7 P.R. Fed.
Volume 7 — Puerto Rico Federal Reports
145 opinions
- 7 P.R. Fed. 1Morales Avila v. Fantauzzi (1913)
<p>Jurisdiction and Procedure.</p> <p>Jurisdiction — Irregularity.</p> <p>1. The question of jurisdiction can always he raised even if it has been decided previously by the same court. But jurisdiction is a defect going to the power of the court over the parties or the subject-matter, and is not amendable. It is different from a defect in the statement of the case, which is demurrable and amendable.</p> <p>Previous Decision — Correction.</p> <p>2. While the court is willing to correct a point which has been improperly decided, it will not disturb a previous ruling, particularly of a predecessor of the presiding judge, unless real injustice has resulted.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 4Morales Avila v. Fantauzzi (1913)
<p>As to Peevious Accident to Chaufeeue.</p> <p>Automobile — Liability of Owner.</p> <p>Under the Porto Rieo Civil Code, § 1803, the owner of an automobile who is in it and in personal control is liable for an accident due to the negligence of the chauffeur. Section 1804 as to liability for employees does not apply. Velez v. Llavina, 18 P. R. R. 634, distinguished.</p> <p>Note.- — -The authorities on the question of the liability of owner where automobile is being driven by chauffeur under orders of a member of family are discussed in notes in 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 778, and 50 L.R.A. (N.S.) 63.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 8Martinez v. Paul Taylor Brown Co. (1914)
<p>As to Reconsideration in Matter of New Triad.</p> <p>Terms of Court — Porto Rico.</p> <p>1. The organic act provides for terms at San Juan, Ponce, and Mayaguez. The practical construction has been that the court is in almost continuous session at San Juan, where is the bulk of the business, and takes a recess to hold the required terms at Ponce and Mayaguez.</p> <p>Circuit Court Sessions — Revised Statutes, § 612.</p> <p>2. Revised Statutes, § 612, providing for holding a circuit court in different places at the same time, is inapplicable to Porto Rico, inasmuch as there is but one judge.</p> <p>Terms of Court.</p> <p>3. Terms are meant for the convenience, not the destruction, of business, and the San Juan term is not ended by holding the term at Ponce.</p> <p>Special Terms.</p> <p>4. The United States district court for Porto Rico has the power to call special terms (Revised Statutes, § 581), and, if necessary, reconvening at San Juan after the Ponce term will be regarded as a special term.</p> <p>District of Porto Rico — Divisions.</p> <p>5. Porto Rico constitutes one district with no technical judicial divisions. Cases submitted at one place of session may be decided at another.</p> <p>Reconsideration — New Trial.</p> <p>6. While reconsideration of a motion for a new trial is rare in practice, it is sometimes proper. It will be granted where, in the meantime, other judicial proceedings have thrown doubt upon the good faith of parties or witnesses at the trial.</p> <p>New Trial — Attorney.</p> <p>7. Alleged misconduct of an attorney in the conduct of the trial will affect the matter of the trial itself, although for some purposes it may have collateral bearings. The Federal practice as to new trials is independent of local rules.</p> <p>Consideration by Jury- — Affidavits.</p> <p>8. Affidavits of jurors will not be admitted to show what weight was given to the testimony of a witness. So far as this matter affects new trial, the question is whether the facts could reasonably have affected the jury, not whether the jurors thought it affected them.</p> <p>New Trial — Difficulty of Recovery.</p> <p>9. The fact that the plaintiff had difficulty in. recovering a verdict is no reason for taking away the fruits of his victory, if there is reason to think that the verdict had been improperly obtained.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 14United States v. Cook (1914)
<p>CRIMINAL Information for Landing Chinese Seamen.</p> <p>Rinding of Pacts — Waiver.</p> <p>1. A finding of facts by the court may be waived by the parties in interest, even in a criminal ease.</p> <p>The Chinese Exclusion — Porto Rico.</p> <p>2. The Chinese exclusion regulations apply to Porto Rico as well as in the other parts of the United States. The captain is responsible for the acts of his officers permitting Chinamen to go ashore without bond. Por many purposes the captain is the ship.</p> <p>Pine — Suspension.</p> <p>3. Where a judgment is for the purpose of settling a principle, and the offense is one rather of omission than commission, the fine imposed may be suspended in good behavior as part of the judgment itself.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 16Javierre v. Fritze (1914)
<p>Jury — Preponderance.</p> <p>1. If the plaintiff does not establish Ms case by a preponderance of the evidence, and as a result the mind of the jury is left in doubt, they must find for the defendant.</p> <p>Jury — Evidence.</p> <p>2. The jury are to go by the credibility of the evidence, not the number of witnesses. Positive evidence weighs more than negative, if the witnesses are equally credible.</p> <p>Corporations — Individuals.</p> <p>3. Corporations stand on exactly the same footing as individuals in courts of justice. The relative wealth of the parties is not to be taken into account.</p> <p>Two Cases Tried at Once — Verdicts.</p> <p>4. Cases against two defendants may by agreement be tried at the same time, but the verdicts must be separate.</p> <p>Value — Taxes.</p> <p>5. The value of his property returned by a party for taxation is not binding upon him in a suit involving its value; .but a false return may be given in evidence as a contradiction of conflicting evidence by a party.</p> <p>Pacts — Federal Judge.</p> <p>6. A Federal judge has the right to sum up the tendency of the facts of a case as an aid to the jury, but his view of the facts is not binding upon the jury.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 25In re Dooley (1914)
<p>On Petition oe Antonio Matos.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Provisional Receivership.</p> <p>1. A claim cannot he proved in bankruptcy until there has been, an adjudication in bankruptcy.</p> <p>Rule to Show Cause — Petition.</p> <p>2. A rule to show cause should not be used as a substitute for a petition setting up any claim. It arrests orderly procedure of a case, and should be confined to extraordinary cases, such as misconduct of officers appointed by the court and the like.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 28United States v. Cook (1914)
<p>Where money is deposited in lieu of a bond, the money takes the place-of the bond and will be treated as such. This is not a ease which-authorizes the deduction of the 1 per cent called for in § 828 of.' Revised Statutes.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 30Berwind White Coal Mining Co. v. Borinquen Sugar Co. (1914)
<p>Re Organization of Defendant Company.</p> <p>Reorganization — Prior Bonds.</p> <p>1. Where the reorganization of a corporation is at the instance of second mortgage bondholders and later security holders, this does not affect the first mortgage, and is in subordination to the holders of the first mortgage bonds.</p> <p>Operating Expenses.</p> <p>2. Claimants for operating expenses which are superior to the mortgages, unless they assent to reorganization, must be provided for in cash.</p> <p>Reorganization.</p> <p>3. A plan of reorganization is effective only against the parties who join in it, but where it is proposed by a majority of each class the court will carry it out by decree as far as possible.</p> <p>Reorganization — Dissension.</p> <p>4. The court has no power to compel dissenters to assent. It can only regulate a sale, which must be open to all bidders. Reorganization is a voluntary arrangement effected by bidders outside of court.</p> <p>Mortgage Sale — Discretion of Court.</p> <p>5. The court on a previous occasion refused to permit a sale under second mortgage when it would result in a sacrifice of the property and unsecured creditors. It may be granted -at a later time, however, when these results will not follow, and a reorganization can be effected fair to all.</p> <p>Reorganization — Receiver’s Certificate.</p> <p>6. Reorganization must be subordinate to receiver’s certificate issued for obligations authorized by the court. Such certificates must he retired or otherwise provided for before reorganization will be approved.</p> <p>Note. — -The cases discussing priority of receiver’s certificates of indebtedness are set forth in notes in 9 L.R.A. 143, and 2 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1052, 1063.</p> <p>Reorganization — Bonds.</p> <p>7. It is usual to provide that the bonds of a company foreclosed may be used as cash at a foreclosure sale, and that sufficient money must be provided in addition to pay in full or pro rata expenses, preferred claims, and interests not entering into the plan.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 37In re Ripoll (1914)
<p>On Appeal from Referee as to Rents.</p> <p>Bankruptcy Law — Local Priorities.</p> <p>The bankruptcy law recognizes priority for rents and leases for one year as declared in the Porto Rico Civil Code, § 1823 (7). So much of the classification of credits in the Civil Code as is connected with bankruptcy is superseded by the international bankruptcy law, hut so much as is independent thereof will he enforced as a local lien.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 39Grosch v. Central Vannina, Inc. (1914)
<p>PLEA TO JURISDICTION.</p> <p>Jurisdiction — Conflict.'</p> <p>1. Jurisdiction embraces subject-matter and parties. The subject-matter must be within the powers conferred by law upon the court, and the parties must be within the territorial limits of the court. The fact that the same matter is brought in two different courts does not affect the question of jurisdiction.</p> <p>Plea or Motion.</p> <p>2. The court may, in its discretion, consider a plea to the jurisdiction as a motion raising a similar point in order to expedite a case.</p> <p>Receivers — Appointment.</p> <p>3. A court may, upon its discretion, appoint receivers ex parte in a pressing case.</p> <p>Receivers — Defendant’s Preference.</p> <p>4. A defendant has no right to the choice of a receiver. The object of a receivership is to taire the property out of the hands of one who does not administer it properly.</p> <p>Receivership — Bes.</p> <p>5. Having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter and the possession of the res, a court will, through its receivers, retain possession until shown that the possession should go elsewhere. It will not turn adrift property in its hands for a scramble among creditors.</p> <p>Note. — As to reeeiver’.s right of possession as affected by the time of appointment, giving bond, and taking possession, and as to questions between state and Federal courts, see note in 20 L.R.A. 393.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 44Porto Rico Railway, Light, & Power Co. v. Atlas Transfer Co. (1914)
<p>Collision or Street Car and Truck.</p> <p>Burden on Plaintiff — Doubt.</p> <p>The burden is on the plaintiff to prove his ease, and if, in a case of negligence, it is doubtful whether the plaintiff was thus exercising the proper care at the time and in the place of the accident, the verdict of the court will he for the defendant.</p> <p>Note. — The authorities on the burden of proof as to contributory negligence are discussed in an extensive note in 33 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1085.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 46Muñoz v. Atlas Transfer Co. (1914)
<p>Injuby to Motorman in Collision op Truck and Car.</p> <p>Negligence — Street Car.</p> <p>1. The motorman of a street car has the right, when he sees an auto upon the track, to assume that it will turn off in time to avoid a collision; hut he must in the meantime remain in control of his car and in condition to avert an accident if the auto does not turn off the track.</p> <p>Note. — As to the right of motorman to assume that person on the-track will get out of the way, see note in 21 L.R.A. (N.S.) 880.</p> <p>Motorman — Doubt.</p> <p>2. A motorman is the actual representative of the owner of the' trolley car, responsible for the fortunes of the car, and in case of doubt as to the preponderance of the evidence cannot recover.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 48Atlas Transfer Co. v. Porto Rico Railway, Light, & Power Co. (1914)
<p>Collision of Truck and Street Cab.</p> <p>Crossings — Suburban Car.</p> <p>1. The rule as to care as to suburban railways in private crossings is the same as that which applies to railroads.</p> <p>Note. — For cases on the care required of driver of automobile at railroad ■crossing, see notes in 21 L.E.A.(N.S.) 794; 29 L.R.A.(N.S.) 924, and 46 L.R.A.(N.S.) 702. The origin, function, and mode of operation of the doctrine of last clear chance is discussed in note in 55 L.R.A. 418, and as to the doctrine of last clear chance as affected by question whether negligence of plaintiff and of defendant was concurrent, see notes in 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 132, 152; 17 L.R.A.(N.S.) 707; 19 L.R.A.(N.S.) 446, and references; 27 L.R.A.(N.S.) 379, and 36 L.R.A.(N.S.) 957.</p> <p>Contributory Negligence.</p> <p>2. It is negligence for a truck to become stalled while crossing a railroad track by reason of its hood striking an overhanging sign.</p> <p>Negligence — Last Clear Chance.</p> <p>3. It is the duty of the motorman to watch the track so as to avoid inflicting unnecessary injury, but less care is required where the street railroad runs alongside of and separate from the highway than when it is part of the street. The doctrine of last clear chance does not apply unless supported by a preponderance of evidence.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 52Fuentes v. Santos Maldonado (1914)
<p>Default — Mesne Profits.</p> <p>While the Porto Rican Civil Code permits recovery of land by the person holding the better title, he can recover mesne profits only for-the time the land is withheld in had faith. Good faith is presumed, and bad faith begins only from the time that the possessor knew of the adverse claim. A complaint may, as in this case, be sufficient to permit of recovery of the land and yet not sufficient to cover mesne profits except from the time of bringing the suit.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 55Grosch v. Central Vannina, Inc. (1914)
<p>Receivers Appointed by Different Courts.</p> <p>Jurisdiction — Conflicting Suits.</p> <p>1. Within their respective jurisdictions each court is the equal of every other court, and no question of relative dignity arises except in matters of appeal. The only question in ease of conflict is as to which obtained prior jurisdiction.</p> <p>Note. — As to exclusiveness of jurisdiction by appointment of receiver, see note in 20 L.R.A. 391.</p> <p>Comity — Appointment of Receiver.</p> <p>2. In case of concurrent jurisdictions it is for the plaintiff to choose his forum, and when that is once chosen the court having jurisdiction must proceed. It then ceases to be a matter of comity between courts. A receiver is appointed by the court in its discretion, and not directly or indirectly by the parties.</p> <p>Conflicting Jurisdictions — First Acts.</p> <p>3. The first court acquiring jurisdiction will retain it. As between parties jurisdiction is complete when the proper pleading is filed and proper process served, and for some purposes it relates to the filing-of the bill. Sometimes the possession of the res is important.</p> <p>Jurisdiction — As Between Courts.</p> <p>4.The act giving jurisdiction is a judicial act of the judge in making an order, as distinguished from the administrative act of the-clerk in filing a paper. The order of a court will, for jurisdictional purposes, unless conflicting rights have intervened, relate back to the original filing, which is the initial step in the case.</p> <p>Suits m Personam — In Rem.</p> <p>5. Suits in personam are those between parties; suits against the-thing rather than the owner are in rem. In the first instance service of the party is essential to jurisdiction; in the second it is not-jurisdictional and merely an incident to afford the owner an opportunity to come in. Suits quasi in rem■ are where the res is proceeded against, but is affected only as between persons made parties. To-the extent that the court takes possession of the property the proceeding is m rem.</p> <p>Suit in Rem — Possession.</p> <p>6. Upon the filing of a proceeding strictly in rem the court acquires possession, and, while other courts may proceed in personam as to the same parties, they cannot touch the res, which is in cus-todia legis.</p> <p>Creditors’ Bill — Quasi in Rem.</p> <p>7. A receivership is sometimes an incident, sometimes the gist of an action, although never intended as a final status. The question is ,not as to receivership, but as to the nature of the suit in which the receivership is invoked. A single creditors’ bill is inter partes,. while a general creditors’ bill for marshaling and distributing of assets is quasi in rem.</p> <p>Jurisdiction — Seizure.</p> <p>8. The original view of creditors’ suits was that the seizure of the property gave jurisdiction; hut this has since been renounced in circuit courts of appeals.</p> <p>Porto Rico — Lis Pendens.</p> <p>9. Lis pendens does not apply in Porto Rico, because it is an incipient change of title by a constructive possession of property without registration in the record office. This, however, does not apply to proceedings in rem where the filing is accompanied by possession.</p> <p>Suit in Rem, — Constructive Possession;</p> <p>10. Actual seizure is not necessary in a proceeding in rem. There may be a constructive seizure or levy and return. A suit for forfeiture of charter is in rem, and if a receiver is appointed in another court pending such suit, he will be required to deliver possession over to a receiver subsequently appointed in the original proceeding.</p> <p>Equity — Porto Rico.</p> <p>11. The system of equity jurisprudence is not in force in the insular courts of Porto Rico, and there is no procedure by statute authorizing a general creditors’ bill. A single creditors’ bill is provided' for, with the provisional remedy of incidental receiverships.</p> <p>Same — California.</p> <p>12. The Porto Rican law is taken from California, or is analogous to the California statute. This does not provide for a general creditors’ bill and receivership to administer the property. Such receivership is a provisional remedy, like attachment in aid of a suit in personam.</p> <p>Local Receivership — Federal Receivership.</p> <p>13. The local court has jurisdiction of the suit of a creditor in personam, and incidentally a provisional remedy by receivership, while the Federal court has jurisdiction of a general creditors’ bill to administer corporate property as a trust, which to all intents and purposes is a proceeding in rem.</p> <p>Local Statutes — Federal Court.</p> <p>14. At one time it might have been questioned whether a general creditors’ bill could be recognized in the Federal court except in pursuance of local legislation; but even if the Federal court had no-jurisdiction, it would not turn over the property of which it had acquired possession to receivers of another court which had no more jurisdiction.</p> <p>Eeeeivership — Notice to Defendant.</p> <p>15. It is not absolutely necessary to give notice to a defendant before appointing a receiver. This should ordinarily be done, but in its discretion the court may, in carrying out its duty to prevent the wasting of a res, in what it deems a proper case of urgency, appoint receivers without service. More particularly is this true where the defendant was co-operating' with creditors seeking to have receivers appointed in another forum.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 75Vallon v. P. J. Carlin Construction Co. (1914)
