¶1 There is nothing in this case to distinguish it from the case preceding, Bank of Charlotte v. Davidson, and numerous other cases of a similar character. The legislative scale must be applied at the date of the note. The Legislature of 1866 thought it equitable that in all eases whether upon *125 loans of Confederate money or on purchases of property, the borrower or purchaser should repay the vdkie which he received. Snell contracts were not looked on as contracts to deliver stocks or specific articles of fluctuating value, where the damages for the breach would be the price of such articles on the day of delivery. We have felt ourselves bound by the intent and language of the act, and we have no reason to doubt that the assumed equity upon which the act was founded, was the one really and properl}' applicable to such cases.
¶2 We do not think that it makes any material difference that the note sued on, was payable on demand, or earlier at the option of the makers; or that it expressed on its face that it was payable in Confederate money.
¶3 Judgment below reversed and judgment may be entered here in conformity with this opinion.
¶4 Pee Curiam. Judgment reversed.