701 So. 2d 56 - State v. Brooks’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 5 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““On a fourth or subsequent conviction, a person convicted of violating this section shall be guilty of a Class C felony and punished by a fine of not less than four thousand one hundred dollars ($4,100) nor more than ten thousand one hundred dollars ($10,100) and by imprisonment of not less than one year and one day nor more than 10 years.... “Any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the Alabama habitual felony offender law shall not apply to a conviction of a felony pursuant to this subsection, and a conviction of a felony pursuant to this subsection shall not be a felony conviction for purposes of the enhancement of punishment pursuant to Alabama’s habitual felony offender law.””

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Adamson v. State · 740 So. 2d 421 - State v. Parker

2. “"It is the duty of the court to give effect to the legislative intent expressed in the clear language of a statute. Parker v. Hilliard , 567 So.2d 1343 (Ala. 1990). If the legislature intended for some date other than the date of conviction to control under § 32-5A-191 (f) [the DUI *Page 308 statute], it is the province of the legislature to clarify the matter in the language of the statute. We must `enforce the statute as written.' Allen v. Hawes , 539 So.2d 273 , 276 (Ala.Civ.App. 1988). "Even if it were to be conceded that the language of § 32-5A-191 (f) is somewhat unclear, `"ambiguous criminal statutes must be narrowly interpreted, in favor of the accused." United States v. Herring , 933 F.2d 932 , 937 (11th Cir. 1991)[, vacated on rehearing, 977 F.2d 1435 (11th Cir. 1992)]. "[I]t is well established that criminal statutes should not be `extended by construction.'" Ex parte Evers , 434 So.2d 813 , 817 (Ala. 1983). "`[C]riminal statutes must be strictly construed, to avoid ensnaring behavior that is not clearly proscribed.'" United States v. Bridges , 493 F.2d 918 , 922 (5th Cir. 1974).' Carroll [v. State], supra , 599 So.2d [1253] at 1264 [(Ala.Crim.App. 1992)]."”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Grace v. State

3. “It is the duty of the court to give effect to the legislative intent expressed in the clear language of a statute. Parker v. Hilliard , 567 So.2d 1343 (Ala. 1990). If the legislature intended for some date other than the date of conviction to control under § 32-5A-191 (f) [the DUI *Page 308 statute], it is the province of the legislature to clarify the matter in the language of the statute. We must `enforce the statute as written.' Allen v. Hawes , 539 So.2d 273 , 276 (Ala.Civ.App. 1988). "Even if it were to be conceded that the language of § 32-5A-191 (f) is somewhat unclear, `”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Grace v. State