<p>Demurrer to Evidence — Direction of Verdict.</p> <p>A demurrer to evidence requires the joinder of the plaintiff, and denies the defendant, in ease of refusal, the right to offer further evidence. This procedure is not usual in Porto Rico, where the local procedure is a motion to dismiss, which can be followed by admission of further evidence. A demurrer to evidence, therefore, will not be enforced in this jurisdiction, but instead a motion to dismiss or the direction of verdict, as is more common in Federal courts.</p> <p>N. B. — Rule 52 of the Federal court for Porto Rico now covers this point.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 77Fuentes v. Santos Maldonado (1914)
<p>On Motion to Quash Summons.</p> <p>Conformity of Practice — Revised Statutes, § 914.</p> <p>1. The conformity statute, Revised Statutes, § 914, does not require literal conformity of Federal courts to local procedure. The conformity required is “as near as may be,” and is enforced through rules and otherwise at the discretion of the courts.</p> <p>Same — Names of Parties.</p> <p>2. The Porto Rican Code of Civil Procedure, § 89, requires that the summons shall contain the names of all the parties, but where, as provided by § 92, a copy of the complaint containing these names is served with the summons, the names of the parties need not appear in the summons itself.</p> <p>Practice — Summons Directed to Marshal.</p> <p>3. The fact that the summons is not directed to the defendant as required by § 89 of the local Code of Civil Procedure, but to the marshal, is not material if actually served on the defendant and notifies him of court, term, time, and place of appearance. It is not a jurisdictional requirement that the process be directed to the defendant rather than to the marshal when the marshal must serve it upon the defendant.</p> <p>Summons — Necessary Averment.</p> <p>4. Omission in the summons, that, unless the defendant appears, the plaintiff will take judgment or apply to the court for specific relief, is one of form, and not of substance.</p> <p>Practice — Amendment.</p> <p>5. Where defendants have been before the court in several applications, amendable irregularities will be considered as amended.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 80Fernández v. Calaf (1914)
<p>As to Restriction of New Trial Issues.</p> <p>New Trial — Limited Issues.</p> <p>1. In some of the states a new trial may be limited to particular issues. There seems to be no Porto Rican practice on the subject, but the California decisions, from which the local procedure law was taken, seem to permit such limitation.</p> <p>■Conformity Statute — New Trials.</p> <p>2. The conformity statute, Revised Statutes, § 914, does not apply to new trials. These are within the discretion of the trial court.</p> <p>Appeal — New Trial.</p> <p>3. The Pederal practice allows new trial after reversal and limiting the issue to some of the defendants.</p> <p>New Trial — English. Practice.</p> <p>4. According to the English practice, where new trials are discretionary, a new trial may be confined to a certain issue. It would seem .that this should be followed where other issues are satisfactorily covered by the verdict, and it would be a hardship to compel plaintiff to bring witnesses from a foreign country as to unnecessary issues.</p> <p>New Trial — Subsequent Term.</p> <p>5. A court cannot generally make an order at a subsequent term which will change what has been done at a previous term. Semble, it may make more definite what has been ordered at a previous term, and in the case at bar the motion for a new trial had been made at the' previous term and continued.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 85Cerecedo v. Calderón (1914)
<p>On Motion foe Writ of Error.</p> <p>Bankruptcy Law — Complete.</p> <p>1. The bankruptcy law is a system complete in itself, and necessarily exclusive.</p> <p>Bankruptcy Law — Administration.</p> <p>2. All matters connected with the administration of a bankruptcy estate and bankruptcy proceedings are exclusively governed by the provisions' of the bankruptcy law. These are steps in bankruptcy,</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Controversy.</p> <p>3. If the question is not as to administration of assets, but as to whether certain property is assets of the estate or not, there is a controversy • arising in bankruptcy proceedings, winch is not necessarily cognizable in a Federal court.</p> <p>Note. — As to whether question relating to bankruptcy is a Federal question, see note in 62 L.R.A. 535.</p> <p>Appellate Jurisdiction — Judicial Code, § 252.</p> <p>'4. Judicial Code, § 252, is a re-enactment of § 24(a) of tbe bankruptcy act of 1898. The words “appellate jurisdiction” therein used .are-to be taken in a general sense, and not confined to appeals in equity. They embrace also writ of error at law.</p> <p>Appellate .Jurisdiction — Controversy in Bankruptcy.</p> <p>5. The distinction between law and equity is preserved in the Federal courts. An appeal is proper in equity and a writ of error at law.</p> <p>Supreme Court — -Appellate Jurisdiction in Bankruptcy.</p> <p>6. The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction from the district of the United States for Porto Rico only in cases of $5,000, with certain exceptions, amongst which are steps in bankruptcy. The appellate jurisdiction as to controversies arising in bankruptcy is limited to amounts exceeding $5,000.</p> <p>Federal Question — -Bankruptcy.</p> <p>7. An appeal does not lie in a controversy as in bankruptcy on the theory that the bankruptcy law presents a Federal question. A Federal question is presented in an appeal as to steps in bankruptcy, but not as to controversies arising in bankruptcy proceedings.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 91In re Espitery (1914)
<p>Attorneys’ Fees in Bankruptcy.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Payment of Fees.</p> <p>1. The order found in Collier on Bankruptcy relative to paying fees at the end of the bankruptcy proceeding is not one required by the bankruptcy law.</p> <p>Bankruptcy Law — Fees at End of Case.</p> <p>2. An attorney’s fee is allowed in proportion to the benefit to the estate, not in proportion necessarily to the exertions of the attorney, and therefore should not be allowed in full until it is certain what is the result of the service to the estate.</p> <p>Attorneys’ Fees — Appeal to the Supreme Court.</p> <p>3. Where a case is appealed it cannot be known whether the amount recovered below will be sustained or not, and therefore it is impossible to tell the amount of fee which should go to the attorney. It is the duty of the parties to know what proceedings are had before the referee.</p> <p>Note.- — -As to allowance of attorneys’ fees in bankruptcy cases, see note in 54 L.R.A. S26.</p> <p>Attorneys’ Pees — Fart Payment.</p> <p>4. A referee may under some circumstances authorize the payment of part of an attorney’s fee before the end of a case. Postponement, to the end of a case may dull the edge of energy.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 96Cerecedo v. Calderón (1914)
<p>In the Matter of Writ of Error.</p> <p>Writ of Error — Allowance.</p> <p>1. Where a Eederal question is involved the lower court should always allow a writ of error. This is not necessarily true in a criminal case.</p> <p>Writ of Error — Time.</p> <p>2. If a writ is allowed by a justice of the Supreme Court, the lower court may on cable allow it pro forma, to save any question of time.</p> <p>Writ of Error — Judicial Act.</p> <p>3. Allowing a writ of error is a judicial, and not a ministerial, act. It would otherwise be a mere matter of form.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 98Irwin v. Fernandez Nater (1914)
<p>On Application fob New Tbial.</p> <p>Court — Jury Duties.</p> <p>I. The court will not interfere with questions relating to the weight of the evidence. That is a matter for the jury. Particularly is this so after two verdicts the same way.</p> <p>Tax Redemption — Porto Rican Political Code, §§ 348, 349.</p> <p>2. If the original owner deposits money for the redemption on taxes, and afterwards withdraws the amount from the registry, he waiyes all rights growing out of the deposit. He cannot have both land and redemption money.</p> <p>Agency — Province of Jury.</p> <p>3. The extent of agency is to be inferred from the evidence, whether oral or written, and the court will not interfere with the conclusion of the jury so drawn.</p> <p>Motion for New Trial — Defects not Alleged.</p> <p>4. The court will not consider grounds for a new trial not set up in the motion filed for that purpose.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 101Grosch v. Central Vannina, Inc. (1914)
<p>On Jtjbisdiction and Dismissal.</p> <p>Practice — Motion as to Jurisdiction.</p> <p>1. It is never too late to raise the question of jurisdiction, Rut when once raised and decided the court will not usually entertain it again.</p> <p>Jurisdictional Defects — Demurrable Defects.</p> <p>2. Jurisdiction relates to the power of the court, the allegations as to the suit, the power over the parties. None of these can be supplied by amendment. The omission of facts or careless stating of facts are matters of demurrer or motion, and can be amended.</p> <p>Debt — Trial by Jury.</p> <p>3. Under the 7 th Amendment to the Federal Constitution a debt cannot be tried in any form on the equity side of the Federal court.</p> <p>Equity — Creditors’ Bill.</p> <p>4. The jurisdiction as to creditors’ bills is still in a formative stage. It proceeds upon the principle of marshaling the different assets of a trust fund for the benefit of creditors.</p> <p>Same — Dismissal.</p> <p>5. The court will grant a motion for dismissal joined by both parties only if the expenses, whether of court or receivership, have been satisfied.</p> <p>Same — Receivers of Another Court.</p> <p>6. Where a court in possession by receivers judicially knows that receivers have also been appointed by another court, it will not, upon the dismissal of the ease, turn the property over to the defendants, but will await application by the other receivers.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 106Ramos v. People (1914)
<p>Execution under Mandate from Supreme Court.</p> <p>Injunction — Equitable Procedure.</p> <p>1. Injunction is a remedy peculiar under Federal practice to a court of equity, and cannot be entertained in a law case.</p> <p>People of Porto Rico.</p> <p>2. If the People of Porto Rico intervene in a case, they are in that case for all the purposes thereof. They cannot come in and out of court at will.</p> <p>Same — Escheat.</p> <p>3. Where the People of Porto Rico claim an escheat, they do so as a quasi heir and aye subject to the liabilities of an individual heir.</p> <p>Same — A University.</p> <p>4. Under Civil Code, § 923, the University of Porto Rico is entitled to property escheated. The university becomes something in the nature of a eestui que trust of property of which the People of Porto Rieo are the trustee; but the People of Porto Rico are the proper parties in suits concerning the title.</p> <p>Execution — When too Broad.</p> <p>5. The fact that an execution is too broad in that it runs against property which is not subject to execution, as well as property which is, does not impair the execution when it is actually levied only on the property which is liable.</p> <p>Execution — Directed by Supreme Court.</p> <p>6. It may be doubted when an execution is issued by the clerk of the district court under the mandate of the Supreme Court, whether the district court can interfere.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 113Romero v. Calaf (1914)
<p>As to Dischabge of Attorney.</p> <p>Practice — Affidavits on the Hearing.</p> <p>1. Motions are properly heard upon affidavits filed at the hearing;' this will, upon application, he adjourned over to give the opposed party opportunity to file others in rebuttal.</p> <p>Attorney and Client — Discharge.</p> <p>2. A contract between attorney and client is ambulatory, and can be canceled at any time by the client, subject to the rights of the attorney for damages for breach. The court cannot try the question of damages except by a regular suit.</p> <p>Same — Notice to Attorney.</p> <p>3. A discharge of an attorney, if questioned, will be recognized only if there has been proper notice to the attorney so as to give him the right to institute any proper proceedings-.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 116Gonzalez v. Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society (1914)
<p>As to Opening of Judgment by Default.</p> <p>Federal Praetiee — Conformity Statute.</p> <p>1. Eevised Statutes, § 914, provides that the practice of local courts shall he followed as far as may he. Everything connected with a jury trial, however, is outside of this rule, inasmuch as there are no jury trials in civil cases in Porto Rico. A judgment by default is governed by the Porto Rican Code of Civil Procedure. '</p> <p>Same — Setting Aside Default.</p> <p>2. Setting aside a default in the Federal court is governed by the Porto Rican Code of Civil Procedure.</p> <p>Same — Amendment.</p> <p>3. There having previously been no decision of this court upon the subject, the applicant is permitted to amend his motion to conform to the above principles.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 119Lowe v. Nelson (1914)
<p>Osr Bbeach of Contract.</p> <p>Complaint — V erifieation.</p> <p>1. Under the Porto Rican Code of Civil Procedure, § 118, the verification to a complaint must state that the same is true on the knowledge of plaintiff, except what is stated on information and belief, and this he must state he believes to be true. The plaintiff’s affidavit that he knows the contents and verily believes them to be true is not in compliance with the statute.</p> <p>Practice — Joint and Several Defendants.</p> <p>2. On a joint and several contract defendants may be joined or each sued separately, but, if it be a separate contract each defendant must be sued separately. It is not practicable to have separate is- . sues as to different defendants tried at one time before the same jury. Where a complaint says the suit is on -the several liability, the same rule will apply whether in tort or ex contractu.</p> <p>Practice — Pleading.</p> <p>3. If the allegations of the complaint are reasonably clear as to the plaintiff, allegations as to a party not joined axe not necessary and will be treated as surplusage.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 122Trublard v. Trujillo y Mercado (1914)
<p>On Bebach of Contract.</p> <p>Contract — Facts Open to Observation.</p> <p>1. Where the means of knowledge of the facts of a contract are equally available, neither party can be heard to say that he is deceived. A party cannot complain if afterwards he finds that he had misjudged the facts.</p> <p>Practice — Burden of Proof.</p> <p>2. If the plaintiff does not prove a material allegation in his complaint by a preponderance of the evidence, he cannot recover.</p> <p>Contracts — Alteration.</p> <p>3. If the contract is altered by consent of parties, compensation for the alteration agreed on may be recovered.</p> <p>Completion of Work- — Acceptance.</p> <p>4. The completion of a contract is waived by acceptance. Where a reservoir is built and is used, the work will be considered as completed, and the full compensation due.</p> <p>Attorneys’ Fees — Contract.</p> <p>5. Under § 824 attorneys’ fees cannot be recovered in the Federal court unless they are made an express part of the contract.</p> <p>Note. — As to effect of using building by owner as an acceptance of work of construction or repair, see note in 16 L.B.A. (N.S.) 489.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 127Ramos v. Wood (1914)
<p>The Power of District Court over Mandate of Supreme Court.</p> <p>Mandate of Supreme Court — Control by District Court.</p> <p>1. Where the Supreme Court has directed that an execution issue, the district court may exercise supervision, but will exercise its discretion only so far as necessary.</p> <p>Porto Rico — University.</p> <p>2. Where it is shown to the court that an educational institution, like the University of Porto Rico, will be seriously crippled by a sale of property in which it is interested under executions from the Supreme Court, the district court will take the interests of the university into account.</p> <p>The University — Appearance.</p> <p>3. The court will not take the interests of the university into account unless some application be made by that institution.</p> <p>Practice — Stay of Execution.</p> <p>4. In order to enable the university to apply the plaintiff to apply to the Supreme Court for stay of execution ordered by the Supreme Court cumstances, directed for thirty days. to the court and further orders, a is, under the cir-</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 131Ponce & Guayama Railroad v. American Railroad (1914)
<p>As to Accounting and Mistake.</p> <p>Equity — Bill for Accounting.</p> <p>1. A complicated account is one of the grounds for equity jurisdiction, but not every matter of accounting. Where an account is agreed upon, there is no such jurisdiction.</p> <p>Accounting — Mistake.</p> <p>2. A mistake of law does not give a remedy in any court. A mistake of fact is not a ground of equitable jurisdiction when the mistake is one which can be remedied at law.</p> <p>Accounting — Wrong Construction.</p> <p>3. If the mistake in the accounting is one of construction of a contract, by which one party retains money which eco equo et bono belongs to the other, it is a matter cognizable at law, and not in equity. Under the Constitution, in suits at law the right of trial by jury should be preserved.</p> <p>Fiduciary Relation- — Agency.</p> <p>4. The fact that the defendant stood in a fiduciary relation to the complainant, in that he collected and disbursed the money taken in under the contract, makes him an agent rather than a trustee. The result is not a trust, but a debt.</p> <p>Settlement — Reopening.</p> <p>5. Where there has been a settlement, either final, or several partial settlements which can be added up into a final settlement, a court can reopen the matter only in case of mutual accounts, complication, or fiduciary relations, unless in case of fraud or error.</p> <p>Motion to Dismiss — Law Side.</p> <p>6. Under the new Equity Rule 22, if it appears that a suit in equity should have been brought at law, it must not be dismissed, but transferred to the law docket with such alterations in the pleadings ás are necessary.</p> <p>Voluntary Payment — Recovery.</p> <p>7. If money has been voluntarily paid, it cannot be recovered back at law or in equity; but if the payment is only on a partial settlement, this rule does not apply upon suit as to final settlement. The payment is not voluntarily made when it relates to a continuous account which is not to be closed until later, and is reopened upon this final closing.</p> <p>Costs — Party in Fault.</p> <p>8. Where a party has brought his suit upon the wrong side of the court, and it becomes necessary to transfer it, the costs will be taxed against such original plaintiff.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 140Ruiz de Noble v. Gallardo y Seary (1914)
