Frost v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

17 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““While the authorities are not in full accord, see 58 A.L.R. 64 , et seq., the majority rule seems to be that it is a permissible practice for the State to prove the prior convictions upon the trial of the principal offense charged. This majority rale is stated in 25 American Jurisprudence, page 270, under Section 23 of the Chapter on Habitual Criminals as follows: “ ‘The question whether the fact of the prior conviction of the defendant may or should be alleged in the indictment and proved upon the trial for the principal offense, or considered apart from his conviction for the principal offense, has not received a uniform answer. Generally, the courts permit allegation and proof of the prior conviction upon trial of the principal offense, and it has been held that this is essential.’ “As to such evidence being prejudicial, the necessary conclusion is that relevant evidence is not made irrelevant because it is prejudicial. Also, such a problem is legally considered solved by a jury instruction of the trial court that the evidence of previous convictions must be considered only with reference to the minimum amount of punishment to be assessed. That practice is followed when in cross-examination of a defendant he is required to admit previous convictions reflecting upon his credibility. “The conclusion of this Court is that it was not improper upon, and as a part of, Frost’s trial of the principal offense of driving while intoxicated alleged in the indictment to admit evidence”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Burrus v. State

2. “Such holding in the McBride case was undoubtedly correct and in accord with the general rule. That rule is stated in 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law sec. 1969(b), p. 1167, wherein, in dismissing the order of trying the issues in a prosecution of accused as a second or subsequent offender the rule is stated to be that: ‘Tn the absence of statutory provisions relating thereto, it has been held that the manner of presenting issues is discretionary with the trial court, * * V 203 Tenn. 552 , 314 S/W.2d 35.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Harrison v. State

3. “< t Therefore, it must be held that tbe concluding provision of Code, Section 59-1035 purporting to authorize proof of conviction and mandatorily increased punishment for tbe second or third offense of driving while drunk without previous notice thereof given to tbe defendant in tbe indictment, or otherwise, in, so far as it purports to dispense with notice, is invalid in that it is a violation of tbe due process clause of tbe State and Federal Constitutions. ’ ’”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Frost v. State