done for the defendant’s intestate and for money paid.</p> <p>It appeared at the hearing that the plaintiff and the defendant’s intestate were partners and a nonsuit was ordered.</p> <p>The plaintiff appealed and a judgment was rendered for defendants.</p> <p>Held, that there should not have been a re-hearing on the facts.</p> <p>Held also, that where a refusal of leave to amend would by operation of a statute of limitation bar the plaintiff from bringing a fresh action, an amendment ought to be allowed.</p> <p>Held also, that the nonsuit was wrong and</p>

<p>The defendant G. was the servant of defendant M. and was entrusted to drive the carriage of the latter with his son from M’s. residence to Honolulu, and there left him, and was ordered to drive back to M’s. house. Instead of going by the direct route home, G. drove out of his way on his own business and to see a friend, and while out of the direct route negligently drove against and injured the plaintiff, Ah You.</p> <p>Held, following Parsons vs. Winchell, 5 Cush., 592, that M. was not liable.</p>

<p>Exceptions from Bickerton, J.</p>

<p>On Question Reserved.</p>

<p>Exceptions from Decision of Bickerton, J.</p>

<p>The defendant appealed upon points of law, as provided by Section 1006 of the Civil Code.</p> <p>No points of law were stated as required by Buie 39 B.</p> <p>Held, that there was nothing for the Court to consider.</p>

<p>Application for Order to Join in Error.</p>

<p>Previous to the enactment of “An Act relating1 to the property and rights of married women” (Laws of 1888, Chapter XI.), a power of attorney from a husband to a wife, authorizing1 her to mortgage his real estate, did not empower her to mortgage her own real estate.</p> <p>The professional knowledge of an agent, such as a legal adviser, does not necessarily bind the principal after the relation of principal and agent is at an end.</p>

<p>Section 1314 Civil Code provides that “ a suit to annul a marriage on the ground that one of the parties was under legal age, may be brought by the parent or guardian entitled to the custody of such minor.”’</p> <p>Held, allowing demurrer by the minor, that the suit should have been brought in the name of the minor by the parent or guardian, or in the parent’s own name, making the minor a defendant.</p> <p>Per Dole, J. : The demurrer should be sustained solely on the ground that the first rule of Court had not been complied with in the caption of the petition.</p>

<p>Appeal from Decree of McCully, V.C.</p>

<p>On a bill to set aside a conveyance of land on the ground of fraud, the evidence showed that the deed was understandingly executed and the alleged secret trust not disclosed or proved, and the bill was therefore dismissed.</p> <p>Failure to pay the consideration named in the deed is not ground for annulling it.</p>

<p>The defendants had been determined by the Court to have held eertain shares of stock as security for the payment of notes given in purchase from them of a plantation, and of another note for $6000 assigned to them with the stock as collateral to it. The plantation was surrendered. Neither party had made appropriation of the dividends to either the plantation note or the assigned note. Held, that the dividends on the stock should be considered since the surrender as having been appropriated toward the payment of the assigned note, interest and principal, “justice and equity” requiring that the defendants be now allowed to do what they would have done as mortgagees of the stock, as the Court makes them, and not owners as they had considered themselves to be.</p>

<p>The act of His Majesty, in pursuance of the power given him by the Constitution of approving and of disapproving of bills passed by the Legislature, is a personal one and does not require the advice and consent of the Cabinet.</p>

<p>When a person is committed for trial in this Court, the case is at once pending. And it is a contempt of this Court to publish anything tending to prejudice the right of the defendant to a fair and impartial trial.</p>

<p>Submission under Section 1140, Civil Code.</p>

<p>It is misconduct in a Judge to have interviews with a person accused in his Court of an offense, and suggest points of defense to him and to ask and obtain loans of money from the accused to be repaid without interest.</p> <p>This, with other similar transactions, and the unsatisfactory accounting by the Judge to the Auditor-General of the fines and costs received by him, deemed sufficient cause for his removal from office.</p>

<p>It is not proper for a prosecuting officer to receive a retainer and act as an attorney for a person in a matter which has a close connection with a criminal ease against said person.</p>

<p>The bill of exceptions to the findings of fact or of law in a jury-waived case must be presented to the Justice within ten days from the filing of the decision.</p> <p>Time may be allowed in which to settle the exceptions after they have been presented, but not before.</p>

<p>The provision in Section 1242 of the Civil Code, that an executor on applying for probate of a will shall apply for a citation to the next of kin, is a mere direction and not a mandate, and to the applicant and not to the Court, and it is not necessary that the next of kin should be cited.</p>

<p>Fence Commissioners by law required to give due public notice before acting on petition; notice to parties supposed to be in interest not sufficient.</p> <p>Decrees of tbe Commissioners.to be effectual must include designation of the time within which the work shall be done.</p>

