Volume 7 — Puerto Rico Reports

This is an action in intervention of ownership instituted in the District Court of Mayagüez by Federico Schroder, plaintiff, against the municipal council of said city and Federico Philippi, as managing partner of Schulze & Co., the latter in default, both defendants; which case is pending before us on appeal in cassation, now ordinary a-ppeal, taken by the complainant in intervention from the judgment rendered by said court, the party appellant having been represented…

This is an action instituted in the District Court of San Juan by Saturnino Sola y Rodriguez against Juan Morera Martínez and Francisco… Held: at which, after reviewing the evidence taken, - the attorneys for the parties presented arguments in support of their respective contentions, and upon the conclusion thereof a day was set for the voting upon the judgment. “Upon the termination of all the steps in the trial, the voting on the judgment took place, on the 7th of April…

This is an action in intervention of ownership, instituted by Maria Ramona Beatriz Trilla y Martínez, plaintiff, represented by Attorney Sandalio Torres, against Herbert E. Smith and Reyes Almodovar Gralindo, defendants, the former represented by himself, as attorney at law, while the latter, though cited, failed to appear before this Supreme Court.

<p>Bill op Exceptions — Evidence.'—When there is no bill of exceptions, and the evidence introduced at the trial does not appear from the transcript of the record, no basis is afforded for discussing the consideration given to the the evidence by the trial court, and it must be presumed in the absence of such basis, that the court acted in accordance with the law and the merits of the case. „</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

This is au action to recover possession of land, instituted in the District Court of Mayagüez by Messrs.

' STATEMENT OP THE CASE. This is a declaratory action brought in the District Court of San Juan by Jaime Colón, of legal age, married, a master builder and resident of Ciales, plaintiff, represented in this Supreme Court by Attorney Jacinto Texidor, against José Roig Colomer, of 'legal age, married, an agriculturist and a resident of Utuado, defendant, represented by Attorney Juan Hernández López, in the matter of rendition of accounts, which case is pending before ns on an…

This is a suit prosecuted in the District Court of Huma-cao by the plaintiff Eugenio Ruiz de Val, married, of legal age, a property owner and a resident of .Guayama, represented in this court by Attorney Wenceslao Bosch, against the defendant, Pedro Virella Uribe, of the same place, married, of legal age and a property owner, represented by his counsel, Rafael López Landrón, for the. recovery of money.

This is an action instituted in the district court by the “Banco Español de Puerto Bico,” the firm of J. T. Silva Banking and Commercial Company, and Francisco de Acuña, established in this city, plaintiffs, against Herminio Díaz Navarro, a lawyer and a resident of this city, on his own behalf, Gorgonio Bolívar y Alvarez,, a resident of Bilbao, and Basilisa Bolívar y Alvarez, a'resident of Munguía, Vizcaya (Spain), defendants; the plaintiff being represented in this Supreme…

This is a case prosecuted in the District Court of San Juan on behalf of Martin Garcia representing his wife Ri-carda Mercado Caballero to secure dominion title to a lot situated in the barrio of Santurce, and the place called “Mi-nillas” and opposed by Herbert E. Smith.

This is a case prosecuted in the District Court of Maya-güez by Juan B. Capifali y Bioseco, as plaintiff, in representation of his wife, Bicarda Olivieri y Monsanto, against J. Tornabells & Co., in liquidaton, as defendants, to compel the execution of a deed of acquittance, which case is now pending’ before us on appeal taken by the plaintiff from a judgment rendered by the said court.

Appeal in complaint from a decision of the District Court of Mayagüez. STATEMENT OP THE CASE. 'This is a summary foreclosure proceeding prosecuted by Victor Martinez against Domingo Rivera for the recovery of a credit under the procedure provided for by the Mortgage Law and the Regulations for the execution thereof.

■ This is a case prosecuted in the District Court of San Juan at the instance of Ramón Córdova Díaz, to'prove the ownership of a lot situated in barrio Cataño of'the ihunicipal district of Bayamón, now pending before us on appeal taken hyocounsel for the petitioner from a judgment rendered in the said court, a copy of which reads as follows, to wit: “San Juan, Porto Rico, July 30, 1903.

STATEMENT OE THE CA-SE.' This is a case prosecuted in the District Court of San Juan by Mariana Carreras y Morales to obtain a dominion title to a rural estate, now pending before us on appeal taken from the judgment rendered by the said district court, a copy of which reads as follows: “San Juan, Porto Rico, June 30, 1903. — Mariana Carreras Morales, widow of Martín Rodríguez, claims to be the owner, and has been in possession for more than six years, of a rural estate…

This is an executory action prosecuted in the District Court of Ponce for the recovery of money by the mercantile firm of Pizá Hermanos, of that city, as plaintiff, represented in the trial court by Attorney Luciano Ortiz Anton, and in this court by Attorney Antonio Alvarez Nava against Mariano Al-faro y Diaz, married, a merchant, of legal age, and a resident of Juana Diaz, as defendant, represented in the trial court by Attorney Julio Padilla é Iguina, he having made no…

This is a proceeding instituted in the District Court of San Juan by Sandalio Morales, for the purpose of obtaining a declaration of ownership of two rural estates; which case is pending before us on appeal taken by the petitioner from the judgment rendered by aforesaid district court, which reads as follows: “Porto Rico, June 11, 1903. — Sandalio Morales y Negron presented a petition stating that he is and has been, for over six years, the owner of (1) a rural estate…

This is a case prosecuted in the District Court of Huma-cao by Domingo Carrasquillo y Ortiz to secure a dominion title to two rural estates.

This is a proceeding instituted in the District Court of Iinmacao by Apolinar Vega Martinez, for the purpose of obtaining a declaration of ownership of two rural estates; which case is pending before us on appeal taken by counsel for the petitioner, from the judgment rendered by aforesaid district court, which reads as follows: “Judgment. — In Guayama, June 2, 1903.

This is an action prosecuted in the District Court of Ponce by G-regorio Cintron Flores, of legal age, a widower, and a resident of Jnana Díaz, as plaintiff, against Hilario Cruz Colón, a resident of the same place, a laborer, as defendant declared in default in the said court, the former having been represented in this court by Attorney Felipe Casaldnc, and Manuel F. Bossy, Esq., having appeared on behalf of the latter.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

José and Luís Bou, accused of the crime of assault with a deadly weapon, were condemned by the District Court of San Juan, on April 4, 1904, for the crime defined in section 237 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, to pay a fine of five hundred dollars, each, and to undergo one day of imprisonment for every dollar they should fail to pay, and to one-half the costs, which offenders are now serving said sentence in the jail of this city.

This is a declaratory action for divorce, instituted in the District Court of Mayagiiez by Rosario Pnente y Acosta, represented in the first instance by her attorney Benito Fores, and in this Supreme Court by Attorney Sandalio Torres Monge, plaintiff, against José Antonio Otero y Alomar, defendant, who, not appearing at the trial, was declared in default.

<p>Appeal — Bill op Exceptions — Manifest Ekboks in Recokd. — In the absence of a bill of exceptions, and it not appearing from the record that any error has been committed affecting the substantial rights of the defendant, the judgment appealed from must be affirmed.</p>

<p>Demurrer. — A demurrer cannot "be considered unless it be filed in writing and taken at the time prescribed'by law.</p> <p>Evidence. — The taking of evidence which" was not proposed and admitted at the proper time cannot be demanded when the hearing is in progress.</p> <p>Eights op Dependants. — The defendant must exercise all his rights in the manner and at the time prescribed by law.</p> <p>Eight to a Jury Trial — When Waived. — The defendant having waived his right to be tried by a jury, cannot allege as ground for a new trial that he was denied said right.</p> <p>Judgment. — A judgment which conforms to the law and is the result of well-developed and correctly weighed evidence, cannot be set aside.</p> <p>New Evidence. — New evidence ^discovered after the trial cannot be admitted, unless the requirements prescribed by the Code of Criminal Procedure have been complied with.</p> <p>New Trial. — ,A new trial cannot be refused on the .ground that it is allowable only in eases of trials by jury, inasmuch as section 364 of the Code of Criminal Procedure authorizes the Supreme Court to grant it with reference both to a jury trial and a trial by a law court.</p>

This is a case prosecuted in the District Court of San Juan by the municipality of Bayamón, represented by Attorney Lnis Freyre Barbosa, to prove the ownership of two lots. The case is pending before ns on an appeal taken by counsel for the petitioner from the judgment rendered by the said district court, a copy of which reads as follows, to wit: “San Juan, Porto Rico, November 4, 1903.

This is - a proceeding instituted in the District Court of San Juan by José Martínez Crespo to prove bis ownership of a rural estate.

■ This is an appeal pending before ns, taken by Jnan Francisco Bernabé Carreras y Carbó and María Lanreana Carbó y González, who have entered an appearance in this Supreme Court, represented by Attorney Sandalio Torres Monge, requesting the reversal and annulment of a decision rendered by the District Court of Mayagüez, which reads as follows: “ Mayagüez, October 1, 1903.

<p>Application for a writ of Habeas Corpus.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Appear from the District Court of Arecibo. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. Held: the plaintiff, Antonio Puente y Leal, assigned to his sister Juana Puente y Leal, by public deed, all his rights and actions in this suit, and the court, after complying with the legal formalities, recognized the latter as subrogated to the rights and actions of the former.

Appeal in complaint from a decision of the District Conrt of Humacao.

This is an executory action instituted in the abolished Court of First Instance of Mayagiiez by José Peña Chavarri against José Antonio Annoni for the recovery of money.

Question of Competency between the Municipal Court of Ponce and the Municipal Court of the Cathedral District of San Juan. STATEMENT OE THE CASE. Held: the question should be resolved in favor of the municipal court of the Cathedral district as being that of the domicile of the defendant. A day was set for the hearing and the same was held, the fiscal of this court and the attorney for the petitioning firm being present.