<p>Refacción and Limitations.</p> <p>Refacción Contract — Definition.</p> <p>1. A refacción credit, arising from a refacción contract, is one by law attached to a loan which brings into existence or preserves that which otherwise would not exist or would perish. It goes back through all the Spanish law to Roman times, and applies in Porto Rico especially to agricultural crops.</p> <p>Same — Third Parties.</p> <p>2. Under this principle a tacit mortgage preferential lien is given superior to all creditors not specially privileged.</p> <p>Same — Extent.</p> <p>3. Where the contract on its face refers to making a crop, the lien is limited by law to the crop and to the interest the planter has in the land. It must be definite and public.</p> <p>Refacción — Registration.</p> <p>4. Before the present registration law such a contract must be noted in the Anotaduria of Mortgages.</p> <p>Registration — Registrars.</p> <p>5. The duties of a registrar are administrative rather than judicial, and, although his opinions are persuasive, they do not con-elude a law court. Particularly is this so if there are two opposite decisions.</p> <p>Contracts — Prescription.</p> <p>6. After thirty-five years it is not material whether the thirty-years statute of repose or the twenty-years statute as to mortgages applies. Either is sufficient as to land, and the shorter period applies as to personal obligations.</p> <p>Keeping Alive — Liens.</p> <p>7. A general mention of liens does not necessarily include keeping alive a refacción contract.</p> <p>Anotaduria — Mortgage Law.</p> <p>8. A transaction antedating the mortgage law is governed by the provisions as to an Anotaduria de Hipotecas.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 149Alonzo Sobrino v. Maimy (1914)
<p>On Motion to Dismiss.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Abatement of Lawsuit.</p> <p>1. A suit at law is not ipso facto terminated by the bankruptcy of the plaintiff. Under § 11c the trustee may, with approval of the court, prosecute the suit.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Property.</p> <p>2. The property of the bankrupt passes to the trustee, but this does not include personal rights, such as slander, malicious prosecution, and personal injuries. This is the rule at common law.</p> <p>Same — Civil Law.</p> <p>3. The Porto Rico Civil Code, § 1079, makes all rights derived from an obligation transmissible, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary. In order to make the law as to Porto Rican bankrupts conform to the general practice, the above section will, in bankruptcy matters, not be construed to include personal rights as above.</p> <p>Note. — Por eases passing upon the question of whether causes of action for personal injuries are assets in bankruptcy, see note in 44 L.R.A. 180; as to whether right of action for personal injuries passes to trustee in bankruptcy, see note in 12 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1173, and whether a right of action for tort for injury to person other than physical is an asset is discussed in note in 43 L.R.A. (N.S.) 940.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 154Fajardo Sugar Co. v. Richardson (1914)
<p>Recovery of Taxes Paid under Protest.</p> <p>Taxation — Foreign Stock. •</p> <p>1. The People of Porto Rico cannot tax shares of stock of a >'oi ■ eign corporation held by another foreign corporation actually situated outside the Island, although both corporations do business in Porto Rico.</p> <p>Taxes — Interest.</p> <p>2. Interest does not run against a government on recovery from It of taxes paid under protest.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 158Sanchez v. Gestera de Ubarri (1914)
<p>Petition — Agent.</p> <p>1. A creditors’ petition in bankruptcy may be verified by their agent; but he must give particulars and also state the source of his information.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Verification.</p> <p>2. Judicial verification must generally allege knowledge of the facts set out, and not be merely upon information and belief.</p> <p>B ankruptcy— Allegations.</p> <p>3. Tlie creditors in a petition in bankruptcy must set out the particulars making up the fraud which is charged. Merely pleading the conclusion of fraud is insufficient.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 161Ramos v. People (1914)
<p>Stay op Execution Directed by Mandate.</p> <p>Supreme Court Mandate — Lower Court.</p> <p>1. Where the direction of the Supreme Court is clear, the lower court can do nothing except execute the order; hut a certain amount of discretion is allowed the lower court as to the method of such execution.</p> <p>Supreme Court — Federal Court in Porto Rico.</p> <p>2. The Federal court of Porto Rico may, in its discretion, control the time and mode of enforcing the mandate of the Supreme Court so as to avoid injustice or undue hardship.</p> <p>Government — Individual.</p> <p>3. An individual may realize upon his property at will, but a government can only pay out of current revenues after appropriation. Execution against the property of a state means a different thing from execution against the property of a citizen, and the lower court may take this into account in enforcing the execution directed by the Supreme Court.</p> <p>Stay of Execution — Equalizing Conditions.</p> <p>4. While the government will be protected in such manner as to equalize it with an individual debtor, the interest of the judgment creditor will be protected by allowing stay of execution only upon payment by the government of interest and expenses.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 166In re Espitery (1914)
<p>Fixing Fees of Attoenev fob Tbustee.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Attorneys’ Fees.</p> <p>The intention of the bankruptcy law is to keep all fees, whether of officers or attorneys, within strict limits. But this is to be considered in connection with all the circumstances of the ease in question. If the case is a novel one, presenting difficult questions, and from its nature the attorney has to rely upon success for any fee at all, the court will approve, a larger allowance than under other circumstances. Twenty-five per cent of the recovery is allowed in the case at bar.</p> <p>Note. — As to allowance of attorneys’ fees in bankruptcy cases, see note in 54 L.R.A. 826.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 168Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. v. Borinquen Sugar Co. (1914)
<p>On Petition on Certain Bondholders.</p> <p>Equity — Mortgage Bonds.</p> <p>1. Wkere the court is administering a property under a general creditors’ bill a question arising as to mortgage interest must generally be presented by the trustee under the mortgage. A cestui que trust can apply to the court only after he has applied to the trustee and the trustee has improperly refused to act.</p> <p>Marshaling — Corpus and Income.</p> <p>2. The principle of marshaling will be applied to a case where one creditor has recourse upon the income and another has recourse both upon the income and corpus of the property.</p> <p>Equity Practice — Master’s Reports.</p> <p>3. A court will not take up petitions affecting matters which have already been referred to a master and are under consideration by Mm.</p> <p>Note. — On the right of a junior creditor to compel paramount creditor to resort primarily to property of third person which may be subjected to payment of his claim, see note in 39 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1000.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 172Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. v. Borinquen Sugar Co. (1914)
<p>On Intervening Petition oe Pedro Mas for Bents.</p> <p>Equity — Master’s Keport.</p> <p>1. The court will not on petition decide matters already referred to the master before his report comes in.</p> <p>Receivership — Lessee.</p> <p>2. Where the court has authorized the receiver to lease the receivership property, it will not entertain an application to dispossess the lessee without hearing him.</p> <p>Receivership — Leased Property.</p> <p>3. A sugar central in Porto Rico is dependent largely upon the cane produced upon lands leased by it. While the court will not likely cancel such a lease, it will not permit its receiver to enjoy its benefit without compensation.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 175Rios v. Palou (1914)
<p>Attorney — Discharge hy Client.</p> <p>A client has the right to discharge an attorney subject to proper-provision as to fees, even without a rule on the subject.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 176Garofalo v. City of Rio Piedras (1914)
<p>On Motion to Strike Parts os' Answer.</p> <p>Pleading — Motion to Strike.</p> <p>1. A motion to strike cannot take the place of a demurrer. The motion relates to superfluous phraseology, which demurrer relates to insufficient or improper phraseology. The one cannot he used for the other.</p> <p>Contract — Necessary Allegations.</p> <p>2. If a contract is to be paid for by money obtained from public authorities, that fact must be alleged in order to he material.</p> <p>Contract — Approval.</p> <p>3. An allegation that a contract is invalid because not approved by the Commissioner of the Interior is a denial of its legal execution.</p> <p>Contract — Superseded.</p> <p>4. An allegation that a new contract was entered into which annulled the old one is in effect an allegation that the old contract ceased to be effective, and that a new one took its place.</p> <p>Answer — Construction.</p> <p>5. Under the Porto Rican practice,. Code of Civil Procedure, § 122, denials and new matter set out in the answer must be construed together as a whole.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 180Post v. Torres y Pacheco (1914)
<p>On Response to Rule to Show Cause Wht an Injunction Should Not Issue.</p> <p>Nonresidents — Security for Costs.</p> <p>1. A local regulation for security for costs may not be binding upon the Federal court, and § 342 of the Porto Rico Code of Civil Procedure is not mandatory. If the complainant has abundant property on the Island subject to levy, a motion for security for costs will be denied.</p> <p>Rescission — Discrepancy in Contract.</p> <p>2. If all the property called for by a lease has not been turned over, or the consideration of the whole contract has failed, rescission will lie.</p> <p>Temporary Injunction — Burden.</p> <p>3. Where the matter comes up upon answer to a bill or answer to a rule to show cause, .the burden should be upon the plaintiff to show the necessity for issuing the injunction.</p> <p>Preliminary Injunction — Trial on the Merits.</p> <p>4. A court will not, upon, application for preliminary injunction, undertake to try the merits of the case. If the application makes a prima facie case for an equitable remedy, to which injunction is a proper accessory, a temporary injunction will issue upon a suitable bond. Amendable defects will be considered as amended, and defenses which are a confession and avoidance will be disregarded.</p> <p>Equity' — J urisdiction.</p> <p>5. A court of equity taking jurisdiction for one purpose will see that that is thoroughly carried' out, and the complainants will not be remitted to another court for part of their remedy.</p> <p>Lease — Discrepancy. ■</p> <p>6. A small discrepancy in acreage is a ground for damages, not for rescission of contract. Secus as to a quarter of the property.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 185Semidey v. Central Aguirre Co. (1914)
<p>As TO MODIFICATION OF INJUNCTION.</p> <p>Order of Court — Previous Term.</p> <p>1. While a court is bound by its decree at a previous term, this-. does not prevent it from modifying an injunction -pendente lite. This is in its nature provisional.</p> <p>Preliminary Injunction — Vacancy on the Bench.</p> <p>2. A preliminary injunction issued in view of the intended vacancy on the bench may be modified after the vacancy is filled.</p> <p>Equity — Trial of a Case Piecemeal.</p> <p>3. A court of equity will not try a case piecemeal and render a final judgment against one defendant, leaving the case open as to the other.</p> <p>Law of Waters — Porto Eico.</p> <p>4. The first law of waters extended over Porto Eico was that of Spain dated August 3, 1866. This was subsequently repealed and replaced by a new law of June 13, 1879, which was not extended over Porto Eico until Eoyal Order of April 5, 1886. This is still in force as amended by Acts of Legislative Assembly of 1903 and 1905. Water rights pass with the land to which they are attached without special mention or registry.</p> <p>Irrigation Eight — Separation from Land.</p> <p>5. While on a preliminary injunction the question of separation of irrigation rights from the land complained of will not be finally passed on, the court will protect the parties by injunction without waiting for action of the public authorities, and an injunction will be granted, although in the middle of the case, upon the giving of a satisfactory bond.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 190Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. v. Borinquen Sugar Co. (1914)
<p>On Petition op Certain Bondholders to Vacate Decree op Foreclosure Rendered May 13, 1914.</p> <p>Equity — Orders of Previous Terms.</p> <p>1. Where a cause has been in court for several terms and is tried upon the merits, points which could have been raised by demurrer will be disregarded and treated as waived by failure to assert them sooner.</p> <p>Practice- — Special Appearance.</p> <p>2. A special appearance can be made by a defendant who claims to have been irregularly served, and who wishes to set up certain defects. It cannot be made by parties who are not defendants in any sense.</p> <p>Practice — -Outside Parties.</p> <p>3. A person who is not a formal party to a suit, and does not wish to become such, cannot set up alleged defects in the proceeding. If he is not a party, he is not affected by the result, and has no' right to appear.</p> <p>Practice — Intervention.</p> <p>4. If persons having interest wish to appear in a suit, it must be by a petition, and upon a proper showing they will be admitted.</p> <p>Practice — Making Parties.</p> <p>5. Until an application is made by a person desiring to be made a party, the court will not pass upon the proper method of securing this result.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 195Welch v. Central San Cristobal (1914)
<p>As to Contract Preceding Receivership.</p> <p>Receiver — Existing Contracts.</p> <p>1. A receiver has a reasonable time within which to determine whether he will carry out existing contracts, and when so adopted a contract must be carried out in all respects. In such a case he must pay the contract price for the work done after the receivership prior to his election.</p> <p>Pre-existing Contracts — Adoption.</p> <p>2. The court may rearrange terms for the part of the contract performed after the receiver’s election, acting not on the ground of adopting an old contract, but of doing what is necessary to preserve the property.</p> <p>Pre-existing Contract — Railroad Iron.</p> <p>3. Where rails have been furnished prior to the receivership under a pre-existing contract, the debt has no preference. It is not a continuing contract in the sense that it has to be paid for .in preference to other contracts.</p> <p>Railroad — Operating Expenses.</p> <p>4. The substitution of a heavier rail for a lighter rail cannot be said to be an operating expense, when it appears that the lighter rail could have been still used for that purpose.</p> <p>Note. — As to receiver’s obligation on contract of the party whose property he holds, see note in 16 L.R.A. 90.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 200Welch v. Central San Cristobal (1914)
<p>General Creditors’ Bill — Claim of Complainant.</p> <p>1. The claim of the complainant has no higher position than that of any other creditor of the same class. It must be proved either under the bill or under a claim filed in the case the same as other claims.</p> <p>Claims — Publication.</p> <p>2. All claims filed, whether by the bill or under published order, are treated in the same manner. Their priorities depend upon their nature, and not upon how they get into the case.</p> <p>Creditors’ Bill — Consent.</p> <p>3. Claimants in court under a creditors’ bill stand upon an equality of right, and, if not represented by counsel, there can be no general consent on any subject. All claims should be sent to the master.</p> <p>Equity — Trying Piecemeal.</p> <p>4. The court will not try a case piecemeal, and will send all claims to the master, whether of complainant or of those brought in by publication.</p> <p>Creditors’ Bill — Mortgage Trustee.</p> <p>5. A mortgage trustee will be admitted to oppose claims upon his application showing that these will conflict with the mortgage.</p> <p>Receivership — Eunds.</p> <p>6. The court will not usually direct a receiver to deposit funds in any particular bank. If the court makes any order it would be for the payment into the registry of the court; but it may direct the receiver to segregate a certain fund for a good reason.</p> <p>Reference to Master — Claims at Issue.</p> <p>7. Under a rule of this court claims are referred to the standing master when at issue or ten days after filing if no issue has been, filed, whether the court is in session or not. The receiver should put a case at issue or otherwise for the guidance of the court.</p> <p>Creditors’ Bill — Mortgage Trustee.</p> <p>8. Where a mortgage trustee is not made a party to a general creditors’ bill, it is a serious question whether the jurisdictional court is not confined to collection of rents and profits. The rule may be different where the mortgage trustee himself is made a party on his own application.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 205Welch v. Central San Cristobal, Inc. (1914)
