Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire’s Empirical Analysis
700 F.2d 376 · 1983
Citation profile
13 federal appellate · 4 district ·
Appellate journey
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 1 (§ 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act) · 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (Alternative Water Sources Act of 2000)
Relies on Parker v. Brown · Bates v. State Bar of Arizona · Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar · California Retail Liquor Dealers Assn. v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. · City of Lafayette Louisiana v. Louisiana Power & Light Company
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 36 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
““[I]f we can determine that the state gave the City authority to operate in the area of sewage services and to refuse to provide treatment services, then we can assume that the State contemplated that anticompetitive effects might result from conduct pursuant to that authorization. The district court properly focused on determining if authorization for the refusal to provide sewage treatment exists rather than attempting to find a specific authorization for the monopolizing effect that results from refusing to provide these services. If the state authorizes certain conduct, we can infer that it condones the anticompetitive effect that is a reasonable or foreseeable consequence of engaging in the authorized activity.””
3 later decisions quote this exact passage“The Supreme Court has required active state supervision of the challenged restraint only in cases in which the defendants were private entities or individuals. * * * In this context, the state supervision requirement is intended to control the potential for abuse created by authorizing private persons to make anti-competitive decisions and to insure that those decisions are consistent with the clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy at stake. Because municipal officials generally are politically accountable to the citizens they represent for their decisions regarding the challenged restraint, state supervision is not as necessary to prevent abuse as in the private context. * * * Moreover, because the Parker doctrine requires that the state delegate to the local government the authority to engage in the challenged conduct, state supervision of Kansas City’s conduct is unnecessary to find state action. * * * As a leading commentator recently noted: requiring state authorization for local conduct is analogous to requiring active supervision of private conduct; it tests whether challenged local activity is truly state action and therefore entitled to immunity.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“"Because we conclude in the present case that Boulder’s moratorium ordinance does not satisfy the 'clear articulation and affirmative expression' criterion, we do not reach the question whether that ordinance must or could satisfy the 'active state supervision’ test focused upon in Midcal. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 51 -52 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. at 841 n. 14.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.