<p>Appeal — Grounds of Appeal — Bill of Exceptions. — Grounds of appeal which are not supported by the transcript of the record, and which are not sustained by a bill of exceptions, cannot be considered by the appellate court.</p> <p>Information — Dismissal—Trial.—A defendant who submits to a trial without having moved for a dismissal of the cause on the ground that the information was not filed within the time fixed by law, will be deemed to have , waived that right.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>STATEMENT OE THE CASE.</p> <p>This is an action instituted in the District Court of San Juan by Pierre Enmanuel, Baron du Laurens d’ Oiselay, against the People of Porto Eico, for the recovery of lands, which case is pending before us on an appeal in cassation, now-ordinary appeal, taken by the defendant, who was represented by the 'fiscal of this Supreme Court, counsel for the respondent being Attorney Eduardo Acuña.</p> <p>On January 30, 1901, Pierre Enmanuel, Baron du Laurens d’ Oiselay, brought an action against the treasurer of this Island, in the District Court of San Juan, alleging the following facts: That the King of Spain, Don Carlos III, in 1776, granted four square leagues of land to the Duke de Mahon, which gift was confirmed in 1792 by King Carlos IV, said extension of land being subsequently reduced to 83% caba-llerías [each caballería consists of 33% acres] which were allotted in the townships of Naguabo, Fajardo, Luquillo, Loiza, and Pepino, but as some years elapsed without the possession thereof becoming effective by proper measurement, claims ensued which resulted in the designation of 45% caballerías in barrio Cibao, within the municipality of Pepino, now Lares, as belonging to the Duke de Mahon, which lands were measured and delivered to him; that these lands, owing to the changes occasioned by the lapse of time, now consist of 4133 merdas, equal to 1624 hectares, 43 ares and 3 centares, situated in barrios Callejones and Piletas, within the district of Lares, judicial district of Aguadija, the same being planted with coffee, pasture and bushes, and bounded on the north by lands belonging to José Gregorio Velez, on the south, by those of Miguel Jesús Colón, on the east, by the Camuy river, and on the west, by lands of Juan José López, according to the metes and bounds set forth in the bill of complaint; that the Government of the Island, considering that the representative of the Duke de Mahon did not comply with the conditions as to cultivation, to which he was bound, the board of waste lands took up the matter and on June 3, 1854, decided upon the reversion to the Crown of Spain, of the lands granted to the duke, and afterwards, by a decision of the same board, on December 22d of aforesaid year the Lares lands were given to seventy-four persons who had been occupying them, each grantee being formally put in possession of his respective portion; that upon being apprised of said decisions, the successor of the Duke de Mahon, represented by Maria Balbo Bertone de Crillon, who, by reason of her minority, was represented by Count Manfredo Balbo Bertone de Sambuy, addressed a petition to the Queen of Spain requesting that the term of one year be allowed her within which to make the clearings and cultivation of aforesaid lands, and thereby be given-full possession thereof, the decisions of the board of land apportionment, meantime, to remain in abeyance. In response to said petition two royal orders were issued, the first, dated April 8, 1857, directing the Governor of Porto Rico to report to the' Queen upon the state of the matter and to communicate his ' opinion as to the means of reconciling, if possible, the family interests of the duke with the agricultural interests of the Island, and that until the Queen should give her final decision thereon, the effects of the notice served upon the heirs of the duke be left in suspense, without in any manner .awarding to new grantees the lands in question;.and the second, dated January 20, 1859, ordering the Governor to extend to the heiress of the duke all the protection and facilities to which she was entitled, in order that she might take all proper steps to the end of recovering the lands; that the board of waste lands, at their session of October 25,1857, resolved that the antecedents of the matter be referred to their fellow-member, the auditor de guerra (counsellor appointed to assist military officers with his advice in law proceedings), who was commissioned to prepare a draft of the report to be submitted, in compliance with the Queen’s order; that on April .7, 1859, the Governor and Captain-General of this Island, taking into account the antecedents of the case, and considering that in the opinion of the Government of Madrid, the grant made to the Duke de Ma-. hon was not a simple gift, but a compensation for services rendered to the Nation, and having in mind, moreover, that the heiress of the duke was a minor, decided, in conformity with the auditor de guerra, that as soon as Count de Sambuy should appear in the district, he again be put in possession of the lands that had been awarded to the Duke de Mahon, according to the plans and documents to be produced by him; that the data relating to said possession, which were filed with the record of the general government, could not be found, because said record did not now exist; but it is a fact, beyond doubt, that said possession was given in compliance with the orders of the Government, for in the official letter-book of the year 1859 of the municipality of Lares, appears copied a communication wherein the alcalde states that he forwards to the Governor the record of the proceedings instituted by the alcalde relative to the possession given to the successor of Duke de Mahon, of 20% caballerías of land, in barrio Cibao, of said district, pursuant to a communication from the Government, dated April 7, which was placed at thé head of the record of said proceedings; that said possession is proven, moreover, by the fact that the taxes were paid by the Estate of Duke de Mahon from 1862, without interruption, down to the fiscal year 1898-1899; that while matters thus stood, Virgilio Acevedo, desirous of obtaining possession of .the lands belonging to the Estate of Duke de Mahon, began to urge the colonos (settlers) to resist payment of rents they had been paying, under the pretext that said Estate had forfeited its dominion rights, and succeeded in getting them to transfer to him the title to said lands, by deed dated July 5, 1900, executed before the notary of Lares on the assumption that they were the owners thereof by reason of the grant made in their favor in 1854, which was not true, inasmuch as the grantees had been dispossessed of the rights acquired by them, and if they remained on the estate, it was in the character of settlers, as shown by the fact that they had paid rent to the successor of Duke de Mahon, the latter paying the taxes assessed on said property; that with aforesaid deed Acevedo applied to the office of the alcalde of Lares, requesting that the successor of the Duke de Mahon be struck off the taxpayer’s roll, which request was forwarded to the Treasurer, who, on September 4th of the same year, rendered a decision directing that the Duchess de Mahon be eliminated from the assessments, and the landholders entered instead, with the cuerdas of land respectively held by each, according to classification, as provided for in the hand-book for the guidance of tax-assessors, and that a certificate of said decision be forwarded to the registry of property, so as to léave without effect the record in favor of Acevedo, the landholders being ordered to surrender their titles to the lands held by them, in consequence of which decision, the lands belonging to the Estate of Duke de Mahon were recorded in the registry as belonging to the People of Porto Eico, by virtue of the order of said Treasurer; that the Baron de Laurens as heir of the Duchess de Mahon, came to this Island for the purpose of defending his rights, and having submitted the documents establishing the same to the Treasurer, the latter admitted that among said documents there were royal orders and provisions of the general G-overnment of Porto Rico which, if authentic, would indicate that the reversion of the lands had been suspended, and the representatives of the heir of the Duchess de Mahon reinstated in the possession thereof, but that it devolved upon a court of competent jurisdiction to decide upon the authenticity, of said documents and whether or not the com ditions and requisites of tile orders by virtue of which, the revision was suspended, had been fully complied with, although he does not hesitate to declare that if said orders and provisions had been registered in the proper archives, the action taken by his office would have been omitted, and ■that, in his opinion, said documents constituted very important evidence in relation to the question and the is'sue thereof. As legal grounds, plaintiff alleges that the documents accompanying the complaint constitute a perfect dominion title in favor of the Duchess de Mahon and of her present heir; that the identity of the lands claimed with those recorded in favor of the People of Porto Pico, is shown by the very text of the Treasurer’s communication ordering the admission to record, and that the owner of real property has a right to demand the same of the person who holds it, and to request the annulment of the record made under the latter’s name in the registry; and exercising the action of ownership, he prayed that judgment be rendered, declaring that the lands in question belong to the plaintiff, and ordering the cancellation of the récord made in the name of the People of Porto Eico, the same to be substituted with another in favor of the plaintiff.</p> <p>The plaintiff “filed with the complaint the following documents : 1. Copy of the holographic will executed September 16, 1889, by Madame de Crillon, Duchess de Mahon, who devises to Pierre du Laurens, a cavalry officer, the Lares lands situated in the Island of Porto Eico, in fee-tail, and bequeathing, moreover, the title of Duke de Mahon and Grandee of Spain, to Louis des Balbes de Berton de Sambuy; 2. Copy of the record of the death of Madame Marie Gabrielle Antoi-niette de Barton de Balbe de Crillon de Mahon, which occurred at Avignon, Prance, on April 11,1899; 3. Copy of the petition presented to the Governor-Captain-General of this Island, on November 26, 1828, by José Javier de Aranzamendi, as agent for the Duke de Mahon Crillon, asking that, after survey of the lands and citation of the adjoining property-owners, he be put in possession of the 45% caballerías which, were needed to complete the number granted him by royal bounty, that an official communication for that purpose be addressed to the tenientes á guerra [delegates of the Captain-General, acting as mayors] of the districts of Pepino, Isabela and Loiza, where waste and unappropriated lands were still to be found, and issuing to him the proper dominion title, for his protection in the possession thereof; 4. Copy of the decree of the Governor-General, dated November 20th of aforesaid year, commissioning the tenientes á guerra of Loiza, Isabela and Pepino to order the survey of the unappropriated lands which, as claimed by the agent for the Duke de Mahon Crillon, existed in their respective districts, to be made by a surveyor, after citation of the adjoining landowners, it being worthy of note that according to the statement of said duke, in the district of Pepino there were 20% caballerías; 5. Copy of a decree of the teniente á guerra of Pepino, dated April 14 of the following year, ordering the survey of the 20% caballerías of lands, with citation of the adjoining owners, as directed by the Governor and Captain-General; 6. Copy of the record of proceedings in connection with the survey had after citation of the adjoining owners, fixing points, bearings and distances, which took place on April 22nd, aforesaid; 7. Copy of the writ of protection issued on March 10, 1830, in favor of Duke de Mahon Crillon, by Captain-General Don Miguel de la Torre, of the 20% caballerías that had been surveyed in the district of Pepino, with the same metes and bounds appearing on the record mentioned above, which title to the lands in question is issued in favor of the Duke de Mahon, that he may use, enjoy and possess the same as owner, cultivating them in the manner that may best suit him, without thenceforth being disturbed in the possession thereof by any person; 8. Certificate of minutes of the abolished superior board of apportionment of waste lands, from which it appears that, at a sitting had in April, 1854, taking into account the royal orders referring to the waste lands held in this Island by the Duke de Mahon Crillon, and in view of the reports submitted by the local boards of the towns of Rio Grande and Lares, whereby it is shown that the heirs of said dnke did possess in the first-mentioned district a certain number of caballerías, without stating how many, and 20% caballerías within the territory of the other, which lands, according to both reports, not only were in a state of abandonment, but there was no person commissioned to satisfy the royal du.es accruing thereon, the said board of apportionment decided upon classifying them as unappropriated lands, and instructed their fellow-member, the auditor de guerra, to prepare the proper notices, so that by this means they might be distributed among such persons as should apply for them, without prejudice to said decisions being reported to the Queen; that at another sitting the same board, at the request of the municipal board of Lares, which pointed out the convenience of granting to seventy-four neighbors whom it mentioned, the lands already occupied by them, the same forming part of those that had belonged to the Duke de Mahon Crillon, it decided to grant said lands to the occupants, not exceeding, however, one hundred" cuerdas to each, the proper order for the survey thereof to-be taken out within two months, and the prescribed dues paid; and it was further decided to make allotments of lands, also belonging to the Duke de Mahon in the Lares and Rio Grande districts, to thirty-four persons mentioned in aforesaid certificate; and, finally, that at a session held-October 25, 1857, two •royal orders were read, dated respectively March 18th and April 8th of the same year, the former being accompanied by a memorial addressed to the Spanish Minister of State by the Cavalier Berton de Sambuy, guardian of the infant heiress of Duke de Mahon, referring to lands granted by Kings Carlos III and Carlos IV to the first duke of that name, and the other inclosing a petition of the writer addressed to the Queen, wherein, as in the memorial, an extension of time was requested for said lands to escheat to the State, the Queen directing that the antecedents and present condition of the matter be set forth and an opinion given as to the manner of reconciling, if possible, the interests of the duke’s family with the agricultural interests of the Island, and that, pending the Queen’s final determination of the matter, the effects of the notice served upon the heirs of the duke, through the Consul of France, be kept in abeyance, no awards of any kind to be made to new grantees in the meantime of the lands not yet cultivated, to which reference is made in the aforesaid royal order and accompanying petition; the decision of the board being to the effect that the antecedents and royal provisions, mentioned above, be referred to their fellow-member, the auditor de guerra, for the purpose of preparing a draft of the report that was to be transmitted to the Queen; 9. Copy of the petition of Cavalier Berton de Sambuy, addressed under date of April 1, 1857, to the Queen of Spain, which elicited the above-mentioned Boyal Order of April 8th, in which petition Count Manfredo Balbo Bertone de Sambuy, representing Maria Balbo Bertone de Crillon, heiress to the Duchy of Mahon, states that he had received by a tardy and indirect channel the notice given to the Consul of France in this Island by the chairman of the board of apportionment of lands, to the effect that said board, at a session held on May 24, 1856, in view of Boyal Decree of September 15, 1852, declaring that the 27 cab alienas of land situated in Bio Grande and Lares had escheated to the Crown, and of the one of December 13, 1854, in response to the last claim made by the’ Duke de Mahon’s family had decided to notify said family that if they still desired to preserve some of the lands granted to the Duke in Naguabo, Fajardo and elsewhere', they should immediately appoint a duly authorized agent to specify the metes and bounds of these lands and put the same under cultivation within the period of one year, in the manner prescribed in the circular of April 23, 1856, and pay the dues, as otherwise they would revert to the Crown; which petition closed with the request that he he allowed one year from the day his ward should attain her majority and he put in condition to assume full possession of the lands in question and to carry out the clearing and cultivation thereof, and that meanwhile the decision of the hoard of apportionment of lands of this Island he declared without effect and the restitution of the aforesaid 27 caballerías ordered, if they really have been declared to have escheated; and in case that, either through regular decisions of the board or by legal prescriptions, some portion of these lands should already belong to other lawful owners, who cannot he dispossessed, that in place thereof other lands he ordered assigned to the Duke de Mahon’s family, the same to be equivalent to and in identical conditions with those described in the royal cédulas of concession, dated July 4 and September 25, 1776; 10. Uncertified copy of the Eoyal Order of April 8, 1857, elicited by the preceding petition, and containing the particulars hereinbefore mentioned; 11. Uncertified copy of the Eoyal Order of January 20, 1859, wherein the Queen of Spain instructs the Governor-General of this Island,to extend to Count Manfredo Bertone de Sambuy all the protection and facilities due to his rank, in order that he may take proper steps to recover the lands inherited by his daughter-in-law and ward, Maria Bertone de Crillon, Duchess de Mahon and Grandee of Spain of the first class; 12. A communication from Governor-General Cotoner, dated May 7, 1859, addressed to Count Manfredo Bertone de Sambuy, wherein is inserted the decree of the general Government, dated April 7th, same year, in conformity with the opinion of the auditor de guerra, directing . that the representative of Duke de Mahon be reinstated in •the possession of the lands whereof he had been dispossessed, according to the plans and documents that may be produced by him, leaving unimpaired the rights of those possessing them in whole or in part, to be prosecuted at such place and in such, manner as provided by law, Her Majesty to be duly informed tliereon; wbich decree was issned in consequence of the proceedings instituted by Count Manfredo Bertone de Sambuy, as representative of the Estate óf Duke de Mahon Crillon, to recover possession of the lands he had in this Island; 13. Uncertified copy of the order issued to the local authorities of Fajardo, Naguabo, Lnquillo, Ceiba, Lares, Isa-bela, and Bio Grande, on April 7,1859, acquainting them with the decree of the same date, for their information and guidance ; 14. Certified copy issued by the secretary of the municipality of Lares, of a communication appearing in the letter-book of the year 1859, which reads as follows: “Your Excellency: I have the honor to forward to Your Excellency the record of proceedings instituted by this alcaldía for the purpose of giving possession to Count Sambuy, as lawful representative of the Estate of His Excellency, the Duke de Mahon Crillon, of 20% caballerías in barrio Cibao, within this district, pursuant to Your Excellency’s communication, dated April 7, this year, which is placed at the head of said record. Lares, June 4, 1859;” 15.' Cex-tified copy of a-communication from the Treasurer, dated September* 4, 1900, to the alcalde of Lares, which reads as follows: ‘ ‘In view of the action taken by the municipal corporation at a special session held August 27, last, copy whereof was forwarded by you with an official communication dated the 1st instant, with reference to a petition, supported by documents, from Virgilio Acevedo y Her-nández, who requests that the Duchess de Mahon Crillon be excluded from the posted assessment roll of land taxes for’ 1900-1901 and that in her stead the aforesaid Acevedo be included therein as assignee of the lands purporting to be the property of said Duchess in your municipality, which lands were