¶1 The mstructions requested by the defendant were properly denied.
¶2 It is true that “ in the earlier history of the common law only such acts were deemed criminal as had m them the vicious element of an unlawful intent, indicating a deviation from moral rectitude; but this quality has ceased to be essential, and now acts unobjectionable M a moral view, except so far as bemg prohibited by law makes them so, constitute a considerable portion of the criminal code. In such statutes the act is expressly prolfibited, without reference to the intent or purpose of the party committing it, and is usually of the class M which the person committmg it is under no obligation to act unless he knows he can do so lawfully. Under these statutes it is not a defence that the person acted honestly and m good faith, under a mistake of fact. He is bound to know the fact as well as the law, and he acts at his peril. These statutes do not make a gmlty knowledge one of the Mgredients of the offence.” State v. Cornish, 66 N. H. 329, 330, and numerous *197 authorities there cited; State v. Campbell, 64 N. H. 402—405; Commonwealth v. Uhrig, 138 Mass. 492; Commonwealth v. Savery, 145 Mass. 212; State v. Smith, 10 R. I. 258; State v. Hughes, 16 R. I. 403.
¶3 The statute in question dearly comes within this class, and having been enacted nearly five years subsequent to the decision in State v. Cornish, of which the legislature must be deemed to have liad knowledge, no room for reasonable doubt remains that the legislative intent was that the statute should be construed in accordance with its language and agreeably to the construction obtaining not only in State v. Cornish, but in preceding cases.
¶4 _Exceptions overruled.