Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

700 N.E.2d 494

Sisson v. Wilson

Indiana Court of Appeals

Decided October 15, 1998

Indiana Court of Appeals · decided 1998-10-15

Cited by 2 later decisions — most recently May 2005

2 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“(a) Except as provided in subsection (d), a purchaser or the purchaser's assignee is entitled to a tax deed to the property that was sold only if: (1) the redemption period specified in section 4(a)(1) of this chapter has expired; (2) the property has not been redeemed within the period of redemption specified in section 4(a) of this chapter; and (3) not later than nine (9) months after the date of the sale: (A) the purchaser or the purchaser's assign-ee ... gives notice of the sale to the owner of record at the time of the sale and any person with a substantial property interest of public record in the tract or real property. [[Image here]] (e) The person required to give the notice under subsection (a), (b), or (c) shall give the notice by sending a copy of the notice by certified mail to: (1) the owner of record at the time of the: (A) sale of the property; (B) acquisition of the lien on the property under IC 6-1.1-24-6; or (C) sale of the certificate of sale on the property under IC 6-1.1-24; at the last address of the owner for the property, as indicated in the records of the county auditor; and (2) any person with a substantial property interest of public record at the address for the person included in the public record that indicates the interest. [[Image here]] (i) The notice required by this section is considered sufficient if the notice is mailed to the address required under subsection (e).”

quoted by 2 later decisions, including Lake County Auditor v. Burks, Darling v. Martin

Relies on Tax Certificate Investments, Inc. v. Smethers

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1998-10-15

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1OPINION

SULLIVAN, Judge. ■

¶2Frederick P. Sisson (Sisson), appeals the trial court’s denial of his Motion For Leave to Intervene, For Relief From Final Order, and For Injunctive Relief.

¶3We affirm.

¶4Upon appeal, Sisson presents essentially two issues, which we restate as follows:

(1) Whether Sisson waived his right to intervene; and
(2) Whether I.C. 6-1.1-25-4.6 (Burns Code Ed. Repl.1998) imposes a duty upon a tax deed petitioner to provide notice to a non-record owner if the petitioner has actual knowledge of the latter’s name and address and of his claimed interest.

¶5Because we conclude that the statute fails to afford Sisson relief, even if he did not waive his right to intervene, we decline to address his first issue.-

¶6On March 20, 1979, Sisson purchased a 2.16 acre tract of real property in Brown County from Richard and Sharon Thomas (Thomases). Sisson failed to record the Warranty Deed.

¶7In the spring of 1995, Gail Scrougham Wilson (Wilson) offered to purchase the property from Sisson.1 He apparently declined. Thereafter, on July 2, 1996, Wilson filed a Verified Petition for Order Directing the Auditor of Brown County, Indiana, to Issue Tax Deed. In support of her petition, Wilson asserted that she complied with the applicable notice provisions. Wilson sent no notice to Sisson. However, Wilson did provide notice to the Thomases.

¶8On November 12, 1996, the trial court entered its Order Directing the Auditor of Brown County, Indiana, to Issue Tax Deed to Wilson. The Auditor issued the Tax Deed on December 3, 1996, and Wilson recorded the deed on December 4, 1996. Wilson subsequently informed Sisson of her intent to secure possession of the property, at which time Sisson filed his Motion For Leave To Intervene, For Relief From Final Order, and For Injunctive Relief. The trial court denied this motion on July 24, 1997, concluding that Sisson failed to file a timely appeal from the tax deed determination.

¶9I.C. 6-l.l-25-4.6(a) provides that “[njotiee of the filing of this petition and the date on or after which the petitioner intends to make application for an order on the petition shall be given to the owner and any person with a substantial interest of public record in the tract or real property....” In the present case, Sisson contends that, because he was the owner of the property, he was entitled to notice. We disagree. The statute requires that the petitioner provide notice “to the owner ... of public record_” Id. We decline an invitation to hold that the phrase “of public record” is a modifier only of a “substantial interest” holder other than an owner. Because Sisson failed to record his Warranty Deed, Sisson was not the owner of public record. Accordingly, he was not entitled to notice. See generally In re Madison County (1998) Ind.App., 690 N.E.2d 358, 360, (wife remained joint-record owner of property with former husband for purposes of I.C. 6-l.l-25-4.6(a) notice requirement because quitclaim deed was not recorded), reh’g denied and clarified on other grounds.

¶10Nonetheless, Sisson argues that, because Wilson knew that he maintained an interest in the property and how to contact him, she was obliged to provide him with notice. We decline to impose such a requirement by judicial fiat. To do so would be to read the phrase “of record” out of the statute. If the legislature wishes to impose a notice require*496ment as to all persons known to claim an interest, it is free to do so.

¶11The judgment is affirmed.

KIRSCH, J., concurs.BAKER, J., dissents with separate opinion.

¶12. Wilson denies that she offered to purchase this land and, in fact, claims that she did not know that Sisson maintained an interest in- the land before March of 1997. However, for the purposes of this appeal, we assume the facts to be as pleaded by Sisson.

/700/ne2d/494 · .json · Public domain