70 Okla. Crim. 340 - Collins v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 19 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 25 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““We think this request of the defendant was reasonable and should have been granted. However apparent the guilt of the defendant might have been, he is still clothed with the presumption of innocence and is entitled upon his trial to wear his civilian clothes. There is no statement in the record as to just the kind of clothes the defendant was forced to wear. Neither is there any statement in the record by the court as to his reason for refusing the apparently reasonable request of defendant’s counsel for permission to change to his civilian clothes. Ordinarily, this action of the court would constitute ground for a reversal or modification of the judgment. But in this particular instance, it is undisputed that many thousands of dollars were taken by the defendant while he was a trusted employee of the postal association. The forged check herein involved was for $13,776. All of this money was a complete loss. No explanation of the theft or as to the whereabouts of the money was ever given by the defendant when questioned as to the loss. The jury could have given the maximum punishment of seven years; instead they gave only five years imprisonment. For this reason we do not think the fact that the defendant was tried in his jail clothes prejudiced him in the least before the jury; and for that reason the punishment imposed will not be modified.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 210 So. 2d 9 - Atkins v. State · Alexander v. State

2. ““The prohibition of the common law and of the Constitution is against a second jeopardy for the same ‘offense’, that is, for the identical act and crime; or, as expressed in a number of cases, to entitle a defendant to plead successfully former jeopardy, the offenses charged in the two prose-cutiqns must be. the same in law and in fact. The plea will be vicious if the offenses charged in the two indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law, however nearly they may be connected in point of fact. It is not necessarily decisive that the two offenses may have some material fact or element in common, or that they are similar, where they are not in fact the same. The test is not whether defendant has already been tried for the same act, but whether he has been put in jeopardy for the same offense. The term ‘same offense,’ however, does not signify the same offense eo nomine, but the same criminal act, transaction or omission.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Thacker v. State · State v. Hall

3. ““Under the constitutional guaranty not to be twice put in jeopardy, the decisive test on a plea of former jeopardy is whether the same testimony will support both charges. Otherwise stated, the offenses are the same whenever evidence adequate to one information will equally sustain the other.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 73 Okla. Crim. 411 - King v. State · Thacker v. State