Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 702 F.2d 426 - Township of Springfield v. Lewis

Township of Springfield v. Lewis’s Empirical Analysis

702 F.2d 426 · 1983

Citation profile

39
cited by 39 later decisions
January 2012
most recently cited

16 federal appellate · 5 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 39 later decisions — most recently January 2012 · most notably 611 F. Supp. 1223 - In Re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation (1985), Morris County Trust for Historic Preservation v. Pierce (1983)

16 federal appellate · 5 district ·

2201983199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 23 U.S.C. § 101 (America Fast Forward Financing Innovation Act of 2012) · 23 U.S.C. § 103 · 23 U.S.C. § 105 · 23 U.S.C. § 106 · 23 U.S.C. § 110 · 23 U.S.C. § 112 · 23 U.S.C. § 128 · 23 U.S.C. § 138

Relies on Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe · Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. · Kleppe v. Sierra Club · Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission · Rodriguez v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 39 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “... determine whether all necessary procedures were followed, to consider de novo all relevant questions of law, and to examine the facts to determine whether the decision was arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of discretion. The reviewing court must adopt that posture because NEPA, while establishing significant substantive goals for the Nation, imposed upon agencies duties that are essentially procedural. NEPA was designed to insure a fully informed and well-considered decision, but not necessarily a decision the judges ... would have reached had they been members of the decisionmaking unit of the agency. Once an agency has made a decision subject to NEPA’s procedural requirements, the only role for a Court is to insure that the agency has considered the environmental consequences; it cannot interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of action to be taken.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[t]he Secretary’s scrutiny must not be cursory, for DOTA’s compass is broad: ‘Congress articulated in § 4(f) a disparate weighting against the use of parkland for highway projects. It said, don’t use greenlands, but if you must do so, be practical and cut harm to the minimum. It did so in recognition of the fact that it is always easier to build highways through publicly owned parks because people and their homes, businesses, schools and churches will not have to be displaced and its acquisition costs little or nothing. This thumb-on-the-scale approach is required whenever the parkland is to be used. If courts were to interpret this section to permit an initial appraisal of whether the use was substantial, it would infuse consideration of elements (such as the degree of harm to the park, animal life, environment, etc.) which Congress did not want considered when it said, if there is another way, take it. Any park use, regardless of its degree, invokes § 4(f).’ Louisiana Environmental Society, Inc., v. Coleman, 537 F.2d 79, 84 (5th Cir.1976) (emphasis added).”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “found it unnecessary ... to join either group of opposing appellate courts. Instead, without deciding whether it was in fact the appropriate judicial standard, [the Circuit] proceeded to apply the ‘reasonableness’ test to the facts of the case for three reasons: first, because that test appeared to be preferred by the district courts under [the Third Circuit’s] supervision; second, because there was ‘much to be said in favor of subjecting these threshold determinations to the higher scrutiny on review,’ and finally, because the particular agency decision under consideration “pass[ed] muster even under the ‘higher’ measure of ‘reasonableness.’ ””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.