<p>Motion to be Allowed to File Exceptions.</p>

<p>The plaintiff sued defendant for damages for obstructing a right of way.</p> <p>At the trial the defendant asked the Court to instruct the Jury to return a verdict for the defendant, on the ground that the Commissioners of Private Ways and Water Rights had exclusive jurisdiction.</p> <p>The Court declined to giye such instruction, and the jury having found a verdict for the plaintiffs, the defendant excepted.</p> <p>Held, that the Commissioners had no jurisdiction in cases of this nature. Stone vs. W. F. Alien, 3 Hawn. 621, approved.</p>

<p>An agreement was entered into between one C., as adopting parent, and H.. D., widow, mother of plaintiff D. H. D. inter-married with one M., and C. and H. D. afterwards acknowledged the execution of the agreement before the Chief Justice. H. D. was divorced and afterwards inter-married with the plaintiff J. H. 13. At the time of the execution of the agreement C. was a married man, and his wife was not made a party. The agreement was not recorded as required by Section 1263 of the Civil Code. C. had taken out a life policy for $1000 payable to his “surviving children.”</p> <p>Held, that the agreement was invalid, not having been recorded during the iifetime of C., and that the plaintiff was not entitled to the insurance money as one of the surviving children of C.</p>

<p>On Appeal prom Decision op the Chancellor Opening Default.</p>

<p>Appeal from Decision of Bickerton, J.</p>

<p>In an action of ejectment for a piece of land known as the “Ili of Kuunahawelu,” situate at Waihee, Island of Maui, the plaintiffs claimed title under an award of the Land Commissioners to W. C. L. of the “Iliaina o Ahikuli.”</p> <p>The defendant claimed under a conveyance dated December 6th, 1880, from the trustees of the will of W. C. L. of “all the right, title and interest of the said trustees under said will, in and to all that tract of land situated in Waihee, Island of Maui, known as the Ili of Ahikuli, containing an area of 1324 acres more or less, and described in Land Commission Award No. 8559 B. Ap. 21.”</p> <p>The Court (Judd, C.J.) instructed the jury, inter alia:</p> <p>3. “The deed from the plaintiffs to the defendant passed all the land known as Ahikuli.”</p> <p>4. “The grant of an Ili by name will pass all leles forming part of such Ili.”</p> <p>6. “If the land claimed is a lele of Ahikuli, it passed to the defendant by force and effect of the deed of December 6th, 1880, if unexplained.”</p> <p>Held, that the third and fourth instructions were correct and that the Ili passed by the deed.</p> <p>Held also, that the conveyance of all a party’s interest in property, to a purchaser for value, passes every interest vested in him.</p> <p>Held also, that the addition of the words, “if unexplained,” to the sixth instruction, was erroneous, but being for the benefit of the plaintiffs, they could not avail themselves of such error.</p>

<p>After the proofs had closed, and counsel on both sides had addressed the jury, the defendant’s counsel moved the Court to dismiss the complaint for variance between the pleading and the proof, urging that the evidence showed mere trespass by the covenantor and not an eviction.</p> <p>Held, on the evidence, that the lessor (defendant) went on to the demised premises, asserted title, denied the validity of his lease to plaintiff, repeatedly arrested and impounded plaintiff’s cattle ; that tnis was an eviction for which plaintiff could recover damages on an action for breach of covenant for quiet enjoyment.</p> <p>A motion by defendant, to dismiss a case.at law for variance after issue joined, will not be entertained. The correct practice is to move the Court to instruct the jury to return a verdict for defendant.</p>

<p>The plaintiff's took a lease of certain rice lands from the defendants and others. The lease contained a covenant that the lessors would not buy or lease from the owners of kuleanas any kuleanas lying or being within the premises demised. After the execution of the lease one O. executed a lease to the defendants of a piece of land with a watercourse, from which the plaintiffs obtained water for irrigation, and said to be within the first demised premises.</p> <p>The defendants leased the said land and watercourse to the plaintiffs for §200 a year.</p> <p>The plaintiffs brought a suit to set aside such lease on the ground that the taking of the lease by the defendants from C. was in violation of their covenant, and should enure to the benefit of the plaintiffs.</p> <p>Held (sustaining the decree appealed from) that on the evidence there had not been a breach of covenant, and the appeal was dismissed.</p>

<p>Exceptions from Rulings of Preston, J.</p>

Petition for Writ of Mandamus to Certify up an Appeal. The Government claims that the law in question is no violation of the constitutional right of trial by jury, because plaintiffs by the act of appealing to the Circuit Judge elected such Court rather than fhe Circuit Court, or waived their constitutional right of trial by jury. Election or waiver is a question of fact, i.e., did the man, as a matter of fact, choose between the two Courts?

