Steinbach v. Murphy’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 7 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 9 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““It imposes an absolute prohibition upon the granting of an order after the lapse of a year from the time when it first could have been made. The right, by the terms of its creation, can endure but a year. The time element is an essential constituent of the right. When the year has expired, there is no longer any right, and the status of the ease is then the same as if there were no revivor statute. Analogies from the statute of limitations are not pertinent. That statute imposes limitations upon remedies; the revivor statute conditions the right. * * * A party seeking its benefit must bring himself strictly within its terms.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Spaeth v. Sells · Riney v. Riney

2. ““An order to revive an action against the representatives or successors of a defendant shall not be made without the consent of such representatives or successor, unless in one year from the time it could have been first made.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Spaeth v. Sells · Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Fenton

3. ““It is true that, some eight months beyond the time when the action could have been revived, the judge of the district court declined to acknowledge jurisdiction ; lmt the plaintiff did nothing within those eight months to protect his right to revive. Had. he profitably employed his time, and moved to revive instead of to reinstate, he could have secured himself against the unpropitious disposition of his case. Having failed to improve his opportunities, the erroneous decision of the court upon the question of jurisdiction amounted to no more than any other perverse fact working delay. The ease was pending in a duly constituted court, whose action was not adversely dominated by any paramount power, and the plaintiff neglected available measures, whereby he might have fortified himself against a destruction of his right hy lapse of time. All statutes prescribing time limits for the institution or completion of proceedings are necessarily arbitrary; but that relating to revivor is especially unforbearing, and parties must so order their conduct that, notwithstanding disastrous circumstances, and ‘moving accidents by flood and field.’ they may comply with it. Interruptions of the flow of the allotted time cannot be permitted ‘from reasons based on apparent hardship or inconvenience, hut must rest upon some practical impossibility to sue. They are limited in their character, and are to he admitted with great caution, and only in eases of strict necessity.’ 19 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Spaeth v. Sells