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← 70 SW2D 618 - McDaniel Bros. v. Wilson

McDaniel Bros. v. Wilson’s Empirical Analysis

1934

Citation profile

61
cited by 61 later decisions
3
states following
May 2017
most recently cited

6 federal appellate · 47 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 61 later decisions — most recently May 2017 · most notably Trinity Universal Insurance Co. v. Cowan (1997), General Mills Restaurants, Inc. v. Texas Wings, Inc. (2000)

6 federal appellate · 47 state decisions

100193419401950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Robbins v. Chicago City · Kampmann v. Rothwell · Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. Co. v. Zumwalt · Scoggins v. Atlantic & G. P. Cement Co. · 58 Tex. Civ. App. 331 - Steger v. Barrett

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 61 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “* * * that liability for trespass is not dependent upon personal participation. One who aids, assists, or advises a trespasser in committing a trespass is equally liable with him who does the act complained of.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “[E]very unauthorized entry upon land of another is a trespass even if no damage is done or the injury is slight....”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “* * * because such definition was incorrect, not a proper definition, and *Page 1004 was likely to lead the jury to believe that in order for a new cause to break the chain of causation, it had to be the sole cause of the injury; that is, that the new cause of itself had to be sufficient, standing alone, to cause the injury, (c) "* * * because by requiring that the new cause be sufficient of itself to stand as the cause of the injury, it prevented the jury from considering the defendant's theory of the case which was that the defendant only created a condition or gave rise to the occasion which made the injury possible, and that its conduct was only the prior or remote cause, because, the conduct of the deceased in driving on the track immediately ahead of defendant's approaching train, on which the loud horn was being continuously sounded, was a new cause which produced a result which the defendant could not have reasonably anticipated, and that, therefore, the deceased's conduct was a new and independent cause and prevented the defendant's conduct from being the proximate cause of the collision.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.