<p>Exceptions From the Circuit Court of the Second Circuit.</p>

<p>Motion for re-argument upon the bill, on the ground that the allegation of the appurtenance of the water had been overlooked in the Court’s consideration of the ease, was denied, it appearing that such allegation had not been made.</p>

<p>On Exceptions prom Mr. Justice Dole.</p>

<p>Exceptions to Refusal of Circuit Court, Third Judicial Circuit, to Entertain Motion for New Trial.</p>

<p>Appeal from Decision of Dole, J., on Demurrer.</p>

Exceptions from Second Circuit. cited Article 7 of the Constitution : * * * “ And he shall have the right to meet the witnesses who are produced against him face to face; to produce witnesses and proofs in his own favor, and by himself or his counsel, at his election, to examine the witnesses produced by himself, and cross-examine those produced against him, and to be fully heard in his own defense.” * * * The constitutional privilege of being confronted by one’s accusers…

<p>Exceptions to Rulings of Dole, J.</p>

<p>Appeal from Decree op Judd, C.J.</p>

<p>Writ ok Error.</p>

<p>Motion for a New Trial.</p>

<p>Under the statute, prohibiting a Chinese passenger not furnished with a permit or passport from the Minister of Foreign Affairs from landing, or attempting to land, in this Kingdom:</p> <p>Held, that the return passport must have been issued to the individual who may return upon it.</p> <p>The presenting of a passport to the Customs officer was an attempt to land, and the passport not appertaining to the defendant, such attempt falls under the penalty of the law.</p>

<p>The statute confers exclusive jurisdiction in matters of Divorce upon the Circuit Court of the Judicial Circuit in which the parties last lived together as man and wife. Complied Laws, p. 434.</p> <p>The libel contained the allegations that the parties cohabited together from the marriage up to March 2d, 1886, that during said cohabitation and up to the present time they were and are residents of Halawa, Molokai, which is within the Second Circuit.</p> <p>Held, this was a sufficient jurisdictional averment.</p> <p>Order dismissing the libel rescinded and case ordered back to the Circuit Court for hearing.</p>

<p>A charge for “Violating Section 5, Chapter XLI, Act of 1886 in a house on Beretania street, near Kaumakapili Church on or about the 17th day of December, 1887, in Honolulu,” is sufficient to support a conviction under the said section; defendants counsel not having before trial objected to the charge made as not being sufficiently specific.</p>

<p>Exceptions to Instructions of Dole, J. at Trial.</p>

<p>Appeal from Decision of Dole, J., Overruling Defendant’s Demurrer.</p>

<p>When, in the opinion of the Court, a case previously tried was so nearly parallel to the ease for trial that jurors who had sat upon the former could not be free from bias, it was proper to exclude them in a body, without separate examination.</p> <p>Talesmen may be cited by the Marshal from the bystanders or from the Circuit at large, and it is inevitable and within the law that he should exercise his choice and make his selection out of the qualified residents.</p> <p>It is for the defendant to show himself within the excepted cases; it need not be charged in the indictment that he was not so.</p> <p>It was proper to refuse to instruct the jury that no conviction could be had on a certain count as not stating a criminal offense, the statute requiring that objection to an indictment for a defect apparent on the face thereof shall be taken by demurrer or motion to quash before plea.</p>

<p>A statute once specifically repealed is dead.</p> <p>An Act which made lawful the sale, possession and use of opium under certain licenses, and which in general terms repealed all laws in conflict therewith, previous statutes having prohibited such sale and use, being repealed by a subsequent Act which provided in general terms only that the laws which had been abrogated by the former statute should be revived :</p> <p>Held, that an Act repealing an Act, and in general terms reviving what had been in general terms repealed therein, conflicted with the just principle and statute that a repealed law shall not be construed to be revived unless it be so clearly expressed.</p> <p>The statute intended to be revived need not be recited at large, but its title and date of passage should be recited in the reviving Act.</p> <p>The defendant cannot be held upon a charge based on a repealed statute, not certainly revived by the re-enacting statute.</p>

<p>A new trial, on the ground of newly discovered evidence, will not be granted, where such newly discovered evidence would merely impeach or discredit a witness who testified at the trial, especially where the evidence sought to be discredited was not decisive of the issue.</p>

<p>Principles and Rules for the Accounts of Guardians.</p> <p>A Guardian who succeeds himself as Administrator is upon the same footing in respect to guardian’s commissions as if he had received the estate from another person.</p> <p>If is the duty of a guardian to render account to the Probate Court annually.</p> <p>It would be anticipating commissions, which are due only on the entire term of the guardianship, to charge in the first annual account the entire funds as received and disbursed. The Court may allow a proper amount to the guardian.</p> <p>In the event of a change of guardian, the Court will allow an equitable proportion of the commission on the entire fund.</p> <p>Guardians may charge commissions at ten, seven and five per cent., as allowed by the statute, at the end of each annual account rendered, upon all actual disbursements during the term, not to include investments, but they will not be allowed the advantage of separating the accounts into annual periods unless actually so rendered.</p> <p>When the widow’s one-third interest in. the estate remains unsevered, the guardian managing the entirety may charge as guardian only two-thirds commissions, dealing with the widow as her agent for her proportion of the service.</p> <p>An account of the receipts and payments from the investments must he rendered, in which property received in specie must be discriminated from that received in money.</p>