acquired by him from their lawful possessors, that is, the lights and actions accruing to the holders who had been in peaceful possession thereof; in view also of the appeal taken by Virgilio Acevedo from the said action alleging that the municipal corporation rendered no decision, but, on the contrary, had forwarded the antecedents of the matter to this office to be passed upon; and inasmuch as on examination of said antecedents it appears: (1) That since 1776 a grant of lands was made to the Duke de Mahon Crillon, consisting of 27 caballerías, or 5,400 cuerdas, in Bio Grande and Lares, which lands lie has not used nor cultivated, according to a circular of the Governor and Captain-General, published in The Gazette, No. 67, of June 6, 1854; (2) That by Boyal Order of September 13, 1852, it was declared that said lands, situated in Bio Grande and Lares, which had been neglected and kept without cultivation by the grantee, should revert to the Crown, proper proceedings being at the same time ordered to be instituted for the purpose; (3) That the superior board of apportionment of waste lands decided to declare that aforesaid lands had escheated to the State, and ordered that notice thereof be published, so that persons 'having the qualifications prescribed by law, might apply for them, if they so desired; (4) That the municipal corporation of Lares, in a resolution passed August 18, 1854, recognized the award made in usuf-ruct and without ownership to the same persons who had been the occupants of the lands in question; (5) That on December 27, 1854, the board of land apportionment awarded the escheated lands to those possessing them, not to exceed, how-. ever, 100 cuerdas to each tenant who was bound to take out the proper measurement-permit within two months, and pay the prescribed dues, which requisites do no.t appear to have been complied with; (6) That all the tenants, or part of them, had, by public deed executed in Lares before Acting Notary Salvador Picornell y Cardona, on July 5, this year, transferred to Yirgilio Acevedo y Hernández all the rights and .actions that might have accrued to them, over aforesaid lands, situated in barrios Callejones and Piletas of that municipality, the whole aggregating 4,133 cuerdas, equivalent to 1,624 hectares, 43 ares, and 43 centares, bounded by unappropriated lands and lands belonging to José Gregorio Vélez, José Miguel Colón, Juan José López, and by the Camuy Biver; and considering (1) that the lands granted in 1776 to the Duke de Mahon Crillon belong to the State, now the Insular Treasury of Porto Bico, from the time they were declared escheated by the board, nobody having a right to them, except the Insular Treasury; (2) that although awarded by the same board to the seventy-four tenants aforesaid, the possessory proceedings had not been perfected, owing to non-compliance by the tenants with the requisites prescribed; (3) that the Duchess de Mahon Crillon cannot and should not have been included in the land-tax assessment, and those who placed her upon the roll without due authorization shall be held responsible for the consequences; (4) that neither can the tenants assign or transfer what does not belong to them, for which reason the deed of conveyance executed in favor of Virgilio Acevedo is null and without effect; now, therefore, I decide as follows: 1. That the Duchess de Mahon Crillon be forthwith eliminated from the assessment-roll and in her place the holders of the lands be separately included therein with the cuerdas respectively held by them, specifying the classification thereof and other circumstances required by the hand-book for the guidance of assessors; 2. That a certified copy of this resolution be forwarded to the registrar of property so that the record of the conveyance in favor of Virgilia Acevedo, contained in aforesaid public instrument, be given no effect; 3. That all the landholders be required to surrender at the alcaldía, against receipt, such titles of grants as they may possess conferring upon them a right to the usufruct of the lands, which documents you shall forward, with a list thereof in duplicate, to this Treasury, in order that they may be filed with the record, or, in the absence of such documents, a certificate to that effect. The foregoing is communicated to you for your information, that of the municipal council, of Virgilio Acevedo and of the landholders, both the latter to be informed through proper notifications which, upon being duly served and returned, shall also be forwarded to this office; 16. Certificate issued by the alcalde and secretary of the municipality of Lares, showing the taxes paid by the Duke de Mahon Cril-lon, and by the Estate of said Duke or Duchess de Mahon Crillon, from 1862 to 1899; and 17. A letter addressed by the Treasurer under date of January 4,1901, to Baron du Laurens d’Oiseley, containing the statements attributed to him in the complaint.</p> <p>The fiscal of this Supreme Court, representing the Treasurer of Porto Bico, in answering the complaint, alleged, by way of dilatory exception, the want of legal capacity on the part of the plaintiff, setting forth, in support of said exception, that King Carlos III, having, by Eoyal Cédulas of March 30, 1872, (sic) and May 13, 1783, conferred upon Louis Balbo Bertone, Duke de Crillon, in compensation for services rendered to the Crown of Spain, the title of Duke de Mahon, carrying with it that of Grandee of Spain of the first class, and as this high dignity demanded the foundation of an entailed estate to be perpetually attached to the Grandeeship, the Duke de Mahon had set apart for this purpose one of the four square leagues of land that King Carlos III had himself granted him in this Island; that part of the property bestowed upon the Duke de Crillon having been constituted as an entailed estate annexed to the title of Duke de Mahon and Grandee of Spain, said title should have passed to the successive possessors of the entailed estate until the publication in Spain of the laws disentailing property, namely, those of October 11, 1820, May 15 and June 28, 1821, June 9, 1835, and August 19, 1841, which prohibited the establishment of entails and freed from entailment such properties as were then held by strict settlement, with the obligation of reserving one-half for the next in succession; that the plaintiff does not state whether he claims as possessor by settlement in tail, or as heir, but in the first case he should have proven the existence of the entailed estate, and. at all events, lie is bound to prove by means of proper documents that the estate oin question, both as to the entailed half and to the other half reserved to the possessor, has by order of strict and legal succession, or by testamentary dispositions, become the property (of the claimant?), and as s'he has failed to prove the character and representative capacity under which she sues, in compliance with the obligation imposed by paragraph 2, article 532, of the Law of Civil Procedure, the dilatory exception should be sustained and the complaint dismissed.</p> <p>The defendant also pleaded the peremptory exception of want of action, setting forth in support thereof that, notwithstanding the grant made to the Duke de Crillon by King Carlos III of Spain, in Boyal Cédulas of July 4 and September 25, 1776, of four square leagues of land.in this Island, he was not given possession thereof, nor even had their location or locations in the Island been made known, for which reason in the year 1837 the agents of the Duke’s family were still pressing their claim; that inasmuch as the grantees had not complied with the necessary condition of clearing and cultivating the lands, the G-overnment of this Island had reported the fact to that of Spain, and thereupon the Boyal Order of September 15, 1852, was issued, copy whereof accompanied the complaint, and in compliance therewith the board of apportionment of waste lands declared that the lands granted to Duke Mahon Crillon had reverted to the Crown, Circular No. 77 of July 3, 1854, published in the Official Gazette, being issued to that effect; that on December 27th of the- same year, the board of apportionment of waste lands awarded the es-cheated lands to those who had been in possession of the same, on condition that the allotments should not exceed 100 cuerdas to each holder, and with the obligation to take out the proper licenses for the measurement thereof within the period of two months, and to pay the established dues, which requisites do not appear to have been complied with; that the Estate of Duke de Malion Crillon having no legal representative in this Island, the aforesaid decisions were notified to them through the French Consul, whereupon Count Manfredo Balbo Ber-tone de Sambuy, in liis capacity as protutor and father-in-law of young Maria Balbo Bertone de Crillon, heiress to the Duchy of Mahon and to the title of Grandee of Spain of the first class, presented a petition to the Queen of Spain under date of April 1, 1857, a copy whereof was filed with the complaint, which petition gave occasion for the Boyal Order of April 8th of the same year, of which a copy was also joined to the complaint by the plaintiff; that upon Count Manfredo Bertone de Sambuy’s trip to this Island'for the purpose of clearing up the rights of his daughter-in-law and ward, the Duchess of Mahon, an official recommendation to the Governor of this Island was given him by Boyal Order of January 20, 1859, to the end that all facilities to which he was entitled by his rank should be afforded him, as shown by the copy of said royal order filed with the complaint; that once here, Count Manfredo Bertone de Sambuy applied to the highest authority in the Island which was then represented by the “Segundo Cabo” (or Lieutenant-Governor) Mediavilla who, going beyond his powers, directed, by decree of April 7, 1859, that the representative of the Duke be put in possession of the lands that had been awarded to him, according to the boundaries marked out in the plans and documents he should produce; leaving unimpaired the rights of those in possession, and ordering said decision to be reported to the Queen; that it does not appear that such possession was given, for with reference thereto the only antecedent to be found is the communication from the alcalde of Lares, dated June 4, 1859, mentioned in the complaint; that although the Estate of the Duke de Mahon is shown to have paid taxes to the municipality of Lares from 1862 to 1899, this fact is not sufficient evidence to establish ownership, being only a requisite which, joined with others, serves to establish possession of the estate, without prejudice to a 'third party; that neither before nor after the year 1859 have the family of the Duke de Mahon Crillon fulfilled the conditions imposed upon them to clear and cultivate the lands awarded him in 1776; that by public instrument of July 5, 1900, most of those who without a just title had been in possession of the lands which form the subject-matter of this controversy, transferred their presumed rights to Virgilio Acevedo Hernández, who requested the municipal council of Lares to exclude the Estate of the Duke de Mahon from the assessment-roll, and include him instead, which request having been submitted to the Treasurer of Porto Rico, he rendered the decision of September 4, 1900, copy whereof was filed with the complaint. The defendant alleged, as legal grounds, that in issuing his decree of April 7, 1859, the Captain-General had gone beyond his powers, which should have been confined to a compliance with the Royal Order of April 8,1857, leaving the determination of the matter to the Queen of Spain, who, in Royal Order of May 20, 1859, did not authorize him to order the delivery as was done by the Captain-General’s decree of April 7, 1859; that the payment of taxes is no evidence of ownership; that neither the Duke de Crillon and Mahon, nor his heirs, had fulfilled the condition as to clearing and cultivating the lands awarded to him by the Crown of Spain, wherefore they could not acquire full ownership of said lands; that real actions with regard to real property prescribe after thirty years, accordr ing to article 1963 of the Civil Code; and that by virtue of the Treaty of Paris between the United -States of America and the Kingdom of Spain, the United Statfes acquired this Island with all the buildings, public highways, and other immovable property which in conformity with law belong to the public domain and as such formerly belonged to the Crown of Spain, and no transfer of ownership to the People of Porto Rico having been made in the Organic Act of Porto Rico with respect to said property, the same should be considered as public property belonging to the Peo-pie of the United States, according to articles 2 and 8 of the Treaty of Paris and section 13 of the Organic Act of Porto Eico, and it now devolves upon the sovereign power of the United States to. do what was left undone by the Queen of Spain, namely, to pronounce the final decision which had been reserved in the Eoyal Order of April 8,1857. The fiscal, in closing, prayed that the dilatory exception of the plaintiff’s want of capacity be first sustained, or, otherwise, that the allegation that there was no cause of action be sustained and the complaint dismissed upon that ground, with costs against the plaintiff; and that, in the latter case, judgment be rendered declaring that the plaintiff’s claims should be substantiated before the United States Government, upon which devolved a final decision in the matter.</p> <p>The trial being open for admission of evidence, at the instance of the plaintiff there was joined to the record a copy •of the certificate issued by the Treasurer of Porto Eico, September 14, 1900, for the purpose of recording at the registry of property, in favor of the People of Porto Eico, the 4,133 ■cuerdas of lands situated in barrios Callejones and Piletas, of Lares, within the judicial district of Aguadilla — the same being planted with coffee, pastures, and brush, according to the boundaries described in the deed executed in favor of Virgilio Acevedo y Hernández, July 5, 1900, and with the points of demarcation specified in the title of protection issued March 10, 1830, in favor of Duke de Mahon Crillon, it being noticeable that said certificate contains a statement to' the effect that the lands in question belong, by dominion title, to the People of Porto Eico, for, although they had been awarded in the year 1776 to the Duke de Mahon Crillon, the latter having failed to cultivate them, said lands were declared to have escheated by the board of apportionment of waste lands, about the year 1854, in compliance with Eoyal Order of September-15, 1852, which record of possession was entered at the registry of property of Aguadilla under date of September 14, 1900.</p> <p>Although at the instance of the plaintiff a communication was addressed to the Secretary of Porto Bico, requesting that from the records delivered by the Spanish Government a certificate be issued of the official communication addressed by the alcalde of Lares, on June 4, 1859, to the Governor-General of the Island, reporting that the representative of the Estate of the Duke de Mahon Crillon had been put in possession of the Lares lands, and certifying also as to the other antecedents relating to said official communication, this evidence could not be introduced because the index of the records sent to the Library of Congress, Washington, packed in 249 boxes, containing 2,246 files of papers, refers to all sorts of matter so confusedly jumbled together, that it was impossible to obtain the desired evidence.</p> <p>The defendant proposed, as evidence, to be procured from the general archives of this Island, the text or authorized copies of the Boyal Grants of March 30, 1782, and May 13, 1783; of Boyal Cédulas of July 4 and September 25, 1776; of Boyal Decree of September 15,1852; of Boyal Orders of April 8 and January 20, 1857; and of the circulars of the board of apportionment of waste lands, dated July 3 and December 27, 1854; but the only exhibits forwarded were the books of the board of apportionment of waste lands, from September 1, 1843, to September 19, 1863, and from 1866 to 1873; the record relating to the lands of the Duke de Mahon Crillon; copy of the circular of June 3, 1854, declaring that the lands granted to the Duke de Mahon Crillon had reverted to the Crown of Spain, because of failure to comply with the necessary conditions; copy of the draft of notice served upon the 'heirs of the Duke de Mahon Crillon, through the French Consul in this Island, dated June 7,1857, which reads as follows:</p> <p>“Communication to the Consul of France in this Island: After examination of the record relating to the grant made by Kings Carlos III and Carlos IY to Duke de Crillon; tbe Eoyal Order of September 15,1852, declaring that it was necessary to proceed to tbe reversion of tbe 27 caballerías remaining uncared for and without cultivation by tbe grantee, in Eio Grande and Lares; tbe record of tbe proceedings in which this declaration was made; and, lastly, the Eoyal Order of December 13, 1854, issued on tbe occasion of tbe claim recently pressed by tbe heirs of His Excellency tbe Duke, tbe board of apportionment of waste lands of Porto Eico, at a meeting held, etc., decided that said heirs be notified, through you, that if they still desire to preserve some of the lands that were granted to them in Fajardo, Nagnabo, or any other locality, they must appoint an agent who shall produce the measurement and boundaries thereof, and put them under cultivation within one year, in compliance with the conditions prescribed in the circular of which I inclose a copy, and pay the royal dues; for in that case their rights shall be respected, but otherwise said lands shall he declared to have escheated, in conformity with the terms of aforesaid circular. Pursuant to this decision, and in order that the heirs of His Excellency the Dulce may not think that they have been slighted, although the principle that the authorities should address themselves to each and every one of the persons who might be affected by their determinations, could never be sustained, I communicate said decision to you for the purpose above stated. God, etc. — June 7, 1856. To Monsieur the Consul of Prance in this Island. — T echo. ”</p> <p>And, finally, copy of a communication from the chairman of the superior board of apportionment of waste lands to the Governor of this Island, dated March 31, 1869, and of another communication from the President of the Council of Administration, dated June 14, of the same year, both documents having reference to a petition addressed under date of July 25, 1865, to said Governor by Count de Sambuy, as representative of the Duchess de Mahon Crillon, accompanied by several documents to be kept on file by tlie Government so that the proper authorities might safeguard the grant made by King Carlos III and the foundation instituted by Duke de Mahon, the Conqueror of Minorca.</p> <p>At the hearing the plaintiff’s attorney and the fiscal argued upon the dilatory exception of want of legal capacity on the part of the plaintiff, which exception was overruled, and then both parties pleaded upon the essential part of the case, advancing such arguments as were deemed favorable to their respective contentions.</p> <p>The District Court of San Juan, by a majority vote, rendered judgment on August 1, 1902, sustaining the complaint, and accordingly declared that the lands formerly situated in the district of Pepino, now of Lares, referred to in the certificate of September 14, 1900, issued by the Treasurer of this Island, by virtue whereof the 4,133 cuerdas of land, described therein, were, by order of said Treasurer, recorded under date of September 16, 1900, on folio 51, volume 28 of the municipal council of Lares, estate No. 1677, entry 1, in the Registry of Property of Aguadilla, as belonging to the People of Porto Rico, were the property of the plaintiff, and ordering said lands to be left at the free disposal of the latter, and.that aforesaid record be cancelled, without special imposition of costs.</p> <p>Prom the foregoing judgment the representative of the defendant took an appeal in cassation for error of procedure and error of law, which was allowed; and the record having been forwarded to this Supreme Court, after citation of the parties, said appeal was conducted as an ordinary appeal, pursuant to the provision of an Act of the Legislative Assembly establishing the Supreme Court of Cassation as a court of appeals, approved March 12, 1903. Both parties presented in writing such pleas as were deemed pertinent in support of their respective claims, after which the hearing was had, counsel for appellant and respondent being present.</p>

