¶1ON REHEARING
¶2In their motion for rehearing, Tobias and M.S. Carriers urge that Ring’s conduct was the proximate cause of the occurrence in question as a matter of law. Under the summary judgment proof, Ring’s conduct was a proximate cause of *663the occurrence. However, there can be more than one proximate cause of an occurrence. The summary judgment proof does not show as a matter of law that Ring’s conduct was the sole proximate cause of the occurrence in question. Proximate cause is generally a question of fact for the jury to determine, but may, under limited circumstances, be a question of law where evidence is without a material dispute and where only one reasonable inference may be drawn therefrom. Rodriguez v. Moerbe, 963 S.W.2d 808 (Tex.App.-San Anontio 1998, pet. denied).
¶3We recognize that a motorist is not required to react in abstract anticipation of the negligence or unlawful act of another. McCall v. Williams, 311 S.W.2d 743 (Tex.Civ.App.Austin 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e). We also recognize that a motorist has the right to assume that an approaching motorist will abide by the traffic laws. Clifton v. Wilson Indus., Inc., 589 S.W.2d 498 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texarkana 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.). However, in the present case, the testimony of Tobias made it clear that the speed at which Ring was entering on the ramp made him anticipate that Ring would not yield the right-of-way.
¶4Tobias submitted three cases setting aside jury findings on proximate cause. In Bodine v. Welder’s, 520 S.W.2d 407 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court determined that a driver’s failure to keep a proper lookout was not a proximate cause of a collision because at the time he would have seen the oncoming vehicle, there would not have been an opportunity to take evasive action to avoid the accident. In Taylor v. Brooks, 392 S.W.2d 878 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court found that no causal relation existed between a driver’s failure to keep a proper lookout and the collision. In Pittman v. Licerio, 496 S.W.2d 676 (Tex.Civ.App.-Corpus Christi 1973, no writ), the court found the jury’s findings on proximate cause contrary to the great weight and preponderance of the evidence because the driver did not fail to see something that would have alerted her to the danger that the defendant might either run a stop sign or, having stopped, proceeded on into the intersection.
¶5The present case was not a failure to keep a proper lookout because, as indicated by Tobias’s testimony, he saw Ring’s car at an early point. The issue for the jury is whether Tobias anticipated that Ring would fail to yield right-of-way and, if so, could his action have prevented the occurrence in question.
¶6This is a summary judgment proceeding. We are not making a determination that Tobias was negligent or that his failure to act was a proximate cause of the occurrence in question. We are only making a determination that there was some evidence that he did anticipate Ring’s failure to yield the right-of-way at a time prior to the accident. Whether this was negligence and whether it was proximate cause is a fact issue for a jury.