star-pagination">*Page 634 the defendant claims that the timber on the land was to be retained by his father, but there is no reservation to that effect in the deed.

There is some testimony in the record to the effect that the father stated to some of his children that he owed his son James an old debt; that he had sold the land to James to pay this debt, and that he referred to his son two men who were seeking mineral leases on the property, and stated to them that the property belonged to his son. However, regardless of whether the father had received any consideration for the sale of the land to his son, he recognized the fact that the deed stood in his son's name and knew that a lease of the land would have to be signed by the person in whose name the land stood on the records. Moreover, his acts and statements indicating that he still considered himself the owner of the land outweighs any statements which might be construed as a recognition on his part of the validity of the sale to his son.

But the weakest part of defendant's case is the improbability of the existence of a debt due by the father to his son to serve as a consideration for the sale. With reference to the sale of a mule team by the son to his father in 1916, the son at that time was only 16 or 17 years old, was living with his father and working with him in some logging operations. While the son may have driven this mule team and claimed to own the team, yet the fact remains that his father furnished the money with which to buy the team and had charge of the logging operations. We cannot understand how a minor, living with his parents could acquire the ownership of a mule team which his father purchased for use in his logging operations, even though the team was driven by the minor son for his father. The same thing can be said as to the other amounts which the defendant claims to have advanced to his father while he was still a minor. It is admitted that this minor son had no property of his own, and the only way that he could buy and own a car, a horse, or a mule team, was by having his father furnish the money and allowing his son wages for his work.

A minor son remains under the authority of his father and mother until his majority, and in return for the support which the parents owe to the child, the child owes a duty to the parents to obey them and render them assistance when they are in need. C.C. art. 215 et seq. When we consider this circumstance, together with the fact that the father made practically no mention of this debt which the son claims that the father was due him over a period of some 15 years, coupled with the further fact that the father continued to exercise acts of ownership over the land after he had transferred it to his son, we are forced to reach the same conclusion, as did the trial judge, that there was no real and valid consideration to support this sale from the father to the son.

The sales of immovable property made by parents to their children may be set aside by the forced heirs, as containing a donation in disguise, if these heirs can prove that no price was paid, or that the price paid was less than one-fourth of the value of the property sold. C.C. art. 2444. We do not deem it necessary to pass on the question presented in the briefs as to whether the plaintiffs have the burden of proving that no consideration was paid by the defendant, or whether the burden rests on the defendant to prove the reality of the sale for the reason that the father. (as claimed by plaintiffs) remained in possession and control of the land, thereby throwing on the defendant the burden of proving the reality of the sale under Article 2480 of the Civil Code. In our opinion, the plaintiffs have proved such facts and circumstances in this case as to lead to no other reasonable conclusion but that there was no consideration to support the transfer of this property by the father to the defendant son. See Smelley et al. v. Ricks et al.,174 La. 734, 141 So. 445; Giles v. Kelly, 162 La. 512,110 So. 738; Peyton et al. v. Roth, 149 La. 147, 88 So. 773.

For the reasons assigned, it is ordered that the judgment appealed from be and the same is hereby affirmed at the cost of appellant in both courts.

LeBLANC and DORE, JJ., concur. *Page 635

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