<p>Appeal — Bill op Exceptions — Exceptions Embodied in the Minutes oe the Trial. — Although no bill of exceptions has been included in the transcript of the record presented for the purposes of an appeal, the court has the power to consider such exceptions as are embodied in the minutes of the trial.</p> <p>Information — Plea of Former Acquittal or Conviction of ti-ie same Offense —Minutes of the Trial. — The plea of the defendant, that he has already oeen tried for the same offense, must be-interposed at the time of pleading to the information, not only naming the court by which he was previously tried, but also stating the date of the judgment and entering it upon the minutes of the court.</p> <p>Evidence — Irrelevant Questions. — All questions with regard to matters which have no connection whatever with the facts at issue on the trial are irrelevant and inadmissible.</p> <p>Id. — Admissibility.—Where the admission of certain evidence is denied to defendant, and neither the purpose contemplated by the defendant in the presentation of the evidence, nor the reasons of the judge in denying its admission appear from the transcript of the record, the appellate court will not consider the admissibility thereof.</p>

<p>Appeal — Bill cot Exceptions — Questions oe Law. — Questions of law arising during the trial, which have not been embodied in a bill of exceptions, cannot be considered and determined by the appellate court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Grand Larceny — Embezzlement—Penalty.—Although the penalty prescribed for the crime of embezzlement is the same as that provided by the Code for the crime of larceny, both offenses are, nevertheless, distinct under the statute, and are defined in different sections of the Code.</p> <p>Id. — Conviction op a Crime Different from that Included in the Information. — The offenses of embezzlement and larceny being distinct, a defendant . cannot be found guilty of embezzlement on an information charging him with the crime of larceny. In this ease A. sold to B. a certain number of cattle, the price of which was to be paid in cash at the time of delivery. B. having come into possession of the cattle, and the bill of sale, paid part of the price, and afterwards having disposed of the cattle, disappeared without paying the balance. Reid, that these facts do not constitute the offense of larceny but that of embezzlement.</p>

