Midkiff v. Tom’s Empirical Analysis
702 F.2d 788 · 1983
Citation profile
28 federal appellate · 3 district · 2 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 39 later decisions (3 by the Supreme Court) — most recently March 2024 · most notably Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff (1984), Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff (1983)
28 federal appellate · 3 district · 2 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Appellate journey
Relationships
Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1331 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))
Relies on Younger v. Harris · Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States · Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co. · Dandridge v. Williams · Burford v. Sun Oil Co.
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 39 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“(1) The complaint “touches a sensitive area of social policy upon which the federal courts ought not to enter unless no alternative to its adjudication is open.” (2) “Such constitutional adjudication plainly can be avoided if a definitive ruling on the state issue would terminate the controversy.” (3) The possible determinative issue of state law is doubtful.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent“Pullman abstention may also be appropriate where a state court may find that the challenged statute violates the state's own constitution. But such abstention is limited to application of a specialized state constitutional provision with no clear counterpart in the federal constitution.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the concurrence“To be sure, the Court’s cases have repeatedly stated that one person’s property may not be taken for the benefit of another private person without a justifying public purpose, even though compensation be paid.... But where the exercise of the eminent domain power is rationally related to a conceivable public purpose, the Court has never held a compensated taking to be proscribed by the Public Use Clause. On this basis, we have no trouble concluding that the [HLRA] is constitutional.... Regulating oligopoly and the evils associated with it is a classic exercise of a State’s police powers. We cannot disapprove of [Hawaii’s] exercise of this power. Nor can we condemn as irrational the [HLRA’s] approach to correcting the land oligopoly problem. The [HLRA] presumes that when a sufficiently large number of persons declare that they are willing but unable to buy lots at fair prices the land market is malfunctioning. When such a malfunction is signalled, the [HLRA] authorizes [the Authority] to condemn lots in the relevant tract. The [HLRA] limits the number of lots any one tenant can purchase and authorizes [the Authority] to use public funds to ensure that the market dilution goals will be achieved. This is a comprehensive and rational approach to identifying and correcting market failure. Of course, this Act, like any other, may not be successful in achieving its intended goals. But. whether in fact the provision will accomplish its objective is not the question: the constitutiona”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.