Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc.’s Empirical Analysis
700 F.2d 774 · 1983
Citation profile
18 federal appellate · 19 district ·
How this case has been cited
Cited by 53 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently April 2015 · most notably Central Bank of Denver Na v. First Interstate Bank of Denver Na K (1994), Metge v. Baehler (1985)
18 federal appellate · 19 district ·
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 15 U.S.C. § 77Q (§ 17 of the Securities Act of 1933) · 15 U.S.C. § 78J (§ 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934) · 15 U.S.C. § 80A
Relies on Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder · Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston · Aaron v. Securities & Exchange Commission · Coates v. Securities & Exchange Commission · Securities & Exchange Commission v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 53 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(1) the commission of a violation of § 10(b) or rule 10b-5 by the primary party; (2) the defendant's general awareness that his role was part of an overall activity that is improper; and (3) knowing and substantial assistance of • the primary violation by the defendant. Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774 (1st Cir. 1983).”
7 later decisions quote this exact passage“[I]n the absence of a duty of disclosure, a defendant should be held liable as an aider and abettor only if the plaintiff proves that the defendant had actual knowledge of the improper activity of the primary violator and of his role in that activity [citations omitted]. Where the defendant has a duty to disclose the primary violations, however, courts have been willing to impose liability on the basis of a recklessness standard, [citation omitted] or on a lesser showing of actual awareness than is otherwise required,”
3 later decisions quote this exact passage“The district courts of this circuit that have considered this question have also held that such a private right of action does not exist. E.g., Kaufman v. Magid, 539 F.Supp. 1088, 1097-98 (D.Mass.1982); Manchester Bank v. Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 497 F.Supp. 1304, 1314 (D.N.H.1980); Dyer v. Eastern Trust & Banking Co., 336 F.Supp. 890, 903-05 (D.Me.1971). We decline, however, to base our decision on this ground which is the subject of substantial dispute and on which the circuits are split. Compare Stephenson v. Calpine Conifers II, Ltd., 652 F.2d 808 (9th Cir.1981) (holding that § 17[a] supports a private right of action) and Kirshner v. United States, 603 F.2d 234 (2d Cir.1978), cert, denied, 442 U.S. 909 , 99 S.Ct. 2821 , 61 L.Ed.2d 274 (1979) (same) and Newman v. Prior, 518 F.2d 97 (4th Cir.1975) (same) and Surowitz v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 342 F.2d 596 (7th Cir.1965), rev’d on other grounds, 383 U.S.-363, 86 S.Ct. 845 , 15 L.Ed.2d 807 (1966) (same) with Landry v. All American Assurance Co., 688 F.2d 381 (5th Cir.1982) (holding that § 17[a] does not support a private right of action) and Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d 783 (8th Cir.1967) (same). The Supreme Court has declined to decide the issue. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, [ — ] U.S. [-], [-] n. 2, 103 S.Ct. 683 , 685 n. 5, 74 L.Ed.2d 548 (1963).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.