United States v. Mazzei’s Empirical Analysis
700 F.2d 85 · 1983
Citation profile
52 federal appellate · 7 district · 7 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 108 later decisions — most recently February 2025 · most notably Moss v. Morgan Stanley Inc. (1983), United States v. Young (1984)
52 federal appellate · 7 district · 7 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 1952 · 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (§ 901 of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) · 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (§ 901 of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act) · 18 U.S.C. § 224
Relies on United States v. Turkette · Bates v. State Bar · S.S. Zoe Colocotroni v. Puerto Rico · Harris v. McRae · Kissinger v. Halperin
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 108 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Although “enterprise” and “pattern of racketeering activity” are separate elements, they may be proved by the same evidence. In United States v. Mazzei, 700 F.2d 85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 , 103 S.Ct. 2124 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1304 (1983), construing United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 , 101 S.Ct. 2524 , 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981), the court rejected the defendant’s contention that a RICO conviction requires proof that the enterprise and pattern of racketeering activity were distinct. We agree that Turkette requires the government to prove both the existence of an “enterprise” and a “pattern of racketeering activity.” We do not, however, read Turkette to hold that proof of these separate elements be distinct and independent, as long as the proof offered is sufficient to satisfy both elements. There is nothing in the language or legislative history of the Act to support the appellant’s view. Moreover, it does not make sense to impose a “distinctness” requirement in RICO cases. The appellant would have us rule that his actions are beyond the purview of RICO because he engaged only in point shaving and did not commit criminal acts other than those specifically contemplated in the conspiracy. Mazzei’s interpretation would lead to the anomalous result that a large scale underworld operation which engaged solely in trafficking of heroin would not be subject to RICO’s enhanced sanctions, whereas small-time criminals jointly engaged in infrequent sale of contraband drugs and ill”
7 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“[t]he enterprise is an entity, for present purposes a group of persons associated together for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct. The pattern of racketeering activity, is on the other hand, a series of criminal acts as defined by the statute. The former is proved by evidence of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit. The latter is proved by evidence of the requisite number of acts of racketeering committed by the participants in the enterprise.”
5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“continuing unit, i.e., during the 1978-79 B.C. basketball season”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.