<p>Rents Prior to Receivership.</p> <p>Receivership — Rental Pending.</p> <p>1.A receiver cannot use the property of another without paying rent for the time he so uses it.</p> <p>Same — Prior Lease.</p> <p>2. A receivership fixes a different status, and the receiver is not liable for such part of the contract as has not been performed during the receivership, unless there is a lien fixed by law.</p> <p>Federal Court — Local Liens.</p> <p>3. The Federal court will enforce a lien created by a local law where it otherwise has jurisdiction.</p> <p>Note. — As to question of liability for rent of premises occupied by receiver, see note in 59 L.R.A. 673.</p> <p>Same — Receivership.</p> <p>4. Although a receiver has the option to cancel an onerous contract, he must, when he adopts it, hold it subject to all valid existing liens.</p> <p>Lien — Civil Law.</p> <p>5. The word “lien” is not known to the civil law. The Porto Rican law provides for credits graduated and paid in a manner-specified in Civil Code, §§ 1822 and 1823 as to personal property,, and § 1824 as to real property.</p> <p>Civil Code — Privileged Credits.</p> <p>6. The Civil Code, §§ 1823, 1824, relates to the privileged credits- or preferences given by law to certain creditors because of the presumption that such is the intention of the parties. The former section refers to personalty, the latter to realty. The priorities fixed by § 1825 are ordinary privileged credits, and come after the others.</p> <p>Lien — Preference.</p> <p>7. In American jurisprudence a lien is a right in regard to particular property to obtain satisfaction of a claim by force of sale. The-civil law preference is the advantage, primacy, or priority that is given to one competing creditor over another. Lien and preference-are practically the same thing.</p> <p>Lien — Louisiana Law.</p> <p>8. In Louisiana the landlord’s lien gives a pledge on personal' property on the premises. A lessor has a double right, — a right of pledge and detention, and a privilege or lien proper existing after the property leaves his possession.</p> <p>Rent — Proceeds of Property.</p> <p>9. A lien created by the local law is to be paid out of the proceeds - of certain property, and rent can be allowed preference only to the extent of the proceeds realized from that property.</p> <p>Rent — Expenses of Cultivation.</p> <p>10. The provisions of the Civil Code, § 1823, for deducting expenses of cultivation from the rent, cannot be applied in a case whom there is no evidence adduced of such expenses.</p> <p>Rent — -Severance of Crop.</p> <p>11. Under the local law the lien for rent is inchoate until the removal of the crop, hut becomes fixed when that is done.</p> <p>Rent — Sublease.</p> <p>12. Section 1823 of the Civil Code fairly applies to a sublease where the fruits of the property can be traced.</p> <p>Lieijs — Priorities.</p> <p>13. A declaration of liens upon property in a receiver’s hands does-not fix its priority relative to other liens. That is a separate subject, for investigation and declaration.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 215Erwin v. Fernandez Nater (1914)
<p>On Motion to Reconsider Former Oedeb.</p> <p>New Trial — Reconsideration.</p> <p>1. It is almost as important to have certainty in law as it is to have litigation decided right.</p> <p>New Trial — Local Practice.</p> <p>2. Local practice as to refusal of new trial, being res judicata, is not binding upon the Federal court. Since in Porto Rico there can be no appeal except where the amount is large, the court will not refuse to hear even the second application for a new trial if any good ground is shown.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 217Rios v. Palou (1914)
<p>On Substitution op Attobneys.</p> <p>Attorneys’ Pees — Court.</p> <p>1. The court will not decide the value of legal services rendered by. an attorney unless the matter is formally brought in a suit, or is submitted informally by consent of attorney and client.</p> <p>Same — Application of Client.</p> <p>2. Where a client makes application for the discharge of an attorney, and the court has granted the application conditional on settlement of fees of the attorney, it will decide upon the amount of fees, only upon application of client.</p> <p>Same — Bond.</p> <p>3. The court would permit such substitution upon the client’s filing: a proper bond to pay the fees which may be determined.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 219Gregg Co. v. Utuado Sugar Co. (1914)
<p>As to Receivership Liens and Sat.e.</p> <p>Receivership — Two Objects.</p> <p>1. In every receivership there is involved, first, the handling and disposing of the property involved and administrative questions, and, second, determination of the claims which are set up against the property.</p> <p>Same — B ondholders.</p> <p>2. In a receivership sale bondholders will be allowed to use their bonds in payment of their bid, provided enough cash is supplied to take care of claims given priority.</p> <p>Same — Property not Mortgaged.</p> <p>3. If there is property not covered by a mortgage, it may be ordered sold at the same time as the mortgaged property, but its proceeds in cash held as a separate fund.</p> <p>Claims — Priorities.</p> <p>4. In the adjudication of claims against a fund in court, there must be determined not only the correctness of the claim, but whether it has a lien, and also the relative priorities of the different liens declared.</p> <p>Bonds — Sale of Collateral.</p> <p>5. The court will grant an order permitting persons holding bonds as collateral to dispose of them.</p> <p>Receivership — Early Sale.</p> <p>6. In the case of such property as a sugar central, which goes by crop and grinding seasons, a sale shall be so regulated, if possible, that the purchasers can get ready for the next season.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 225United States Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Central San Cristobal (1914)
<p>On Appointment op Receives.</p> <p>Receiver — Two Receiverships.</p> <p>1. Where it becomes proper to have a receivership in two suits for substantially the same property, the same receiver will be used if possible, and his powers extended from one suit to the other.</p> <p>Receivership — Expenses.</p> <p>2. Where there is little to do except the actual winding up, the receiver will be instructed to cut down all unnecessary expenses.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 227Post v. Torres (1914)
<p>Injunction as to Contract.</p> <p>Injunction — Act of Congress.</p> <p>Where a bill presents a public and a private matter as grounds for injunction, it will be granted upon the private ground without reference to the other.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 229In re Dooley (1914)
<p>Re Petition eoe Receiveb’s Counsel Pees.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Receivers.</p> <p>1. Receivers can be appointed at any time after tke filing of the petition in bankruptcy.</p> <p>Attorneys’ Pees — Administration.</p> <p>2. Pees of attorneys for trustees and receivers are among the expenses of administration, and are payable out of the estate. The amount depends upon circumstances.</p> <p>Pees of Counsel — When Allowed.</p> <p>3. The allowance of counsel fees at the last meeting of creditors has advantages, but does not apply to a preliminary receivership. In such case an allowance will be made when the property is turned over to the trustee.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Amount of Attorneys’ Fees.</p> <p>4. Services and fees differ with different eases, hut the court adopts as a standard, varying with circumstances, 5 per cent upon the fund brought into court, claimed upon the fund when realized and paid out.</p> <p>Note. — Por cases passing upon attorneys’ fees in bankruptcy cases, see note in 54 L.R.A. 826.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 233Welch v. Central San Cristobal (1914)
<p>On Motion to Consolidate.</p> <p>Consolidation — Time.</p> <p>1. The object of consolidation is to save expense and make orders effective in both cases. It will not be granted where the party making the motion has already pending another motion to dismiss for want of equity.</p> <p>Consolidation — Not Before Answer Filed.</p> <p>2. There can be no consolidation until the court knows the issues in the two causes, and this cannot be until an answer is filed, until which a motion to consolidate is premature.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 235Santiago v. Roses (1914)
<p>Mortgage — Spanish Foreclosure.</p> <p>1. The old law of civil procedure in Porto Rico was promulgated by Royal Decree of September 25, 1885. This was an executory proceeding and prevailed until the mortgage law was adopted in 1894.</p> <p>Fraud — Presumption of Good Faith.</p> <p>2. By the Civil Code, as well as in equity, good faith is presumed. Whether either defendant is wealthy or poor has no bearing on this point.</p> <p>Plaintiffs — Capacity.</p> <p>3. A prerequisite to any judicial investigation is that the parties plaintiff have the right to sue. If they claim as heirs, the heirship must be shown.</p> <p>Power of Attorney — Death of Principal.</p> <p>4. Under the civil as under the common law death is a revocation of a power of attorney, but under the Civil Code, § 1640, what has been done by an agent unaware of the death of the principal is valid.</p> <p>Foreclosure — Notice.</p> <p>5. Where the original papers have disappeared a copy duly proved may be admitted to show that the defendants therein — complainants herein — were notified.</p> <p>Mortgage Procedure — Adjudication of Land.</p> <p>6. Under the mortgage procedure in Porto Rico land may be adjudicated to the mortgagee, and informalities will not render the proceeding void.</p> <p>Fraud — Prescription..</p> <p>7. An action of nullity has a prescription of ten years (Civil Code, § 1268), commencing from the consummation of the contract. Other cases of fraud are covered by Civil Code, § 1858, which gives ten years as to persons present, and twenty years as to those absent, with good faith and a proper title.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 240Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. v. Borinquen Sugar Co. (1914)
<p>Re Confirmation of Master’s Report.</p> <p>Master’s Report — Exceptions.</p> <p>1. Where the minute entry speaks generally of an exception to a report, but in point of fact the record does not disclose any exception taken, the submission will be held as taken from the record.</p> <p>Master’s Report — Equity Rule 66.</p> <p>2. The new Equity Rule No. 66 seems to declare a master’s report not excepted to stands confirmed ipso facto. There is no error, however, in entering an order of confirmation, as this makes everything appear of record.</p> <p>■Confirmation — Payment.</p> <p>3. The confirmation of master’s report as to a claim does not mean that it is to he paid at onee. Although confirmed, it stands over as in the ease of other claims.</p> <p>Master’s Report — Not Stare Decisis.</p> <p>4. The fact that a master has reported a claim upon a certain theory of law does not make that theory binding upon the court, if the report is not excepted to and the matter is not argued. It is binding for the purposes of that claim, but is only persuasive as to other claims.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 244Erwin v. Fernandez Nater (1914)
<p>On Payment of Money out of Registry.</p> <p>Order of Court — Money in Registry.</p> <p>Where money is in the registry of the court the practice is for it to be paid out .upon an order. But this is not an order of the court so much as a direction of the, judge, and may be made out of term time.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 246Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. v. Borinquen Sugar Co. (1914)
<p>On Motion to Vacate Allowance op Claims.</p> <p>Equity Practice — Rehearing.</p> <p>1. A motion is the proper method of securing correction of a clerical error during the term, a petition for rehearing the proper method of correcting errors not clerical in a decree before enrolment, and a bill of review is proper where a modification is sought of an enrolled decree, an error of law or fact.</p> <p>Intervention — Pinal Decree.</p> <p>2. A determination of a claim of intervention is a final decree, and cannot be vacated after the expiration of the term.</p> <p>Intervener — Standing in Court.</p> <p>3. A court of equity is inclined to grant leave to any person in interest to raise a material question, and will look beyond the mere matter of form.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 249Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. v. Borinquen Sugar Co. (1914)
<p>Classification of Claims.</p> <p>Master’s Report — Restating Allowances.</p> <p>1. Where a master’s report merely restates claims as previously-ruled on by the court, an exception will be overruled.</p> <p>Same — Unnecessary Finding.</p> <p>2. The court will not pass upon the recommendation of the master-which has become immaterial through subsequent proceedings in the-case.</p> <p>Trustee — Individual Bondholders.</p> <p>3. The trustee is the mortgagee for the purposes of procedure,. unless shown to be derelict in his duty, and voluntary applications by individual bondholders will be disregarded.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 251Santiago y Muñiz v. Amangual (1914)
<p>On Demukree to the Complaint.</p> <p>Federal Practice — Demurrer.</p> <p>Under Revised Statutes, § 954, in cases of demurrer, the party must specially set down the cause thereof, and unless the ground is so specially set out, it will be disregarded.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 253Antonmattei & Negroni, S. en C. (1914)
<p>On Appeal from Allowance op Fees to Bankrupt’s Attorney.</p> <p>Attorney — Names of Clients.</p> <p>1. An attorney does not appear in person, but on behalf of his clients, whose names should be set out.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Referee.</p> <p>2. In bankruptcy matters the referee is the court for almost all purposes, and his action will be sustained by the judge unless it is clear the referee is wrong.</p> <p>Referee — Court.</p> <p>3. The court cannot take into account anything that happens before the referee, exeept what the referee certifies, except what the parties agree has been done, and in certain cases what may appear by cer-tiorari.</p> <p>(October 15, 1914.)</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Attorneys’ Fees.</p> <p>4.Where the referee has allowed the attorney of the bankrupt $300, it is improper, in the absence of a satisfactory showing as to special difficulties, to increase the amount $200 more, where the whole estate realized the sum of $3,000.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 258In re Dooley (1914)
<p>Bankruptcy Sale oe Personal Property in Porto Rico.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Equity Practice.</p> <p>1. Bankruptcy proceedings are largely proceedings in equity. A bankruptcy court calls in the principle and sometimes the practice of a court of equity.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Ancillary Jurisdiction.</p> <p>2. Under the bankruptcy law proceedings in aid of bankruptcy may be had by ancillary proceedings in a district different from that of adjudication. Ancillary jurisdiction is peculiarly necessary under the circumstances in the district of Porto Rico.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Ancillary Court.</p> <p>3. While this jurisdiction is ancillary in its ultimate result, the proceedings in the ancillary court are practically exclusively for the purposes of administering the property within that district.</p> <p>Referee — Orders of Court.</p> <p>4. In an ancillary proceeding the court may appoint a special referee, or the court may give directions to the trustee as to sale and other questions. It is not necessary in a court of ancillary jurisdiction to appoint a referee per se.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 263Welch v. Central San Cristobal, Inc. (1914)
<p>Books of Account.</p> <p>Evidence — Books of Account.</p> <p>Business books of account do not prove themselves, no matter how regular they appear. In order to prove a debt by them, they must be shown to be kept in the regular course of business, their correctness shown by the official in charge of them, and his knowledge must be shown. They may, however, within the discretion of the court, be admitted pro forma subject to being connected up by further proof.</p> <p>Note. — As to authentication of books of account and entries as affecting admissibility in evidence, see note in 52 L.R.A. 590.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 265San Juan Fruit Co. v. Carrillo (1914)
<p>Definiteness of Description.</p> <p>Res Judicata — Civil Code.</p> <p>1. The subject of res judicata, is covered by § 1219 of the Civil Code of Porto Rico, which calls for substantially the same requirements as the common law. There must be shown identity of the thing sued for, of the cause of action, of the parties, and of the capacities in which they sue. The fact that other things also are set up in the pleading does not impair these requirements.</p> <p>Ejectment — Rei Vindicatoria.</p> <p>2. The proceeding in Porto Rico under the Code of Civil Procedure is statutory, and not in terms either civil law or common law. As no forms are prescribed, a suit to determine adverse claims under § 282 of that Code is neither ejectment nor rei vindicatoria, and its nature must be determined from its allegations.</p> <p>Real Action — Description.</p> <p>3. The definiteness of description relates more to the possession of the defendant than to the later action of the marshal. Stating that several people possess lands within a definite outside boundary is insufficient.</p> <p>Official Survey — When Ordered.</p> <p>4. Section 286 of the Code of Civil Procedure for an official survey applies where the plaintiff cannot secure a definite description outside of court.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 271Dinkins v. Prescott & Mehrhoff Co. (1914)
<p>Employees’ Liability.</p> <p>General Demurrer — Overruled.</p> <p>1. Saying that a complainant does not state facts sufficient to-constitute cause of action is a general demurrer and will not be considered.</p> <p>Employers’ Liability Act — Notice.</p> <p>2. An allegation that notice was given does not comply with the-statute that requires that notice must he given in writing.</p> <p>Same — Minors.</p> <p>3. Under § 40 of the Porto Rico Code of Civil Procedure a minor is allowed six months after he has obtained majority to commence-any action which he is entitled to bring.</p> <p>Patria Potestas — Extent.</p> <p>4. Under patria potestas the parent is authorized to represent the minor in general, and this extends to representation in suits for the-child’s advantage.</p> <p>Uncertainty — Statement of Law.</p> <p>5.Uncertainty in pleadings relates only to the facts and is designed to enable the parties and court to understand them. It is, not necessary that a complaint set out the law under which it is. brought. The law is self-executing and will be read into a complaint'.</p> <p>Negligence — Employer’s Liability.</p> <p>6.Sections 1803 and 1804 of the Civil Code covered all questions, of negligence, but the legislature has carved out and segregated from them a special system as to negligence between master and servant.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 275Lowe v. Nelson (1914)
<p>On Motiost to Strike Parts or Complaint.</p> <p>Damages — Breach of Contract.</p> <p>1. The allegation that a man’s credit was ruined to the amount of $5,000 as a result of the breach of a contract entered into with the defendant is an allegation of the proximate result of the breach.</p> <p>Payments — Moral Obligations.</p> <p>2. A plaintiff cannot recover as damages for the breach of the contract, payments which he was morally, but not legally, bound to make.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 277San Juan Fruit Co. v. Landrau (1914)
<p>As to Security eor Costs.</p> <p>Nonresident — Security for Costs.</p> <p>The fact that a nonresident has property within the district does not take him without the purview of rule 16 as to security for costs by nonresidents.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 278Sanchez v. Gestera de Ubarri (1914)