This is an action prosecuted in the District Court of Are- ' cibo by José Esteves Torres against Alonso del Rio y Diaz and Román Montano y Cruz to secnre the annulment of proceedings brought to… Held: counsel for José Esteves Torres and Alonso del Eio y Diaz being present at the same.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>STATEMENT OP THE CASE.</p> <p>This is a proceeding in the nature of executory process, initiated in the District Court of Mayagüez by Agustín Her-nández, now bis assignee José Henares, against Miguel Casanova, for the recovery of a sum of money. The case is pending before us on an appeal in cassation, now ordinary appeal, taken by Ursula Casanova from tbe decision rendered by said court in the proceeding in question.</p> <p>“On November 2, 1901, counsel for Agustín Hernández Mena presented a motion in writing in said executory action to the District Court of Mayagüez, praying for the enlargement of the attachment upon the sum of one thousand, odd pesos, provincial money, which, in connection with the summary proceeding prosecuted in the same court by Ursula Casanova against her brother, Miguel Casanova, for the recovery of a sum of money, had been left in favor of the latter in the award of property which had been made in favor of Ursula in said proceeding for two-thirds of its price. Said motion having been granted in an order made on the fifth day of said month of November, counsel for Hernández Mena, on January 8, 1902, presented another application in writing, praying that demand be made upon Ursula Casanova to deposit in the office of the clerk of the court, within three days, the sum of $998.88, to which said sum, according to a liquidation made, the surplus remaining in favor of Miguel Casanova amounted, after paying the claim of Ursula, which surplus should be delivered to Hernández Mena on account of principal, interest and costs sought to be recovered by him in the executory action.</p> <p>“Upon this second application the District Court of Mayagüez made an order directing that a statement showing the liquidation made in the summary proceeding referred to be added to the record, and, said statement having been produced, it appears: 1. That the estate awarded to Ursula Casanova was incumbered with a first mortgage in favor of Eduardo Bayron for the sum of 7,490 pesos, interest and. costs; 2. That the same estate had been mortgaged in favor of Julio Savona for 2,633 pesos and costs; 3. That subsequently a mortgage was executed in favor of Ursula Casanova, said mortgage amounting to $5,659.80, after deducting the part thereof which had been can-celled, the assessed costs amounting to $53, which, added to the said sum, makes a total of $5,812.80; 4. That the award was mad,e to Ursula for two-thirds of the value of the property, namely, $7,800, there remaining, therefore, a surplus of $987.20 in favor of the debtor, Miguel Casanova, of which surplus the necessary amount should be devoted to the satisfaction of the prior mortgages.</p> <p>“In view of said statement the Mayagüez court made an order, on the fourth day of February following, directing that a certified copy of the application of Ursula Casanova praying for the award of the estate and the decree of award be likewise attached to the record, together with a statement of the office of the clerk as to whether the liquidation of charges had been approved, and said certificate having been issued, it appears that Ursula Casanova requested in the summary proceedings, under date of October 29, 1901, that inasmuch as no bidder had presented himself at the sale, the award of the mortgaged property should be made in her favor, according to law, in order to cover the amount of the claim and costs, executing in due time the decree of award prescribed by article 174 of the Regulations for the execution of the Mortgage Law, after taking the necessary steps in connection with the liquidation and taxation of costs. An order was made on this petition on the twenty-first day of said month of October, whereupon the mortgaged rural estate was awarded to Ursula Casanova for two-thirds of its value, in payment of the amount claimed and costs, which would be assessed, the appropriate liquidation of charges to be also made, and. the sum specified in the deed of cancellation, -which accompanied said petition, to be deducted from the mortgage credit, the award being therefore understood to have been made for the resulting difference.</p> <p>“It was stated in the former certificate that on March 3, 1902, the liquidation of charges made in the summary proceeding prosecuted by Ursula Casanova against Miguel Casanova had been approved.</p> <p>“The District Court of Mayagüez, by an order made on the eleventh day of said month of March, directed' that demand should be made upon Ursula Casanova to make a deposit, within three days, of the surplus of $987.20, which had been attached, and the deposit having been made, an entry thereof was made in the summary proceedings.</p> <p>‘ ‘ Counsel for Ursula Casanova applied for a revision of said order so as to make it declare that no way existed to extend to an executory action, instituted for the recovery of a promissory note, the effects of the liquidation of charges and an award made in a summary proceeding prosecuted for the enforcement o'f a mortgage credit, nor to apply outside of the summary proceeding a surplus, the expenditure of which is prescribed by law for covering prior charges of a mortgage nature.</p> <p>“The revision having been denied by an order of the ninth of April following, José Hernares y Giménez was admitted as a party to the action in the capacity of assignee of Agustín Hernández Mena; and Ursula Casanova, having taken an appeal in cassation from said order, it was disallo-wed on the 20th of May; whereupon she came in "with a complaint to this court, which ordered the appeal in cassation to be allowed, the same having been complied -with by the Mayagüez court. ’ ’</p> <p>The record having been forwarded to this court, after citation and summons of the parties, the case was conducted as an odinary appeal. A day was set for the hearing, which took place on the date fixed for that purpose.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Embezzlement — Grand Larceny — Conviction op a Crime Different From That Charged in the Information. — The crime of embezzlement and larceny are distinct and separate offenses, and a defendant charged with the crime of grand larceny cannot he convicted of embezzlement.</p>

This is an action instituted in the District Court of Are-cibo by Francisco D. Córdova y Stewart, who is of legal age, married, and a resident of Utnado, in his own right, as plaintiff, against Santisteban Chavarri & Company, a commercial firm of this city, and Pedro Rivera Collazo, who is of legal age, a widower, and a resident of Utnado, who has been declared in default, to determine the ownership of property by proceedings in intervention.

<p>ApplioatioN for a Writ of Certiorari.</p> <p>STATEMENT OE THE CASE.</p> <p>According to the record before us a civil suit was prosecuted in the municipal court of Bayamón, by the Rev. Manuel Diaz'Caneja, acting as collector of charitable funds, against Julio Montell, for the recovery of the principal of an annuity and charges accrued thereon, in which suit, at the Instance of the former, and for the purpose of securing the effectiveness of the judgment, the sum of $480 was attached and ordered to be retained in the bands Frederick IT. Hawes, said sum, as stated, belonging to Julio Montell, the defendant in the case.</p> <p>Judgment for the plaintiff haying been rendered, the defendant took an appeal therefrom to the District Cotirt of San Juan, which reversed said judgment and dismissed the action brought by Caneja in the aforesaid capacity; and according to an order of 10th instant, made by said court, in the original record of proceedings forwarded by the latter, there appears from letters requisitorial of the Bayamón court that the attachment of the aforesaid sum was dissolved, and, from other copies, that Hawes was requested to deposit the same in said municipal court; but without explaining the reason therefor, the deposit was made in the District Court of San Juan, after notification to the parties, namely, Caneja and Montell; and although the latter had requested that said sum be delivered to him, the order of the 10th instant, mentioned above, was issued, declaring that the deposit could not be admitted as having been properly made, and directing that the voucher for ■the $480 deposited with the firm of DeFord & Co., be returned to Hawes, against his receipt therefor.</p> <p>The representative of Montell having applied for a writ of certiorari, and notice thereof being served upon Manuel Diaz Caneja, who opposed the same, a day was set for the hearing which was held without the attendance of the parties, the said writ being issued calling for the original record with reference to the matter.</p>

By an order of April 12, last, Judge José Tous Soto, of the District Court of San Juan, at the instance of the Estate of ■José Rodríguez de las Albas and others who applied for an injunction against Eoberto Korber, as manager of Müllenhoff & Korber, for the purpose of staying the proceedings instituted by the latter in the Humacao court against Manuel Ar-g'üeso and his wife, Ernestina Frías for the recovery of money secured by mortgage upon plantation “Ingenio”, decreed a…

<p>INFORMATION-COPY TO BE DELIVERED TO DEPENDANT.-There ÍS UO provision in the Code- of Criminal Procedure which requires that the copy of the information which is to be delivered to the defendant should be signed by the secretary of the court and sworn to by the fiscal, it being only the original which should be signed and sworn to by the fiscal.</p> <p>Grand Jury — Insular Courts. — The provisions of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States are not extended to Porto Pico, and an indictment by a grand jury is unnecessary.</p> <p>Constitution op the United .States — Territories.—The affirmative action of Congress is necessary in order to extend the Constitution of the United States to a Territory.</p> <p>Id. — Treaty op Paris — Organic Act — Statute op the United States. — Neither in the Treaty of Paris nor in the Organic Act is any provision to be found extending to Porto Rico the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, all of the laws of Porto Rico, in so far as they are not in conflict with the laws of the United States not locally inapplicable, having been left in full force and effect.</p> <p>Information — I-Iow it should be Presented. — The information shall allege only one offense, but the same may be alleged in different terms and under distinct counts; but when the offense has been committed by the use of different means the means can be alleged alternatively in the same court.</p> <p>Id. — Plea of the Defendant of once in Jeopardy for ti-ie same Oppense.— The plea of former jeopardy for the same offense is properly made at the time of the arraignment of the defendant.</p> <p>—dismissal op the Information — Felony—Misdemeanor.—The court may either upon its own motion, or upon the application of the prosecuting attorney, order an information to he dismissed; but such dismissal is a bar to any other prosecution for the same offense in cases of misdemeanor, but not so in cases of felony.</p> <p>Evidence — Confession of Defendant. — The confessions of a defendant to other persons in regard to the crime may be introduced ag'ainst him, provided they are freely and voluntarily ’ made, without being extorted from him by undue influence or by promises held out to him by some one in authority.</p> <p>Id. — Hearsay Testimony. — The testimony of witnesses who detailed to the court the confessions made by the defendant to them cannot be considered as hearsay, but is, on the contrary,, direct evidence of the acts of the defendant, and is admissible.</p> <p>Id. — The only objections -which the defendant may interpose to the admission of testimony in regard to the confessions made by him of the offense are that he was under duress at the time of making them, pr that he was acting under . the influence of hopes or promises held out to him in the event of making a confession.</p> <p>Murder — Degrees of the Crime — Manslaughter—Instructions to the Jury.— In a prosecution for murder, even though the facts of the case clearly constitute the crime of murder in the first degree, the court should nevertheless instruct the jury with respect to murder in the first and second degrees and manslaughter, in order that the jury may make an intelligent distinction between the different degrees of said crime.</p> <p>Id. — In their instructions to the jury courts should confine themselves to the facts of the case and to the law applicable thereto, and should not instruct the jury with regard to facts which have not been proved on the trial, nor with regard to laws which have no application to the ease.</p> <p>Id.. — -Verdict—Degree.—The jury should designate in their verdict the degree of the crime of which they find the defendant guilty.</p> <p>Id. — Objections to Charge — Bill of Exceptions — Appeal.—If the defendant wishes to present objections to the charge given to the jury by the trial court, he should embody the language of the charge in a bill of exceptions or include it in proper form in the transcript of the record, so that the objections thereto may be brought up and considered and decided upon the appeal.</p> <p>Id.- — In the absence of a bill of exceptions showing the charge of the trial court, the presumption is that the charge of the court was correct.</p> <p>Id. — Written Instructions. — Although there is nothing in the statute which requires the instructions of the court to the jury to be given in writing, nevertheless, in capital cases, the better practice is to submit the instructions to the jury in writing, in order to more carefully conserve the rights of the defendant, and to more effectually aid the jury in the consideration of such instructions, and to more readily facilitate the correction of errors in the •same on review by the appellate court.</p> <p>Id. — Instructions Submitted by Counsel. — In proper cases the attorneys should aid the court in giving its charge to the jury by submitting for its consideration in writing drafts of instructions applicable to the ease and necessary to guide the jury in finding a correct verdict.</p> <p>Appeal. — The Supreme Court has power to consider and decide points of defense which appear in the record, especially such as go to the foundation of the ease, even though they have not been alleged by the defendant.</p> <p>Verdict op the Jury. — The verdiet of the jury should not be pronounced orally, but should be written in proper form and signed by their foreman.</p> <p>Id. — The statute does not prescribe any definite or special form for the verdict of the jury, but it is necessary that it should be expressed in plain and intelligible words, so that its meaning may be readily understood and cannot be misinterpreted to the prejudice of the defendant.</p> <p>Id. — Degree op the Crime. — Whenever it is necessary to make a distinction be-between the various degrees of a crime, as in eases of murder, the jury must necessarily find the degree of the crime of which the defendant is guilty.</p> <p>Id. — Verdict Contrary to Law — New Trial. — Where the jury, in eases in which it should do so, fails to determine in the verdict the degree of the crime of which it finds the defendant guilty, the verdict is contrary to law and in such cases justifies the granting of a new trial, even though it should not be held to require it.</p> <p>Construction op Statutes.' — It is a well-established principle, both in American and Spanish law that, when a statute is adopted by one state from another, ■ the construction put upon it by the courts of the latter is entitled to great weight in the interpretation to be given it by the courts of the former; it being presumed that the Legislature had such construction in view in the passage of the act when adopting the language of the statute.</p>

<p>Appeal — Bill op Exceptions — Minutes op the Trial. — Although no bill of exceptions is included in the transcript of the record, the court may consider and pass upon the exceptions taken at the trial.</p> <p>Evidence — Minors—Admissibility—New Trial. — The refusal of the trial court to require the attendance of an eyewitness to an act charged against a defendant, even though it appears that such witness is a boy and his competency to testify is open to some doubt, constitutes an error sufficient to justify the reversal of the judgment and the granting or a new trial.</p>

MotioN filed in the suit prosecuted in the Supreme Court, as a court of original jurisdiction, for the recovery of property and other matters. STATEMENT OE THE CASE. The ■ Attorney General filed a motion in writing before this court on the 19th of July, last, requesting that the period of twenty days fixed by this court within which to answer the complaints filed against him as the representative of the People of Porto Bico by the Eev.