<p>Proceedings in bankruptcy, and the order to the Marshal to take possession of tbe bankrupt’s property, are not an execution, within the meaning of the Act, “To facilitate the recovery of rents.”</p> <p>Held also (overruling Bankruptcy of Ching On & Co., 6 Hawn., 287) that a landlord’s claim for rent is not a lien on a bankrupt’s estate, and has not priority over ordinary debts.</p>

<p>Exceptions from Mr. Justice Preston, Jury Waived.</p>

<p>Exceptions From Circuit Court, Fourth Judicial Circuit.</p>

<p>A bill of exceptions, on the ground that the judgment or verdict is not sustained by the evidence, must set out the evidence or enough thereof to apprise the apx>ellate Court of the nature of the questions raised.</p> <p>Kamalu vs. Lovell, 4 Hawn., 604, followed.</p> <p>The Bill of Exceptions in this ease not containing any of the evidence,</p> <p>Held, that there was nothing before the Court to consider.</p>

<p>An Act of the Legislature devolved the duty of selecting the list of fifty persons to serve as jurors upon the Chief Clerk of the Supreme Court. This officer was absent from the Kingdom and the list was selected by the Deputy Clerk.</p> <p>The law (Civil Code, Section 867) prescribes that in case of the absence or death of the Clerk, the deputy shall act as Clerk, etc.</p> <p>Held, that the list of jurors having been prepared by the Deputy in the absence of the Clerk, it was done according to law.</p>

<p>Appeal from Police Justice, Honolulu.</p>

<p>The defendant was convicted of forgery.</p> <p>The Court was requested to instruct the jury that “To rebut the presumption of innocence through ignorance, guilty knowledge must be shown by some act or acts of the defendant.”</p> <p>The Court held that there is no presumption of innocence through ignorance, and declined to give the instruction.</p> <p>Held, that such refusal was correct.</p> <p>The Court was also requested to instruct the jury that “The jury must be satisfied that the defendant was a principal in the forgery, in order to convict.”</p> <p>The Court gave the instruction, but added, “But if he being present, aided, incited, countenanced or encouraged the act of forgery, the law deems him a principal.”</p> <p>Held, that such addition was not error.</p> <p>To support an application for a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence, an affidavit by the witnesses, whom it is proposed to produce, must be obtained.</p>

<p>A motion for a new trial, on the ground that the verdict was against the evidence, will not be granted if there is sufficient evidence in support of the verdict to make it unnecessary to account for the verdict on the ground of prejudice or mistake.</p> <p>A rejection of a claim against the estate of a deceased person by the executor or administrator must be definitely brought home to the claimant, in order to bring the claim within the statute of 1876, limiting the time for bringing suit, after rejection, to two months.</p>

<p>Appeal erom Decree oe Preston, J.</p>

<p>The plaintiffs A., P. and M. alleged that they were the sole owners of certain land as the heirs of their father K., and filed a bill to set aside a mortgage of such land given by their mother and her second husband to the defendant Humphreys, and a mortgage given by the plaintiff Ananu to the defendant Tenny to prevent a sale and foreclosure of said first mortgage, which second mortgage was alleged to have been obtained by fraud and misrepresentation.</p> <p>It appeared that K. had two other sons besides the plaintiffs, and that they died in the lifetime of their mother, and that her mortgage was only of the shares she was entitled to as their heir.</p> <p>Held, affirming decree appealed from, that the appeal must be dismissed.</p>

<p>To justify the reformation of a written contract, the mistake must be clearly proved.</p> <p>The clause in a partnership agreement, that “Each partner holding more than one. share shall furnish a workman for each share over and. above the initial share ; ” “Initial share” construed to mean the “Original interest” which the partners had at the formation of the partnership.</p> <p>Held, that as the articles of partnership provide that plaintiffs are to furnish but one workman for their two original shares of $600 each, the reformation of the partnership articles to effect this is denied, reversing Bickerton, J.</p> <p>The construction of the articles of partnership could be raised by the answer in a former suit, and the cross-bill was unnecessary.</p>

