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70 Ill. App. 671

Abbott v. Stone

Appellate Court of Illinois

Decided July 26, 1897

Appellate Court of Illinois · decided 1897-07-26

<p>1. Usury—Duplicate Promises.—A principal note contained a promise to pay interest. Notes for the amount of the interest were also given, this fact being recited in the principal note. Held, that the form of the transaction did not render it usurious, only one payment being intended.</p> <p>2. Evidence—Of the Payment of Taxes.—The receipt of a county collector is competent evidence of the payment of taxes.</p> <p>3. Mortgages—Allowance of Solicitor's Fees Under Trust Deed.—</p> <p>Attorney’s fees may be allowed to the holder of notes secured by a trust deed providing for the payment of attorney’s fees to the trustee in case of foreclosure, as it matters not to the grantor whether he pays to the trustee or the holder of the notes.</p> <p>4. Promissory Notes—Indorsements as Evidence of Title.—Notes offered in evidence by the complainant in a foreclosure suit showed indorsements to a third person which the complainant testified were for collection only. Held, that this was sufficient as equity looks to substance and as the indorsements might have been canceled.</p> <p>¡5. Equity Practice—As to Orders of Reference.—A cause was referred to a master in chancery to take proof of the allegations of the bill. The defendant did not ask that the master be ordered to take proof of the averments of the answer, or make any objection to the form of the order, and he and his witnesses testified before the master. Held, that the defendant could not complain of the form of the order on appeal.</p>

Relies on Cheltenham Improvement Co. v. Whitehead

Affirmed · Decided 1897-07-26

Mr. Justice Windes

¶1DELIVERED THE OPINION 0E THE COURT.

¶2This is an appeal from a decree of foreclosure of a trust deed given to secure a loan of $20,000. The bill was filed by the trustee and holder of the secured notes.

¶3The principal note given by appellant was as follows :

¶4“ $20,000.00. Chicago, Ills., July 14, 1892.

¶5On August 15th, A. D. 1897, after date, for value received I, Alice, Asbury Abbott, promise to pay to the order of George W. Stone, of Chicago, the principal sum of twenty thousand (20,000) dollars, with interest thereon at the rate of six (6) per cent per annum from August 15, 1892, payable half yearly, to wit: On the fifteenth day of February and of August in each year, until said principal sum is fully paid. Both principal and interest are payable at Northern Trust Co.’s Bank, of Chicago.

¶6The several installments of interest aforesaid, for said period, five years, are further evidenced by ten (10) interest notes, or coupons, of even date herewith.

¶7The payment of this note is secured by trust deed of even date herewith, on real estate in city of Chicago, Cook county, Illinois.

¶8Alice Asbury Abbott.”

¶9Ten interest notes representing the semi-annual interest for five years were also given by appellant, each of which bear interest at seven per cent per annum after maturity, and she now contends that the transaction was therefore usurious, not that usury has been demanded or was intended but that the form of the notes, principal and coupons, is such as to constitute usury.

¶10We do not so understand the notes.

¶11Four hundred dollars of the loan of $20,000 was paid to William L. Pierce & Co., and for this appellant gave the following receipt:

¶12“ John W. IJlm, 610 Chamber of Commerce Bldg., Chicago.

¶13Received of Geo. W. Stone the sum of four hundred (400) dollars as part of the loan of twenty thousand (20,000) dollars—balance left in escrow with Jno. W. Ulm.

¶14Alice Asbury Abbott.”

¶15This amount, the evidence shows, was paid to Pierce & Co. for commissions, and was entirely proper.

¶16Appellant objects to the just allowance of $239.57, paid by appellee, Stone, for taxes upon the incumbered property, and for which appellee produced the receipt of the county collector, which was competent evidence of payment, but if not, a witness testified that he paid the taxes.

¶17A solicitor’s fee of $539.38 was properly allowed under the provision of the trust deed, which appellant states as follows:

¶18“The provision is, that in case the trustee files a bill,and obtains a decree and sells the premises as trustee, or special commissioner, or otherwise, under order of court, he may, out of the proceeds of the sale, pay, first, the costs of suit; all cost of advertising, sale and conveyance, and reasonable fee or compensation as trustee; also (not to-exceed) two and a half per cent on the amount of such principal, interest and costs, for attorney’s and solicitor’s fees, and all other expenses of this trust, including all moneys advanced for insurance, taxes and other liens and asessments, with interest thereon at seven per cent per annum; and then ’ to pay the principal of said notes and interest up to the time of such sale; (third) rendering the overplus, if any, unto the said party of the first part.”

¶19As to such provision, see Cheltenham Improvement Co. v. Whitehead, 128 Ill. 279, which is authority for allowing the solicitor’s fee in this case.

¶20It is claimed that two of the interest notes offered in evidence appear to have been indorsed by complainant, Stone, to the Northern Trust Co., and that it should have been made a party to the bill. The notes were produced on the hearing by Stone, who testified that the indorsements were for collection only. This was sufficient, as equity looks to substance. The indorsements might have been canceled on the hearing, and that they were not so canceled can make no difference.

¶21The following order of reference was made:

¶22“George W. Stone et al. v. Alice A. Abbott et al. Bill,

¶23On motion of complainants’ solicitor, it is ordered that this cause be and is hereby is referred to William Fenimore Cooper, Esq., one of the masters in chancery of this court, to take proof of all the material allegations in the said bill contained, and report the same to this court, with his opinion on the law and the evidence, with all convenient speed.”

¶24This order is said by appellant to have been a nullity, because appellant insists that under it proof of the allegations of the answer was not to be taken.

¶25If appellant desired that there should be special directions to take proof of the averments in the answer, she could have asked for it. It is evident that in the order the word “bill” is used as synonomous with cause or pleadings.

¶26Appellant, with her witnesses, appeared and testified before the master.

¶27Afterward the following order was made:

¶28“ This cause coming on to be heard upon the objections and motions and exceptions to the denial or overruling of such objections and motions, saved by said' defendant, Alice A. Abbott, during the taking of testimony before the master in chancery, according to the provisions of the rule of this court, it is ordered by this court that the master make his report upon the evidence taken, and that all the said motions and exceptions be saved, to be considered by the court upon the hearing of the case, and the report of the master.”

¶29The master made a report, to which appellant filed objections, and these being overruled, they were refiled as exceptions, but appellant did not ask for a further reference or for the taking of additional testimony, or for another report.

¶30The testimony and evidence were reported to the court, appellant not asking leave to add anything thereto.

¶31The action of the trustee shows that he accepted the trust, and that the trust deed was and is a valid incumbrance.

¶32The decree of thé Circuit Court is affirmed.

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