The application was presented to Justice Hernández in bis office. STATEMENT OE THE CASE.

<p>Appeal — -Dismissal op Appeal. — An order of the trial court refusing to dismiss the prosecution in the cases specified in section 448 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may be considered and reviewed on appeal.</p> <p>Id. — Habeas Corpus. — Errors committed by a court in overruling a motion of the defendant for the dismissal of the prosecution, in the cases specified in section 448 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, cannot be corrected on habeas corpus proceedings.</p> <p>Id. — Void Judgment. — Only in cases in which the judgment is entirely void would it be proper to consider it on habeas corpus proceedings.</p>

<p>. Appeal — Bill oe Exceptions — Manifest Ebbob in Recoed. — There being no bill of exceptions, and no error appearing upon the record Which would justify the reversal of the judgment appealed from, the same must be affirmed.</p>

<p>Appeal — Bill op Exceptions — Manifest Ekbob in Record. — There being no bill of exceptions, and no error appearing upon, the record which would justify the reversal of the judgment appealed from, the same must be affirmed.</p>

This is an action for divorce instituted in the District Court of Mayagiiez by the plaintiff, Eduvigis Mercado Cancel, engaged in industrial pursuits, a resident of Lajas and married, represented in this court by Attorney Sandalio 'Torres Monge against the prosecuting attorney and Maria Monserrate Pabón y Vargas, defendant, a resident of the same town, who, having failed to appear, was notified in the court room; which case is pending before us on an appeal taken by Mercado…

This is a declaratory action of greater import prosecuted in the former District Court of Ponce by the plaintiff, Amalia Rodríguez y Matos,… Held: a majority of the District Court of Ponce rendered judgment on November 28, 1900, whereby the peremptory plea of res adjudicata invoked by the defendant, Francisca Castaing, was overruled and the complaint was sustained, except with respect to the prayers therein contained asking for the annulment' of the proceedings had in the…

<p>EvideNce — Minutes of Trial — Public Document — Genuineness .and Validity.. — The minutes of a trial certified by the clerk of the court is a public document and is admissible in evidence, the genuineness and validity of which is conclusive until the contrary is proved.</p> <p>Id. — Witnesses.—There is no legal provision which prevents the employees of the office of a district attorney from acting as witnesses in a criminal trial for the purpose of testifying to facts which occurred in their presence and concerning which only they and the district attorney have knowledge.</p> <p>Perjury — Competent Official. — The statement made by a person under oath before a competent official, such as the prosecuting attorney, as to a material fact whose falsity was known to the affiant, constitutes the crime of perjury.</p> <p>Id. — The fact that the defendant was ignorant'of the importance of the false statement which he made, and that such statement did not affect the result of the case in which it was made, does not constitute a defense in a prosecution for perjury, since it is sufficient, to constitute such crime, that the statement is material and that it is utilized for the purposes of the case in which it was made.</p>

This is an action instituted in the District Gonrt of Maya-giiez by José Rafael Valls, single, of legal age; and a resident of the city of Ponce, plaintiff, represented in this Supreme Court, at first, by Attorney Miguel Kearney, and afterwards by Attorneys Díaz and Texidor, against Kafael Blanes y Mestre, of legal age, married, a resident of the city of Maya-güez, defendant, for the recovery of a mortgage debt; which case is pending before us on an appeal taken by the…

<p>Election — Resignation oe Candidate — Period in Which It Should Be Piled. — A candidate for. office by popular election, whose nomination has been certified according to law and filed in the office of-the Secretary of Porto Rico, may present his resignation in writing to the Secretary within three days after the filing 'of such certificate of nomination; but if that period shall have expired without presenting it, his light to resign shall be deemed extinguished; and if he subsequently exercises it, the resignation must be disregarded.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Mandamus — Jurisdiction.—The object of the words "within its jurisdiction," as employed in section 1 of the law of mandamus, was to indicate the persons, companies, corporations, or inferior courts upon whom the writ of mandamus issued by the Supreme Court or by the district courts should operate.</p> <p>Id. — Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. — The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Porto Eieo is coextensive with the Island and extends to every place where the statutes of Porto Eieo have their force.</p> <p>Id. — Jurisdiction of the District Courts. — The jurisdiction of the district courts is limited in their territorial limits to their respective districts.</p> <p>Id. — The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus.</p> <p>Id. — Demurrer.—Sufficiency of Application. — Although, under section 8 of the mandamus act, it is doubtful whether in proceedings of this nature a demurrer may be interposed to the application, nevertheless the court has power to examine on its own motion the sufficiency of the same.</p> <p>Id. — Attorney General. — It is the duty of the Attorney General to represent and defend before the courts of justice the officers and agents of the Government of Porto Eico in eases of mandamus.</p> <p>Id. — Title of Application. — The custom of bringing suits for mandamus in the name of the State on the relation of the real party to the suit is followed in many States of the Union, but the better practice appears to be to entitle said suits in the same manner as any other ordinary suits.</p> <p>Id. — The People Ought Not to Appear as a Party to the Proceeding. — When the relator presents the application for his own benefit, and the People of Porto Eico has no interest whatever, in the suit, uot being a necessary party to the same, its name should not be used, and it is not necessary that the plaintiff be authorized by the Attorney General or by any other officer representing the State to enable him to appear before the courts and seek the enforcement of his rights.</p> <p>Id. — Ministerial Act. — A writ of mandamus will properly issue when the act which is sought to be compelled is a ministerial one and does not involve the exercise of .any judicial discretion.</p> <p>Id. — Proper Parties Defendant. — The party whose duty it is to perform the act in question is the real and only necessary party defendant in the case.</p> <p>Id. — Answer of Defendant. — The defendant in a suit for mandamus is not required to answer allegations made by way of inducement and for the purpose of strengthening the rights of the relator, and which tend to show that the latter has been injured in the community either financially or in his public record or future.</p> <p>Id. — Demurrer.—In the consideration and determination of a demurrer, the court must presume that all the facts stated in the application are true.</p> <p>Id. — Failure to Answer. — Where the defendant fails to file an answer to an application for mandamus, either denying or explaining the facts stated therein, the same must he taken as true, and in this case a peremptory writ of mandamus should issue ordering the performance of the act sought to be enforced.</p> <p>Elections — Certificate oe Nomination — Resignation op Candidates. — The certificate of nomination of a candidate to an office by popular election having been filed, no one has the right to withdraw his name except the candidate himself, and he can only do so within three days after the filing of such certificate and not less than twenty days preceding the election.</p> <p>Id. — Death, Resignation, or Removal op Candidates. — Only in case of the death, resignation, or removal from the Island of a candidate subsequent to his nomination for the office can the president of the party or of the central committee thereof designate another candidate to occupy the position which has become vacant.</p> <p>Mandamus — Ballots.—Mandamus is the appropriate remedy to compel the Executive Council to insert in the ballot the name of a candidate, duly nominated to fill an office by popular election, in cases in which his name is unlawfully omitted from such ballot.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagüez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Aguadilla.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Elections — Boards of Registry. — There is nothing in the law which specifically prescribes the time and manner in which the board of registry, composed of the judges of election, is to be finally dissolved, for which reason it should be understood that its legal existence continues until the beginning of the election — that is, until election day.</p> <p>Id. — Registration op Electors. — Although the law does not fix the period for the registration of electors, whoever voluntarily allows the period to expire without exercising his right to register cannot subsequently exercise it; nevertheless, a citizen, whose name has been illegally eliminated from the lists used at the preceding election, may ask that his name be restored thereto, even after the expiration of such period.</p> <p>Id. — General Supervisor op Elections. — The general supervisor of elections has no power to personally register electors, such authority residing exclusively in the boards of registry.</p> <p>Mandamus — When It Will Issue. — The writ of mandamus will lie only to compel the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or public function of the defendant.</p> <p>Id. — REGISTRATION oe Electors. — The writ of mandamus will not lie to compel the general supervisor of elections to register in the electoral lists the name of a citizen which has been illegally eliminated from such lists.</p>

<p>AeelicatioN for a Writ of Mandamus.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

Angel Monserrate and Pedro Comas, as members of the local board of the “Partido Unionista de Puerto Rico” in Santa Isabel, filed in the District Court of Guayama an application for a writ of mandamus against the board of registration of electoral precinct No. 21 of the municipality of Santa Isabel, directed to Juan Yalls, as president thereof, to compel him to proceed to the registration of sixty-seven electors who had a right to vote in the general election, and who, for…

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Areeibo.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Judicial Notice — Absence op Judge. — The absence of a judge from the Island is not a matter of which the courts will take judicial notice without proof or some kind of showing being made.</p> <p>Jurisdiction — Proceedings.—Where a court exercises judicial functions not included within the limits of its ordinary jurisdiction, but which are included in its extraordinary jurisdiction, no presumption is indulged in in favor of the regularity of its proceedings or as to the 'exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction.</p> <p>Id. — Where a specific ground has been assigned in a case as justifying the jurisdiction of the court in such case, it will not be presumed that other different grounds exist which justify such jurisdiction.</p> <p>Id. — Injunction—Powers op District Judges. — The object of the provisions of section 2 of the injunction law of March I, 1902, was to grant- to the judges of courts, as distinguished from the court itself, authority to issue preliminary injunctions, but such provisions do not confer any authority whatever upon a judge of one district to act in another district.</p> <p>Id.- — -It is doubtful whether, according to the provisions of section 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, one judge can act for another without previously complying with the formalities prescribed by section 21 of the Same code, or those prescribed by section 2 of the act of March 10, 1904, reorganizing the judiciary of Porto Rico.</p> <p>Id. — Procedure—Motions.—All motions made in connection with a specific case must be made to the court in which the proceedings are pending.</p> <p>Id. — Incidental Matters. — An application for an injunction, the object of which is to prevent the party against whom it is sought from prosecuting certain proceedings pending before a court, is a matter incidental to the main purpose of the suit.</p> <p>id. — The orders which, according to' section 316 of the Code of Civil Procedure, may be made by a judge in any part of the Island, are orders relating to cases pending before the same court.</p> <p>Id. — Whatever may be the power of a district judge to act in a case pending before the court of another district, it can never be such as to permit two different courts to entertain jurisdiction of the same identical proceeding at the same time, or to enter judgments or orders at the same time with relation to the same case.</p> <p>Id. — Procedure—Judicial Proceedings — Constructive Notice. — All the proceedings instituted in connection with a certain case should be entered and recorded by the secretary of the same court in .which such case is pending, since for the purposes of the principle governing constructive notice of judicial proceedings, it is necessary that the place in which they are to occur, and from which judgments and orders are to emanate in each case, should he fixed and definite.</p>

The application was presented to Mr. Justice Hernández, at chambers. STATEMENT OP THE CASE. The petitioner or plaintiff states the facts in his application as follows: That section 251 of the Eevised Statutes of Porto Eico provides that the Executive Council of Porto Eico shall cause to be printed on the official ballot the names of candidates for elective offices where the petition is signed by five hundred signers who are registered as qualified voters for such election.