<p>Fraud in Bankruptcy.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Verification.</p> <p>1. A petition cannot be verified before the petitioner’s attorney. Administering an oath is a quasi judicial act.</p> <p>Same — Hindering Creditors.</p> <p>2. The bankruptcy law does not require more detail in allegation than the creditors could reasonably furnish. An allegation of fact showing intent to hinder or delay creditors is sufficient without adding fraud.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 280Welch v. Central San Cristobal, Inc. (1914)
<p>Offer of Letters in Evidence.</p> <p>Evidence — Letters.</p> <p>A letterpress copy book of a corporation cannot be offered in evidence without showing the loss of the letters of which it purports-to contain copies. The letters themselves may be admitted subject, to full proof, and the fact that some are signed by an officer personally is not material if it is shown that the matter treated of is corporate-business.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 283Hesse v. Ledesma (1914)
<p>Receivership and the Mortgage Law.</p> <p>Attorneys — Change of View.</p> <p>1. It is not material that attorneys have presented other views of the law on other occasions. It is their duty to present each ease with all the force and knowledge of which they are capable.</p> <p>Court — Parties Present.</p> <p>2. A court will hesitate to make a restraining order which will affect a third party who is not a party to the suit. No court will affect the rights of parties not having their day in court.</p> <p>Federal Court — Injunction of Local Court.</p> <p>3. Revised Statutes, § 720, forbids the issue of an injunction to stay the proceedings of a local court except in bankruptcy; but where this point was raised, but not fully argued as to special pro-eeedings in a local court, the question will' be considered again in a subsequent ease.</p> <p>Eeceiver — Appointment.</p> <p>4. A receiver is the agent of the court, not of the parties, and will be removed unless neutral. If the parties do not agree in recommending the receiver, the court may refer the matter to the master to nominate a receiver.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 288Welch v. Central San Cristobal, Inc. (1914)
<p>Reopening Confirmation of Master’s Report.</p> <p>Master’s Report — -Reopening Confirmation. ■</p> <p>1. Under new Equity Rule 66 the report of the master stands confirmed ipso facto, unless exceptions are filed within twenty days. This confirmation, however, is like any other decree of the court, and can be reopened during the term upon proper showing.</p> <p>Reopening Master’s Report — Petition.</p> <p>2. A master’s report may be reopened at the same term<-upon a direct petition. Exceptions filed after confirmation will be disregarded.</p> <p>Confirmation — Receivers.</p> <p>3. Where the master’s report relates to an issue between receivers of this court, the court will, in a proper ease, reopen the matter as one of administration, in which case it will be open to exception by anyone else also.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 290Semidey v. Central Aguirre (1914)
<p>Notarial Certificate as Evidence.</p> <p>Notarial Certificate — Evidence.</p> <p>1. A notary on tbe stand as a witness may adopt as part of his; evidence a certificate previously made by Mm. But anything hearsay or otherwise incompetent in the certificate will be ruled out upon proper objection.</p> <p>Evidence — Name of Canal.</p> <p>2. In Porto Rico, where irrigation canals are common, a witness testifying to a certain canal may state the name by which it is known.</p> <p>Evidence — Federal Court.</p> <p>3. The practice in the local courts of admitting all the statements of a notarial certificate is not binding upon the Federal court.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 293United States v. Garofolo (1914)
<p>Re Place of Impkisonment.</p> <p>Place of Imprisonment — Powers of Court.</p> <p>Under § 5541 of the United States Revised Statutes and the Porto Rico act of March 9, 1911, the Federal court has the right to designate the place of imprisonment of convicted defendants, and of defendants convicted whether for felony or misdemeanor.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 296In re Fernandez (1914)
<p>Voluntary and Involuntary Petitions.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Insolvency.</p> <p>1. The second, third, and part of the fourth acts of bankruptcy set out by § 3 of the law require insolvency at the time the act of bankruptcy is committed. This is not required under the first and fifth acts of bankruptcy. Under the fifth act of bankruptcy it is not necessary to allege insolvency at the time of committing the act of bankruptcy, but it must be alleged as existing at the time of filing the petition. Insolvency once proved is presumed to continue.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Insolvency.</p> <p>2. Under the act of 1898, unlike the previous acts, insolvency exists only when the aggregate of one’s property shall not, at a fair valuation, be sufficient to pay his debts. It does not now, as formerly, mean inability to pay one’s debts at a particular time. The alleged bankrupt’s admission of insolvency written by an attorney for the use of creditors will be construed to mean insolvency under the existing law.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Voluntary and Involuntary Petitions.</p> <p>3. A bankrupt may take advantage of the bankruptcy law by voluntary proceedings, although involuntary proceedings ha.d already been instituted; but this must be before trial and submission under the involuntary petition.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 301Welch v. Central San Cristobal (1914)
<p>As to Salt! of Receivership Property.</p> <p>Receivership — Sale of Property.</p> <p>1. A court of equity having possession of property by its receiver may, pending litigation, sell the property in suit when such course is necessary to preserve the interest of all parties, whether or not rights of mortgagees or other creditors have been determined. These questions may be reserved and claims settled out of proceeds.</p> <p>Receiver’s Sale — Whole Property.</p> <p>2. The whole business involved in a receivership should be sold either as an entirety or in lots all at the same time.</p> <p>Sale — Bondholders’ Bid.</p> <p>3. At a sale under a mortgage the bondholders may use their bonds as part of their bid, providing for expenses and preferred claims in cash, and any receivership sale ordered pending litigation should, if possible, have similar provision.</p> <p>Receivership — Preservation.</p> <p>4. A court cannot permit trust property under its administration to perish while determining who are the beneficiaries entitled thereto. It will take care of the property by some means.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 304Welch v. Central San Cristobal (1914)
<p>On Motion to Consolidate Causes.</p> <p>'Consolidation — Discretion.</p> <p>1. The consolidation of suits is authorized by Revised Statutes, § 921, which applies to equity as well as law. The object is to save costs and delay where two suits can be conducted together, and is within the sound discretion of the court.</p> <p>.Equity Jurisdiction — Ancillary Suit.</p> <p>2. An ancillary court has the power to regard its proceedings as entirely independent of those of the primary court up to the point of distribution of assets, whose net proceeds should be remitted to the primary court.</p> <p>■Consolidation — Identity of Parties.</p> <p>3. Where the issues and parties are not identical, consolidation is not appropriate. Nevertheless, if conditions arise in which the two causes concern the same subject-matter, consolidation will then be considered.</p> <p>Testimony — Two Causes.</p> <p>4.Where testimony is germane in two causes it may be taken in one, and an order applied for its use in the other case. Identity of evidence is not per se ground for consolidation.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 308Santiago v. Amangual (1914)
<p>On Motion to Amend Answer.</p> <p>Amendment — Federal Court.</p> <p>1. Revised Statutes, § 954, confers upon the Federal court discretion to allow amendments to pleadings upon such terms as it may think proper. The Federal court has this power independently of local legislation.</p> <p>Limitations — Waiver.</p> <p>2. Under the American system and under the procedure in Porto Rico the statute of limitations is considered a personal defense which must be pleaded, or it is to be considered waived.</p> <p>Amendment — Up to Trial.</p> <p>3. An amendment of pleadings, whether relating to statute of limitations or otherwise, may he had at any time up .to trial, and in some instances at the trial in order to meet evidence, and upon such terms as the court may fix in order to protect the opposite parties.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 311Welch v. San Cristobal Central (1914)
<p>Master’s Report on Intervening Petition of Barrioia.</p> <p>Equity Practice — Exceptions to Report.</p> <p>1. Under rule 83 of this court exceptions to the master’s report shall state the principle of law or conclusion of fact excepted to, and refer to the evidence relied upon. A reference to evidence upon the hearing on file does not come up to this rule.</p> <p>Master’s Report — Presumption.</p> <p>2. Unless there, is some satisfactory showing that the master is in error as to facts reported, he will he sustained.</p> <p>Master’s Report — No Exception.</p> <p>3. If no exception is filed to a point in the master’s report, an argument cannot he entertained in opposition to the finding of fact.</p> <p>Receivership — Previous Contracts.</p> <p>4. The court has the power to authorize a receiver to abrogate contracts affecting the receivership property in the interest of the trust, and this does not amount to an infraction of the contract, and does not confer a right to damages. The power, although unusual, exists, and is to be exercised with great care.</p> <p>Damages — Anticipatory Breach.</p> <p>5. If a defendant puts it out of its own power to carry out a contract, this gives a ground for damages. Becoming insolvent, and so necessitating receivership, is such an instance of making performance of a contract impossible.</p> <p>Receivership — Rejected Contract.</p> <p>6. Damages from an anticipatory breach of contract caused by receivership relate back to the appointment of the receiver. While-ordinarily the damages amount only to an open account, there are eases, similar to bankruptcy, in which a claim for damages by a colono-can be set off against the claim of rent by a landlord.</p> <p>Rent — Reduction of Rate.</p> <p>7. Where the master reduces the amount of rent called for by the lease without any evidence shown to justify it, he will not be sustained. The agreement of the parties to the lease, if not contradicted, is persuasive.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 317In re Dooley (1914)
<p>Allowance of Fees to Appraisees.</p> <p>Appraisers — Per Diem.</p> <p>Five dollars a day is fixed as a standard for appraisement of bankrupt estates, but special circumstances may vary tbe rate. The master’s finding as to number of days employed will be sustained, unless shown to be improper by tbe evidence.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 319Fuentes v. Santos Maldonado (1914)
<p>On a Petition of Intervention by the Claimant of Real Property.</p> <p>Fraud — No Presumption.</p> <p>1. Under the civil law as at common law fraud is not presumed, and, if an issue, must he proven.</p> <p>Registration — Notice.</p> <p>2. If an attachment is registered it is notice to third parties, hut if in point of fact it has been released, such registration is not notice of anything further in the case.</p> <p>Fraud — Evidence.</p> <p>3. If the evidence is not persuasive, fraud cannot he assumed.</p> <p>Registration — -Knowledge.</p> <p>4. If an encumbrance is not registered, the fact that a third party knows of it is immaterial. He is hound only by the state of the record itself.</p> <p>Registration — Fraud.</p> <p>5. If a third party buys property under such circumstances as amount to fraud, he is not protected by the registration statutes and equity will afford an appropriate remedy.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 323Welch v. Central San Cristobal, Inc. (1914)
<p>On Exceptions to Master’s Report.</p> <p>Receiver — Construction of Contract.</p> <p>1. Where the matter concerns a contract by a receiver, the court prefers to consider the questions on the merits, regardless of who raises them. In such case it will overrule pro forma objection^ raising the question of standing in court of objectors.</p> <p>Receiver — Compromise.</p> <p>2. Where there has been a contract between the receiver and another party, the court has a right to construe the instrument and consider the evidence as to the settlement contemplated.</p> <p>Same — Time of Payment.</p> <p>3. A contract providing for an accounting of the profits from a sugar crop is to be construed as calling for a settlement within a reasonable time of the close of the grinding season which was to produce the sugar.</p> <p>Receiver’s Contract — Compromise.</p> <p>4. Where the master has reported a settlement which seems to the court to be to the advantage of the trust, the court will confirm the same, and not go on to ascertain matters which might be more to the prejudice of the trust than accepting the offer made.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 328Teillard v. Green (1914)
<p>PRESCRIPTION AND GOOD EaITH.</p> <p>Opinion — Power of Court.</p> <p>1. Under Spanish practice an opinion and a judgment are combined in one paper, but this is not the American practice. While the judgment cannot be changed, the opinion is subject to correction by the judge making it until formally published.</p> <p>Cotenants — Presumption.</p> <p>2. Under the civil law, as under the common law, cotenants are presumed to hold in harmony with each other’s title, and it will take a stronger case of dispossession against a cotenant than against third parties.</p> <p>Prescription — Tacking.</p> <p>3.Possessions of different possessors may be tacked for the purposes of prescription. If the thirty-year period as to the possession of land is not applicable, the case must he decided under the terms of the ten-year period, as modified by military order in this case to six years.</p> <p>Good Faith — Definition.</p> <p>4. Good faith consists in one’s belief that the person from whom one has received the thing was the owner of the same, and could convey his title.</p> <p>Fraud — Relationship.</p> <p>5. Transactions between relatives are scrutinized more critically than those, between people having no such connection, but there is not any inference of fraud from the mere fact that the parties are relatives. Good faith is always presumed. Civil Code, § 437.</p> <p>Justo Titulo — Definition.</p> <p>6. The justo titulo, just title, required by the law of prescription, is not presumed, but must be proved. Civil Code, § 1855. It is of the nature of color of title, and is satisfied when an instrument is in proper form, although the title itself may not be good.</p> <p>Inscription — Registration.</p> <p>7. Inscription of real rights to immovables in the registry of property is necessary in order to affect third parties. Civil Code, § 613. But instruments which are null by law are not validated by registration. Mortgage law, article 33.</p> <p>Prescription — Ordinary, Extraordinary.</p> <p>8. The distinction between ordinary and extraordinary prescriptions is substantially common to all civil-law countries, including Louisiana and France, and their practical equivalent is found in the Roman law. The requisites for ordinary prescription are good faith, just title, and continuous possession under a valid contract. Extraordinary prescription relates to possession alone.</p> <p>Expediente Posesorio — Not Title.</p> <p>9. An expediente posesorio does not amount to a just title, for it is not per se a judicial determination of title. It is rather a basis of a future dominio proceeding which does declare title.</p> <p>Residents — Nonresidents.</p> <p>10. Nonresidents suing each other cannot always set up the same questions of limitation that are permitted to residents.</p> <p>Bona Fide Purchaser — Not Known to Civil Law.</p> <p>11. The defense of bona fide purchase without notice is not known to the civil law where all questions are decided under the mortgage law. It is peculiar to equity, but runs along much the same lines as the civil law.</p> <p>^Evidence — Original Bill — Bill of Review.</p> <p>12. The complainant not having made out her case on the evidence under the law as construed by the court, and nothing material that is new being shown under the bill of review, the bill of review must be denied.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 345In re Martinez & Co. (1914)
<p>On Review of Action of Referee in Bankruptcy as to Expenses.</p> <p>Local Custody — Expenses.</p> <p>If a trustee in bankruptcy does not claim goods of the bankrupt estate until charges for custody have accrued, the estate is liable for the expenses of custody.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 347In re Antonmattei & Negroni, S. en C. (1914)
<p>On Motion foe Removal of Tbtjstee.</p> <p>Pleadings — Sworn Denial.</p> <p>1. Where a sworn petition in bankruptcy is met by a sworn denial, the one neutralizes the other.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Supervision of Court.</p> <p>2. Bankruptcy proceedings are not inter partes in the same sense with other proceedings. Bankruptcy is especially under the supervision of the court because it concerns administration of an estate by court officials.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 349Cleveland Bigelow v. Poto Rico Planters Co. (1914)
<p>Osr Motion to Dismiss fob Want of Jubisdiction.</p> <p>'Citizenship — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>1. The personal jurisdiction of the United States district court for Porto Rico is based on citizenship, and not on residence. There may be a suit between citizens of different states.</p> <p>•Service — N onresidents.</p> <p>2. The acts of 1887 and 1888, which authorize the service of residents only, are not locally applicable in Porto Rico. Nevers v. Central Altagraeia, 3 Porto Rico Fed. Rep. 496, affirmed.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 352Fanfan v. Fajardo Sugar Growers Ass'n (1914)
<p>On Motion to Dismiss upon Payment of Costs.</p> <p>Procedure — Dismissal.</p> <p>1. Rule 39 of tliis court as to dismissal refers to the clerk, but the principles will be followed in actions by the court.</p> <p>Nonsuit — Dismissal.</p> <p>2. Nonsuit was originally had upon motion of the plaintiff. Dismissal is the action of the court. But practically there is now little difference between the two.</p> <p>Counterclaim — Affirmative Relief.</p> <p>3. Under the Porto Rican practice a counterclaim is much the same as an offset in the American practice. Affirmative relief goes beyond defeating the plaintiff’s claim and seeks additional relief.</p> <p>Dismissal — Costs.</p> <p>4. The actual taxable costs of both sides up to the granting of the motion must be paid before a motion for dismissal under § 192-of the Porto Rico Code of Civil Procedure.</p> <p>Dismissal — Merits.</p> <p>5. A dismissal or nonsuit under § 192 of the Porto Rico Code of ■Civil Procedure is not upon the merits, and the case can be brought up at some future time; but it cannot be brought up again in the Federal court unless the costs of the first trial have been paid.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 357Welch v. Central San Cristobal, Inc. (1914)