<p>Exceptions prom Mr. Justice Dole. Jury Waived.</p>

<p>Two Chinamen arrived at the port of Honolulu in the S. S. Australia, having return passports not issued to them by the Foreign Office but purchased by them in Hongkong :</p> <p>The Master of the Australia made return to the Writ that he held the men in custody by virtue of an order from the Collector-General, and that he did not know the cause of such restraint and did not hold them by virtue of any process or warrant:</p> <p>The Statute of 20th December, 1887, “To Regulate Chinese Immigration,” prescribes that “From and after the 1st day of March, A.D. 1888, no vessel coming from ports beyond the Hawaiian Islands shall be allowed to land Chinese at any port in this Kingdom, unless said Chinese are provided with permits to enter the Kingdom,” etc., etc:</p> <p>After notification, the Attorney-General filed a supplementary return, wherein he averred that the appellants are legally detained, being Chinese within the meaning of the Statute above quoted :</p> <p>Held, the appellants were legally detained in custody, their landing on these shores being prohibited :</p> <p>The Statute prohibiting their landing and imposing a penalty upon Masters of vessels for landing them, is sufficient authority or due process of law justifying their detention:</p> <p>The vessel bringing them to this port having departed pending this appeal, the appellants were ordered to the custody of the Marshal to be returned by him to the Master of the vessel on his arrival, for deportation out of the Kingdom.</p>

, Sustaining Demurrer. submitted that the Court had no jurisdiction, as this was a suit against the Hawaiian Government, although nominally against the Minister of the Interior. “The suit is brought, not against the Government, but ainst one of its officers.

<p>The report of a Master in Chancery upon questions of fact referred to him has substantially the weight of a verdict of a jury and is not to be set aside or modified without clear proof of error or mistake on his part.</p> <p>On a review of the evidence no error is found in the report.</p>

<p>A person taking a license to carry on a retail business is not thereby estopped to say, on a criminal prosecution for violation of a condition in tile license, that the law under which he took his license was unconstitutional.</p> <p>An Act of the Legislature prescribed that no wholesale or retail license should be granted to any person except upon the express condition that the licensee shall at all times keep full, true and correct books of account of all business transacted by him in connection with such licensed business, which books of account shall be kept in the English, Hawaiian or some European language.</p> <p>Held, to be contrary to Articles 1 and 14 of the Constitution, which secure to all persons the enjoyment of life and liberty and the right of acquiring, possessing and protecting property according to law.</p> <p>Held, the Act cannot be sustained as an exercise of the Police power of the State, as it has no relation to the health, comfort, safety or welfare of the public.</p> <p>Section 2 of the Act authorized certain officers to examine the licensees’ books to see if kept according to the statute.</p> <p>Held, to be contrary to Article 9 and 12 of the Constitution.</p> <p>The whole Act is unconstitutional and void, and conviction of the defendant quashed and he discharged.</p>

<p>So much of Chapter 67 of the Laws of 1888 as provides that liquors in domestic shipment, not being labelled with the name and quantity of the liquor and the names of the shipper and consignee, may be seized by any police officer, and may be declared by the Court before which such case shall be brought to be forfeited to the use of the Hawaiian Government, is pronounced unconstitutional because the statute does not provide for notice of hearing to the parties interested.</p>

<p>Section 1 of Chapter LXVII. of the Laws of 1888, is pronounced unconstitutional and void, because:</p> <p>1. The Act being entitled “An Act to better Prevent Illicit Traffic in Spirituous Liquors,” this section provides that the mere possession at his place of business, by a person whose business requires a license, of liquor beyond a certain small prescribed quantity is an offense, without regard to an intent to traffic therein. This offense not being indicated by the title of the Act, it does not conform to the requirement of Article 77 of the Constitution.</p> <p>2. The provisions of said section are not within the proper compass of the Police Power of the State, and establish an arbitrary discrimination against a class of persons, in violation of the equal property rights guaranteed by Article 1 of the Constitution.</p>

<p>The correct practice concerning appeals from the Police Court to the Supreme Court in Banco on points of law, is as follows :</p> <p>The points of law, if they have been made by the party during the trial, and are stated by the Police Justice on his minutes, need not be restated by the Justice on a separate paper.</p> <p>If the points on which the appeal is based were not made during the trial and (or) were not noted on the minutes, they must be reduced to writing and be presented to the Police Justice within the ten days allowed for perfecting the appeal.</p>

<p>The Court refused to disturb a verdict for $1500 damages for malicious prosecution on the ground that it was excessive.</p>

urged that the statute left nothing whatever expressly to the discretion of the Minister, and that by plainly prescribing the acts to be performed, to have implied that no discretionary power was intended to be given; and the fact that the Minister may by Section 18 prescribe (though not arbitrarily) regulations in the license, would seem to preclude a*discretionary power in the granting of the license. None of the predecessors of the present Minister have claimed this power.

