Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 70 F.3d 1191 - Levine v. Comcoa Ltd.

Levine v. Comcoa Ltd.’s Empirical Analysis

70 F.3d 1191 · 1995

Citation profile

15
cited by 15 later decisions
December 2005
most recently cited

5 federal appellate · 1 district ·

Relationships

Relies on Sampson v. Murray · Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers, Local No. 70 · Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Flight Engineers' International Ass'n · Connell v. Dulien Steel Products, Inc. · Fernandez-Roque v. Smith

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “There is no statutory authority for the indefinite, successive extensions of temporary restraining orders ... Appellee argues that the time limits set forth in Rule 65(b) ... are applicable only to situations where the temporary restraining order was issued ex parte ... The fact that notice is given and a hearing held cannot serve to extend indefinitely beyond the period limited by the Rule the time during which a temporary restraining order remains effective. The statute contemplates that notice and a hearing shall result in an appropriate adjudication, i.e. the issuance or denial of a preliminary injunction, not an extension of the temporary stay. The purpose of a temporary restraining order is to preserve an existing situation in statu quo until the court has an opportunity to pass upon the merits of the demand for a preliminary injunction. Such an order is necessarily limited to a very brief period because what may later prove to be a right of the party who is restrained is suspended before even a tentative adjudication as to that right has been had.... It is because the remedy is so drastic and may have such adverse consequences that the authority to issue temporary restraining orders is carefully hedged in Rule 65(b) by protective provisions. And the most important of these protected provisions is the limitation on the time during which such an order can continue to be effective. It is for the same reason, the possibility of drastic consequences which cannot later be co”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  2. “A district court, if it were able to shield its orders from appellate review merely by designating them as temporary restraining orders, rather than as preliminary injunctions, would have virtually unlimited authority over the parties in an injunctive proceeding. In this case, where an adversary heading has been held, and the court’s basis for issuing the order strongly challenged, classification of the potentially unlimited order as a temporary restraining order seems particularly unjustified. Therefore, we view the order at issue here as a preliminary injunction.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
  3. “Two concerns about TROs are reflected in the case law and in Rule 65. First, restrained parties often have no opportunity for a hearing and may not know precisely what conduct is prohibited. Second, a restrained party may not obtain appellate review of a TRO. Our holding respects both these concerns; Grossman and Grossman’s client had the opportunity to contest the preliminary injunction (and had previous notice of the enjoined conduct) and also could have obtained appellate review of the injunction.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.