<p>Fees foe Stenogeaphic Woek befoee the Mastee.</p> <p>Practice Before the Master — Not a Precedent.</p> <p>1. Whatever has been done upon the practice before the standing master, and not brought to the attention of the court by exception or otherwise, is not binding upon the court, and will be considered upon its merits.</p> <p>Stenographer’s Fees — Copies of Testimony.</p> <p>2. The fact that it has been the practice for copies of testimony before the master to be furnished the parties without the order of the -master is no reason that they be allowed as a proper expense of the hearing. It is a matter for the parties receiving the copies, if chargeable at all.</p> <p>Master’s Report — Not Itemized.</p> <p>3. Where there are some matters of expense in the master’s report which cannot be allowed, but are not so itemized as to be separated, the whole matter will be re-referred to the master to allow or dis- ■ allow according to the opinion of the court.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 360In re Porto Rico Progress Publishing Co. (1914)
<p>Involuntary Bankruptcy.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Confession.</p> <p>1. While the return day in involuntary proceedings in bankruptcy is after fifteen days, and this cannot be shortened as to creditors, a confession by the bankrupt himself within that time authorizes adjudication.</p> <p>Jurisdiction — Adjudication.</p> <p>2. There is no want of jurisdiction when the adjudication is made immediately upon the confession of a petition in bankruptcy. Whatever rights creditors may have will be conserved by the court by further orders.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 362Dawes v. McCormick (1914)
<p>DEMURRER.</p> <p>Tort — Employee and Corporation.</p> <p>1. The old rule that a corporation could not be held to authorize a tort on the part of its employees has been changed. A tort committed within the scope of the agent’s authority may be visited upon the corporation itself. If the agent goes outside of his employment in committing the tort, he is liable, and the corporation is not.</p> <p>Tort — Principal and Agent.</p> <p>2. A corporation may be joined as a defendant with its agent in an action to recover damages for his tort.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 364Fanfan v. Fajardo Sugar Growers Ass'n (1914)
<p>In the Matter op Payment op Costs before Dismissal.</p> <p>Dismissal — Forma Pauperis.</p> <p>1. If a person suing m forma pauperis moves to dismiss his suit, he is subject to the payment of costs just as any other plaintiff. The exemption from costs applies to him while suing, not when asking dismissal of a suit.</p> <p>Nonsuit — Costs.</p> <p>2. If the plaintiff asks a nonsuit in order to begin a suit de novo, the defendant must be put in the same position that he was, that is, his costs must be paid up to the granting of the nonsuit.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 367Gregg Co. v. Utuado Sugar Co. (1914)
<p>Isr the Matter of the Lease to Carlos Cabrera.</p> <p>Receivership — Lease.</p> <p>1. Where the court deems it proper to lease the receivership property on bids made, it has.no right'to change offers submitted except, by consent.</p> <p>Lease — Vague Item.</p> <p>2. The matter of drawing a proposed lease will be referred to the master for an administrative report. It is his duty to make certain all vague details.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 370Welch v. Central San Cristobal, Inc. (1914)
<p>In the Matter of the Claim of Barrióla & Company.</p> <p>Receivership — Operating Expenses.</p> <p>Where rent has been increased in order to cover a right of way, the increase is in the nature of a purchase or original construction, and not of an operating expense for the six months preceding receivership.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 371Romero Fernandez v. Calaf (1914)
<p>On Motion to Modify Former Order of Court.</p> <p>Decrees — Court and Counsel.</p> <p>1. The rules provide that counsel shall draw decrees subject to the approval of the court. Counsel should also see that minute entries in important matters are correct.</p> <p>Practice — Pleadings, Trial, Verdict, and Judgment.</p> <p>2. In every case there are the four steps of pleading, trial, verdict, and judgment. Setting aside one does not set aside the other. If the judgment is set aside, the verdict may be set aside and retried in part, and remain undisturbed in part.</p> <p>Stay of Execution.</p> <p>3. If a judgment has been set aside, there can be no stay of execution because there is no execution.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 376Romero Fernandez v. Calaf (1914)
<p>On the Method Oe Pbooe oe a Fobeign Law.</p> <p>Santo Domingo — Foreign State.</p> <p>1. The United States has special relations with Santo Domingo,, but not such as to change the status of that country as a foreign, state.</p> <p>Foreign Law — Official Gazette.</p> <p>2. The Official Gazette cannot be used to prove a law contained in, it, unless the law is proved to show the Gazette has that effect.</p> <p>Foreign Law — No Judicial Notice.</p> <p>3. Courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be proved as matters of fact.</p> <p>Foreign Law — Porto Rico Code of Evidence.</p> <p>4. The Code of Evidence of Porto Rico is not necessarily binding-upon the Federal court, but will be considered with great respect.. Its provisions as to foreign law do not cover an Official Gazette.</p> <p>Foreign Statutes — Proof.</p> <p>5. A copy of a foreign statute proved to have been printed by official authority may be admitted. Local statutes generally provide-that the volume must purport to be printed by authority of the foreign government, or it must be proved to be admitted in the courts, of that country.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 382Gregg Co. v. Utuado Sugar Co. (1914)
<p>On Petition of Carlos Cabreba to Foreclose Mortgage and to Cancel Certain Contracts of Lease.</p> <p>Reference to Master — General and Administrative.</p> <p>1. The regular reference to the master is where he is to hear and report after notice to all parties, and this will he taken up the first motion day after twenty days for exceptions. Hiere is also an administrative reference of a clerical nature which does not call for a hearing or exceptions.</p> <p>Report — Exceptions.</p> <p>2. The equity rules provide for twenty days for exceptions, hut if parties agree to a shorter time the exceptions will he heard by the court, and the decision will he binding upon the parties so excepting.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 384Welch v. Central San Cristobal, Inc. (1914)
<p>In the Matter of the Sale of the Property.</p> <p>Receivership- — Sale.</p> <p>A court may sell the property in receivership subject to all questions of priority, when there is no other good way of preserving the property.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 386Cleveland Bigelow v. Porto Rico Planters Co. (1914)
<p>Verification or Pleadings.</p> <p>Notary — Affidavit.</p> <p>1. A notary is perhaps the only officer whose power has lasted from ancient times to the present. His original employment was drawing documents, but notaries in England have always administered oaths.</p> <p>Federal Courts — State Notaries.</p> <p>2. Notaries of the several states are authorized to take depositions, affidavits, and the like, the same as commissioners of the Federal courts.</p> <p>United States Commissioners — Powers.</p> <p>3. United States commissioners as to Federal offenses have the same authority as justices of the peace, and are given power to take affidavits, including verification of pleadings.</p> <p>Notary — Judicial Knowledge.</p> <p>4. A court of the same jurisdiction may take judicial knowledge of the signature of notaries, but the signature must be verified by the official notarial seal before recognition in courts of another jurisdiction.</p> <p>Notary Public — Certificate of State Official.</p> <p>5. The certificate of a state court or official as to the powers of a notary public is unnecessary. An oath before a notary is prima facie authenticated by the signature and seal.</p> <p>Verification — Knowledge, Information.</p> <p>6. The practice in this court both before and since the Porto Rico Code of Civil Procedure requires that the party’s affidavit verifying pleading must state that the facts are true of affiant’s knowledge, except as to what is upon information and belief, and as to these that he believes them to be true.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 392In re Solá é Hijo, S. en C. (1914)
<p>AgKICTJLTUBAL ADVANCES.</p> <p>Bankruptcy Law — State Priorities.</p> <p>1. For the purposes of administering the bankruptcy law Porto Rico is regarded in the same light as a state.</p> <p>Priorities — Fertilizer.</p> <p>2. Claims for fertilizer sold and used for cultivation in Porto Rico are créditos refaccionarios, and entitled to a preference under the Porto Rican law. This is as true in bankruptcy as in equity.</p> <p>Fertilizer — Not Used for Cultivation.</p> <p>3. The law establishes preferences upon the basis of the application of the supplies, and not upon that of the intention of the parties. Fertilizer is a charge upon the crop produced by it.</p> <p>Preference — Civil Code, § 1824.</p> <p>4. In refacción agricultural credits recorded in the registry of property have a lien upon the property, the object of the loan, but not, if not so recorded.</p> <p>Fertilizer — Refacción.</p> <p>5. Fertilizer obtained as an advance, but not applied to the land by the debtor, gives no lien.</p> <p>Refacción — Application.</p> <p>6. The object of the refacción law is to secure advances which have actually benefited the property. If the creditor wishes to lend money for general purposes, he must employ a mortgage. If for refacción, he must see to the application of the money.</p> <p>Refacción.</p> <p>7. Refacción in Roman times applied to making over a house, and was extended by the Partidas, a later Spanish law, to neutralizing land for making a crop.</p> <p>Evidence — Business Books.</p> <p>8. The Code of Commerce requires a business house to keep strict hooks, and affixes a public penalty; but the burden is on the claimants of a refacción to show the application of the fund, regardless of what the books may show.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 400Avalo Sanchez v. Veve y Diaz (1914)
<p>Costs before Trial on Reversal.</p> <p>Reversal — Previous Costs.</p> <p>1. Where the supreme court directs that costs be collected by exe cution, this process must be seasonably applied, and the trial court will not delay the retrial if a long time has elapsed and no execution has been sought.</p> <p>New Trial — Previous Costs.</p> <p>2. The usual practice of courts is not to grant a new trial without payment of costs of the previous trial, so that, before the losing party can retry the merits, he must put his opponents and the court officers in statu quo as to costs. If the supreme court directs a writ of execution of costs, this court will construe this as meaning payment of costs before a new trial.</p> <p>New Trial — Security for Costs.</p> <p>3. No security for future costs will be exacted in connection with an application for payment of costs accrued. If the latter are paid, there could be no inference as to inability for the future; if not paid, there will be no future costs.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 403In re Boucet (1915)
<p>Priority op Public Document.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Priority of Public Instrument.</p> <p>1. A priority is given by the Porto Rican Civil Code, § 1825, to a debt otherwise allowed privilege, if it appears in a public instrument.</p> <p>Priority — Claim by Agent.</p> <p>2. If a party who is an agent of another claimant sets up a priority for himself, it will not be allowed except by allowing also his principals opportunity to amend for the same purpose.</p> <p>Code of Commerce — How far Valid.</p> <p>3. The Code of Commerce covers all partnership and commercial dealings, and part of it originally covered bankruptcy and preferences of creditors. As to real rights it adopts the mortgage law.</p> <p>Insolvency Law — Bankruptcy Law.</p> <p>4. Local insolvency laws are suspended by the bankruptcy act, but revived upon the repeal of that act. This applies to the insolvency or bankruptcy sections of the Porto Rico Code of Commerce.</p> <p>Public Document — Priority.</p> <p>5.A public document entered into before a notary and filed in the notary’s archives is open to public inspection, and a copy of the index of notarial acts is filed with the supreme court, and sometimes in the Mercantile Registry. Giving such an instrument priority does not violate the Constitution or fundamental legal principles.</p> <p>Commercial Dealings — Civil Code.</p> <p>6. Section 1825 of the Porto Rico Civil Code does not apply to mercantile transactions as such. The priority mentioned does not attach to mercantile transactions.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 409Olivieri v. Olivieri y Negron (1915)
<p>Redemption ekom Tax Sale.</p> <p>Tax Sale — Order of Court.</p> <p>1. It is anomalous for the Federal court to conduct a tax sale and consider redemption therefrom. If, however, this was agreed upon by all concerned,' including the taxing power, the matter will be adjudicated in the Federal court.</p> <p>Sale of Land — Inscription of Deed.</p> <p>2. If a person buys a piece of land, and a deed containing the description is properly inscribed in the Registry of Property, proper notice will be held to have been given according to the mortgage law.</p> <p>Registry of Real Property — Description.</p> <p>3. The records of the real property registry are arranged in books according to the location of the land, and not according to the names of owners. While a deed not containing a description may be binding between the parties as a contract, it could not affect third parties.</p> <p>Redemption — Agreement.</p> <p>4. If the statement of facts agreed on for the trial recites a certain interest, this will bind for the purposes of the trial, regardless of what may have been proved on this point in other branches of the case.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 415Welch v. Central San Cristobal (1915)
<p>As to Renting Receivebship Property.</p> <p>Consolidation — Property a Unit.</p> <p>1. Where the property in two different suits is a unit, and one part cannot be well handled without the other, it is proper to consolidate the causes.</p> <p>Receivership Property — Lease.</p> <p>2. Where propositions are made by parties in interest for the lease of the receivership property, it will be determined, through the master or otherwise, which proposition is for the benefit of the trust as a whole, taking all interests into account. It is the whole property, not the individual interests, which must be considered.</p> <p>Case in Court — Letters to Judge.</p> <p>3. Where a matter is in litigation and the parties are represented by counsel, it is not proper for clients to write to the judge on matters connected with the suit.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 418Rodriguez v. Nicole (1915)
<p>On Demurrer to Complaint.</p> <p>Automobile — Control.</p> <p>1. That an automobile is under control of the defendant is stating a conclusion of law, and is demurrable unless tbe facts showing such control are stated.</p> <p>Note. — For cases on the liability of owner where automobile is being driven by chauffeur under orders of member of family, see notes in 41 L.R.A. (N.S.) 778, and 50 L.R.A.(N.S.) 63.</p> <p>Automobile — Owner Present.</p> <p>2. Where the owner is present in the automobile and in the active control of the chauffeur, the owner is liable individually under Civil Code, § 1803, and not as being responsible for the chauffeur under § 1804.</p> <p>Automobile — Complaint.</p> <p>3. A complaint in an automobile accident ought to state how the accident happened, or show that the plaintiff was not in position to know.</p> <p>Accident — Injury.</p> <p>4. A complaint based upon an accident should show the exact nature of the damages inflicted, so as to give the other side opportunity to know what he is to defend.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 422In re Pico (1915)
<p>Bankruptcy — Eule to Show Cause.</p> <p>1. Where a court rule requires a petition in review to he filed ■within twenty days, this practice is to he followed; hut in order to give the. judge fuller supervision over bankruptcy proceedings, there may arise strong cases in which the matter will be reviewed later by a rule to show cause.</p> <p>Note. — As to allowance of attorneys’ fees in bankruptcy cases, see note in 54 L.E.A. 826.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — -Attorneys’ Fees.</p> <p>2. Five per cent is a proper standard for compensation to attorneys for bringing a fund into court, whether bankruptcy or otherwise, subject to variation under particular circumstances.</p> <p>Attorneys’ Fees — -Creditors.</p> <p>3. While a referee may make an order as to attorneys’ fees at other times than at a meeting of creditors, important matters should be communicated to creditors as far as possible, so as to give them an opportunity of filing a petition of review.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 426Newman v. Ledesma (1915)
<p>Motion to Dissolve Eestraining Order.</p> <p>Jurisdiction — Day in Court.</p> <p>1. A bill alleging facts showing that property has been taken without due process of law presents a Federal question.</p> <p>Note. — As to due process of law as a Federal question, see note in 62 L.E.A. 530.</p> <p>Mortgage Law — 14th Amendment.</p> <p>2. Where a bill alleges that property has been 'taken without due process of law by proceedings in a local court, the Federal court will require a full transcript of the proceedings before passing upon the question.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 429Riera Coronas v. American Railroad (1915)
<p>Photogbaphs as Evidence.</p> <p>Evidence — Photographs.</p> <p>The admissibility of photographs is a principle recently developed, and is analogons to the admission of written instruments. The court will first satisfy itself prima facie as to the circumstances under which the photograph was taken, the witness testifying, and the like,, before admitting the photograph as evidence before the jury.</p> <p>Note. — The authorities as to the use of photographs in evidence are discussed in a comprehensive note in 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 843.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 432Welch v. Central San Cristobal (1915)
