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7 Rob. 164

Colton v. Jones

The Superior Court of New York City · decided 1868-07-15

This was an action brought to recover damages for a forcible entry on the plaintiffs premises and carrying away his goods. It appeared on the trial, that the plaintiff hired the premises in question, on the 24th of September, 1866, from one Townsend, whose tenant he was, Townsend hired the room from the defendant’s mother, and was her tenant. His lease expired on the first day of December, 1866, when Townsend quit and surrendered the keys and possession to Mrs. Jones.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1868-07-15

How this case has been cited

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently November 1927

4 state decisions

101868187018801890190019101920decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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McCunn, J.

¶1I fully concur in the opinion of the chief justice. The defendant was not justified in entering the plaintiff’s premises and taking possession of his goods for non-payment of rent; no rent was demanded, and it does not appear that any was due, but even if it were due, the landlord’s lien for it has long since been abolished. After the defendant had placed the goods-in the hall of the building, his subsequent bringing them upon his own premises, and refusal to deliver possession when demand was made, constituted a conversion for which there was no legal j ustification. To my mind this constituted a cause of action without proof of any trespass.

¶2It is preposterous on the part of the defendant to contend that he had a lien for storage. Ho evidence to support such a claim can be found in the case. For the purpose of recovery in this action it was not necessary *178to prove a trespass, or a tortious taking. It is enough to prove possession by the-defendant and then a demand and refusal to deliver the goods, to sustain it.

¶3I therefore concur with the chief justice in affirming the judgment.

¶4Jones, J. dissented. (See his opinion, post, p. 669.)

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