Distefano v. Lamborn’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 4 district · 19 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Sec. 478. General Rules as to Interpretation. — The question whether a statute operates retrospectively, or prospectively only, is one of legislative intent. In determining such intent, the courts have evolved a strict rule of construction against a retrospective operation, and indulge in the presumption that the legislature intended statutes, or amendments thereof, enacted by it to operate prospectively only, and not retroactively. Indeed, the general rule is that they are to be so construed, where they are susceptible of such interpretation and the intention of the legislature can be satisfied thereby, where such interpretation does not produce results which the legislature may be presumed not to have intended, and where the intention of the legislature to make the statute retroactive is not stated in express terms, or clearly, explicitly, positively, unequivocally, unmistakably and unambiguously shown by necessary implication or terms which permit no other meaning to be annexed to them, preclude all questions in regard thereto, and leave no reasonable doubt thereof. Ordinarily, an intention to give a statute a retroactive operation will not be inferred. If it is doubtful whether the statute or amendment was intended to operate retrospectively, the doubt should be resolved against such operation.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. DiStefano v. Lamborn

2. ““[Tjhere is a valid distinction between the accrual of the equitable, inchoate right to contribution that arises at the time of jointly negligent acts and the maturation of the right to recover contribution that arises only after payment of an unequally large share of the common obligation.” Stated differently, the right to recover contribution “arises only when one tort-feasor has paid or settled a claim for which other wrongdoers are also liable,” while the cause of action for contribution arises at the time of the jointly negligent acts. “Once in being, although contingent, subordinate, or inchoate, [the cause of action] has an existence in contemplation of law until it is no longer needed as a resource to which the joint tortfeasor may look for relief from an inequitable burden placed upon him by reason of the refusal of another to perform such other’s duty by paying his honest share of the common obligation.” This cause of action is a substantive right.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 719 F. Supp. 1310 - Lightner v. Duke Power Co.

3. “Forgetting for a moment constitutional questions which might arise if this amendment were construed retroactively, let us examine its language in the light of the principle of law just quoted, in order to ascertain whether or not the Legislature has clearly intended that it should operate retrospectively. In the first place, instead of stating that the right of contribution granted by the Act shall be enforceable as to”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. DiStefano v. Lamborn