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70 Or. 232

State v. McDaniel

Oregon Supreme Court

Decided April 21, 1914

Oregon Supreme Court · decided 1914-04-21

<p>Criminal Law—Reception of Evidence—Restriction to Special Purpose.</p> <p>1. On a trial of two defendants for murder, the refusal to restrict evidence of declarations made by one of them after the murder in the absence of the other to the declarant is error.</p> <p>[As to admissibility of confession of third person in criminal ease, see note in Ann. Cas. 1913E, 723.]</p> <p>Criminal Law—Trial—Presence of Defendant,</p> <p>2. The trial court has the power to make a nunc pro tunc order in the absence of defendant for the entry in the journal of a record of a verdict of conviction, but the practice is not to be commended.</p> <p>[As to necessity of the presence of the accused in trial of criminal case, see notes in 28 Am. Dec. 629; 68 Am. Dec. 219.]</p> <p>Criminal Law—Record—Presence of Defendant.</p> <p>3. The record case should affirmatively show that defendant was present when a verdict of conviction was received.</p>

Cited by 2 later decisions — most recently December 1927

2 state decisions

Relies on State v. Walton · People v. Jung Qung Sing

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Reversed · Decided 1914-04-21

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¶1*235Opinion by

Mr. Chief Justice McBride.

¶21-3. The court erred in refusing to restrict the evidence of the declarations of Mrs. Poch made after the killing and not in the hearing of her codefendant. Declarations of an alleged conspirator made after the termination of the conspiracy are not admissible against a co-conspirator: 8 Cyc. 680 B, and cases there cited. A conspiracy is in the nature of a criminal partnership to do an unlawful act, and as in cases of ordinary partnerships each partner is bound by the acts and declarations of his fellow partners made or done in furtherance of the common object; so in conspiracy each conspirator is bound by the acts, declarations and admissions made by a fellow conspirator before the termination of the conspiracy, but, when the unlawful object has been accomplished, the conspiracy is at an end—the criminal partnership is dissolved— and no member of it can bind the others by his own acts, admissions, or declarations. The court should have expressly directed the jury that, while the evidence in question might be considered as against Mrs. Poch, it could not be considered as tending to prove anything against defendant McDaniel. While we are of the opinion that the court had a right to make the nunc pro tunc order in the absence of the defendant, it is a practice not to be commended. Neither the nunc pro tunc order nor the record of conviction or judgment shows that the defendant was present when the verdict was received. This was a grave irregularity, to say the least. The defendant had a constitutional right to be present at every stage of the proceedings, and the record should affirmatively show that he was present: 12 Cyc. 686, and cases there cited; Bishop, New Criminal Procedure, § 1001; State v. Walton, 50 Or. 142 (91 Pac. 490, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 811); People v. Jung Qung Sing, 70 Cal. 469 (11 Pac. 755). While *236we are not prepared to say, in the absence of a statute requiring the presence of a defendant to be noted, that a failure to record the fact of his presence would render the trial nugatory, yet the practice of doing so has been so nearly universal and immemorial that it is better not to deviate from it.

¶3Other objections are urged, but we deem them without merit.

¶4The admission of the declarations of Mrs. Poch without limitation of their effect was so prejudicial to defendant that it necessitates a reversal of this case.

¶5The judgment will therefore be reversed and a new trial granted. Reversed.

Mr. Justice Moore, Mr. Justice Burnett and Mr. Justice Ramsey concur.
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