Heyman v. Commissioner’s Empirical Analysis
1978
Citation profile
5 federal appellate ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 29 later decisions — most recently March 2017 · most notably Crown v. Commissioner (1981), Battelstein v. Internal Revenue Service (1980)
5 federal appellate ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Helvering v. Price · G. Douglas Burck and Marjorie W. Burck v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue · Burck v. Commissioner · Cleaver v. Commissioner · Rubnitz v. Commissioner
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 29 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“"However, even if the loan transaction had been so structured — and it was not — Branham would not necessarily be treated as having 'paid’ the loan fee. For the critical point which appears from the record before us is that Branham never had unrestricted control over any portion of the loan proceeds, much less over the entire $1,650,000. Its powers in respect of these funds were at all times subject to substantial limitations. Under such conditions, a prearranged retransfer of funds, immediately after they had been deposited in Branham’s account, as the final step in an integrated transaction would not constitute the 'payment’ which gives rise to a deduction by a cash basis taxpayer. Thomas Watson, 8 T.C. 569, 579 ; T. Harvey Ferris, 38 B.T.A. 312, 317 , affirmed per curiam 102 F.2d 985 (2d Cir.). Cf. Newton A. Burgess, 8 T.C. 47, 50 . Moreover, there is no evidence that Branham had sufficient assets— apart from the loan proceeds — from which it could have paid the loan fee in full. Cf. G. Douglas Burck, 63 T.C. 556, 559-560 , affirmed 533 F.2d 768 (2d Cir.).””
1 later decision quote this exact passage“[A] cash basis borrower has not paid interest when the loan transaction is structured so that a loan fee is “withheld” by the lender from what is called the principal amount of the loan and only the supposed principal amount minus the loan fee is actually made available for the borrowing taxpayer’s use. * * * [B]y signing a promissory note, it [the borrower] specifically chose to postpone paying that amount until sometime in the future. The entire $57,780 was to be paid ratably by the borrower over the life of the loan as one component of the monthly installments * * * which would ultimately result in the payment of the full $1,650,000. Therefore, [the borrower] may not deduct the $57,750 as “interest paid” during 1970. Rubnitz, supra, at 628. 10”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“the taxpayers maintained their bank accounts at the same banks from which the loans were obtained. The banks merely credited the loan proceeds to the taxpayers’ accounts and immediately charged the accounts for the amounts at issue. Therefore, even though the loan proceeds were first credited to the accounts, the lenders retained control over the proceeds by virtue of the accounts being maintained with the lenders. 70 T.C. at 258, rev’d, 655 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1981).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.