<p>Lease oe Receivership Property.</p> <p>Master’s Report — When Confirmed.</p> <p>1. As a master has a better opportunity for examining the witnesses, his conclusions will be sustained unless shown to be in error.</p> <p>Receivership — Lease of Property.</p> <p>2. Where it seems advisable to lease out receivership property rather than operate it, the method employed will be in the discretion of the court. It is not necessary to have public bidding if the court is satisfied that it has received offers for the best interest of the fund. The object of the court is the preservation of the property in receivership until the end of the suit, rather than putting it in shape for possible purchasers to carry on the business for profit.</p> <p>Lease — Sugar Central.</p> <p>3. Preserving a sugar central involves physical preservation of the property and keeping its clients or colonos attached to the central. While the usual method of preserving such a central is by having a receiver operate it by means of receiver’s certificate, if the receiver can borrow an amount which may not be sufficient, and is doubtful if he can get the plant ready for operation in time for grinding, and on the other hand a proposed lessor offers to assume all expenses and give a fixed rental, the latter course will be preferred.</p> <p>Receivership — Rental.</p> <p>4. The question of borrowing on the one hand, and of leasing on the other, will he determined hy the circumstances of each ease, and the court will exercise its discretion for what it deems the best interest of the property.</p> <p>Due Process of Law — Claim in Receivership.</p> <p>5. So far as possible everything in receivership is done only after notice to the parties interested, but this cannot always be done. The preservation of the property is the first duty; the effect upon the parties litigant is secondary. Where a party has filed exceptions and they have been considered, and no argument has been asked for, due process of law is not by the courts considering the exceptions without more.</p> <p>Receivership — Lease.</p> <p>6. A receivership lease for the operation of the property should be for a short time, provide for the return of the property unimpaired, the bond to be approved by the court, and the execution to be under the supervision of the court through its receiver.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 443In re Solá é Hijo, S. en C. (1915)
<p>Osr Petition foe Appeal.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Appeal.</p> <p>Where the proceedings raise an important jurisdictional point, this court will not he particular as to the form of review, hut will certify the question or record up as applied for, and leave the appellate court to pass upon the form as well as the substance of the review.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 445Hernandez v. Ochoa y Hermanos (1915)
<p>Rents after Decree of Possession.</p> <p>Master — Finding of Rental.</p> <p>1. Where a question of finding the rental value is referred to the master, his report will be reversed if he finds interest instead.</p> <p>Use and Occupation — Civil Law.</p> <p>2. At common law compensation for the rental value follows as a matter of course on a judgment for the land itself; but at civil law the question of good faith must first be considered. Good faith is always presumed, but legal bad faith may coexist with personal good faith.</p> <p>Givil Law — Good Faith.</p> <p>3. Legal bad faith begins from the time that the party is on notice of facts showing that he is wrongfully in possession, as from citation in a suit for possession. The result is that the fruits received belong to the possessor in good faith until, but not after, his citation in a suit. Fruits after that time go to him who wins the suit.</p> <p>Good Faith — -Rents on Reversal.</p> <p>4. If the appellate court declares the party in possession in good faith, any fruits or rents which the opposite party may subsequently recover must go back, not to the original citation, but the decree in the main suit.</p> <p>Mesne Profits — How Ascertained.</p> <p>5. Mesne profits consist of what the premises are reasonably worth annually, with interest at the time of the trial. A possessor in bad faith shall pay for the fruits collected and for those which the lawful possessor might have collected under all the circumstances of each case.</p> <p>Mesne Profits — Pending Suit.</p> <p>6. A possessor originally in good faith is not to he punished as an insurer of all the profits 'which the land could possibly have produced. He is liable for what the property could fairly be held to have actually produced taking the average run of years, and taking into account the regular cultivation and distance from market.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 459Gregg Co. v. Utuado Sugar Co. (1915)
<p>In the Matter oe the Report oe the Standing Master in Chancery on the Petition of Carlos Cabrera for the Cancelation of a Certain Lease Granted to Antonio Serbia by the Utuado Sugar Company.</p> <p>Receivership — Lease of Property.</p> <p>Where it seems best for the interest of all concerned to lease out receivership property which cannot otherwise be handled to advantage,, this will not be construed as affecting liens one way or the other Such procedure is in administration, and does not affect claims one-way or the other.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 463Bigelow v. Porto Rico Planters Co. (1915)
<p>On Demurrer as to Form of Contracts.</p> <p>Maturity of Notes — Presumption.</p> <p>1. A complaint is not demurrable for not stating the maturity of notes sued on. The law will presume that they are payable in a reasonable time.</p> <p>Note — Venue.</p> <p>2. A complaint under the Porto Rican Code is not uncertain because it does not state when and where the contract is entered into. A contract for the payment oí money is transitory in its nature, and, no matter where entered into, is enforceable in a court of proper jurisdiction.</p> <p>Pleading — Necessary Allegations.</p> <p>3. The only allegations necessary in pleadings under the Porto Rican practice are those setting out the essential terms of the contract. Alleging the date of the contract is not essential at the common law. Time is important only in connection with the statute of limitation, and that can be raised by plea. The same is true in Porto Rico.</p> <p>Contract — Exceeding $300.</p> <p>4. Under § 1247 of the Civil Code, ¶ 6, not previously described, a contract exceeding $300 must be reduced to writing; but this is directory as between the parties. All the provisions necessary for a valid contract between parties are consent, definite object, cause, or consideration.</p> <p>Same — Form of Contract.</p> <p>5. This rule has come down to the .present Code from earlier Spanish Codes and from the Roman law. The form of a contract is not important between the parties, but only where the law requires certain documents to be inscribed in the registry.</p> <p>Contracts — Systems of Law.</p> <p>6. Early systems of law are based upon form, but whether under the Roman, civil, or common law, forms have been gradually abandoned, and consent is the basis in most cases.</p> <p>Contract — Castilian View.</p> <p>7. In Spain this gradually evolved under the Castilian view which prevailed over the questions of form. The matter of form is rather more important as regards proof of transactions than as to their validity.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 475Calderon Acosta v. Porto Rico Gas Co. (1915)
<p>On Motion foe New Trim,.</p> <p>Accident — Control by Defendant.</p> <p>1. If control of the work by defendant is necessary for recovery of the plaintiff, and there is no evidence of such control, the motion for a new trial will be denied.</p> <p>Franchise for Laying Pipe — Not Exercised.'</p> <p>2. The fact that a right or franchise was issued to the defendant for digging up streets in order to lay pipes is not material unless he is shown to have exercised it.</p> <p>Construction — Completion.</p> <p>3. The fact that construction work had ceased at a certain time, and that the gas company was using the pipe underground, is no evidence against it that it assumed any liability for surplus material left upon the surface of the street.</p> <p>Negligence — Civil Code, § 1803.</p> <p>4. Liability under the Porto Rico Civil Code, § 1803, must be for the negligent doing or omission of an act with which the defendant is directly connected. There must be an immediate relation of cause and effect.</p> <p>Negligence — Contractor.</p> <p>5. A person causing an act to be done is not exempted from liability because there was a contract .between him and the immediate actor. But if the injury was the result of the wrongful act of the contractor alone, the employer is not liable.</p> <p>Note. — -For cases passing upon the liability of employer for torts of independent contractor, see note in 65 L.R.A. 620.</p> <p>Independent Contractor — Original Employer.</p> <p>6. At common law an employer is not responsible for the acts of an independent contractor.</p> <p>Negligence of Agent — Civil Law.</p> <p>7. The theory of the common law is that for every injury there is-a remedy, but under the civil law there is no remedy unless given by statute. The limitation of an employer’s liability as to negligence is contained in § 1804 of the Civil Code, which comes down from a long civil law ancestry.</p> <p>Civil Code, §'1804 — Liability for Agent.</p> <p>8. The liability of a principal under § 1804 does not rest upon the-basis of respondeat superior, but is confined to liability for persons to whom he stands in the relation of paterfamilias.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 485Quiles y Perez v. Valdez (1915)
<p>On Motion fob New Trial.</p> <p>New Trial — Damages to Employee’s Father.</p> <p>1.The estimation of damages under the employers’ liability' act is peculiarly for the jury, and the court will not disturb the verdict merely because its opinion differs from the jury as to the proper amount. The court has no right to substitute its opinion for that of the jury in such cases.</p> <p>Instruction — Asking Correction.</p> <p>2.If an instruction is not full enough this should be called to the court’s attention or a supplemental charge asked; otherwise the party cannot complain.</p> <p>Damages — Future Earnings. .</p> <p>3.There is no error in refusing to instruct a jury in a damage suit that they can take into consideration deceased might have added to his estate had he lived. In the case of the death of an average hoy of fifteen this would be going into the realm of speculation.</p> <p>Note. — For cases passing upon elements and measure of damages in cases arising under the Federal employers’ liability act, see notes in 47 L.R.A. (N.S.) 80 and L.R.A.1915C, 85.</p> <p>New Trial — Different Verdict.</p> <p>4. A new trial ought not to be granted unless there is reasonable ground to believe -that the new verdict will be different. Mendez v. North British Mercantile Ins. Co. 5 Porto Eico Fed. Eep. 332, affirmed.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 490Hesse v. Ledesma (1915)
<p>On Motion for Appointment of Receiver.</p> <p>Receivership — Pending Motions.</p> <p>Where a case is to be heard substantially upon the merits within a short time, and applications are made for a general and limited receivership, the court will appoint a receiver only to look after what is essential before the case is heard, with leave to parties in interest to apply in the meantime to extend the receivership on proper showing.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 494In re Espitery (1915)
<p>Re Application lor Discharge.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Trustee and Bankrupt.</p> <p>1. The decision of the court in a matter between the trustee and' an alleged creditor is not binding upon the bankrupt himself unless-a party to the suit.</p> <p>Discharge — Follows Adjudication.</p> <p>2. The discharge must he of the bankrupt as duly described in the-adjudication. It will follow the prior proceedings in the ease.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Amendment.</p> <p>3. The power of amendment extends to corrections of error, insufficiency, and uncertainty, and covers insertion of material aver-ments at any stage before judgment. It applies to petitions for discharge, hut where time to file objections has expired will be allowed only where there is record evidence to justify it. Amendment will be allowed which makes the application conform to the other proceedings in the case.</p> <p>Amendment — Ad j udicati on.</p> <p>4. Where an amendment of the application for discharge is made at the hearing, the adjudication will be reset for a future date so as to give contesting creditors right to oppose it.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 499San Juan Fruit Co. v. Carrillo (1915)
<p>On Motion to Strike and a Demurreb.</p> <p>Practice — Motion to Strike.</p> <p>1. A motion to strike for irrelevancy cannot be substituted for a demurrer to pleading for insufficiency. Because a judgment is brief,' and may need reference to tbe pleadings, is not a ground for striking it out from a complaint setting it up as res judicata.</p> <p>Res Judicata — Affirmative Relief.</p> <p>2. Res judicata is not always a defense. While under registration laws it may not be sufficient to confer title, it may be sufficient as an estoppel. It may affect tlie remedy, although it may not affect the title.</p> <p>Motion to Strike — Brief.</p> <p>3. A brief inserted as an exhibit to a complaint will be struck out as irrelevant.</p> <p>Prescription — Good Faith.</p> <p>4. A shorter prescription than thirty years does not apply where the defendant is alleged not to possess land in good faith.</p> <p>Description of Interest — Tenancy in Common.</p> <p>5. Where a complaint alleges that defendants are in possession of a tract of land without right, it will be construed as meaning that they are in possession as cotenants.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 503Dawes v. McCormick (1915)
<p>On Motion nor New Trial.</p> <p>Motion for New Trial — Damages.</p> <p>1. Where the court leaves the question of amount of damages to a jury, the amount allowed is not a question of law.</p> <p>Credibility — Jury.</p> <p>2. The question of credibility of two lines of evidence and witnesses is for the jury. Whether the court agrees with the jury or not is not material. Where credibility is involved it will not interfere with tile conclusion of the jury.</p> <p>Damages — Amount.</p> <p>3. The court usually will decline to interfere with the amount of damages found by the jury. There is involved not so much the question of what the court would allow as of establishing that verdicts will not be lightly disturbed.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 505Romero v. Calaf (1915)
<p>Re Foreign- Deposition.</p> <p>Deposition — Not Interfere with Trial.</p> <p>1. The court always desires to have all proper evidence admitted, and will grant applications for commissions, provided the taking of.' the deposition will not delay the trial of the case.</p> <p>Commission — Dedimus Potestatem.</p> <p>2. Ordinarily a commission is sued out in the clerk’s office to commissioners as of course, but a deposition may also be taken under a dedimus potestatem, unless the witness resides in a foreign country. A United States court cannot, for lack of jurisdiction, give power to a citizen of another country to do anything.</p> <p>Letters Rogatory — Civil Case.</p> <p>3. The Revised Statutes give a right to issue letters rogatory to take the testimony of a witness in a foreign country in suits to which the United States are parties or in which they have an interest. This does not apply to civil cases inter partes.</p> <p>Letters Rogatory — International Law.</p> <p>4. The accepted procedure under public international law is for courts to issue letters rogatory to a foreign court, requesting it to exercise its own powers of taking testimony and transmit the deposition when taken to the requesting court, with the express understanding that the courtesy will be returned on a proper occasion.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 510Riera Coronas v. American Railroad (1915)
<p>On Motion foe New Trial.</p> <p>Application for New Trial — Affidavit.</p> <p>1. Rule 62 of this court requires application for new trial to he under affidavit. This may he supplied at the hearing, in the discretion of the court.</p> <p>Federal Employers’ Liability Act — Capitalizing Damages.</p> <p>2. If damages to the father of a deceased employee under the Federal employers’ liability act are shown to be a certain sum, and the expectancy a certain term, the amount should be capitalized in a verdict by discounting the annual amounts to a present basis.</p> <p>Note. — For cases passing upon elements and measure of damages in cases arising under the Federal employers’ liability act, see notes in 47 L.R.A. (N.S.) 80, and L.R.A.1915C, 85.</p> <p>New Trial — Excessive Verdict.</p> <p>3. If upon the whole it seems to the court that the verdict is excessive, a new trial will he granted unless the plaintiff consents to a reduction to the amount indicated by the court as proper.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 513Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. v. Borinquen Sugar Co. (1915)
<p>In Matter of Powers of Receiver.</p> <p>Receiver — Protecting Property.</p> <p>1. The receiver of a sugar central must, in the presence of unrest in industrial conditions, protect the property in his charge to the fullest extent, but as to whether he used placards and other methods is a matter of administration to be determined by his own judgment.</p> <p>Same — Leased Property.</p> <p>2. The receiver will take similar steps to protect property which he has leased out by order of court. Leased property remains under judicial supervision.</p> <p>Receiver — Support of Court.</p> <p>3. The receiver will use ordinary methods of protection and his. own efforts, but if these prove insufficient he will, upon application, be supported by the marshal, who, under Revised Statutes, § 787, has power to command all necessary assistance in the execution of his duty.</p> <p>Receiver’s Employees — Dispute.</p> <p>4. The first duty of the court is to preserve property in its charge, but the court will promptly hear and decide any claim or dispute between an employee or other person and its receiver.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 516Hesse v. Ledesma (1915)
<p>Injunction Bond.</p> <p>Restraining Order — Bond.</p> <p>1. A restraining order may be issued without a bond, but where the hearing has been unavoidably postponed from time to time for several months, the court will require such bond as it would have required at the beginning had the delay been foreseen, and when so fixed will be made to cover damages since the issuing of the restraining order.</p> <p>Injunction Bond — Amount.</p> <p>2. An injunction bond should cover costs, counsel fees, cost of translations, expenses of incidental receivership, and any actual money loss.</p> <p>Injunction Bond — Ex Post Facto.</p> <p>3. A court cannot do anything ex post facto any more than the Constitution permits Congress to do it, but as it appears something-should have been done in the past, the court may refuse to proceed ■unless that is covered by a bond in the case.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 520Hesse v. Ledesma (1915)
Statement of facts. This cause came on to be beard upon a motion by tbe defendant Westphaling, after full answer filed, to dissolve the temporary restraining order heretofore issued, and alleging as ground that this court has no jurisdiction in the premises and that the bill is without equity.
