70 Ohio App. 3d 624 - State v. Lewis’s Empirical Analysis
1990
Citation profile
147 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 147 later decisions — most recently September 2024 · most notably 79 Ohio App. 3d 667 - State v. Caldwell (1992), State v. Johnson (2006)
147 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Strickland v. Washington · Brady v. State of Maryland · Barker v. Wingo · United States v. Bagley · Arizona v. Youngblood
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 147 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[t]he States * * * are free to prescribe a reasonable period consistent with constitutional standards * * *.”
9 later decisions quote this exact passage“(C) A person against whom a charge of felony is pending: * * * (2) Shall be brought to trial within two hundred seventy days after his arrest. * * * (E) For purposes of computing time under divisions (A), (B), (C)(2), and (D) of this section, each day during which the accused is held in jail in lieu of bail on the pending charge shall be counted as three days. This division does not apply for purposes of computing time under division (C)(1) of this section.”
6 later decisions quote this exact passage““The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment * * * makes the good or bad faith of the State irrelevant when the State fails to disclose to the defendant material exculpatory evidence. But we think the Due Process Clause requires a different result when we deal with the failure of the State to preserve evidentiary material of which no more can be said than that it could have been subjected to tests, the results of which might have exonerated the defendant. Part of the reason for the difference in treatment is found in the observation made by the Court in [California v.] Trombetta, supra [(1984), 467 U.S. 479 ], at 486 [ 104 S.Ct. 2528, at 2533 , 81 L.Ed.2d 413, at 421 ], that ‘[w]henever potentially exculpatory evidence is permanently lost, courts face the treacherous task of divining the import of materials whose contents are unknown and, very often, disputed.’ Part of it stems from our unwillingness to read the ‘fundamental fairness’ requirement of the Due Process Clause, see Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 , 62 S.Ct. 280, 289 , 86 L.Ed. 166, 179 ] (1941), as imposing on the police an undifferentiated and absolute duty to retain and to preserve all material that might be of conceivable evidentiary significance in a particular prosecution. We think that requiring a defendant to show bad faith on the part of the police both limits the extent of the police's obligation to preserve evidence to reasonable bounds and confines it to that class of cases where the interest”
5 later decisions quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.