<p>Motion to Dismiss Exceptions from Circuit Court of Third Circuit.</p>

<p>Exceptions from Third Judicial Circuit Court, Bickerton 'J., Presiding.</p>

<p>Exceptions to Verdict or the Jury Rendered Under Instructions or the Court at the October Term, 1888.</p>

<p>Trial for murder. Evidence of the declarations of the dead man about his business relations with the prisoner, made several days before the murder, is hearsay and not admissible.</p> <p>Where such evidence goes to the jury, and other evidence, covering the same ground and properly admitted, is given to the jury, the improper admission of the hearsay evidence is not a ground for a new trial.</p> <p>It was shown that the prisoner and the deceased and an old woman lived in the same house, which was destroyed by fire at the time of the murder, with the body of the deceased in it at the time. Just before the murder the prisoner took the old woman to another house, giving mysterious and unintelligible reasons therefor.</p> <p>Held that, with this evidence, the question by the prosecution to a crown witness, “ Did the deceased ask you to do anything for the old woman, Kanoa, when you met him between three and four o’clock on Saturday, November 3d (the day of the murder), at the house which was burnt?” was material as tending to show the relations between the deceased and the old woman and as tending to throw light upon the suspicious circumstance of the removal of the old woman by the prisoner just before the fire and the murder. The importance of this question was increased by the prisoner’s own testimony later in the trial, to the effect that he removed the old woman because the deceased did not take care of her and asked him to take her away.</p> <p>A person arrested on suspicion only is not, in the absence of further proceedings against him, disqualified as a witness in the trial of others for the offeuse for which he was arrested on suspicion.</p> <p>Defendant’s request to charge the jury as follows: “To justify the inference of legal guilt from circumstantial evidence, the existence of the inculpatory facts must be absolutely incompatible with the innocence of the accused and incapable of explanation upon any other reasonable hypothesis than that of guilt,” properly refused.</p> <p>Where refusal to charge as requested is excepted to, bill of exceptions should contain the instructions given by the Court in lieu of the instructions refused, or else should show' that no instructions were given covering the ground.</p> <p>Defendant’s request, to charge the jury as follows: “Circumstantial evidence is to be viewed with distrust and to justify a conviction on such evidence, it is necessary to exclude every possible hypothesis of innocence,” properly refused. “ Every reasonable hypothesis,” instead of every possible hypothesis, would have made the instruction allowable.</p> <p>A motion for a new trial of a criminal cause tried in a Circuit Court must be addressed to the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>On a trial for murder the following instruction to the jury was asked by defendant’s counsel and refused by the Court; “That it is insufficient to convict, assuming all to be proved which the evidence tends to prove, if some other hypothesis may still be true. The true testis that the circumstances proven must produce the absolute conviction in your minds of the guilt of the defendant, and must exclude any other conclusion at which you may arrive on weighing the evidence.”</p> <p>Held, the refusal was no error; the true rule is that the circumstances must be such as to produce a moral certainty of guilt and to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis.</p> <p>The Court refused the following instruction on behalf of the defendant; “Where, on the trial of a capital offense, the evidence is solely circumstantial, it should be so strong as to exclude every other supposition inconsistent with the guilt of the accused.”</p> <p>Held, the refusal was no error, for the reason given in the previous point.</p> <p>The Court was asked to charge on behalf of defendant; “That the defendant is not to be presumed guilty merely from the fact of his being in company with Ah Su, who committed the offense, unless some participation of defendant is shown.”</p> <p>The Court refused this instruction, but charged: “If Ah Su alone killed Kapahee and yet if you find that Ahopa did aid and abet Ah Su in that murder; if Ah Su struck the blow and Ahopa was present assisting or in any way aiding or abetting him, it is your duty to find him guilty.”</p> <p>Held, no error: The instruction given was in conformity with Penal Code, Chapter V., Section 1.</p> <p>When the instructions given are correct and cover the ground, the refusal of the Court to charge in the very terms asked by counsel is no ground of exception.</p> <p>The circumstances of the murder reviewed by the Court. They afforded abundant evidence upon which the jury found their verdict of guilty.</p>

<p>The written contract, sued upon in the first count in the complaint, was made between B. and H. of the one part and L. A. of the other part. The action was brought by B. alone :</p> <p>Held bad on demurrer; there was nothing to show that this was not a joint contract, and joint contractors should join in the suit.</p> <p>The contract was made with “ L. A., Minister of the Interior and President of the Board of Immigration.” The Board of Immigration was sued as defendant, eo nomine :</p> <p>Held badon demurrer. The contract was not made with or authorized by the Board of Immigration.</p> <p>If the second count, which purports to be independent of the written contract, be proceeded upon, it must come out in evidence that the oral agreement had ripened into a written contract. Being annexed to the complaint, it is brought to the notice of the Court on demurrer.</p> <p>In the written contract the party of the second part agreed to pay a certain sum per capita for all passengers received on board the vessel:</p> <p>Held, this was not a covenant to put the passengers on board the vessel.</p> <p>Since the contract was made, the Legislature repealed the statute creating the Board of Immigration and enacted provisions for the appointment of a new Board, which is now made defendant:</p> <p>Held, the liabilities of the old Board do not attach to the new, the statute not effecting this.</p> <p>The Board of Immigration is not a corporation, though possessing some incidents of a corporation.</p> <p>In a suit against the Board of Immigration, its members should be named.</p>

