Smith v. Cumberland School Committee’s Empirical Analysis
703 F.2d 4 · 1983
Citation profile
19 federal appellate · 4 district · 3 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 38 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently April 2010 · most notably Smith v. Robinson (1984), Town of Burlington v. Department of Education (1984)
19 federal appellate · 4 district · 3 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Appellate journey
Relationships
Applies 20 U.S.C. § 1401 · 20 U.S.C. § 1415 · 29 U.S.C. § 794 · 29 U.S.C. § 794A · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act)) · 42 U.S.C. § 1988
Relies on Alyeska Pipeline Service Company v. Wilderness Society · Hagans v. Lavine · Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Assn. · Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman · Maher v. Gagne
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 38 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“[T]hat the section 1983 claims alleged here are based upon independent constitutional violations rather than violations of the EAHCA itself is immaterial. The constitutional claims alleged here, a denial of due process and a denial of a free appropriate public education to Thomas because of his handicap, are factually identical to the EAHCA claims. Indeed, in enacting the EAHCA Congress sought to ensure that handicapped children receive the very “rights” that plaintiffs claimed were constitutional under section 1983. See S.Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7, reprinted in 1975 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 1425, 1430-31 (legislation said to be designed to enable states to fulfill their constitutional obligations to handicapped children). Thus, the only difference between the statutory and constitutional claims is that the former carries with it a far more favorable legal standard for the plaintiffs and enabled them to prevail on what would otherwise have been fairly questionable claims. Be cause Congress, in providing statutory remedies for the same factual complaints, did not authorize attorneys’ fees for such actions, we do not believe that section 1988 is a sufficient basis for the granting of attorneys’ fees here. Plaintiffs’ mere recitation of a section 1983 claim cannot create a right to attorneys’ fees in litigation as to which Congress, perhaps recognizing the shortness of school funds, has not seen fit to make a special award. Cf. Scruggs v. Campbell, 630 F.2d 237 (4t”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Rollison v. Biggs“[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual ... shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in ... any program ... receiving Federal financial assistance.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority“not see how the singular omission of any provision for attorneys' fees can be rectified by recourse to section 1988”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majoritye.g. Doe v. Koger
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.