700 So. 2d 1039 - State v. Evans’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

24 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 24 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Adkins · 731 So. 2d 463 - State v. Mickens

2. “Constructive possession is sufficient to satisfy the possession element of La. R.S. 14:95.1; State v. Day, 410 So.2d 741 (La.1982); State v. Wesley, 28,941 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/13/96), 685 So.2d 1169 . Constructive possession occurs when the firearm is subject to a defendant's dominion and control. State v. Wesley, supra . A defendant's dominion and control over a weapon constitutes constructive possession even if it is only temporary in nature and even if control is shared. Id. Mere presence in an area where a firearm is found, or mere association with an individual found to be in possession of a firearm, does not necessarily establish possession. State v. Fisher, 94-2255 (La.App. 1 Cir. 12/15/95) , 669 So.2d 460 , writ denied, 96-0958 (La.9/20/96), 679 So.2d 432 . In addition, jurisprudence has added another aspect to the offense of La. R.S. 14:95.1—awareness. In other words, the state must prove that the offender was aware that a firearm is in his presence and that he had the general criminal intent to possess the weapon, i.e., a knowing or intentional possession is necessary for a violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1. State v. Woods, 94-2650 (La.App. 4 Cir. 4/20/95) , 654 So.2d 809 , writ denied, 95-1252 (La.6/30/95), 657 So.2d 1035 , and citations therein. The determination of whether there is "possession" sufficient to convict depends on the particular facts of the case. State v. Trahan, 425 So.2d 1222 (La.1983).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Morris

3. “Where circumstantial evidence is used to prove execution of the offense, assuming every fact to be proved that the evidence tends to prove, every reasonable hypothesis of innocence must be excluded to convict. La. R.S. 15:438; State v. Cummings, [95-1132 (La.2/28/96), 668 So.2d 1132 ]. This evidentiary rule restrains the factfinder in the first instance, and the reviewer on appeal, to accept as proven all that the evidence tends to prove, and then to convict only if every reasonable hypothesis of innocence is excluded. State v. Young, 618 So.2d 1149 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1993). Whether circumstantial evidence excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence presents a question of law. Id. The circumstantial evidence rule is not a more demanding standard of review than the standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia , but is a useful methodology for its application by an appellate court upon review of cases that hinge on circumstantial evidence. State v. Bailey, 511 So.2d 1248 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1987), writ denied, 519 So.2d 132 ( [La.]1988). Nor are the two standards of review completely separate. All evidence, both direct and circumstantial, must be sufficient under Jackson v. Virginia to satisfy to a rational juror that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Cummings, supra .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Morris