<p>The action being to recover damages for an arrest of plaintiff at defendants’ instance, on an allegation that plaintiff was about to leave the Kingdom :</p> <p>Held, the Trial Justice was right in directing the jury to find for defendants, on the ground that no malice and want of probable cause were alleged and proved.</p> <p>The plaintiff had his remedy on the bond given at the time of the arrest.</p>

<p>On appeal the Court allowed the introduction of a book of original records of births kept by a District School Agent, this evidence being newly discovered and material to the just decision of the case.</p> <p>It appearing from the evidence that the grantor was of legal age when the alleged fraudulent deed was executed, the Court declined to proceed with the bill by his guardian to declare the deed void.</p>

<p>Exceptions From Decision op McCully, J., Presiding at the October Term, 1888, on Motion por a New Trial.</p>

<p>Certificates of stock having been deposited without endorsement but with a memorandum, viz: ‘‘The within certificates of stock belonging to A. F. C., passed over to C. & C., for security for §12,000 of P. 1ST. Co’s, four notes of §3,000 each : ”</p> <p>Held, against the contention that only the dividends were thereby pledged, that the transaction was, in equity, a mortgage.</p> <p>The pledgee having become bankrupt while the stock was so in pledge, the debt being unpaid :</p> <p>Held, that against the equities of the plaintiffs, the general creditors had no claim.</p> <p>Decreed, that the pledgee do endorse the certificates which may be sold under the mortgage, the plaintiffs having leave to prove claim against the bankrupt’s estate for any unsatisfied balance.</p>

<p>Appeal from Police Court, Honolulu.</p>

<p>Appeal from Decision of Preston, J., in the Intermediary Court of Oahu.</p>

<p>On Exceptions.</p>

<p>The defendant, a contract laborer, consented to work on his employer’s schooner, in place of his sugar plantation ; held, to be a voluntary change of the kind of work he was to perform under his contract, and not a violation of any of the terms of his contract.</p>

<p>On a bill to compel the specific performance of the following covenant in a lease :</p> <p>It is understood and agreed upon between the parties to the above lease that Allen and Stackpole shall have the privilege of renewal, subject, however, to a new agreement:</p> <p>Held, that the covenant was uncertain in its terms and therefore equity will not order its enforcement.</p> <p>“Subject to a new agreement” means subject to the formation of a new agreement between the parties as to term, rental, etc., and it does not mean subject to the mere formal signing of a new instrument renewing the old lease with all its covenants except that of renewal.</p>

<p>If in a bill for specific performance the contract sought to be enforced, admits, in the opinion of the plaintiffs, of two constructions, they should both be averred in the bill alternatively.</p>

<p>Appeal in Equity esom Mr. Justice McCully.</p>

<p>Exceptions from the February Term of ti-ie Fourth .Judicial Circuit Court. McCully, J., Presiding.</p>

<p>The plaintiffs are wrongly entitled Trustees of the Kamehameha Schools. They are trustees under the will of the late Mrs. Bernice Pauahi Bishop, and the estate belongs to them (in trust) and not to the schools which are the objects of the trust.</p> <p>The Statute found at page 66 of the laws of 1886, which provides that “Real and personal property belonging to private schools shall be exempt from taxation,” is held to mean the premises, buildings, furniture, etc., in the occupation and use of such schools are exempt.</p> <p>Property of which the income is applied to the support of such schools is not exempt.</p>

<p>The method of bringing up a decision of the Supreme Court in term is by Bill of Exceptions and not by Appeal.</p> <p>Appeals from a Probate Court should go on to the calendar of cases without a jury, and on appellant’s motion that the case be tried by a jury and his showing that he had complied with the statute in all respects, his motion will he granted and the case ordered to the calendar of jury cases for trial.</p> <p>If an issue is made in the Probate Court by a contestant, it is not essential to the appeal that he produce his proofs in support in the Probate Court.</p> <p>The affidavit of value of the estate involved is a condition of the allowance of the motion for trial by jury, and the time for filing it is limited to ten days from the date of the decision appealed from.</p> <p>It is essential to the allowance of a motion for a trial by j ury of an issue of fact in a Probate case on appeal, that a claim to the estate be made in the Probate Court.</p>

Writ op Error. The second count sets forth a cause of action on the case in that portion where it is alleged that, “in pursuance of the command in * * * the warrant,” the officers did the injuries complained of, “If the injury were committed through the medium of and under regular process, as in the case of a malícious arrest or prosecution, although such injury were forcible and' immediate, yet the remedy must be Case;” 1 Oh. PI. 145, 16th Am.

