Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 703 SO2D 432 - Fletcher v. State

Fletcher v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1997

Citation profile

17
cited by 17 later decisions
1
states following
May 2014
most recently cited

17 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 17 later decisions — most recently May 2014

17 state decisions

100199720002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Batson v. Kentucky · Hernandez v. New York · Purkett v. Elem · Musser v. States · Ex Parte Branch

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 17 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[A] finding is `clearly erroneous' when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “"`"[The] United States Supreme Court recently stated in Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765 , 115 S.Ct. 1769 , 131 L.Ed.2d 834 (1995), that the second step does not demand an explanation that is persuasive or even plausible. It stated that a legitimate explanation is not necessarily one that must make sense, but one that does not deny equal protection. At this step of the inquiry, the issue is facial validity of the prosecutor's explanation, and unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the explanation, the reason offered will be deemed neutral. Id., at 768 , 115 S.Ct. at 1771 . When the defendant challenges as pretextual the prosecutor's explanations as to a particular venireperson, the inquiry becomes factual in nature and moves to step three. At this step the trial court must resolve the factual dispute, and whether the prosecutor intended to discriminate is a question of fact. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364-65 , 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1868-69 , 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991). In the third step, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has met his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. At this stage, the trial court must consider the persuasiveness of the explanations, and it is also at this stage that `implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretext for purposeful discrimination.' Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768 , 115 S.Ct. at 1771 ." "` Bush v. State, 695 So.2d 70, 96 (Ala. Cr.App.1995).'"”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “Taylor v. State, 666 So.2d 36, 40 (Ala. Crim.App.1994).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.