- 7 P.R. Fed. 548Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. v. Borinquen Sugar Co. (1915)
<p>On Exceptions to Master’s Report as to Sale on Deficiency Judgment.</p> <p>Master’s Report — Notice.</p> <p>1. Equity Rule No. 66 does not require that any notice be given of the filing of the master’s report.</p> <p>Reading of Report — Notiee.</p> <p>2. The parties are to he held to take notice of what is done in court in the cause in which they are interested. The parties are held to take cognizance of the filing and reading of the master’s report.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 551Berwind-White Coal Mining Co. v. Borinquen Sugar Co. (1915)
<p>On Report oe Special Master as to Deficiency Sale.</p> <p>General Creditors’ Bill — Mortgage.</p> <p>1. A sale under a general creditors’ bill need not be made at the instance of the trustee of the bondholders.</p> <p>General Creditors’ Bill — Sale en bloc.</p> <p>2. It is a good ground of objection to a sale under general creditors’ bill that the property, real and personal, was sold en bloc, without evidence that this prevented competition. Non constat that it was proper to sell the whole as a going concern.</p> <p>Mortgage — After-acquired Property.</p> <p>3. The statement in a mortgage that the lien is to cover after-acquired property does not incorporate the property, when acquired afterwards, in the mortgage, under the mortgage law of Porto Rico, which requires the description to be recorded. Query, whether such a clause amounts to a contract for a mortgage on such property.</p> <p>Agricultural Corporations — Exceeding Land Limit.</p> <p>4. The joint resolution of Congress approved May 1, 1900, provides that agricultural corporations are restricted to the ownership and control of not exceeding 500 acres of land. But the purchase at a mortgage sale by a committee of exceeding that amount of land does not violate this provision before reorganization.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 555Pettingill v. Gandia (1915)
<p>Federal Court of Porto Rico — Proceedings in English.</p> <p>1. Attorneys have not the right under the rules of court to address the jury in Spanish.</p> <p>Same — Discretion of Court.</p> <p>2. The court has the discretion to allow counsel to address the jury in Spanish under special circumstances, provided the address is translated into English, by the official interpreter as counsel proceeds.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 558In re Fajardo (1915)
<p>Bankruptcy — Verification.</p> <p>1.Objection to composition must be verified, and, if by an attorney, must state why it is not made by the party. But opportunity-will be allowed to add proper verification.</p> <p>Fraud — Facts.</p> <p>2.An allegation of fraud is demurrable unless facts are stated from-which the fraud follows.</p> <p>Valuation — Tax Assessment.</p> <p>3. A valuation by the tax authorities is not evidence of value in a civil proceeding between other parties.</p> <p>Composition — Report of Referee.</p> <p>4. Where the referee reports favorably on an offer of composition,, and no facts are shown in opposition to his finding, the report willl be confirmed.</p> <p>Intervention — New Equity Rule.</p> <p>5. Anyone claiming an interest in litigation may at any time be-permitted to assert his right by intervention, but the intervention is in subordination to and in recognition of the main proceeding. A bondholder, however, cannot under this, without more, intervene to-do what the trustee ought to do, or to secure a recognition of himself as bondholder which can properly be secured later in the maim case.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 563Welch v. Central San Cristobal (1915)
<p>Creditors’ Bill — Claim.</p> <p>1. If a claim lias been referred to the master, it is not proper before his report to file a bill of intervention for the same purpose.</p> <p>Claim of Bondholders — Trustee.</p> <p>2. A bondholder cannot set up a claim unless the trustee is shown to be negligent in doing so. There is no necessity for a bondholder proving his ownership until a general order is made for proof of bonds.</p> <p>Bondholder — Special Rights.</p> <p>3. The fact that a general creditor disputes the issue of bonds does not give an individual bondholder the right to intervene without more. This is the duty of the trustee.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 567Hesse v. Ledesma (1915)
<p>Discharging a Receivership.</p> <p>Receivership — How Long in Court.</p> <p>1. A ease is in court absolutely for all purposes until it is taken out of court by a judgment or decree. This may be upon a motion to dismiss 'the bill or other proper pleading, but until dismissed and costs and expenses are paid, the receivership property will be kept in court.</p> <p>Local Court — Foreclosure of Mortgage.</p> <p>2. Where the Federal court has taken jurisdiction of property in the custody of the local marshal, it will in a proper case direct the marshal to proceed, although it may retain jurisdiction of the property for the purposes of adjusting costs and expenses.</p> <p>Receivership — Ob j ect.</p> <p>3. The object of the receivership is not to aid or to injure any party, but to keep the property intact until the determination of the right of the ease. It will not, even on final decree, release the property until payment or securing of costs and expenses.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 572Semidey v. Central Aguirre (1915)
Statement of Eacts. The bill in this cause was filed January 9, 1912, setting up that on July 30, 1901, the complainants leased a certain property of 734.31 cuerdas, known as the hacienda “Teresa,” in the district of Gruayama, Porto Eieo, to the defendant Central Aguirre Company for the term of ten years from August 1, 1901, with the option or privilege of renewal for the further period of ten years, the lease setting out the full description of the terms of the contract…
- 7 P.R. Fed. 620Leake v. McJones (1915)
<p>EXTENSION OE TIME FOR BILL OE EXCEPTIONS.</p> <p>Term of Court — Extension of Time.</p> <p>Where something has to be done, for instance on appeal, which cannot he contemplated at the trial term, an order may he made granting further reasonable time; but in this court it is an extension of time, and not an extension of the term, which is granted.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 623Saxe v. Dooley (1915)
<p>Individual Members op Foreign Partnership.</p> <p>Suit Against Partnership — Individuals.</p> <p>1. Where a suit is brought against certain named persons, adding,. “doing 'business under a certain name,” it is a suit against the individuals, and not against the firm.</p> <p>Federal Court — Foreign Jurisdiction.</p> <p>2. A Federal court will, in support of its jurisdiction, disregard elements of the case which show that there is also a jurisdiction in some other forum. Suit against individuals in a Federal court wilA not be affected by the fact that there might be a suit against a partnership of which they are members in a foreign jurisdiction.</p> <p>Partnership Assets — Foreign Jurisdiction.</p> <p>3. The partners both at common and civil law are individually liable for the firm debts, and an equity may arise to have partnership assets marshaled so as to pay partnership debts before resort is had to that of the partners. But if the partnership assets are in a foreign jurisdiction, it is as if there were no partnership assets involved. In such cases the individual partners within the jurisdiction are liable as upon a joint undertaking.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 628Santiago y Muñiz v. Amangual (1915)
<p>On Motion for New Trial.</p> <p>Citizenship — Proof of.</p> <p>1. It would seem the better plan to prove citizenship of the parties, and not rely upon there being no negative proof.</p> <p>New Trial — Bond.</p> <p>2. Where the defendant is in possession of land and is granted a new trial, the court may require him to execute a bond as a condition to cover damages of the plaintiff in the meanwhile.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 630Ponce & Guayama Railroad v. American Railroad (1915)
<p>Demuerer as to Estoppel, Etc.</p> <p>Uncertainty — Demurrer.</p> <p>1. If a complaint is complete in itself and the defense is based upon particulars which do not there appear, the remedy is not demurrer, but to ask for a bill of particulars.</p> <p>Estoppel — At Law.</p> <p>2. Estoppel is generally a matter of evidence rather than pleading. It involves a misrepresentation of material facts with knowledge, to a party innocent of the truth, with the intention that that party would act upon it, and he accordingly does so.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 634Ponce & Guayama Railroad v. American Railroad (1915)
<p>Demurrer as to Voluntary Payment.</p> <p>Prescription — Collection of Freight.</p> <p>1. The prescription of Civil Code, § 1869, relating to collection of transportation expenses, is six months after delivery of the goods. The same applies to passage. But these are inapplicable to contracts between railroads.</p> <p>Prescription — Torts.</p> <p>2. There is a prescription of one year for actions to recover possession and obligations from fault or negligence, hut this does not refer to a contract between railroads.</p> <p>Pinal Settlement — Settlements from Time to Time.</p> <p>3. Settlements from time to time provided for in a contract may be final if so agreed, or such construction is acted upon. It is not, however, a necessary construction of the words, even if the contract does not provide for any other final settlement.</p> <p>Voluntary Payment — Money Withheld.</p> <p>4. The defense of voluntary payment cannot he applied to money withheld by the party setting up the defense, even if not objected to at the time.</p> <p>Contract — Construction of Parties.</p> <p>5. If a contract provides for passenger, freight, and mixed service, it may be modified by construction of the parties, so as to make mixed cover both passenger and freight service.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 641Welch v. Central San Cristobal (1915)
<p>As to Reopening Confirmed Report.</p> <p>Master’s Report — Confirmation at Previous Term.</p> <p>1. A decree confirming a master’s report cannot be set aside by tbe court at a subsequent term. Each term stands by itself, even though it be in a receivership case.</p> <p>Inadvertency of Counsel — New Cause of Action.</p> <p>2. A matter cannot be reopened because of inadvertency of counsel in stating his case, but a new claim may be filed where the original does not thoroughly cover the subject-matter set up in the new claim.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 643Welch v. Central San Cristobal, Inc. (1915)
<p>In the Matter of Reports of Receiver.</p> <p>Receiver’s Accounts — Forms.</p> <p>1. A receiver in Ms accounts should state receipts and disbursements, and in the report accompanying should describe the condition of the property when he received it and the changes since. Such accounts are referred to the master for adjudication, not merely for examination, and exceptions must be taken before the master. Review by the court is upon petition, and not by exception.</p> <p>Receiver’s Account — Annual.</p> <p>2. A receiver should account annually unless required to do so at shorter intervals. No order is necessary.</p> <p>Master’s Report on Accounts — Recommendation.</p> <p>3. When a matter is referred to the master he should make a recommendation of some kind, and not general statements.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 647Reyes de Lopez v. Suc. de Sainte Jeanne (1915)
<p>Employees’ Liability Act.</p> <p>Local Employers’ Liability Act — Notice.</p> <p>1. If a suit under the Porto Rican employers’ liability act is brought within six months, no notice is required by statute. The words “and” and “or” are frequently used incorrectly, and in the construction of statutes are sometimes held to mean the same thing.</p> <p>Same — Widow.</p> <p>2. The widow practically takes the place of the deceased as plaintiff, and must allege and prove that the deceased was in the exercise of due care and diligence at the time of the accident.</p> <p>Practice — Direction of Verdict.</p> <p>3. Where the plaintiff has omitted some element necessary to make out his case, there is nothing to go to the jury and the court can direct the verdict. This applies if there is nothing substantial to go to the jury. If there is so little in favor of the plaintiff that the court would sot aside the verdict, the court may take the case from the jury without waiting for a verdict.</p> <p>New Trial — Discretionary.</p> <p>4. In Federal courts a new trial is discretionary with the court, and not subject to exception or appeal. The point is not whether the judge would have come to the same conclusion as the jury, but whether the verdict was such as reasonable men ought to come to. If not, a new trial should be granted.</p> <p>Note. — As to knowledge as element of employer’s liability, see note in 41 L.R.A. 33. The doctrine of last clear chance is fully set forth in note in 65 L.R.A. 418.</p> <p>Defect in Machinery — Known to Employer.</p> <p>5. Where an employer sends an employee of a different branch of the service upon a truck, the employer must be held to know the condition of the truck.</p> <p>Workman — Assumption of Risk.</p> <p>6. The workman assumes the ordinary risks of his employment, such as the failure of the master to furnish a reasonably safe place, if the conditions are obvious. A carpenter sent upon a truck does not assume the risk of being jolted off.</p> <p>Last Clear Chance — Porto Rico.</p> <p>7. The rule obtains in the Federal court of Porto Rico that even if the defendant is negligent, he is not liable if the plaintiff has a last clear chance to avoid accident and does not do so.</p> <p>Contributory Negligence — Walking on a Moving Truck.</p> <p>8. Where it appears from- the evidence that the plaintiff’s intestate was seated on a loaded truck and fell off after he got up and was walking along the truck while it was in motion, the conclusion is ■strong that he contributed to the accident.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 659Rodríguez v. Porto Rico Motor Co. (1915)
<p>Bringing in New Parties.</p> <p>Practice — Adding New Party, Defendant.</p> <p>1. The complaint must he amended before a motion can be made to add a new party defendant.</p> <p>Same — Bringing in Party.</p> <p>2. The court cannot mold proceedings to bring in a party unless the pleadings are amended by the parties accordingly.</p> <p>Same — Answer.</p> <p>3. What is true of the complaint is true of the answer. Warrant-ors and some other parties may be brought in on motion of defendant, but only where it is necessary to enforce justice.</p> <p>Same — Alternative Defendants.</p> <p>4. If an amendment is designed to make one defendant liable or tbe other, but not both, it is defective.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 662In re Dooley (1915)
<p>On Allowance op Attobneys’ Fees.</p> <p>Bankruptcy — Receiver’s Attorney.</p> <p>1. The receiver’s agent looking after property at a distance from him is' authorized to employ an attorney to advise him in cases where there is doubt. Such a representative is not bound to act as attorney.</p> <p>Attorney’s Fee — Ancillary Court.</p> <p>2. Where provisional services were rendered to the agent of receivers appointed by the primary court in another jurisdiction, but in a place within the jurisdiction of the court subsequently of ancillary jurisdiction, the questions connected therewith are to be settled by the court of ancillary jurisdiction. This court will not send a party 1,500 miles away to prosecute a claim which it can properly adjudicate.</p> <p>Attorney’s Fee — Representative of Receiver.</p> <p>3. When the receivers accept the action of their representative at a distant place without question, they accept also the services previously rendered to the representative by a local attorney, and must pay therefor.</p> <p>Attorney’s Fee — Receivers’ Representative.</p> <p>4. Such attorneys’ fees can cover only what was rendered to the representative in such representative’s capacity, and do not relate at all to services rendered to him individually.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 666Delgado v. Bernal Estate (1915)
Statement of Facts. Tbe original complaint in tbis case was filed by Luis Delgado et al. against tbe Guanica Central, on December 22, 1913, claiming an undivided one-sixtb interest in a certain sugar plantation called Fraternidad in tbe barrio of Guanica and municipality of Yauco, containing an area of 1378.30 cuerdas.. An amended complaint bringing in tbe Bernal estate and Santa Bita, as additional defendants, was filed December 30, 1913..
- 7 P.R. Fed. 683Barros v. Porto Rico Motor Co. (1915)
<p>On Motion to Dismiss at the Close of Plaintiff's Case.</p> <p>Decision of Court — Obiter Dictum.</p> <p>1. The binding part of a decision of a court is that based upon tlie facts of the case before it. What is said beyond the facts of the case may be good law, but it is not binding upon other courts.</p> <p>Note. — The cases as to making prima facie case of responsibility for negligence of driver of automobile, by proof of defendants’ ownership of car or employment of driver, are discussed in note in 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1091.</p> <p>Evidence — Inference for the Jury.</p> <p>2. The inference to be drawn from facts in evidence is for the jury, and not for the court.</p> <p>Corporation — Agents.</p> <p>3. A corporation can only act through its employees or agents. It is present where they are present. The liability of a cox'poration is not confined to the acts of officials.</p> <p>Issues — Good Eather of a Eamily.</p> <p>4. Where there is a bare question of liability under the Porto Rican Code as to negligence, the exception under Civil Code, § 1804, as to a good father of a family, will not be considered.</p> <p>Motion to take Case from the Jury — Doubt.</p> <p>5. If the court is in doubt as to whether sufficient has been shown to take a case from the jury, it will not do so.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 687In re Reed (1915)
<p>Dead Seaman — Funeral.</p> <p>1. If the captain of a ship has authorized the burial of a dead seaman, the expense will be ordered paid by the court out of the fund delivered by the captain to the marshal, under § 4544 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, as a proper expense against the fund.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 690Fuentes v. Suarez (1915)
<p>Parties to Suit.</p> <p>Fraudulent Grantor — When Unnecessary Party,</p> <p>1. In a suit between a grantee and an attaching creditor the grantor in an alleged fraudulent conveyance is not a necessary party. The property would not go back to him in any event.</p> <p>Certainty — Reference to Other suit.</p> <p>2. A complaint is not sufficiently certain when, in order to understand its terms, it is necessary to refer to another suit.</p> <p>Uncertainty — Description of Land.</p> <p>3. Where the suit relates to one tract of land which is described, and there is incidental reference tó another tract by way of showing separation, it is not necessary that the second piece be described in full.</p>
- 7 P.R. Fed. 693United States Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Central San Cristobal, Inc. (1915)
Statement of facts. On June 29, 1914, tbe original bill was filed in this cause setting out tbat tbe complainant was organized under tbe laws of New York, and is a citizen of tbat state; tbat defendant Central San Cristobal, Inc., was organized under tbe laws of Connecticut, and is a citizen of tbat state; tbat A. It.
- 7 P.R. Fed. 720Welch v. Central San Cristobal, Inc. (1915)
Statement of facts] Tbe bill was filed in tbis case August 14, 1913, and alleges tbat tbe complainant is a corporation organized under tbe laws of California, and is a citizen of tbat state, with its principal place of business in San Francisco. Tbat tbe defendant is a corporation organized under tbe laws of Connecticut, and is a citizen of tbat state. Tbat complainant is a creditor of tbe defendant in tbe sum of over $974,000, all past due and unsecured except $200,000.
- 7 P.R. Fed. 737Welch v. Central San Cristobal, Inc. (1915)
<p>Master’s report on claims.</p>