<p>Land worth §800 was conveyed to K. for the consideration of $20, with which to pay for a $16 coat.</p> <p>Held, on the admissions in the answer, that the deed should be considered to be a mortgage.</p> <p>The grantee K. sold the land to M.</p> <p>Before delivery of the deed to M., the original grantor told M. the facts of the transaction between him and K.</p> <p>Held, M. was put on his inquiry, and was not a bona fide purchaser.</p>

<p>The bill alleged that the water right in question had always been and now is of right belonging to and appurtenant to the demised premises.</p> <p>A prior bill between the parties was pleaded in bar, which contained the allegation that the lessors informed the lessees that the water right was demised to them as appurtenant to the premises.</p> <p>Plea held bad, as the allegations are not the same.</p>

<p>Exceptions to Decision of Bickerton, J.</p>

Submission to the Court Without Action. Submission. “The undersigned, the Hilo Sugar Company, a Hawaiian Corporation, plaintiff, and William L. Green, Minister of Finance, defendant, having agreed with each other' and hereby agreeing upon the statement of facts hereunder written, respectfully submit the same for hearing and judgment of your Honors, whether the said Minister of Finance is liable 'to return to the said Hilo Sugar Company the moneys here claimed by said…

<p>On Motion to Strike Case from Calendar.</p>

<p>Exceptions to Denial of Motion for New Trial by Bickerton, J.</p>

<p>Plaintiff deposited with defendant, who was a storekeeper, one hundred dollars in silver. The following receipt was given: “$100. I ■have in my hands 'belonging to Mr. Domingo J. Lopes to be changed for him in gold and afterward delivered to him. Csesar L. Brito. Honolulu, April 10, 1886. One hundred dollars.”</p> <p>The money was placed in a drawer with other money of defendant, and was destroyed by afire which destroyed defendant’s premises.</p> <p>Held, the transaction was not a bailment, as the specific chattel (the silver) was not to be returned.</p> <p>The property in the silver passed to defendant and he became a debtor of the plaintiff to the value of the silver in gold.</p>

<p>Appeal in Equity from Dole, J.</p>

<p>Appeal from Decision of Bickerton, J.</p>

Appeal in Equity, from Preston, J., on Bill of Interpleader. contended: That by the will of Catharine Bates the residue of her estate was bequeathed to Sarah Dickson, without the intervention of a trustee, and that no present interest or income was devised to any of the children of Sarah Dickson. That by the common law, personal property cannot be the subject of estates other than absolute ownership, and the creation of estates therein cannot be accomplished.

<p>In Admiralty. Appeal on Demurrer.</p>

<p>Appeal prom Dole, J., on Allowance op Attorney’s Fees and Commissions. .</p>

<p>Appeal from Decision of Preston, J., Dismissing Bill in Equity to Establish a Claim Against His Majesty.</p>

<p>The plaintiffs had the care of defendant’s child, hut she was under the authority and management of her father during the whole period, he being able and willing to support her. No contract, express or implied, was entered info at any time for the necessaries furnished. No credit was given to defendant by plaintiffs.</p> <p>Held, that defendant’s estate was not liable, and that no contract can be inferred or implied, because subsequently the child was taken away.</p>

<p>Exceptions From April Term, 1889.</p>

<p>Exceptions erom the Circuit Court oe ti-ie Third Judicial Circuit.</p>

<p>The rule of law approved, that the grantor conveys by his deed as an appurtenance whatever he has the power to grant which is practically annexed to the granted premises at the time of the grant, and is necessary to their enjoyment in the condition of the estate at the time.</p> <p>But where the claim is made that the lease of the rice plantation carried with it the water right which was afterwards demised by a separate lease, the above rule of law does not apply, it appearing that the two leases were one transaction, and it was the understanding of the parties that the lease of the water right should be separate.</p>

<p>Exceptions prom the Circuit Court, Third Judicial Circuit.</p>

<p>Exceptions from Circuit Court, Third Judicial Circuit.</p>

<p>An action to recover rent due for use of a Minor’s land is properly-brought in the name of the Minor by her Guardian.</p> <p>An objection to the summons issued from the Police Court, made for the .first time in the Appellate Court, should not, if sustained, be visited with a dismissal of the action, but an amendment should be allowed.</p>

<p>Exceptions «From Circuit Court, Fourth Judicial Circuit, Dole, J., Presiding.</p>

<p>Exceptions to Decision op Judd, O.J., Sustaining Demurrer to Indictment.</p>

<p>Chapter XXVII. of the Acts of 1878 (C. L., p. 616) does not apply to the cars of the street railway of Honolulu. Decision of the Police Court reversed.</p>