<p>Application for a Writ of Plabeas Corpus.</p> <p>The application was made to Mr. Justice Hernández at chambers.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>New Trial. — An order overruling a motion for a new trial should be embodied in a providencia, and no acta is necessary in the premises; but the fact that the court took one course rather than the other does not constitute error which would justify the reversal of the judgment appealed from.</p> <p>Id. — Newly Discovered Evidence. — The defendant who seeks a new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence must not only present sworn statements showing that evidence, but he must by an affidavit negative the fact that he could have produced the evidence on the trial, showing the reasons which prevented him from doing so and the diligence exercised by him to obtain the evidence before the trial, for the purpose of enabling the court, to determine whether he exercised the greatest possible diligence to obtain such evidence.</p> <p>Appeal — Judgment.—The fact that the reasoning upon which a judgment is based is not correct, is not sufficient to warrant a reversal thereof where the recitals therein contained correctly and properly decide the rights of the parties.</p>

This is an appeal pending before us, taken by Juan Moll-fulleda y Chas, from a decision of the District Court of San Juan in proceedings for the execution of the judgment rendered in an action instituted by Mollfulleda against “El Hospital de Caridad de la Concepción,” of this city, for the purpose of securing the annulment of a contract.

<p>Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the petition.</p>

<p>Habeas Corpus — Sentence—Procedure.—It will'be presumed in habeas corpus proceedings that the judgment, by virtue of which the petitioner is detained, as well as the proceedings which resulted in such judgment, is according to law unless the contrary be proven.</p> <p>Id. — Illegal Imprisonment. — The reasons why petitioner is illegally deprived of his liberty must be alleged in an application for a writ of habeas corpus.</p>

<p>Habeas Corpus — Commitment.—A commitment issued with all the formalities prescribed by sections 327 and 329 of the Code of Criminal procedure is valid and effective in habeas corpus proceedings.</p> <p>Id. — Where the recitals in the record do not afford sufficient information to enable the court to decide as to the legality or illegality of the petitioner’s imprisonment, the application for the writ should be denied.</p> <p>Id. — Prikcipal Penalty — Subsidiary Imprisonment. — In habeas corpus pro-proceedings the legality or illegality of the subsidiary imprisonment imposed upon the petitioner cannot be inquired into until the principal penalty has been served.</p>

A hearing was had of the present administrative appeal taken by Anastacio Castro from a decision of the registrar of property of this city refusing to admit a will to record.

A hearing was had of the present appeal, taken at the request of Francisco Escalona, from a decision of the registrar of property of this city, refusing to cancel a mortgage.

A hearing was had of this appeal, taken by Attorney Alfredo Arnaldo on behalf of Juana Clotilde, Ana Dominga and Manuel María Méndez Yaz from a decision of the Begis-trar of Property of Aguadilla refusing admission to record of the award of an estate in payment of a debt.

<p>Injunction — Owner—Tenant at Sufferance — Unlawful Detainer. — The writ of injunction is the proper remedy to be pursued by the owner of real estate, to restrain a person in the unlawful possession thereof, or a tenant at sufferance, from himself gathering or permitting to be gathered by another person under his direction, the products of the property so occupied, during the course of the proceedings in an action of unlawful detainer prosecuted by the former against the latter.</p>

This is au action prosecuted in the former District Court of Iiumacao by Attorney Luis Muñoz Morales, in the name of Manuel Ramírez Rivera, seeking to obtain a dominion title to three rural estates. The case is now pending before us on appeal taken by counsel for the petitioner from the judgment rendered by the said district court, which reads as follows: “Iiumacao, May 15, 1903.

<p>Dominion Title — Citation—Notice.—It is an indispensable requisite in a proceeding to secure a dominion title that' the citation be personally served upon the former owners of the real estate, or predecessors in interest, if their domicile be known, and, if not, by publication of notice.</p> <p>Id. — Possession—Title—Ordinary Prescription. — Mere possession for twenty-seven years, without title and without stating in what capacity such possession was enjoyed, is not sufficient to acquire the ownership of real' estate by ordinary prescription, because under such circumstances both the old and new law requires the expiration of at least thirty years.</p>

This is a declaratory action for divorce prosecuted in the former District Court of Mayagfiez by Eleuterio Pujáis y Quiñones, a clerk domiciled in said city, plaintiff, represented at first by Attorney Antonio Manrique de Lara and after-wards by Attorneys Ignacio Hidalgo and Herminio Díaz Navarro, the latter being appointed by the court to represent said plaintiff before this Supreme Court, against Maria Carlo y Ramirez, domiciled in San Germán, defendant, represented in the…

<p>Appeal — Amount oe Demand. — Appeals to the Supreme Court lie from all judgments rendered by district courts in civil actions, except those which come within the jurisdiction of municipal courts.</p> <p>Id. — "Contentious Administrative’’ Jurisdiction. — "Contentious administrative” jurisdiction has been abolished, but the old law authorizing "contentious administrative” proceedings authorized appeals from judgments rendered in actions of this character.</p> <p>Inheritance Tax — Appeal.—The appeal authorized by section 374 of the Political Code in eases where persons or beneficiaries are affected by the appraisal and valuation of property must be taken within thirty days after such appraisal and valuation has been completed by the Treasury Department, and after the expiration of such period, the right of the party to take an appeal therefrom will be deemed to have been forfeited.</p> <p>Id. — For the purposes of the foregoing doctrine,, the appraisal and valuation for taxes will be understood to have been completed immediately after the Treasury shall have determined upon the amount, and ordered the collection of the same.</p> <p>ID.^-The term within which the appeal mentioned in section 374 cannot be deemed to have been interrupted by efforts which are unauthorized by law, and made before administrative officers after their jurisdiction of the matter shall have been terminated.</p> <p>Id. — Payment oe Taxes and Costs. — In order that the appeal referred to above may be allowed, it is necessary that the party shall have previously paid all the taxes and costs imposed for the purposes referred to in said section.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo.</p> <p>The facts are' stated in the opinion.</p>

The petitioners, Marcelino Santiago and Mariano López,, alleged as one of the grounds for 'their enlargement under the writ of habeas corpus the following: “The justice of the peace court ,of Carolina has exceeded its jurisdiction: “In accordance with section 549 of the Penal Code, ‘any person who shall carry abroad any other kind of weapon in violation of section 548 of this title, shall be punished by a fine of not more than $15. or- be imprisoned not exceeding thirty…

This is a proceeding instituted in the District Court of San Juan by Alberto del Toro, property-owner and a resident of Cabo Bojo, against the People (Administration), this suit having been commenced… Held: the attorney for the appellant and the fiscal being present, who presented such oral arguments as were deemed favorable to their respective contentions.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of San Juan.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal — Rape—Evidence—New Trial. — When, in considering the evidence taken on a trials the uncorroborated testimony of certain witnesses, when considered both separately and together, is so manifestly contradictory as to raise a. reasonable doubt in the mind of the judge as to the guilt of the defendant of the crime charged, a pew ¡trial will be granted.</p>

<p>Appeal — Bill op Exceptions. — Exceptions entered during tlie trial by the defendant to rulings of the court will not be considered by the appellate court unless they are included in the bill of exceptions.</p> <p>Id. — Evidence—Errors Which Do Not Affect the Eights of the Accused.— If in excluding certain questions sought to be propounded by the defendant to witnesses for the prosecution, the trial court commits an error which could not affect the rights of the accused, such error will not constitute sufficient cause to justify a reversal of the judgment appealed from.</p>

<p>Appeal — Cassation..—An appeal will lie only in those eases in which formerly an appeal in cassation would lie.</p> <p>Id. — Provisional Maintenance — Execution op Judgments. — A decision of an inferior court rendered subsequently to a judgment requiring a defendant to provide provisional maintenance to his wife and by which decision the court refused to require the husband to make a regular allowance to his wife, by reason of the fact that he had- expressed his. willingness to 'receive her into his household, and because of the obligation being optional with the husband, is not an appealable decision inasmuch as it is rendered in compliance with the judgment, and it does not appear that any point is decided which was not controverted m the action, nor decided in the judgment, or which was contrary thereto.</p>

This is a declaratory action of greater import prosecuted in the former District Court of San Juan by Antonia Gon-zález Cabrera in her own right and representing her minor children, Juana and Julio Candelario y González, and, by reason of her death,' continued by Facundo Sánchez León as the guardian of the said minors, represented by Attorney Eduardo Acuña y Aybar, as plaintiffs, against The Sun Life Insurance Company of Canada, as defendant, represented by Attorney Juan de…

<p>Unlawful Detainer — Defendant’s Title.- — An action of unlawful detainer is not a proper remedy wherein to allege rights which are moré or less controvertible, and the courts should confine themselves in such eases to an examination and decision of the question whether the action prosecuted with respeet to the persons sought to be compelled to vacate can ‘be maintained, and the title alleged by the plaintiff may serve to show in another action that the defendant is without right to possession, but not to disprove a situation with respect to the parties.</p>

The hearing was had in this appeal, which was taken by Fernando Vázquez from a memorandum decision of the Registrar of Property of Mayagüez, refusing to record an order approving judicial proceedings prosecuted to prové the ownership of-a rural estate (dominion title).

<p>INTERDICT TO RETAIN POSSESSION-RIGHTS OP THE POSSESSOR.-A person in possession of real estate has an indisputable right to be respected and upheld in such possession, but in order that he may obtain an interdiet to retain possession it is absolutely necessary that he should show that the defendant has disturbed such possession by acts which show willful intention to molest or dispossess him.</p>

' STATEMENT OE THE CASE. The hearing was 'had in this' action, which was a case prosecuted in the District Court of Humácao by the plaintiff, Faustino Espino Cobián, a clerk, against the defendant, Ra-món Frias Noya, a property owner, both residents of this» city ¿nd each litigating in his own right, the former being represented before this Supreme Court by Attorney Rafael Ti-rado, ' and the latter being first represented by Attorney Tomás Bérnardini and later by Rafael…

<p>Appeal — Dismissal.—The dismissal ol an appeal for failure to comply with the rules of the court is within the sound discretion of the court.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagfiez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Humacao.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Arecibo.</p> <p>Tlie facts are stated in tlie opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Ponce.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

<p>Application for a Writ of Certiorari.</p> <p>The facts are stated in the opinion.</p>

This is a “contentious administrative” action prosecuted in the former District Court of San Juan by the Society of the Servants of Mary against the Liquidating Commission of the former Diputación Provincial, which by its decision refused payment to the said society of a subsidy or grant, for the months of October and November, 1898, for services rendered thereby in the “Hospital de la Concepción” of this city.

This is an action of unlawful detainer of a rural estate, prosecuted in the District Court of San Juan by Rafael Cobián y Romeu, an attorney-at-law, property owner and a resident of Bayamón, against Macario Rivera y Morales, a resident of Naranjito, and proceedings for the execution of tfie judgment rendered therein. The case is pending before us on an appeal taken by Cobián Romeu in his own behalf, the respondent being represented by Attorney Manuel F. Rossy.

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez.</p> <p>The facts are stated in. the opinion.</p>

<p>Appeal from the District Court of Mayagiiez.</p> <p>STATEMENT OE THE CASE.</p> <p>This is a proceeding instituted in the former District Court of Mayagiiez, by Attorney Herbert E. Smith, on behalf of Ana Eosa y Cintron, for the purpose of obtaining a declaration of ownership (dominion title) of a rural estate, which case is pending before us on an appeal taken by the petitioner, from the judgment rendered by the aforesaid district court, which reads as follows:</p> <p>“Mayaguez, January 11, 1904. — This proceeding was instituted by Attorney Herbert E. Smith on behalf of Ana Rosa y Cintrón, a widow, of legal age, and a resident of this city, for the purpose of establishing her ownership of a rural estate planted to coffee and pasture and having some underbrush and a part of a stone quarry, the said estate being composed of 40 cuerdas of land, more or less, with a small frame house, in bad condition, situated in barrio Guanajibo, within this municipality. Said property is bounded on the north by lands belonging to the Estate of Enma "Velez, formerly López Bayron and Francisco Torres; on the east by lands belonging to Celestino Oliven-eia, Félix Cruz, Estate of Esteban Nadal, Segundo Castillo and Fernando Vázquez; on the south by lands belonging to Juan Rosas, formerly Roque Nadal, and other lands owned by Nicolas Caballero; and on the west by lands belonging to Juan Rosas, formerly López Bayron, and others owned by the Estate of Laborde; said property being divided by the Hondo River, which crosses it from west to east. The above-described estate is not burdened by any incumbrance whatsoever, and is valued at $760, including the house. According to the accompanying certificate of the Treasurer, the property appears as measuring 43 cuerdas, but in reality it has only 40, as stated above. The petitioner acquired said estate by inheritance from her deceased husband, Juan Andrés Bordonave, whose sole and universal heir she was declared to be, as shown by the certificate which is also attached hereto. Said Bordonave acquired the property by the purchase of 25 cuerdas, more or less, from Juan Ramón Muñiz and 7% cuerdas from Domingo Rosas, the remaining 7% cuerdas having been purchased by the petitioner from Francisco Silva. The petitioner has no recordable written title of ownership to the above-described property.</p> <p>“After hearing the opinion of the representative of the office of the Attorney General, proceedings were commenced for the purpose of obtaining the declaration of ownership (dominion title) sought, and notices were published in two local dailies, which were inserted three times during sixty natural days. Persons claiming to have any property right in said estate and for the unknown parties whom the desired record might prejudice were notified thereby. Summonses were served upon the former owners of the property, namely, León Muñiz, as sole heir of his legitimate father, Ramón Muñiz; Candelaria and Dominga Rosa, as heirs of Domingo Rosas, and Antonio Silva, as a member of the Estate of Francisco Silva.</p> <p>“The witnesses Emilio Derieux y Abraham, Segundo Castillo y Hernández and Ceferino del Río y Rivera, whom the secretary certified were known to him, testified that they knew of their own knowledge that all the facts set forth in the petition were true, and gave reasons for their statements.</p> <p>“Within the period of sixty days allowed for the publication of the said notices, Juan Rosas appeared and opposed the declaration of ownership (dominion title) as being prejudicial to him, inasmuch as he was a creditor of Andrés Bordonave, the petitioner’s predecessor in interest. He proposed as- evidence the following documents: A petition dated December 3, 1900, filed by Eduardo Bado with the court, requesting a declaration of ownership of this property; a certificate of the marriage of Andrés Bordonave to Ana Rosa; a deed of sale executed by Dominga Rosa in favor of Bordonave; another deed of sale executed by Juan Ramón Muñiz in favor of said Bordonave; another by Manuel Colón in favor of Francisco Silva; another by Manuel Feli-ciano in favor of said Bordonave; an opinion of the Attorney General against the declaration of ownership requested by Bado, and a certificate of the decision denying said request. He prayed that the .application of the petitioner Rosa be likewise denied at the proper time, inasmuch as there existed a written title of ownership, said application being therefore contrary to the provision of article 395 of the Mortgage Law.</p> <p>“The appearance of Juan Rosa in opposition to the proceedings having been entered, notice of said opposition was duly served upon the other parties, in order that the proper allegations might be made and the evidence proposed taken with citation of the adverse parties. The proposed certificates referring to the particulars mentioned in the foregoing finding of fact having been filed with the record, the opposition was answered by counsel for the petitioner, who contested the same and proposed the following evidence: Attestations of the certificates of the mayor and of the registrar of property of this city,, which appear in the record of proceedings instituted by Eduardo Bado; a certificate of the judgment rendered by the municipal judge of this city in the civil suit instituted by Juan Rosas against Ana Rosas for the recovery of a sum of money, which documents were included in a single certificate. He furthermore requested that Juan Rosas be summoned to testify under an indecisive oath in reply to questions that would be put to him, the evidence to him, the evidence to be taken after citation of the district attorney, and finally prayed that the opposition be overruled.</p> <p>‘ ‘ Said evidence having been admitted and the adverse party cited, Juan Rosas was summoned to testify, which he did on the day set for the purpose. To questions propounded by Attorney Herbert E. Smith he stated that he lived in barrio Guanajibo, of this city, and knew Ana Rosas, who is his aunt and lives near him, and that the Bordonave lands adjoin his; that the latter, who is dead, had been married to Ana Rosas, from which marriage there had been no issue; that said Bordonave owned in said barrio from 29 to 30 cuerdas of land, but he was not aware that Ana owned any in that locality; that it is true that the latter had filed a deed wherein it appears that she owned 714 cuerdas in barrio Guanajibo, but said land was sold to Andres by Domingo Rosas, .as stated in the deed, the date whereof he does not know, but the same should appear upon the record; that the sale was effected under the stipulations contained in the deed filed with the record; that Domingo Rosas had not sold to the witness the 7% cuerdas of land referred to in the question; that the 7y2 cuerdas now the property of the witness he had acquired by purchase from José López Bayron; that he does not know whether the aforesaid 7% cuerdas formed part of the 22y2 cuerdas sold to the minor children of Rosas by the Yélez brothers; that the lands formerly owned by Bor-donave are now in the possession of his widow, and he could not say how long they had been held by the deceased; that he does not know whether the boundaries described in the deeds are now correct; that he does not know whether Bordonave or his widow had conveyed portions of these lands subsequently 'to the execution of the deeds, which he has read, but whose text he does not now remember; that it is not true that Ana paid taxes for the estate, said taxes having up to this time been paid by the witness for a number of cuerdas amounting to from 29 to 30; that until two or three years ago the Bordonave lands, consisting of 29 cuerdas, had been entered in his name, they being subsequently grouped with those belonging to him, making a total of 40 cuerdas entered in his name, for all of which he paid the taxes; that aforesaid grouping was made because Bordonave had appointed him Ms representative in voce before witnesses who are specified in the minutes referring to this declaration, several of whom are adjoining landowners; and that it is true that he had sued Ana Rosa in the municipal court for a sum of money Bordonave owed him; that he had sued Ana Rosa only once for the debt above referred to, although on a previous occasion he had brought an action against her, which suit, however, had nothing to do with the latter one; that he does not know what was the result of the first suit, nor can he recall the subject-matter thereof, but the last case is pending before this court on appeal taken by the witness; that his opposition to these proceedings is based upon various credits held by him against the Estate of Bordonave, according to documentary and oral evidence submitted by him in the last of the eases mentioned, and that the right of action exercised by Mm in the first suit was not based upon the same documents presented in the last.</p> <p>“Upon consulting the district attorney the latter sees no objection to the court’s denying the declaration applied for, and, as to the opposition filed, he is of opinion that the same should be dismissed, inasmuch as the opponent is not included among the persons comprised under paragraph 2, section 395 (of the Mortgage Law), for he is not a joint owner of the estate, and, according to his own confession, he has no property right therein; said district attorney believing further that the granting of a dominion title to the property, instead of prejudicing, would rather benefit him, since he would be placed in a better condition to exercise his right of action against the property belonging to the Estate.</p> <p>“In the conduct of these proceedings the formalities established by law have been observed.</p> <p>“From the evidence taken it appears that the application for a declaration of ownership made by Ana Rosa y Cintrón has been previously decided adversely.</p> <p>“No person can lawfully disregard decisions of the court which have become res judicata.</p> <p>“ If a judgment were rendered in these proceedings modifying the previous one rendered by this same court, such judgment would manifestly violate the final and unchangeable character of all decisions finally disposing of a case, and which, having been accepted by the parties, the matters in dispute become res judicata.</p> <p>“Considering, moreover, the provisions of article 395 of the Mortgage Law in force, the declaration of ownership applied for by Ana Rosa Cintrón is denied. Concurred in and signed by the judges of the court, to which I certify. Arturo Aponte, J. A. Erwin, Enrique González Darder, Juan Arroyo Mestre.”</p> <p>From the foregoing judgment counsel for the petitioner took an appeal which was allowed both for review and stay of proceedings. The record was forwarded to this Supreme Court, after citation of the parties, and, the appellant having appeared, the appeal was conducted under the proper procedure. A day was set for the hearing which was attended by Attorney José Hernández Usera in representation of Ana Eosa Cintrón, and the fiscal of this Supreme Court, who opposed the appeal.</p>

<p>Dominion Title — Ownership.—Although a declaration of ownership (dominion title) may be involved in an action to obtain the annulment of a proceeding wherein such declaration was made, so long as the annulment thereof is not decreed, the ownership and all its legal consequences will continue to exist in favor of the person on whose petition it has been declared or granted.</p> <p>'Property Held in Common. — In the absence of contracts or special provisions governing property held in common, the provisions of Title III, book 2, of the Civil Code, are applicable.</p> <p>Id. — Administration op the Thing Held in Common. — .Resolution of a Majority of the Participants. — The resolution of a majority of the participants with respect to the administration and better enjoyment of the thing held in common will be binding upon all of the participants, and a majority will be deemed to have existed when the resolution is adopted by participants representing a major interest in the property held in common.'</p> <p>Id. — Resolution Prejudicial to Participants. — In case there should not be a majority among the participants, or in case the resolution adopted thereby should be seriously prejudicial to the interests of the thing held in common, the district court will take proper action for the appointment of an administrator.</p> <p>Id. — Private Rights of the Participants. — "When a part of the thing held in common belongs privately to one or more of the participants, the provisions of law governing community property will not be applicable to such part.</p> <p>Id. — Disagreement oe the Participants — Administration.—In case the participants in the thing held in common should be unable to reach an agreement with respect to the administration and enjoyment of the property held in common, the appointment of an administrator is proper.</p> <p>Id. — Lea.se oe Property Held in Common. — The fact that there is in existence a contract of lease upon the properties held in common will not prevent the appointment of an administrator therefor, since the existence of such a contract could not prevent an 'administrator from exercising the functions of such an officer.</p> <p>Id. — Division oe Community Property — Eight oe Ownership oe the Participants. — The appointment of an administrator for the community property will not be deemed to prejudge the result of actions which may be pending or which may be brought seeking to obtain a division of the property held in common, or the object of which may be to prove the ownership of the participants.</p> <p>Id. — Property Subject to Suit — Incidental Issues. — The administration of property subject to suit constitutes an incidental issue entirely separate from the action itself, the prosecution of an ordinary action not being necessary to determine a matter of mere administration.</p>